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THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALLABHĀCĀRYA

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALLABHĀCĀRYA

DR MRS MRUDULA I. MARFATIA



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PREFACE

THE TERM 'Vedānta' is often too narrowly understood to denote the philosophical system of 'Śaṅkarācārya' and scores of books have been written by scholars—Eastern as well as Western—in explanation and elucidation of his doctrine of Absolute Monism. But there are other Vedānta schools as well and there is also a rich literature, both in Sanskrit and in English (not to speak of other languages), concerning the systems of Ramanuja and Madhva. Yet, a full and critical modern exposition of another Ācārya's school of thought, which deserves to be given due consideration, has been missing in the History of Indian Philosophy. Therefore, it was felt that this rather neglected and insufficiently explored yet important field should be paid due attention to, trying thereby to reduce, if not definitively to fill in, the gap left out in the critical treatment of the main schools of Vedānta Philosophy. Without Vallabha, the complete understanding of the full potentialities and the profound influence of Vedāntic thought on the cultural religious Hindu thought and life, especially in Western India will always remain unachieved.

Indeed, it is a curious fact of history that notwithstanding the wide spread and thorough going popularity which Vallabha's system has enjoyed in Gujarata, Vraja, Marvada and Kathiavada on account of the cult of devotion which has entered into the very fabric of his system, Vallabha's thought has not been accorded full modern critical treatment outside of the restricted confines of its own sect and followers—but for some scholarly efforts in this direction like those of Prof G H Bhatt, Dr Glasenapp and Fr P Johanns. But these are few and far between. There are quite a number of papers, articles, periodicals and booklets written in Gujarati which represent attempts at an exposition of the teachings of Vallabha, but these, being devotional or religious in character, are prompted by unquestioning faith more than based on an analytical, rational approach.

Hence, the present work undertakes to present the 'Suddha-dvaita' doctrines in a scientific and unbiassed manner. This

will also help to remove a not infrequent misunderstanding, viz., that 'Vedānta philosophy' stands for Śāṅkara's system alone. A comparative study alone of all the other Vedānta schools (including Vallabha's) can give an adequate idea of the rich variety of systems, mutual searching criticisms and complementary rectifications covered by that common title—Vedānta Philosophy. This study of the works of Vallabha and of some of his illustrious followers is based on a critical approach, and points of socio-religious importance happen to demand but casual reference in the course of the textual interpretations and analysis.

The questions, which Vallabha is considered to treat as crucial points, either going against his chief opponent, viz. Śāṅkara, or as enshrining his own personal viewpoint have been critically studied and analysed here. Vallabha has sometimes carried the battle into his opponents' camp, by severely attacking those of their theories to which he does not subscribe,—but he himself has not offered a sufficiently acceptable solution of the same (like his concept of Maya etc.), and this represents something like the problem being viewed but left unsolved. On the other hand, there are certain explanations which he offers in consonance with his own doctrine of 'Pure Monism',—but which,—after a critical study—seem to lack a universal rational appeal, and hence, for us, continue to remain 'problems'.

On the whole, this work embodies an attempt at presenting a complete, comprehensive critical study of the tenets of Vallabha as embodied in his works and as reflected in the expositions and annotations offered by his followers. And it is claimed that it will constitute practically the first systematic, comprehensive and critical work of its type in English, in this particular field.

A critical concluding appreciation is given of the stylistic procedure followed by Vallabha in approaching his problems of textual interpretation and his mingling of sources common to other Vedāntic schools with the supreme source acknowledged by him—the Bhagavata Purāna.

Further, Vallabha's theory of 'Pusti' is shown to have a key position in his system and the limits are drawn between what seems legitimate in its use and what seems to imply an unwarranted extension of that use in *rational philosophical* discussion.

Finally, Vallabha's contribution to Vedāntic thought from the point of view of the personal conception of the Absolute is assessed and critically valued

An endeavour is made in the direction of offering translations, explanations and critical appreciations of significant passages occurring in different works of Vallabha and of his followers, with a view to remove difficulties that are likely to arise during the course of their study by future generations of students of this subject. The passages selected for translation are serially marked with letters of the alphabet, and are put within inverted commas. Care has been taken to make them not merely faithful to the original, but also readable in so far as the texts permit. Generally an introductory note precedes such passages, which are followed by an appreciation of the same.

A critical assessment of the dialectics in the 'Vidvanmanḍana', which is considered to be the 'magnum opus' in this school, is attempted and its contents are subjected to a critical analysis. The dialectical style and the nature of the contents of this work have rendered it practically unintelligible to the student world, hence, this attempt at clarification of the same. This is very essential, since this work embodies a rationalisation of Vallabha's interpretations of the significant Brahma sutras as also an elucidation in rational terms of the main teachings of the school. These aspects of ratiocination are first explained, clarified, analysed, and then subjected to the test of logic and consistency.

Some crucial aspects, which arise during the course of study of this school of thought and which do not find a solution in the texts themselves, have been referred to Śrī Dikṣitjee-Maharaja, with whose guidance, backed by profound knowledge of the various traditions of this school and of the subtle and intricate aspects of the whole system as such, the author has availed herself of the *inner and otherwise unknown traditional interpretations concerning points of vital importance. A comparative study of the traditional view and the direct rational analysis* has also been carried out and *its final evaluation* presented in the book.

Many aspects, such as the Āvirbhava and Tirobhāva doctrines, which are generally known to people but the exact connotation of which has remained beyond the ken of the studious and the

interested, are brought to light and presented in a proper, critical, better perspective

Thus, the present book undertakes to remove these hazy notions about terms of philosophical importance by offering suitable explanations and elucidations of the same, with a view to lead students to a better or more satisfactory understanding of the whole system, which has been woefully neglected—both by students and even by scholars

Certain Upanisad texts of fundamental significance like 'That thou art', 'Vacarambhanam vikaro namadheyam', etc have been explained in the light of different interpretations of the same as offered by different commentators, and an unbiased, critical investigation of the 'meaning underlying these statements is undertaken, and the conclusions arrived at are here set out in detail

The verbal information or guidance received from eminent European scholars like late Dr H V Glasenapp (Tubingen), late Dr Renou and Prof O Lacombe (Paris), and Prof Filliozat (Paris), when the candidate could avail herself of the opportunity of visiting foreign countries and of holding consultations with them, has also been incorporated into this book

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In presenting this book, the author wishes to make certain acknowledgements by way of fulfilling the minimum formal obligations—to do so adequately would be practically impossible. First and foremost, she acknowledges her sincere and deep gratitude to her guide, Rev Fr A Esteller, S J (Ex-Head of the Department of Sanskrit and the Ex-Director of the Heras Institute of Indian History and Culture) for the guidance, inspiration and help which he has given in a generous manner

The author also takes this opportunity of putting on record her grateful appreciation of the invaluable aid received from the learned Prof G C Jhala (Head of the Dept of Sanskrit, St Xavier's College). No words can adequately formulate what she owes to his selfless assistance and painstaking help, not only on this occasion but also throughout her student-career. Her sincere thanks are besides due to late Prof G H Bhatt (Ex-Director, Oriental Institute, Baroda) foremost among the scholars who have devoted their energies to the study of the Śuddhādvaita vāda, and to Dr P M. Modi (Ex-Principal, Samaldas College, Bhavanagar) for their thought-provoking suggestions. Further she feels particularly indebted to His Holiness Śrī Dikṣitjee Maharāja, the highest living authority on Vallabha Vedānta, for expounding and clarifying for her certain traditional and abstruse implications of the postulates of the system. And many Sanskrit works which he has kindly presented to her will remain a permanent symbol of his interest in her efforts to study Vallabhācārya's Vedānta.

ABBREVIATIONS

Ait Brah	Altareya Brāhmana
Anu	Anubhāsyam
Bhg	Bhagavata Purana
(Brahman) Br	Brahman
Br Up	Bṛhadaranyaka Upanisad
B S	Brahma sūtras
Ch Up	Chāndogya Upanisad
E R E	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics
Gīta	Bhagavad gīta
I P	Indian Philosophy
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
MBH	Mahabharata
Mu	Mundaka
P R	Prameya ratnarnava
Ramā	Ramanuja
R V	Rgveda
S	Śankara
Ś B	Śankara bhasya
Śata	Satapatha
Śu M	Suddhadvaita martanda
Śvet	Śvetaśvatara
So G	Soḍasa grantha
T	Taittirīya
T D N	Tuttvarthe dīpa nibandha
V	Vallabha
V M	Vidvan mandana
V P	Visnu purāna
Vit	Viṭthalanatha

SCHEME OF TRANSLITERATION

Vowels	a ā ı ī u ū ɾ ʀ e ai o au
anusvara	ṁ
visarga	ḥ
<i>Consonants</i>	
gutturals	k kh g gh ṅ
palatals	c ch j jh ñ
cerebrals	ç çh ḍ ḍh ṇ
dentals	t th d dh n
labials	p ph b bh m
semi-vowels	y r l v
sibilants	ś palatal sibilant pronounced like the soft 's of Russian
	ṣ cerebral sibilant pronounced like 'sh' as 'shun'
aspirate	Ṣ pronounced as in 'Sun' h

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Preface	v
Acknowledgements	ix
Abbreviations	xi
Scheme of Transliteration	xiii
CHAPTER ONE	
Introduction	1
CHAPTER TWO	
General Features	10
Fundamental Drawbacks in different Vedānta Systems.	10
‘Suddhādvaitavāda or the Doctrine of Pure ✓	
Non dualism	17
<u>The Jīva ✓</u>	
(i) The Nature of the jīva or the Individual Soul	19
(ii) Different types of jīvas	23
(iii) The Problem	27
<u>The Nature of the World (Jagat) ✓</u>	29
<u>Brahman, the Highest Reality</u>	
(a) The Nature of Brahman	33
(b) Different forms of the Lord	37
CHAPTER THREE	
Special Features	43
Prāmāṇyas	43
‘Āvirbhāva-Tirobhāva’ Theory	48 ✓
Avikṛtaparīnāma-vāda or The Theory of	
Immutable Transformation	54
<u>Mayā Vs. The Theory of Nescience</u>	
1. The theory itself	56
2. Jagat Vs Samsāra (Application of the theory)	64 ✓
<u>Brahmā-vāda Or Abhinnaṇimittopādāna-Kāraṇa-vāda</u>	66
<u>Puṣṭi or the Doctrine of Grace ✓</u>	70

CHAPTER FOUR

The Path of Devotion	77
✓ The term 'Bhakti' and the Concept of 'Bhakti'	83

CHAPTER FIVE

Important Works of Vallabha	
1 Anubhaṣyam	91
2 Tattvarthadīpa nibandhaḥ	156
3 Subodhini	209
4 Ṣodasa granthah	227

CHAPTER SIX

Important Works of Vallabha's Followers	
1 Vidvanmandanam	242
2 Śuddhādvaita martandah	282
3 Prameya ratnārnavaḥ	292
4 Brahma vadaḥ	307

CHAPTER SEVEN

Final Evaluation	315
Bibliography	335
Index	339

have flourished in the latter half of the eighth century A.D.¹ There came forth, in course of time, learned scholars like Rāmānuja, Nimbarka, Madhva, Vallabha and many more, who, while trying their best to explain the abstruse aphorisms, each founded a system of his own

The Upanisads form the bed rock for the rise of different systems of philosophy, although the later systems like those founded by Rāmānuja, Nimbarka, Madhva and Vallabha assumed some additional hues in their doctrines by accepting the authority of the V P, the Bhg and so on. Only certain suitable portions from the Upanisads seem to have been selected (as had already been done by Bādarayana himself) by each of these philosophers, who left no stone unturned in order to explain away those passages which did not uphold or support their own theories. They explain those passages in function of what they consider to be the pivotal texts or doctrines in the "Śruti" as they understand it.²

Ś's doctrine of Absolute Monism finds its complete expression in his commentary on the B S, and is also reflected in his other works. Gaudapada is known to us as his 'Parama Guru', that is, his preceptor's preceptor, and he is the originator of Ajatavada—the theory of non origin of the universe. The overwhelming influence that Buddhism and Jainism were exercising then and the enormous importance attached to the sacrificial cult by the 'Mīmamsakas' were both subjected to a devastating attack by Gaudapada. Thus, a stream of new life was poured by them into the then drying up river of Brahmanism. Ś has been labelled a 'Prakhara jūāna mārtanda'—a blazing sun in the

¹ Recent research of Hajime Nakamura points to the first half of the 8th Century A.D. (Ref. 'The Great Hindu Theologies'—Rev. R. V. DeSmet) Nakamura's argument has been critically examined in the Italian Review, 'East & West', 1960 also in 'Brahmavidya' Adyar Library Bulletin, December 1960.

² Dr. L. Renou says that it is impossible to reconstruct the exact teaching of the Sūtras in a number of capital points. With Thibaut he thinks that it does not seem that this abstract treatise gives a full idea of the richness of the Upanisads. Bādarāyaṇa had intended to lay down the main guiding points for a synthesis. Anyway, if one had to choose from among the commentators the chance of having come closest to the mind of the Sūtras would be with the 'bbedābheda' (as said by Jacob and Ghate) of L'Inde classique t. II. p. 19.

and is therefore something 'inexplicable' ('Anirvacanīyā'), and it is because of this 'Māyā' that the soul considers itself real and different from Br., while in reality, nothing exists beside Br. Three "categories of reality", viz the Ultimate, the phenomenal or the empirical and the apparent, are set forth, and Br, the world and the dream-world or the snake-in-the-rope cognitions are respectively explained in the light of the same

The state of release consists, according to Ś, in putting an end to this beginningless ignorance—which at once results in the realisation of the unity that underlies all plurality. That is what is meant by 'That thou art', and it forms the very backbone of the doctrine of absolute identity of the individual soul with Br in Ś's system.

In Rāmā, the system of Ś seems to be reversed, because, while Ś is not prepared to accept even existence, intelligence and bliss as qualities of Br, Rāmā declares knowledge (jñāna), power (śakti), vigour (bala), etc, to be the qualities of Br, as different from the latter. Again, the 'jaḍa' or the inanimate world, along with the intelligent souls, constitutes, in the system of Rāmā, the "body" of the Lord. Hence, his system is known as 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' or "the non dualism of the Qualified or Non duality qualified by duality". Br is the one Reality and is qualified by the sentient and the non-sentient world, which are essentially different from Br., although dependent on Br. Br is the highest end to be attained by the soul and Vasudeva, Viṣṇu and Nārāyaṇa are but different names of the same Rāmā considers devotion (bhakti) and absolute self-surrender (prapatti) to the Lord as the only means to salvation. Br is the efficient cause of the world, while Prakṛti in the form of "Māyā"—a power of the Lord—constitutes the material cause.¹ He possesses innumerable auspicious qualities and is devoid of earthly attributes.² The individual soul is consciously perceptive

¹ Thus, Br is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. The creation is nothing but a modification of the subtle form of Br into the gross one. Therefore, Br, with his subtle body³ of sentient and non-sentient world [is the cause, while when possessing the gross 'body' of the same, viz 'cit' and acit', he becomes the effect (Doctrines of Satkarya and Parigama)

² " इत्यत्रापि प्राकृता हेतुगुणान्यनिषिध्य नित्यत्वविमुक्तसूक्ष्मत्व त्वादिकल्याण-
गुणगत्याग परस्य ब्रह्मण प्रतिपादित ।"

—(श्रीभाष्य, Bombay Sanskrit & Prakrit Series, vol lxxviii), p 59)

(intelligent) and is atomic, eternal and different according to different bodies. It is only because of the accidental conditions that it becomes the doer, the enjoyer, etc., and is involved in a connection with Prakṛti. It is a part of God's body, but its own (i.e. the jīva's) body is perishable, while the Body of God is imperishable. The path of action as well as of knowledge is subsidiary to that of devotion. This 'devotion' is defined as an immediate presentation of the divine vision arising from a flow of memory, unbroken like that of oil, as a result of devout meditation.¹ The devotion, as is spoken of in the system of Rama, is based more on intellectual meditation than on emotional attachment for the Lord.

As against S., Rama holds that even in the state of release, which results from devotion, the inner-self (Pratyagatma) does not shed its individuality but shines as "I".² Liberation stands for the regaining of one's original purity and resemblance to Br through devotion, attained through knowledge.

The scriptural text of fundamental significance, viz. 'That thou art', is explained by Rama as meaning that the individual soul which is an attribute or a mode of Br, is Br—suggesting hereby that it is not essentially and identically the same as Br but very similar to it and belonging to it, since it forms a part of the 'body' of Br, Rama very often quotes in support of his doctrine the V P, which has been accepted by him as an additional canon of authority besides the normally acknowledged triple-canon.

The system of Nimbarka is known as the Dvaitadvaita', which signifies that difference and non-difference are on the same level sharing equal importance and are co-existent. The difference (bheda) means the possibility of a separate existence on the part of 'cit and 'acit although dependent while non-difference (abheda) means the impossibility of a totally independent existence. Thus the cit and 'acit are equally real and are different and non-different from Br—different

¹ "सनाद्यत्मनेव विनिश्चयं ध्याने च नैकधातवविद्धि नमृत्स्त्रिानरूपम् ।"

—(श्रीनाथ, I 11, p 9)

² "स च प्रत्यक्षात् सुखाद्यहमित्येव प्रकारतः । तन्नात्मनाराधननिर्भूत-
निरसरोशविष्णुनासपि बानद्वैतेनानहमित्येवानुभवदर्शनाच्च ।" "स्वरूपावदरासु

³ "अहमित्येव प्रकाशमनः स्वरूपम् ।"

—(श्रीनाथ, pp 52-53).

since they can exist separately and non-different in the sense that they are absolutely dependent on Br for their existence. Br. pervades them all, hence the Non duality. At the will of Hari to create, the world comes into existence. He is the material cause in the sense that He manifests His subtle 'cit' and 'ac t' powers (śaktis) in a gross form, and He is the efficient cause since He offers an opportunity to the individual souls (which were unworthy of receiving knowledge because of their limited memory and dependence) to reap the fruits of their actions, etc. Like Rāmī, Nimbārka also advocates the Parināmvāda or the theory of modification of the subtle into a gross form of the world. The soul has knowledge as its essence, is self-refulgent, sentient, atomic, doer, knower, enjoyer and so on. It is both the knower as well as knowledge like the sun and its light. Thus, the attribute and the possessor of attributes, though identical as a full reality, are different from each other. This does not imply absolute identity but a non-perception of difference owing to extreme similarity. The individual soul resembles Hari, since it possesses intelligence and knowledge, but is different from Hari in that it is entirely dependent on Him. The nature of the individual soul is enveloped and clouded by beginningless Maya, which obscures and distorts the true nature of things. The Grace of Hari puts an end to it and reveals the true nature of the individual soul. The Lord Hari is an abode of all multitudes of auspicious and divine qualities and has four main forms viz., Vasudeva, Sankarṣana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Nimbarka speaks of the worship of Kṛṣṇa along with Radha. Devotion to the Lord and a feeling of absolute dependence on His grace amounting to a complete self-surrender to the Divine wish are said to be the means to the highest end. Nimbarka has set out to refute Ś's theory of Maya and thus has blazed the trail for his followers to attack Ś's system. He considers 'Upadhī' or limiting adjunct to be real, as against Ś. Nimbarka says that it is only a thing actually existing elsewhere that can be superimposed upon any other thing where it does not exist, therefore, according to him, the theory of 'Vivarta' or of illusion of an evolute is opposed to sound reason.

Madhva (1199-1278 A.D.) is an exponent of the doctrine of duality. He has tried to explain away those Sūtras which lay down Br. to be the material cause, since that position is

unacceptable to him. He also interprets some of the scriptural texts like 'Ekamevadvityam Brahma', 'Sarvam Khalvidam Brahma', 'tattvamasi', etc., in a very fantastic manner, which is open to severe criticism. Dr Radhakrishnan says in this connection "Madhva comes into conflict with many scriptural passages, which he strains to make them yield a dualism".¹ Going right at a tangent to the doctrine of non-duality, which all his predecessors propounded, Madhva has cut a new way of his own by postulating fundamental distinction of five types. These are (1) the distinction between the soul and the Lord, (2) the mutual distinctions amongst the souls, (3) the distinction between the inanimate world and the Lord, (4) the mutual distinctions amongst the inanimate things and (5) the distinction between the inanimate world and the soul.

These distinctions are beginningless and eternal, and they do exist even in the state of liberation since if the jiva and Br are different from each other in the world how can they become non-different in the state of liberation? For what is different can never become non-different and *vice versa*.² The passages referring to the non-difference mean that Br remains unparalleled and that it pervades the whole world. Br is the absolute creator while everything else depends on it. Br possesses a supernatural body, is immanent in the world and yet remains transcendent, is the possessor of an infinite number of qualities and every type of perfection.

The jivas are infinite, real though absolutely dependent on Br, active beings, atomic in size though they pervade the whole body by means of their quality of intelligence, eternal and distinct from one another. They whirl round in the cycles of existence because of their ignorance but attain their natural blissful aspect at the time of release.

The teaching of Madhva like that of Rama embodies the doctrine of devotion chiefly based on meditation. Prakṛti is the material cause of the world while the Lord is only the efficient cause since a non-sentient thing alone can be the cause of a non-sentient effect. Release is attained through the direct perception or realisation of the Lord. Aversion to worldly or

¹ LP p 745

² Ibid p 743

Vedānta—Ghate (Introduction p 34)

other-worldly enjoyments, equanimity, self-restraint, etc., knowledge, dedication of everything at the feet of the Lord and so on are said to be the means for the supreme realisation

Vallabha (1479-1531 A D)¹ is the protagonist of the system of Pure Non-dualism ('Suddhādvaita'), which implies that Br is free from and untouched by Māyā. The soul and the world are, in essence, nothing but Br since they represent partial manifestations of the essential attributes of Br. The doctrine of Pure Monism stands in sharp contrast to the Māyāvāda of Ś which deems the whole world to be a product of māyā and hence unreal. Although an absolute primacy is attached to the scriptural authority by Ś as well as by V, there is a differentiation in the sense that while Ś regards the Vedas to be real from the phenomenal (vyavahārika) point of view only, but unreal from the ultimate stand point, since they fall within the range of the unreal world, V considers them to be the God Nārāyana incarnate. V maintains the reality of the souls and the world which are nothing but manifested forms of God. Māyā does not produce an unreal world, but it consists in the wrong apprehension or mis understanding of the same and of its real essence. Māyā is a power of the Lord which stirs up the quality of 'Tamas' and the change that is caused is interpreted to be real by 'buddhi'. Thus, the discord and misery; in the world are of 'buddhi's making only. God is the substratum of all contradictory qualities and He pervades the world as clay the jar. He manifests His qualities of 'sat' and 'cit' in the form of the jiva while the bliss aspect remains unmanifest. The jivas emerge from Br even as sparks from blazing fire. They are atomic so long as the bliss aspect of Br remains obscured or suppressed in them, but assume an all pervasive character '(vibhūta') when bliss is manifested through the grace of God. The paths of action and knowledge necessitate painful endeavour and end in the attainment of the lower Br, viz the Aksara, which has only a limited bliss to offer, while the path of devotion is superior to all the rest, since it is easy to follow and brings about the supreme fruit, viz a formal participation in the very sports of the Lord. V puts an overwhelming stress on the grace of God which he

¹ This is the generally accepted date, but Dr Radhakrishnan assigns 1401 A D to Vallabha (I P p 756)

considers to be the chief requisite for the upliftment or redemption of the soul This is a characteristic trend of V's system which brings out the absolute independence of God as infinite, unconditioned Love

Just as there are various ways leading to the top of a mountain, so also there are ways and ways for the attainment of the Highest Action, knowledge and devotion have been picked up severally and also in combination as the paths leading to the 'Summum Bonum' The only point to be borne in mind is that in one there is an excess of importance attached to mere rituals without much consideration for other spiritual aspects, while in another, an emphasis on the rational mind is so overwhelming that the head would (even literally) get heated up under the strain of abstract and abstruse speculation, and, after having got accustomed to reading each and every word with a careful and analytic interpretation, one may possibly not find much that is worthy of note or importance in a doctrine, whose philosophy seems to have little to offer to one's mind All the same it should not be forgotten that every sincere thinker has something earnest to say and it is up to the reader to dive down to the bottom and lay hands on the hidden jewels and bring them to light Man is not merely the head, nor merely the heart Therefore the ideal is the integration of the two, on an ideal plane When the head has weighed the pros and cons of a particular matter it must still wait till the heart is convinced as regards the point and gives its consent to it

Thus V's philosophy, as speculative philosophy properly so called, may at times, not be found to have a very universal appeal It may be felt to lack the vigour and the force, the taking one by the hand method of argumentation by logical acumen—the qualities exemplified in abundance by Ś,—yet, the fount of Devotion flowing from V is capable of sprinkling one over with a Joy Divine

CHAPTER II

GENERAL FEATURES

A *Fundamental Drawbacks in different Vedanta Systems*

THE FACT that the Upanisads ^{do ~} bristle with contradictions makes it obligatory for the commentators on the B S (which latter are but an attempt at evolving a systematic and concise compilation of the chief Upanisadic tenets) to try to reduce the contradictions to their minimum while explaining and interpreting the B S, remaining at the same time, as faithful to (what *they* considered to be) the purport of the sutras as they found it possible to do

The scriptural texts present Br as possessing attributes and also as devoid of attributes. Now, this seems to involve a contradiction in terms and has proved to be the crux of the problem which leads to the fundamental differences in the systems of all later Vedanta philosophers, who profess to have loyally built their theories on the basis of the Upanisads the B S and the Gita the generally accepted triple canon of authority

Ś deems the texts presenting Br as devoid of all predications to be superior to those describing Br as possessing attributes. Now if Ś gave primacy to 'Nirguna' Br as the Ultimate Real and reduced 'Saguna' Br to a lower level, it is theoretically quite possible and again theoretically quite valid on the part of others to give primacy to 'Saguna' by 'contracting' (Sankoca) the 'Nirguna' texts. This has, in fact, been done — practically by all subsequent Vedanta thinkers, who, however widely divergent their own theories, have in effect combined to attack Ś. But so far as pure metaphysical thought and logic are accepted to be the criteria or guiding principles for testing the internal consistency of a system, Ś's system impresses one as the most remarkable for the very strict rigors of logic to which he has submitted each one of his postulates, in the sense

C

that he is prepared to face the direct logical consequences thereof. It is only at a level when reasoning stops exercising its power and has to make room for 'Anubhūti' or Experience that Ś applies a brake to his relentless logic.

According to Thibaut, Rāmā is a more genuine and authentic interpreter of the BS than Ś, since, in his opinion, the BS themselves do not lend any countenance to Ś's 'Mayāvāda', because of the introduction of which he is obliged to twist a good many sūtras to yield a meaning suitable to his own stand. But it should not be forgotten that the same charge, and perhaps many more, could be raised against the method of each of the later commentators, whose theories are tinged additionally because of their being based on sources outside the acknowledged Prasthāna-trayī. Although Rāma seems to have attempted to bring the absolute metaphysical thought of Ś to the realistic earth level so as not only to make it acceptable to the ordinary mind but to rationally explain the Highest Absolute by accepting and analysing the world of realities, yet it is also a fact that many of his interpretations rest on a good deal of twisting of the sutras. Hence, Thibaut's view seems to be open to a misconception, since we can say that Rama has tried to reconcile the views of Badarāyana with the Pīncaratra system, while Ś is free from such extraneous loyalties.

Thus, the charge of having subjected one set of scriptural passages to subordination for the glorification of the other, with a specific motive in view can be raised against each of the upholders of the concept of non duality, since the very terms 'Saguna' and 'Nirguna' are—at least *prima facie*—incompatible or essentially opposed to each other. Therefore, in so far as reason is concerned, one set of passages has to be "suppressed" or "contracted" (Sankoca¹) for the sake of the other.² Now, what remains to be analysed is whether the explanations and

¹ This, of course, is said from the view point of the commentators themselves who accept the Uṣ as śruti²—otherwise according to others who challenge this śruti position there is no such need at all since they may simply accept one set and correct or reject the other. But our concern is with the commentators and their systems and hence it is not necessary for us to try to go beyond our accepted horizon and to enquire into the intention of the 'speaker', except when the commentators do.

interpretations offered by the commentator as also his selection of the fundamental postulates and the systematising of the same are both based on a rational approach and also justifiable in the light of the teachings of the Upaniṣads, etc

↳ The greatest problem for all the upholders of the doctrine of Monism is to reconcile unity with plurality.¹ As these are opposed to each other in essence, if taken at the same metaphysical level, one has to be assigned an inferior grade of reality.² Ś speaks of plurality as unreal and hence the world of names and forms is, according to him, only an appearance of reality. In order to explain the perception of the phenomenal world, he introduces the theory of *Mayā* which he equates with Nescience (which was inculcated in the Upaniṣads themselves, as shown in the following pages), *Māyā* being neither real nor unreal,—something inexplicable (*‘anirvacaniya’*)³ It cannot be defined either as ‘sat’ or existent, since it is not immutable and absolutely real like Br, nor can it be said to be ‘asat’ or non-existent in the sense that the “son of a barren woman” is non-existent. Thus, it can neither be denied nor affirmed in terms of Absolute Being or of absolute (self contradictory) non being. It is deceptive in character and is often called *Avidyā* or false knowledge. Actually, Ś is fiercely attacked by the protagonists of other doctrines—(perhaps partly because they understood him in the light of his followers’ writings)—for the clever and convenient ‘invention’ of this theory of *Mayā*, which, according to them, is a double-edged sword with which he cuts the knot of the scriptural passages of contradictory descriptions while attaching, on the one hand, supreme importance to the *Nirviseśa* aspect of Br and subjecting, on the other hand, the *Saviseśa* texts to a subsidiary position.

Now, it must be said that although Ś is the most powerful exponent of the theory of *Mayā*, he is definitely not posing as the originator of that doctrine (It is inculcated in some of the eloquent passages of the Ch Up⁴, and it is strongly

¹ See ‘the Vedanta’ (Ghate) p 1.0

² cf foot note on pre-page.

³ ‘सर्वज्ञस्वैश्वरस्यात्मभूत इवाविद्याकल्पिते नान्तरूपे त्वान्यवाभ्यामनिर्वचनीये सत्तार-
प्रपञ्चद्वीपभूते सर्वज्ञस्यैश्वरस्य मायाशक्ति प्रकृतिरिति च श्रुतिस्मृत्योरभिलष्येते ।’

S B II 1 14

⁴ ‘वाचारम्भत्र विकारो नामधेय नृत्तिकेनेव सत्यन् ।’

—Ch Up VI 1 14

supported in one of the most important and the longest of the Upanisads, viz the Br Up, although the word 'Mayā' does not occur therein. Yet, the absence of the word does not mean the absence of the thought. Even in the Katha Up (V 12), Śvet Up (VI 12) and the Gītā' (VII. 14, IV. 6), the doctrine is either implied or found in its infancy.)

(This Māyā necessarily brings in the concept of the two-fold nature of Br—the qualified and the unqualified.) Although there are scriptural passages presenting Br as qualified as also devoid of qualities, yet the emphasis that Ś lays on the Nirguna texts by relegating the Saguna-passages to a subordinate position and as referring to 'Aparāvidyā' or the lower lore, is open to challenge—a challenge eagerly taken up by other schools

As a matter of fact, the B S nowhere give an inkling even of such a view, hence, if loyalty to the intention of the Sūtrakāra has to be taken into account, Ś does not seem to be a faithful interpreter of the sutras—still, he deserves all credit for giving us a complete system "of great speculative daring and logical subtlety"² Dr Radhakrishnan says—"S's system, according to Sir Charles Eliot, in consistency, thoroughness and profundity, holds the first place in Indian Philosophy"³

(The Saguna Br is Brahman in a relative aspect, subject to the conditions arising from a relationship. Therefore, in so far as it is in its Saguna aspect, Br does not retain its essential absolute character, the Saguna Br is considered to be Brahman at a lower level or inferior to the Unqualified One. This leads to the concept of an Isvara, who is the creator of the world, while as the Ultimate Reality behind all the variety of changing objects and experiences, it is the Nirguna Br, and that is the Highest. This Highest is 'Saccidananda'—Existence, Intelligence, Bliss. These, again, are not the attributes of Br, they are Br itself. This Br is the Supreme Spirit.)

(Now, how could souls of limited knowledge and inanimate objects spring from the Omniscient, Absolute principle?) says that the phenomenal world with its inanimate objects,

मयि

¹ 'एक रूप बहुधा य कराति', 'एक वीन बहुधा य कराति', नम, माया दुरत्यया',
उभवाभ्यात्समायया'

² I P II p 445

³ Ibid, p 446

is not a reality but a product of Nescience (Here, again, it should be noted that Ś's denial of reality to the world should not be mistaken for the 'Ajātavāda', as propounded by Gaudapāda, according to whom, nothing has originated and even the Mayā does not exist. This theory of absolute non-origination is not the same as the Māyāvada, which implies the triple gradation of reality.)

The scriptural text 'That thou art' embodies the highest truth, which indicates oneness of the Jiva and Br. It is Māyā which veils the true nature of things and projects the unreal one. The Jiva qua jiva appears to be different from Br. and different from other jivas only because it is viewed through the prismatic medium of Mayā, it is but an illusory manifestation or an evolution (Vivarta'), while there is no real transformation (as against what other philosophers hold). In the state of release, the jiva realises its true nature as being one with Br.

Although the system of Ś has been acknowledged on all hands to be the supreme fruit of Indian—if not universal—metaphysical thinking, yet a close scrutiny would show that his interpretation of quite a good number of sūtras is unwarranted by the sūtras themselves and that he has (like every other Vedānta commentator) twisted the sūtras so as to suit his own preconceived theory.* Ś may not be the originator of the Māyāvada, yet its introduction and the consequence thereof, viz. the two fold aspect of Br., do not in the least seem to be the intention of the author of the sūtras. It is not merely the idea of the two fold nature of Br. that has been a point of controversy, (for, there are passages of such nature in the Upaniṣads) but it is the excess of importance that he has attached to the Nirguna texts and the "contraction" of the Saguna texts to indicate only the lower or the phenomenal aspect of Br., that has proved to be the greatest weakness in the theory of Ś. If Br. as the creator, etc. were to signify only the lower Br. or the Īvara, how could the Sūtrakara, at the very start, define the object of the desire to know as one from whom origination, etc., proceed? According to Ś, it is the qualified Br. that creates, and this lower Br. is associated with Māyā. If this were the intention of the author of the Sūtras, he would not have defined the highest object of attainment to be the "lower" Br. So, at the very outset, a clear and wide departure from the system of the sūtras is perceptible in Ś's system. And that is

the reason why Ś has not infrequently had to make introductory remarks to the effect whether it is the higher or the lower Br that is referred to in the different passages. This is absolutely unjustifiable since the passages in question are found to be discussing the problem whether it is the individual soul or Br that is referred to and there is not the slightest suggestion even of the two fold aspect of Br. These and such other discrepancies¹ are found in Ś's interpretation of the sutras as a result of which it has become in spite of the highest type of logical subtlety and the sweeping stylistic grandeur that it exhibits an object of attack by the exponents of later systems.

An attempt at tracing the weaknesses in such a solid chain of metaphysical reasoning points out that the concept that Br is an Absolute and hence an utterly unrelated principle must have led Ś to postulate that nothing else but Br is Real. If he were to admit anything else beside Br as Really existent he would be obliged to explain the relation between the two realities and by admitting any such relation in connection with his absolutely unrelated and self sufficient Br he would be forced to reject the principle of Br's total unrelatedness or independence—a principle which was final and of vital importance in Ś's opinion. Hence he lays down the unreality of the universe etc.

By the very demands of the strictest rigors of reasoning to which he subjects his postulates in order to give his system of thought a stamp of thoroughness in consistency Ś seems to have been forced to seek his so called escape in this direction. But it is no mere running away from reality—since it rather exemplifies how very daring he was in putting to the most severe test of logic anything that he accepted as fundamental and that he was prepared for the direst of consequences in the face of vehement opposition and likely attack. Thus a series of corollaries arises the acceptance of which gives to his system a stamp of originality as also is responsible for labelling him as a chief who has got within.² The absoluteness of importance that he attached to Br's essential independence led him to deny the reality of the world which in its turn brought forth the theory of Maya which again necessitated the concept of the higher and the lower Br—the higher lore and the lower one, etc.

¹ Please refer to Ch V (1) of this work for details.

² Aṅg II 1 14

Other Ācāryas do not have to face any such critical situation, because they lay down Br. either as a repository of all auspicious attributes or as an abode of all contradictory qualities and so on. None of them has tried to put Br. on an absolute plane where it cannot even have any predicates. As a result, none is compelled to deny the reality of the world. For example, Rāmā. speaks of the 'jaḍa' and the 'jīva' as forming the 'Body' of Br., while V. postulates these as real parts of the Whole Reality or as the mānifestations of the Lord in different aspects. They do not view any opposition in establishing a relation between the world or the 'jīva' and Br., because the former are not relation-terms different from Br. (so V. asserts), or they are only different as parts from the whole, hence the relations remain internal and external, and do not affect (so Rāmā considers) the independence of the Absolute.

Taking into account the scriptural description of the desire to create on the part of Br., as also that of His "entering into" the created objects, etc., Ś. explains that it is the Highest self alone that really exists, and the names and forms in the case of created objects have their beginning in speech, and are mere modification, it is the Supreme Br. that pervades one and all as their underlying Reality, and only empirical (vyāvahārika) reality can be predicated of this world of changing objects, etc. The world's creation, as such, does not have any first beginning, nor, therefore, Īvara or the lower Br., who is spoken of as the creator, has any either. He is like an appointed official for the production and supervision of the so-called created fabric of the universe, whose material and efficient cause He is. Even, according to later vedānta-philosophers, the world has no first beginning—and yet they try to justify creation on the part of Br. as a mere sport or "a means for exhibiting His own Majesty" and so on. This may appear to be unconvincing and hardly consistent in itself—although it might have been a very conscientious attempt at solving the serious problems involved.

Rāmā speaks of the 'jaḍa' and the 'jīva' as being the 'Body' of the Lord, but even this is not acceptable to reason, since, how can the Infinite God, in essence, have His Body made of finite entities? V. also lands into difficulty because of his theory of the part-and-the-whole (aṁśāṁśi-bhāva) which states the 'jīvas' to be parts of the Lord, from whom they emerge as sparks do from blazing fire. This is incompatible because how

could the 'spark' emerging from blazing fire be a part of the latter and yet at the same time possess only a portion of the essential aspect of it? Since this aspect of the problem requires full explanation and detailed analysis of the fundamental postulates (accepted by V himself), which form the very centre of the work here undertaken and are treated fully in the following pages, it is not deemed necessary to anticipate them here. We shall come back upon it in due course. २१६३।

B *Suddhadvaita vada or the Doctrine of Pure Non dualism*

The scriptural statements like 'Ekameva dvitīyam Brahma', 'Purusa evedam sarvam', etc., point to the existence of Br even before the universe came into being. This Br wished to sport and hence manifested Himself in the form of the world, etc., by suppressing in the manifested entities one or more of His essential characteristics of existence ('sat') intelligence ('cit') and bliss ('ananda'). The 'sat'-aspect of the Lord is manifest in the world ('jagat'), while both the 'sat' and 'cit' aspects are manifested in the individual soul ('jiva'). The 'Antaryamin' or the Inner Controller is a form of Br wherein all these three essential aspects of Br are manifest and it abides within all living beings. The 'Aksara' form of Br possesses only a limited portion of the bliss of Br and is said to be the one from whom the world proceeds. Although the Antaryamin possesses 'sat', 'cit' and 'ananda', it is not equal to or the same as Br since the former is engrossed in activity¹, while the latter is not. Thus Br is immanent in the 'jiva', the 'jagat' and the 'Antaryamin' and yet remains transcendent. Br is said to be free from the threefold distinctions *intra-genus* ('sajatiya') *extra-genus* ('vyatiya') and *internal* ('svagata'). This has been illustrated by Śrī Harīraja in his *Brahma vada samgraha* through the analysis of the text 'Ekamevadvitīyam Brahma', which means that Br is one only without a second.

According to the explanation he offers, the term 'eva' is a restrictive particle which precludes the possibility of identifying Br with the non-sentient world which is dissimilar ('vyatiya') to Br, since the world is gross and perishable. The term 'eka' points to the fact that Br is different from the 'jiva', although the latter possesses intelligence ('cit'), whereby it falls within the

¹ *Kincit kārya vyagratajā*, as explained by Śrī Dīkṣiṭee Mahārāja, the great living learned exponent of the Vallabhā school.

as Qindhara explains : "Māyā-sambandha-rāhitam Śuddhā-mityucyate budhaiḥ, Kārya-Kāraṇa-rūpam hi Śuddham Brahma na māyikam"

Thus, the Pure Br creates the word without coming into contact with Māyā. This pure Br is of the nature of both the cause and the effect, and it is not illusory (Māyikam) (Compare Ch II c)

The system of Pure Non-dualism also bears titles such as 'Brahma-vāda' and 'Avikrtaparīnāmavāda'. The very name 'Brahma-vāda', assigned to the system of V, brings out a distinct note of the reality of the world, in sharp contrast to the Māyā vada of Ś which emphatically lays down the unreality of the world. In the Śarvanūnaya chapter of his T D N, V clearly says "Ātmaiva tadīdam sarvam Brahmaiva tadīdam tathā, iti srutyarthamādāya sādhyam sarvairiyathāmatī, Ayameva Brahma-vadah śīstam mohāya kalpitam" (V 138-184), meaning that all that is, is nothing but the Self, and likewise, is nothing other than Br —this is what one should understand from the scriptures, —this alone is Brahmavada—the doctrine of Br, all else being fashioned for the sake of confusion²

(According to V, the jagat is real, being but a form of Br. He refers to the text 'Sādeva Somya', etc, laying special stress on the word 'Sat', which points to the reality of the world)

C The Jīva

(i) The Nature of the Jīva or the individual soul

(Since the Lord is the first cause and the only cause, everything is only a form of His Being. The Lord wished to be many—and there came forth innumerable jīvas out of the Akṣara form of His V states in his T D N I 28³, that these jīvas, the sentient or intelligent parts of Br {emerged forth} through that Akṣara form on account of His mere wish, in the beginning of the first creation¹. These jīvas became "nirakara" or "Blissless" owing to the Divine Wish. The Sat and Cit aspects of the Saccidananda Br are manifest in them, while the bliss-aspect is veiled off or obscured (tirobhūta). As they emerge from Br

¹ Śuddhadvaitamārtanḍa V 28

² Also compare T D N II 63 279 282, 325

³ 'तदिन्द्रियमात्रनस्तरम दह्य भूताश्रयतना । 'सृष्ट्यादौ निर्गता सर्वे निराकारस्त दिच्छया ॥

V, reads 'sṛṣṭyādau' to mean 'in the first creation'

like the sparks fly from blazing fire, they are not spoken of as effects, but as "amśas" or parts of the Lord. Hence, they are neither caused nor created. Anu. 11.3.16 explains that the jīva is not produced, but its presence is experienced through its association with a body.¹ This absence of origination (utpatti) leads to their eternality. Witness for instance, 'This Self is free from old-age, mortality', etc. 'Never indeed is this (soul) born, never does it die', etc.)

Owing to the obscuration or suppression (tirobhāva) of the Bliss of Br. in the jīva, the latter does not possess any of the six-divine qualities, viz. sovereignty (aiśvarya), valour (vīrya), fame (yaśas), splendour (śrī), knowledge (jñāna) and detachment (vairāgya). V. explains in Anu (III.2.5) how, owing to this suppression, the jīva undergoes bondage and misery—being turned away from its true centre of reality—and goes round and round auto-centrally, as it were, in the cycles of births and deaths. In order to break the shackles of this bondage, the jīva has to become fully theo-centrally, hence, to worship God with all love and concentration. It secures release (moksa) when it acquires these "Lordly" qualities together with the Bliss-aspect by the grace of God. The grace of God ensures everything and this has been termed ('pusti') by V. It is defined as "Posanam tadanugrahaḥ" meaning the Divine grace (as against the theory of "eat-drink-and-make-merry", which was later, in periods of decadence, substituted for the doctrine of God's Grace) (cf. E.R.E. XII pp 581-82).

It should be pointed out here that there seems to be a contradiction in maintaining that the jīvas are "parts" of the Lord and still are "formless" (Nirākāra). In anticipation of such a challenge perhaps, the commentary on this (T.D.N I.31) explains the word 'nirākārāḥ' as "devoid of bliss", since here, says V., "Bliss" (ānanda) is to be understood as "ākāra-samarpakāḥ"—a 'formative' element. Anyway, it is indeed a misnomer—if not a contradiction in terms.

The jīva is active, intelligent and atomic (anu) in size. It is not all-pervading (vibhu) as Ś holds—but the atomic jīva resumes its all-pervasive form when the bliss-aspect is fully manifested in it.

¹ 'देहधर्मो बोध्यः स एव । हस्तः कर्तव्यैरेतदुत्सवदेग इति श्रुत्वा ।'

This also deserves careful consideration. If the jiva is atomic by its very nature, it can never attain 'vibhutva' or an all-pervasive character, which is opposed to it in essence. Both 'anutva' and 'vibhutva' cannot be said to be the essential characteristics of the jiva. If it is maintained somehow that at the manifestation of the bliss aspect in the jiva, the latter acquires 'vibhutva', it should also be accepted that when the essentially vital attributes like 'vibhutva' and 'ānanda' of the Lord are bestowed on the jiva or rather when these are manifested in it, the latter cannot remain in the category of a jiva but should become indistinguishably one with the Br. This would, then, reverse the whole doctrinal position of V, who holds that the individual distinctions can never be completely lost in the case of the jivas. The following may help to clarify V's thought.

V says in Anu II 3 25-26 that if it were argued that the postulate of jiva's being atomic would give rise to an absence of pervasion of sentiency or intelligence (caitanya) over all parts of the body, the answer is furnished with the illustration of sandalwood put in oil which produces coolness all over the body in spite of its being applied to a part only. Or, just as a lamp, put in one corner of a room, illuminates the whole room, so does the jiva spread its intelligence all over the body, notwithstanding its minute and atomic size. The B S (II 3 43)¹ as also the Gita-text² (XV 7) support the theory of the jiva's being a part of the Lord. If it were argued that Br would then no longer remain impartite (niravayava), V answers that there are scriptural passages that speak of Br being partite as well as impartite, and in case of supra-worldly objects, mere reasoning proves to be futile. Therefore, the text laying down the realisation of all through that of One, points to everything being but a manifestation of the Lord. Again, as Br is the abode of all contradictory attributes, there is no scope for such a conflict or objections³. Thus, V explains the texts 'Sarvam Khalvidam

¹ 'अग्रे नाप्यपदेशान् ।'

² 'समैवाशौ ज्ञानोके ज वभूत सनात्न ।'

³ This is like admitting that a square and a non-square are contradictory predicates but refusing to admit that a non-square reality does not exist on the Absolute level—and it looks dangerously like jettisoning the very principle of contradiction, which is the basis of all rational thinking.

Brahma' and 'That thou art' in a literal sense, whereas these have been explained metaphorically by all the rest

~ The jiva is a part of the Lord, says V, and not a reflection (pratibimba), because a thing which permeates (or constitutes the reality of) another thing cannot cast its reflection on that thing (T D N I 56)

(The pivotal and fundamental text, viz. 'That thou art', is explained by V as meaning that there does not really exist a complete identity between Br. and jiva, but it only conveys that Br. is the foundation of the jivas like gold is of the ring etc)

To the antagonists of V, there seems to be an inherent contradiction in saying that the jivas are "parts" of Br. and yet they do not possess one of His essential attributes. V. accepts Br. as a material cause also, and compare the 'emergence' of the jivas from Br. to the production of rings, etc. from gold or of pots, etc., from clay. Now, if a ring is made of gold, it must exhibit all the essential qualities of gold, its material cause. For, if a spark flying from blazing fire were to lose heat and light (usnatva and prakāśamānatva) which are the essential characteristics of 'fire', it can no more be called a "part" of the fire. Similarly if Br. is the material cause of the jivas, how can the latter be deprived of Ānanda? For, how can you deprive yourself of your "essence"? Just as the essence of gold cannot change in the ring made of it, the 'Saccidananda' nature of Br. must necessarily inhere in its effects—rather 'parts'—viz. the jivas.

From V's stand point, this charge may be answered by saying that the ananda aspect of Br. is ^{not} totally absent in the jiva, but it is only suppressed. Yet, how can that which is substantially essential be suppressed to its own self essence?

(According to V, the jiva is an agent (kartr) and an enjoyer (bhoktr). This is confirmed by the B S II 3 33¹. If it were questioned why the jiva, in spite of being an agent itself, does deeds harmful to itself—the answer is that the power of discretion is obscured in its case and hence it cannot avoid carrying out self harmful acts. Yet, says V, it should not be assumed that since it is unable to escape evil (self harmful) deeds etc., it cannot get liberated, for, if by performing its duty well (without attachment or selfish motive behind it) the jiva

¹ 'कचं हास्त्राथकत्वात्'—Anu II 3 33

dedicates it all to Br, it attains liberation. Just as a carpenter fashions a chariot and moves about mounting the same, even so the soul performs actions and enjoys them¹. Hence, the qualities of being an agent and an enjoyer are not adventitious (aupadhika) as Ś believes. The jīvas and Br are non different from one another except for the suppression of the bliss aspect in the jīva, but even this suppressed bliss flashes forth at the advent of Bhakti through the grace of God, just as the potential masculine feature in a child manifests itself at the advent of youth. Sir R G Bhaṅdarker says "The individual soul is not a form of the Supreme Soul altered by a third thing being involved in it, such as the Māyā (illusory power), but is itself the same substance as the Supreme Soul with one attribute rendered imperceptible. The relation between the two is thus that of identity (Advaita), both being in the pristine unchanged form, i.e. identity of untransformed souls (Śuddhadvaita)^{1 2}

(ii) Different types of jīvas

Various classifications of the jīvas are set out in the system of V. In one of the tracts of his 'Soḍasa granthas', V treats the question of different types of jīvas, and since the main set of division here deals with the Puṣṭi, the Pravaha and the Maryada souls, this tract also bears the same title viz Puṣṭi pravahā-maryada bheda'

Three sets of division of different types of jīvas run along the following lines (1) the Puṣṭi, the Maryada and the Pravaha jīvas, (2) the Śuddha, the Samsarin and the Mukta jīvas and (3) the Ajña, the Durjña and the Sambandhi jīvas.

The jīvas may be free (Mukta) or conditioned. The free jīvas are of two types: those who attain a liberation in their state of embodiment (jīvan muktas) and those who get liberated on the fall of the body. Amongst those jīvas which are conditioned (Muktetarah) some jīvas are divine (daivi), some demoniac (asurah). The [divine jīvas] are eligible for the attainment of liberation, while the [demoniac jīvas] are bound by ties of worldly attachments. The [divine jīvas] are again divided into [Maryada] and [Puṣṭi] the former type undertake to carry out the Vedic injunctions, etc., and believe in the efficacy of human

¹ Refer to Ch V (1) of this work where the implications of this explanation are set out in detail.

² Vaiṣṇavism 'aivism and minor religious systems' p 78

endeavour besides the Divine Grace, while the latter type of jivas are wedded to a single minded devotion unto the Lord and do not attach any value to personal efforts for the accomplishment of the end in view

These Puṣṭi jivas are said to issue from the divine "Body" of the Lord, while the Maryāda jivas emerge from the "Speech" of the Lord, and the Pravāha or the Āsura jivas have the "Mind" of the Lord as their material cause (Puṣṭi pravaha maryādā bheda'—V. 9). This points to the difference in their very nature or essence, which acts as the line of demarcation in this set of division

The Puṣṭi jivas may, again, be either pure ('Suddha') or mixed (misra), in accordance with the particular condition in which they appear. Before the immersion of the jīva into the stream of 'Samsāra' / e when the Maya power of the Lord has not yet brought about a total suppression of the six divine qualities in the jiva, the jiva is said to be in its state of pristine purity¹. Such 'pure jivas become partakers of the Bliss of Kṛṣṇa in Goloka'. These are manifested as such through the will of God in order that they may offer their services to the cause of the Divine Sport and finally return to Him and worship Him. These jivas represent the best type of devotees.

The 'mixed type of Puṣṭi jivas are Puṣṭi puṣṭi Maryada puṣṭi and Pravaha puṣṭi. Such jivas are sent to the world by the Lord as a symbol of punishment for some mistake committed by them. The Puṣṭi puṣṭi jivas possess the knowledge of the nature of the Lord, His attributes, their own mistakes and the correction of the same. The Maryada puṣṭi know the attributes of the Lord, while the Pravaha puṣṭi jivas are bereft of the devotional fervour or affection for the Lord as also of the knowledge of Him—and they somehow take to the worship of the Lord in order to fulfil their earthly aspirations. Yet, all these 'mixed jivas may gradually become eligible for an entrance into the category of 'pure jivas')

¹ 'P R' clarifies this as follows 'भेदकस्तु बीजरूपा निरूपाधिको भाव । स च भगवता अविधानस्य धार्युर्देववसुपादजानन्तर मर्यातामार्गीयजावेभ्यो भेदु विराषानुग्रहच्छ्रया पुष्टिमार्गीयकत प्रापयिचत्येवम् ।' p 9

Thus the distinction amongst the Puṣṭi jivas is based on a condition unstained by an adjunct

{The Maryādā jīvas may be termed 'ordinary' in comparison to the Puṣṭi and the Pravaha jīvas} since, in them, there is a blending, 'as it were, of the divine and human aspects. They believe in Vedic injunctions and their promised fruits as also in the consecration of the same at the feet of the Lord. The Cit aspect of the Lord is predominant in them and they obtain an intellectual release in the sense that they reach the Akṣara or the World-soul—without reaching the Supreme Br

The Pravaha jīvas are devoid of the Divine Grace and the Vedic 'Maryada' too. They chiefly contain the Sat aspect and are said to attain 'Blind Darkness' ("Andham Tamah"), a state bereft of joy and knowledge. Perhaps endless miseries of 'samsara' without any possibility of acquiring release is what is meant by "andham tamah" here (in T D N II 285)

This last category of jīvas viz, of the Pravaha souls, seems to overlap another set of division viz of the 'asura' jīvas. These are of two types—the ignorant or the unformed (ajñās) and the wicked or the mal informed (durjñās). The former are misled for a while by other demoniac jīvas, but can find their way to 'Mukti', since they do not preclude a possibility of attaining 'release'. But the 'Durjña' souls are by nature evil and wicked, hence, they are doomed to 'eternal darkness'. In the 'Puṣṭi-pravaha maryada bheda', wherein V offers to treat these three types of the jīvas (as mentioned in its title), he also speaks of a fourth type, termed sambandhi or intermediary souls, who have no definite characteristics but allow themselves to be dragged sometimes to good and sometimes to bad activities. It seems that this category has been added up on second thoughts in order that the list may become exhaustive.

In T D N II 120¹, V offers another type of division wherein he sums up God's triple manifestation, viz in the phenomenal, the spiritual and the celestial spheres, as witnessed in the body, the soul and the inner-controller respectively. Although these are but the manifestations of the Lord, they are enumerated under the "division of souls", since the latter, through the ego, have a cognition of 'I' about one and all²


¹ 'सच्चिदानन्दरूपेण देहजीवेशरुनिण ।

यदि नमदि पुरुषो जीवभेदात्म्यो सता ॥'

² This line is not clear.

The 'Āvaraṇa-bhāṅga' sūtras' in this connection that the Sūtra-aspect is predominant in the individual bodies, the cit-aspect in the 'Universal Cosmic Egg' and the bliss-aspect in the Puruṣa.

Different Types of Jīvas



'तथा च जीवशरीरेषु व्यदेहसमाप्तशरीरेषु सत्प्रभावे, सुन्देहोत्पत्तेशरीरेषु विश्रान्त्यं पुरुषशरीरेषु सानन्दमासन्नमिति जीवशरीरेषुः'—'Āvaraṇa-bhāṅga' on T.D.N. II 120.

(iii) The problem

The high and low creation of the jivas, having different natures, attitudes and activities, is said to be for the manifestation of the 'Majesty' of the Lord Divine sport requires the undertones of variety and multiplicity which combine to produce different sentiments. But, even when it is not desirable to restrict the independence of God, it is neither appropriate nor desirable that merely for the self-satisfaction on the part of the Lord so as to indulge in His own "Mahātmya-pradarsana", a particular jiva should be made to undertake good or evil activities and then be held responsible for the propriety or otherwise of the same.

Ś seems to have realised the right value of this problem of the dignity of human endeavour, since he relegates the condition of a soul in a particular birth to the actions performed by it in its previous births. Ramā accepts the scriptural text, viz 'He makes him undertake good deeds whom He wishes to uplift', etc, but in order that the reproach of cruelty and partiality be averted, he brings in the concept of the consideration of the initial effort of the soul. But for V. the acceptance of such an initial effort would impair the Divine independence, and therefore, he says that such flaws can arise with respect to earthly agents and activities only, while in the case of the Lord, these gradations and distinctions in creation represent nothing but His Sport.

The theory of God's Omnipotence as also of His Absolute independence and of His unconditioned will involves the question whether the jiva has any freedom to choose and work its own destiny at all. If God has sealed every action, its fruit, etc, with respect to the jiva, if God has already determined the highest fruit or 'eternal damnation' for a particular jiva (as in the case of Puṣṭi and Durjña jivas respectively), what scope does the latter have to choose a better path on its own in order to get redemption? If the jiva is made absolutely dependent on God and nothing is left to be decided by it, what right does one have to blame it for any evil or wicked deeds that it may perform? —since, it is God who inspires and goads the jiva, as it were, to undertake such an activity! For example, in the case of the Āsuras, the Lord is said to enact a type of activity which seems to be characteristic of evil inclination, acting as an obstacle to 'mukti' or release, since these jivas happen to be the objects of

is whether to be more or less "perfectly villainous or murderous" ! Moreover, according to V, the nature' of the jiva is only ultimately a free manifestation of the nature of the Lord over which it has no control whatsoever, thus, the difficulty of accepting any such solutions appears all the clearer

And yet, at bottom, we see V struggling to preserve, even at the cost of consistency, the fundamental acceptance of the absolute independence of God and the primacy of His unconditioned Will. While attempting to prove the supremacy of the Divine Will and the dependence of everything on it, V has ventured to explain away the Law of Karma (which he does accept in principle) as a mere subordinate, carrying out the Divine dictates. But in doing so, the principles of universal application and appeal—such as justice, the dignity of human endeavour and freedom to choose one's course of life—have been sacrificed at the altar of 'Divine Wish'

D The Nature of the World (Jagat)

{ V accepts the Br Up passage (I 4 3) that Br desired to be many and manifested Himself as the jivas and the jagat. This innate desire for self expression is translated into the form of jagat which is but a part or a manifestation of Br with the qualities of cit and ananda rendered imperceptible. Thus, the world is of the nature of Br (Brahmatmaka), and is regarded to be the effect of Br. As a matter of fact, the effect is non-different from the cause, and therefore creation and dissolution of the effect are but phases of the play of His powers of manifestation (Āvirbhava) and concealment (Tirobhāva)

{ This world is a stage for the divine sport (Lila) of the Lord which is said to be created, when Br manifests Himself in that form as capable of being experienced or apprehended by the jivas while it is said to be dissolved or destroyed, when it is reduced back to its causal state ceasing to be an object of perception } thus creation and destruction stand for the evolution or explicitation and involution or implicitation but only in the paradoxical sounding sense of appearing by obscuration and disappearing by manifestation of the fullness of Br

{The world cannot be regarded as illusory nor as distinct from Br. in essence. The Prapañca or jagat is as real as Br., since the latter manifests Himself as such by suppressing His attributes of bliss and consciousness in it. But when the jīva ascribes distinct and real plurality to it through ignorance, it gets caught in the meshes of Samsāra, which is unreal, being but a projection of its ignorance.} The jīva is infected with a perversity of mis-conception when it regards the world to be different from Br. This perversity or ignorance of the true nature of a thing pertains to the mind, but the thing itself cannot be said to be unreal. Thus, it is the wrong conception of the world on the part of the jīva and not the nature of the world itself that is unreal. (The samsāra is unreal as against jagat which is real. V. says that the world is an effect of the Lord, and it came to acquire that form (vi- of the jagat) on account of the Mayā power of the Lord. His power of Avidyā or ignorance has brought about 'Samsara' with respect to the jīvas.}

It is ignorance which confuses the jīva and creates an unreal object in the mind of the individual similar to the worldly object and projects the same on the object within the sense range. When the jīva tries to perceive the object, it is this unreal object that is cognised, and the knowledge soiled by the perception of such an unreal object produces confusion. This being so the unreal qualities also become a matter of perception—and it is this faulty perception that is referred to in 'Yadidam manasa vaca naśvaram grhyamānam ca buddhi mayā manomayam', etc., as nothing but a product of Māyā. (The scriptural texts referring to jagat as 'Mayika' are meant, says V. in opposition to the theory of unreality of the world as upheld by Ś. for the sake of producing an attitude of renunciation and sacrifice.)

Thus the perception of the confused or dull-witted jīvas is unreal, but not so the object itself. The Bhg. says in this connection³ that whatever is perceived in the absence of an

¹ 'प्रपञ्चा समत्र कायस्तद्रूपो मायया भवन् । तच्छक्त्या विधया त्वस्य जीव-सार उच्यते ॥

—T D N I 23

² T D N I 89

³ 'ऋतेऽर्थं यप्रतीयन् न प्रतीयेत चात्मनि ।

तद्विधादा मनो माया यथा भामो यथा तम ॥

E *Brahman, the Highest Reality*

The scriptural texts like 'Ekamevādvyūyam Brahma', 'Puruṣa evedam Sarvam', 'Sanmulah Saumyemah Prajah', etc., stress the point that Br existed even prior to the existence of the world as such and that for the sake of sport, He manifested himself in various forms. This primeval self wished to be many (Br Up I 4 3) and himself became the world, the individual souls and the 'inner controller'. The 'emanation' of these is compared to the emergence of sparks from blazing fire (Mu Up II 1). The world with its beings, etc., forms a field (made of "divine soil") as it were for the divine sport.

The Nature of Brahman

☪ The inanimate world is a form in which the Sat aspect alone of the Saccidananda Br is rendered perceptible through the will of the Lord, while the Cit and Ānanda aspects remain concealed in it. In the individual souls (jivas) only the Sat and Cit aspects are rendered manifest. The 'inner controller' is but His form wherein all these three aspects are manifest. Thus, the world is said to be an elemental or phenomenal (adhibhauṭika) form of Br. The relation between the world and the jivas on the one hand and Br on the other is that of identity (Advaita) since these are, in their pristine forms and fundamental nature, manifestations of one or more of His essential aspects, viz. Sat, Cit and Ānanda, and since all relation of distinction and duality is but a phase of manifestation and concealment. Br permeates everything through the manifestation of His qualities of existence etc.¹ Thus, notwithstanding the experience of distinctions and duality in the world, Br remains untouched by these since differences in attributes, etc., represent but the analytical forms of the divine Reality. V does not subscribe to the theory of a real difference, because, according to him, there is no such thing as a real difference, everything being an analytical form of the Lord. Thus, the world, before its origination, was implicit in Br, while the world qua world is an explicit, analytical aspect of Br. Just on account of His will, Br suppresses or conceals the bliss aspect to the extent, and, assuming the form of the world. Thus the Akṣara represents a form

concepts regarding the creation of the world. According to some, it is a product of Māyā, while others say that it is a result of the combination of the three Gunas, and, there are others still who attribute the creation to Īśvara, while some understand it to be beginningless like the flow of a river. According to V, the Lord assumes the form of Akṣara, through which He manifests himself as the jagat \

(The effect can be of two types—that in which the immanent cause undergoes change or modification (like milk into curds) and the other in which the cause remains absolutely unmodified, i.e. it can go back to its original causal state. For example, the gold ornaments do have different shapes, but they can be brought back to their causal state, viz. gold (a thing which cannot happen in the case of curds vs. milk). This is said to be Unmodified Transformation, a unique feature in the system of V, who propounds that Br pure and simple is the cause of the world, which can regain its original form when it merges into its cause.)

(Anu III 217 describes Br as the efficient and the immanent cause of the world. The same point has been emphasised upon in T D N I 68. The creation and dissolution of the world depend upon the Divine Will.) In the Sarva-nirṇaya chapter of his T D N, V explains how the twenty-eight elements came forth. A limited portion of the Bliss aspect of Br is manifest in the Akṣara, who out of his Cit aspect creates the Puruṣa, while from his Sat aspect comes forth the Prakṛti. These two together bring about the rest of the twenty-six elements viz. Sattva, Rajas, Tamas, Mahat, Ahaṁkāra, the five Tan matras, the five Maha bhūtas, the five Karmenpṛīyās, the five Jñānendriyas and the Mind. V considers Prakṛti as an element separate and distinct from its constituent three gunas, viz. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. When the Highest Br enters into the 'Cosmic Egg' of creation in the form of the Inner controller and governs it from within, the evolution of names and forms takes place. This 'Cosmic Egg' is also known as the Viraṭ Puruṣa.

¹ Notwithstanding the existence of Akṣara, Kāla, Karma and Svabhava before the creation of the world V does not include these in the list of the tattvas, since they are general causes inseparable from the Lord, and they represent the causal potency of the Lord.—T D N II 86.

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☪ Just on account of His will, Br suppresses or conceals His bliss aspect to some extent, and, assuming the form of Aksara, creates the world. Thus, the Aksara represents a form

¹ 'अस्मिन्नातिप्रियत्वेन मन्त्रिदानद्रूपेणान्धयान् ।'—Anu I 1-3

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¹ 'अस्मिन्मन्त्रिण्येन सुच्चिदानन्दरूपोऽकान्तवान्'—Anu I 1-3

of Br wherein only a limited portion of the divine bliss is manifested—as far as required for the full manifestation of creation—and it is said to be ‘an Abode’ of the Lord (‘taddhāma paramam mama’). The followers of the path of devotion consider the Aksara to be an ‘Abode’ or resting place of Lord Kṛṣṇa, having the attributes of the ‘Vyāpi Vaikuntha’¹, while the followers of the path of knowledge regard it as a principle whose nature is existence, intelligence and bliss, is unconditioned by time, space, etc and is devoid of all attributes. A divine power, which is said to be inscrutable and inexplicable, renders the full absolute qualities of the Lord imperceptible in this Aksara or the Immutable, which is not devoid of those attributes, but the latter are obscured by divine power in the case of the followers of the path of knowledge. This Akṣara represents the spiritual (Ādhyātmika) aspect of the Lord, while Puruṣottama or the Lord Kṛṣṇa is the Celestial or fully divine (Ādhidaivika) form of Br.

Br is the one reality, eternal, omnipotent, omnipresent, immutable and yet mutable—a repository of contradictory attributes, and has innumerable incarnations. He possesses attributes like sovereignty, valour, etc., and is unqualified. He is both infinite and finite, since He is the cause of the world and the world itself. The jīvas are but His ‘parts’ (amśas) and still He is impartite. Thus, Br is the substratum of contradictory attributes. But it is not contradictory that the Lord should possess contradictory attributes because, says V, there is no non being with respect to Him. The experience of contradiction is due to the mistaken relegation of our concepts of origination, existence, increase, development, change and destruction (which pertain to worldly objects) to the Lord, who, in reality, simply makes explicit (through the play of His powers

¹ Sir R G Bhandarkar explains this as follows

“The Vyāpi-Vaikunṭha is above the Vaikunṭha of Viṣṇu the protector of the world. There dwells Puruṣottama who manifests himself variously to his various devotees. To those in whom Bhakti has risen to the highest pitch and has become a haunting passion he manifests himself as the sportive Kṛṣṇa. In a portion of the Vyāpi Vaikunṭha there is a Goloka with Vṛndāvana in which there are extensive trees, bowers of creepers and the river Yamunā. The highest Bhaktas are transferred to this Vṛndāvana, and Kṛṣṇa sports with them there.”

of Āvirbhava and Tirobhava) what was implicitly contained within Himself. For example, infinity in His case stands for the finite in an unmanifested or implicit form, while finite means the infinite in an unmanifested form—or the finite, which was implicit before within the Infinite becomes explicit as such. Thus, there is no contradiction in the case of Br. And,¹ even if such contradictions are viewed in Br (from a worldly stand point), these do not speak for any defect ('dusanam') in Br, but prove to be ornaments ('bhūṣanam'), because they underline the unfathomable majesty of the Lord which cannot be grasped by mere reasoning uninformed by loving devotion and unaided by Divine Grace. Thus, 'Śabda' or scriptures alone can operate in the field of 'Brahma jñāna'. V says that Br is beyond the reach of human mind and speech and is still attainable by means of pure devotion and loving service to the Lord.

Br creates the world and yet remains untainted by Māyā—and hence His nature is "Pure Monism". Through his Powers of Manifestation and Concealment, the world with its paraphernalia of distinctions and duality comes about—but the underlying 'unity' of the Lord remains absolutely unaffected thereby. This is what V's concept of 'Pure Non-dualism' stands for—the Pure Monism of Br that admits of no admixture of or connection with any principle of unreality. Śrī Giridhara says¹ in this connection that Br is 'pure', devoid of any connection or association with Maya, and it is this Pure Br that is both the cause and the effect. Br is both the efficient and the material (immanent) cause of the world (Anu I 1-4). He is said to be Nirguna or unqualified in the sense that He does not possess any material (Prakṛta) qualities.

☞ In his T D N 144, V describes Br as "possessing a 'Body' which is comprised of attributes which are flawless and perfect, and is self subsistent and devoid of such attributes as belong to an inanimate body, yet possessing hands, feet, face, belly, etc. made of absolute Bliss, a self, devoid of the triple distinction everywhere or all throughout."

Here the concept of the Lord as possessing hands, feet, etc. made of pure Bliss, as expressed in the afore-said stanza

¹ 'मायात्मन् भवति शुद्धमित्युच्यते बुधै ।

requires to be analysed. If V wants to convey by it the idea of a personal God, *॥* Kṛṣṇa, having body, etc., his description of the latter as "Ānanda matra" appears to clash with his own idea. It is true that a humanly configured God represents but a symbol thought of and projected by the human mind on the analogy of the human body etc.—yet, in the above description the conception of a "mass of mere Bliss" (perhaps similar to Ś's ideal of 'mere Intelligence') seems to be confused with the idea of a humanly configured God. It is sure however, that the author wishes to convey thereby that the Divine limbs are not made of the ordinary (Prakṛti) matter, but are composed of Bliss.

Br is immanent in the world, and yet remains transcendent. This is explained by V by referring His immanence to the manifestation of one or more of His essential aspects in all beings and His transcendental nature to His remaining beyond the triple distinction *॥* intra genus extra genus and internal (Sajatiya vijatiya svagata bheda varjita) ¹

V. says that by means of His powers of Manifestation and Concealment Br assumes many forms. In the system of V Avirbhava stands for manifestation (prakaṣya) and Tirobhava for 'concealment' or 'absorption' (Samavesa) as against the meanings 'creation' (Utpatti) and 'dissolution' (Pralaya) attributed to these terms by Ś while commenting on the Ch Up passage VII 26 1* wherein these are expressly mentioned. In contrast to the view of Ś V postulates the world to be real thus offering a practical solution for the world of experience. V says that the Vacarambhana text (Ch Up VI 1 1 7) also suggests the same. He warns the readers against Ś's interpretation of this text since the latter does not (according to V) refer to the unreality of the effect, but it lays stress on the point that the perception of the effect as totally different from and independent of its cause is wrong. If it were to convey what Ś has pressed it to mean the statement would have been 'Vacarambhanam Vikāro namadheyam mṛttikaiva satyam'. And only this form of the statement could give rise to the theory of Maya as upheld by Ś.

¹ Please refer Ch II B. of this work for a critical appreciation of this interpretation.

Here, however, a follower of S will certainly want to ask (of the upholders of the Śuddhādvaita doctrine) for an explanation of 'eva' used in the Vacarambhana text under consideration How can 'iti', in the presence of that restrictive particle 'eva' be made by V to yield so much extra sense as to go against the very core of the context meaning of the whole passage?—And why could not 'eva' (even in conjunction with "iti) stand for the reality of the cause alone, in consonance with the context, the general purport and the meaning of the restrictive particle itself? The passage, referring to the story of a learned father admonishing his son, who was puffed up with the little knowledge that he had acquired, and finally teaching him about the only Reality, etc clearly points to the unreality of worldly object as against the reality of one principle viz Br. The illustrations such as of pots of clay, nails made of iron, etc prove the same, since the very wording of each statement conveys the idea of the reality of the cause alone and of the cause of all causes from the ultimate point of view. The particle "eva" as employed for the restriction of application of reality to the cause alone, to the exclusion of effects, etc, also speaks for itself. Thus, these considerations based on the context, the textual meaning and the import of the particle 'eva' would go to prove the validity of Ś's conclusion¹

Different forms of the Lord

{ Br has four forms, viz Kṛṣṇa, Akṣara which is twofold and the Antaryāmin or the Inner Controller. Lord Kṛṣṇa is the highest, absolute Br which possesses Sat, Cit and Ānanda, is all pervading and the substratum of all beings. All attributes that the Upaniṣads describe have a reference to the Lord Kṛṣṇa, while the texts that offer Br as Nirguṇa, Nirākara, and so on pertain to the Akṣara form of Br. } The concept that Akṣara

¹ Refer to Ch. V 2 (b)

Also compare Ś's own commentary on the passage under consideration
 "वासरभण वगारम्भण वगालम्बनमित्येन । काट्या ः विकारा नामधय नात्रैव
 नामधय नात्रैव नामधयन् वगालम्बननात्र नात्रैव क्वचन न विकारा नाम वस्त्वन्नि,
 परमाधनो मृत्तिरित्येव मृत्तिरैव तु सु-य वस्त्वन्नि ।"

² Dr P M Modi says that the 'negative' thoughts (like asthulam anaṅga etc) deny only the rūpa' or form of Br and such thoughts of the Akṣara' are not useful for meditation on Br—A critique of the B S II, p 6

is the lower Br is based on the description of the Purusottama or the Highest self as given in the Gita¹ The Puruṣottama is said to be 'Rasa rupa', i.e. of the form of Bliss The chief divine qualities, viz. sovereignty, valour, fame, glory, knowledge and absence of passion are characteristic of Him V shows in Anu III 25 how the jīva comes to lose these six divine qualities at the instance of the will of God The jīva then becomes miserable, and even the Bliss aspect of the Lord is then rendered imperceptible or obscured in it, though it is said to be present at the time of its first emergence It is only through devotion that it can make itself properly disposed to regain the same and realise the Highest Yet, this Highest form is—finally and actually—attainable by a devotee only through the Grace of God. The attributes of God are celestial in essence (i.e. free from any imperfection or limitation) and therefore defects like inequality and cruelty, which are of earthly application only, do not arise in the case of the Lord²

(Kṛṣṇa is not one of the numerous incarnations of the Lord but is God in His first and primordial Self³ as the Bhg teaches ('Kṛṣṇastu bhagavan svayam')) The highest type of Kṛṣṇaite monotheism is witnessed in T D N I 4, wherein V. emphatically declares Lord Kṛṣṇa to be the supreme object of all scriptures, chants, service and so on

(The Akṣara form of Br is said to be the substratum of the world, from which the jīvas, the different incarnations (avatāras), and the 'Guna' and the 'Karma' deities arise The Akṣara is called 'Bṛhat' and the Bliss of Br is only partially manifest in it The world (Jagat) is also said to originate from this Akṣara form and that is why the attribution of 'Vyāpīva' or 'all pervasiveness' to Akṣara is made The Akṣara represents a form of Br which possesses Bliss that is measurable or limited (gaṇit-ānanda)) The followers of the path of knowledge obtain release having the nature of an absorption in this Akṣara form of Br as the 'ground' or an 'abode' of the Lord and His Divine Sport ('taddhāma paramam mama')

The Lord manifests himself in different incarnations (avatāras) in order to fulfil the purpose of securing the general

¹ An 17 18

² T D N I 41

³ T D N I 4 13 Sādhānta muktāvallī also says 'Param Brahma tu Kṛṣṇo hi etc.

welfare of all beings. These incarnations differ in accordance with the employment of His power of Action or that of Knowledge. These incarnations which represent His power of Knowledge destroy the "inner sufferings" of the beings by giving light, while the incarnations that involve His power of Action destroy "outward sufferings" by conquering the demons, etc. Vyasa, Dattātraya and so on go under the former category, while the incarnations as Fish, Tortoise, etc represent the latter

The Prakṛti composed of the three Guṇas gives rise to different effects. Apart from these three 'Prakṛta' qualities, the true form of power ('śakti') which the Lord possesses is instrumental in bringing about the triple Guṇāvatāra or subordinate incarnation, such as Viṣṇu, Brahma and Śiva, representing the Sattva, Rajas and Tamas respectively. They are said to be subordinate, since in their capacity of superintending deities¹, they represent only a part of Br and possess the Prākṛtical attributes, while Br. is free from or beyond the pale of such attributes. (The offerings made to lower deities lead to the attainment of the respective deity only, while the worship of Kṛṣṇa leads to the supreme Bliss. These deities are either His "Vibhūtiṣ" (special manifestations of His power), or "aṁśas" (parts))

This concept of Avatāras and Vibhūtiṣ is taken up from the Bhg (X, XI) and has been so developed as to exercise great influence in the Vallabhite religious circles. The perfect Puruṣottama or Kṛṣṇa, having the form of Bliss, represents the first and the highest divinity, while the Akṣara, having only limited Bliss, acts in the first place as the 'abode' of Kṛṣṇa, and, secondly, is revealed in the forms of Kāla, Karma and Svabhāva.² Kāla or Time is that form through which the changes in the world are effected and is said to be the "chief devotee" of Kṛṣṇa.³ Karma or Action manifests itself as the performance of prescribed and prohibited deeds with reference to beings.⁴ Svabhāva or Nature stands for the natural disposition of God, comparable to the "Body of God"⁵, present in all existential

¹ Aṅg. II 4 14

² T D N II 121

³ T D N II 106

⁴ T D N II III 268 294

⁵ T D N II 113

} This sounds similar to the Western definition of 'Time' as the measure of change (in limited beings)

the nominative singular form "yah" remains unexplained and hanging in the air, as it were

(In T D N II 2, V describes Lord Kṛṣṇa in the form of different sacrifices. He has innumerable divine powers (T D N I 40), of which twelve are said to be the principal. These are Śrī, Puṣṭi, Gīra, Kānti, Kīrti, Tuṣṭi, Ila, Urja, Vidyā, Avidyā, Śakti and Maya (vide V M p 35). The last-named, viz. Mayā, is the divine magic power whereby the Lord really manifests himself in the form of the world (T D N I 23). The powers such as Avidyā, Prakṛti and Maya are said to pertain to the Kṣara, Akṣara and Kṛṣṇa respectively. The powers of the Lord facilitate His manifestation and concealment into various forms. 'Wish' and 'Action' are also referred to as His powers.)

The "Āvesa" ("inspirational") incarnations of God are witnessed in living persons, like Nārada. V stresses his own point of view, after having followed the thread of the Purāṇa-Gīta descriptions in connection with different forms of the Lord. He divides and sub-divides and yet finally says that all are One—although perceived as different.

(The three-fold division into the Para Br., Akṣara and Antar-yāmi stands for the Divine (adhidaivika), the Spiritual (ādhyatmika) and the Elemental (adhibhautika) conditions of the One Br. Thus, we find a kind of trinity within pure Unity in the system of V.) The Highest Br. assumes different forms and yet remains unchanged. Br. is the universe in endless variety of things, forms and phenomena. No earthly individual can comprehend Him in his intimate and ultimate reality—such is His unfathomable greatness, says V,—yet, He is attainable by means of loving devotion. The scriptural statement that He is incomprehensible implies the richness of His qualities and it does not refer to His being absolutely devoid of attributes as Ś. maintains.¹ This position, viz. that Kṛṣṇa, possessing all possible attributes, is the Highest, while Akṣara is the lower Br. (attainable by the followers of the path of knowledge) presents a sharp contrast to Ś.'s stand, viz. that the Nirguna and the Saguna represent the higher and the lower Br. respectively.

This is connected with one of the chief and most valuable contributions of V. to the total Indian philosophical thought

¹ Cf. V's explanation of the B.S. 'Arūpavadeva hi tatpradhānatvat', also 'Iraṅgānāvatvam' etc.

Also cf. V M p 132

112 the restoration and re integration of the personality value as the supreme aspect of the Absolute According to V, the 'Jñānin' proceeds by way of abstraction and generalisation to an Ideal Reality, which is Existence, Intelligence and Bliss—all fused together like rainbow colours into a subsistent self-identical essence of all, like an Absolute White Light But for V., that is mere 'It'—and it lacks the fullest self-integration and participation in the Divine Bliss of a personal God In short, V is looking for an Absolute that fulfils and explains not only the truth seeking intellectual thirst of man, but also the inmost cravings of man's heart that find a fitting consummation in a loving self surrender to God

This seems to be the inner dynamism of V's trend of thought which is, more often than not, more implicit than explicit and mixed with extraneous elements that possibly disfigure or obscure this valuable trend

CHAPTER III

SPECIAL FEATURES

APART FROM the common trends that the advocates of the doctrine of Non duality follow, there are certain minor and yet vital points of difference that give a stamp of originality and a special name to the theory of each Vedānta philosopher. V.'s doctrine is known as 'Śuddhādvaita-vāda' or the theory of Pure Non-dualism, the significance of which can be borne out by those factors, which mark a clear departure from the predecessors and also bring out the salient features of his philosophy-cum-theology Prof Dr. H V Glasenapp characterises V.'s doctrine as "a systematisation of the doctrines of the Bhāgavata-purāṇa in the light of certain epistemological views and sectarian ideas".¹ We shall consider the factors on the basis of which statements such as the one quoted above are made and whether there is a sufficient justification for the same

A Pramānas : Authoritative Canons and Valid Means of Knowledge

(According to V., scriptures are the only means for the comprehension of Br, whose greatness is inconceivable Br, being something supra-worldly or, better said, divine, can be known through scriptures alone) Thus, V regards 'Śabda' or 'Śruti' as the most authoritative and the only means of knowledge concerning Br (The validity of other means is accepted only if the latter are in conformity with the scriptural authority) Ś also gives supreme primacy to 'Śabda', but he regards it to be real from the practical or empirical (Vyavaharika) point of view only, since it forms a part of this ultimately unreal world, while V respects the vedas as God Nārāyaṇa incarnate Seeking shelter under the statement occurring in the Matsya purāṇa²

¹ Die Lehre Vallabhācārya's in Zeitschrift für Indologie Und Iranistik, Bd 9, Leipzig, 1934

² 'अभिनवा इत्यु ये भावा न तस्मिन्नेव योऽयेत् ।' —(113 7), Agu II 1 27.

which are obviously not supported by the Upanisad-teachings, the introduction of the topic of 'incarnations' and 'special manifestations' under the sūtra III 3 3, the emphasis laid on the concepts of 'Grace' and 'Divine Wish', etc.)

V. means by 'Vedas' the entire Vedic literature, comprising the Samhitās, the Brāhmanas, the Āranyakas, the Upanisads and the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsās. The authentic Śruti-literature, which is not opposed to the teachings of the Śrutis, the Vyāsa-sūtras, the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga in their pristine forms, the MBH, the Gītā (only the words of Lord Kṛṣṇa occurring therein), the Rāmāyana, the Purāna-literature (like the Bhg and the Pancarātra texts), etc., are stated to be authoritative (T.D.N. I 3, 15, 46, 78-93, 104, II 19, 48-53, 57-81, 83, 205-209, 243, 277-282, 325-326).

Leaning too much on the teachings of the Bhg. for the exposition of a philosophical treatise like the B S, V. has provoked rather severe criticisms. In his system, the connection with the traditional Vedānta is said to be "more formal than profound."¹ One has to admit that in V's system, the philosophical basis is very thin, and his interpretations of many sūtras are too clear to be read as anything but sectarian. (His explanations and interpretations are, according to Dr. Ghate, "far from satisfactory, besides being sometimes too sectarian"²)

The Lord, in His sacrificial form, is present in the Pūrva-kāṇḍa, while in the Uttara-kāṇḍa, He is represented in His form of Knowledge. Thus (the Pūrva and the Uttara Mīmāṃsās represent the power of Action and that of Knowledge respectively, belonging to the Lord. Therefore, there is no opposition between these two, since they are two different aspects of Br.) The Sarva-nirṇaya chapter of his T.D.N. deals with the questions of 'Pramānas' at length. In the tenth skandha of his Subodhinī, V. says that the Lord himself represents all the four authoritative canons³, which implies the concept of revealed theology, and as the latter depends on a starting-point which is supra-rational, it may not remain purely rational. The very belief, common to all schools of Vedānta, that scriptures are the first authority and that reason, on

¹ Dr. Glasenapp in Die Lehre Vallabhācārya's in Zeitschrift für Indologie Und Iranistik

² 'The Vedānta', p. 176

³ 'भाक्त्वाद्यस्यैव नगमानेव प्रमाणादित्यनुष्ठयन् ।'—Subodhinī, X. 2-38.

account of its limitations, should be accepted only so far as it is in conformity with the scriptural texts, assigns infallibility to Śabda-pramāṇa. Thus scriptural testimony is said to be the only means to the full and complete realisation of the highest principle—an idea which is completely based on faith. Ś says in this connection that the knowledge of the Highest Reality is the end in view, terminating in intuition.¹ The task of reason is to render the contents of the scriptural texts acceptable to all. Even the Bṛ Up statement, viz 'The self has to be seen, heard', etc., implies that the Self that has to be seen, heard, etc., should also be pondered over (mantavyah) and meditated upon (nididhyāsitavyah), so as to create a flash of Ultimate Realisation.² (Thus, reason has its own footing and jurisdiction.) The higher the metaphysical insight and the keener the logical acumen, the more perfect and intelligible the ascertainment of the meaning (artha). (The meaning must emphasize the inner rationality and complete non-contradictedness—which is the end of 'manana', producing complete tranquillity, a condition not empty, but calmly illumined by the full radiance of the ascertained truth.³)

Thus, 'tarka' or reasoning has to be given its due, lest the ascertainment of meaning should be capriciously dogmatic and irrational—(although, the significance of 'realisation' (vyñāna) should not be forgotten in that the Anubhūti or Experience is something beyond the reach of mere reason.)

(Thus, a proper co-ordination of reason and revelation—at least in the sense that the latter is to be accepted and understood, with the aid of reasoning in so far as it is admissible—should be the ideal golden mean. These two together lead to the realisation of the Supreme.)

V postulates a progressive order of importance concerning the four-fold canon of authority, viz the Upaniṣads, the Gitā, the B.S and the Bhg. Hence, (the doubts pertaining to the Ups are said to be solved and explained in the light of the Gitā, those arising in the Gitā by the B S, while the Bhg, occupying the highest peak of authority, is the 'magnum opus' and the

¹ 'अनुभवान्मानं च ब्रह्मविज्ञानं', etc.—Ś B II 1-4 p 441.

² "यं निरपि—'श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः' इति श्रवणव्यतिरेकेण मननं विदधती तत्र मन्तव्यव्यतिरेकेण दर्शयति"—Ś B II. 1.4

³ 'Theological method and Vedānta'—Rev R.V De Smet

Supreme Court of Appeal for V. and his followers) In fact, certain tenets which V has formulated as essential components of his system (such as the concept of a personal God “transcendentally configured” as Lord Kṛṣṇa) are but full-fledged forms given to the Bhg teachings. In trying somehow to explain and justify such tenets while at the same time swearing allegiance to the Upanisadic lore, the position of the aspirant seems to be more confusing than promising—and is apt to arouse serious misgivings, such as the one cited earlier in this chapter. One could argue as follows:

The Upanisads are first said to be explained in the light of the Gīta, etc., hence, the importance which the Bhg is allowed to enjoy by having the first priority amongst authoritative canons, should not be belittled in trying to show that the doctrines formulated out of the Bhg itself have the Upanisads as their foundation. Either the “Uttarottara-sandeha-vāṛakatva” should be eliminated or no efforts should be wasted in proving the unprovable.

V is anxious to answer that what the last and supreme source, viz the Bhg, explicitates is implicit in the preceding ones, and that a harmonious consensus of all the sources would be more convincing and impressive for all—especially so for his opponents who try to show that the Upanisads do not support V’s tenets.

It should not be too often repeated that since each Vedānta thinker has obviously tried to read his own doctrine into the Upanisads and the B S, the charge of twisting them is equally applicable to them all. In so far as the B S represent an attempt at the preservation and compilation of the rich, mystical and speculative genius embodied in the Upanisads, the B S are but secondary in importance—as compared to the Upanisads. Ś has tried to evolve a system of his own as based on the fundamental teachings of the chief Upanisads, and he has explained the B S in the light of the same (to which even the B S ultimately owe their allegiance). As regards other commentators, the works like the Bhg, the V P and those of the Pāncarātra system obtain an overwhelming importance in the formulation of their doctrines, rendering their systems dogmatic.

There is no direct reference to the accepted *means* of valid knowledge in V’s own works, but that is surely because he

regards perception (pratyakṣa) etc. to be valid so far as these are in consonance with the 'Śabda' ¹

B 'Āvirbhāva-Tirobhāva' Theory

Br, the jīva and the jagat, regarded absolutely and in relation to one another, form the basic problems of investigation in Vedānta Philosophy (Br is the highest Reality and the cause of this world) (The theory of Causation necessitates that an effect must be similar to its cause, but neither be absolutely similar lest it should prove a mere identity, nor be totally different so as to give rise to a contingency of anything becoming the cause of anything) say, clay could be the cause of a piece of cloth and so on. The effect can only receive from the cause what (in some way) is contained in the cause, since no one can give what one does not possess.

Now, (the scriptures declare Br to be the first and the only cause and of the nature of existence, intelligence and bliss (Saccidānandātmakam) V propounds that the world is but a form of Br in which only the Sat-aspect of Br is manifest, the other two aspects being rendered imperceptible through the Will of the Lord (The jīvas are said to emerge from Br) like sparks from blazing fire (and have in them the Sat and Cit aspects of Br manifest, the bliss-aspect remaining concealed ('tirobhūta') The bliss-aspect is manifest in the Inner Controller (Super-Soul of the universe as a whole) dwelling in all beings. These manifestations of Br are thus shown to possess a portion of His essence and as a result to be similar to their cause, while, at the same time, they remain distinct from it in the sense that one or more of His essential aspects remain concealed in them. (This explanation of evolution is based on the theory of Manifestation and Concealment which forms a unique feature in the system of V)

Manifestation (avirbhāva) and Concealment (tirobhāva) are said to be inherent causal potencies of the Lord, who delights in such a display of the said powers so as to give rise to variety (vaicitrya). This is His Līla, divine Sport. It is through His own

¹ Witness for instance, "प्रमाणगुणा लावव्यकृद्धारप्रयाजना । तन शब्दाविकृदा साऽऽदरणीयेति भूचितम् ।" श्रुति प्रत्यक्षमैच्छानुमान चतुष्टयम् । एतेरा दित्यमण्डन सर्वैरेव विधास्यते ॥" —Prasthāna-ratnakara, p 33.

wish that He engages himself in such Lila, and it does not in the least put any limitations on Him or imply any need or gain for Him

(The term 'Āvirbhava' is explained by Viṭṭhalanatha, the eminent follower of V, as "fitness for or capability of becoming an object of experience, ¹ and the term 'tirobhava' as "capability of not becoming an object of experience" ²) P R explains the term 'tirobhava' to mean 'concealment' which is not the negation or absence of the power of manifestation in the case of an entity but is the non activity of an existent entity in its possible range of being a cause or an effect ³. In the second skandha of Subodhinī, V states that 'abhava' does not form a separate category, for, there is no transit from being into not being and vice versa, but only from one form of being into another. Thus, the jiva, the jagat and the Antar yamin represent Br with one or more of His essential aspects manifested in them in a graded manner—their intimate reality never coming into being nor ceasing to be

Even the terms 'Janma' and 'nasa', generally understood to convey the sense of 'birth' and 'death', refer to manifestation and concealment respectively ⁴. 'Janth Pradurbhāve', says Panini—and 'pradurbhava' is appearance or manifestation. In the same way, the word 'nāśa' stands for 'disappearance', as corroborated by the Panini sutra 'Nas adarsane

Therefore, there is no non-being, nor any becoming, for, non being does not mean 'nasa' or 'abhava', but simple non manifestation, disappearance or concealment of certain aspects, while 'being' refers to the manifestation of certain aspects through the Divine Wish. When the implicit aspect becomes explicit, it is understood as 'being', while on the obscuration of certain qualities or when the explicit lapses back into the implicit, we call it 'non-being, etc

¹ 'अनुभवविषयत्वयोजयता आविभाव', तदविषयव्योभयता तिराभाव ।' —V M p 44

² Refer to Ch VI 1 for a detailed explanation of the terms and the concepts of Manifestation and Concealment

³ 'सुत पदास्य स्वकायाकारित्व तिराभाव ।'—p 12

⁴ T.D.N II 140-143

'आविभावतिरोभावजन्मनाशविकल्पवद् इति विष्णुपुराणे प्रथमोऽश्लो ।'

(On the basis of this theory of manifestation and concealment, Viṭṭhalanātha, the prominent follower of V, undertakes to refute the Vaiśeṣika theory of the four-fold non existence, such as the antecedent non-existence, etc¹ There is no antecedent non-existence (Pragabhava) of anything, because it simply means that the explicit aspect, say in the case of a pot, is non manifest or that the pot 'qua pot' was implicit in the form of clay, its material cause. (If Pragabhāva were admitted, it would lead to Asat-Karya vada or the theory that a thing can be produced out of nothing) This is the pivotal point on which all Vedānta thinkers have similarly focussed their attacks on the Vaiśeṣika point of view, and in its place, they tried to lay the foundation stone for their own systems by establishing the theory of Sat-Kārya. The other aspects of non-existence (viz Pradhvamsabhava, Anyonyabhava and Atyantābhava) are also declared to be meaningless by Viṭṭhalanātha, who explains them as nothing but phases of manifestation and concealment.)

(The concept of Sat-Kārya or of the existence of an effect even prior to its perception as that effect can be traced back (to a certain extent and in a not specifically Vedantic form) to the R V times. The Nasadiya sūkta is pregnant with the implications of the same problem, viz whether it was 'Sat' or 'Asat' in the beginning that brought about this world. (Nothing can come out of Asat or non existence. Therefore, an effect has to exist (as the Vedantins deduce) in some form or another before its production as an effect.) For example, a pot does exist in the form of clay, its material cause, before it acquires its name and form as a pot. This implies that the material cause and its effect are non-different from each other in their material substance or in essence. All empirical causes lead back to Br, which is the prime cause of everything.)

This doctrine of Sat Kārya is a point of common acceptance amongst all Vedānta philosophers, but the relation as implied 'by 'ananyatva' between the cause and effect has proved to be a turning point that differentiates one system of thought from another. Ś's doctrine of 'Vivarta' or of illusion of an evolute can be briefly stated as follows. Br is the only Reality which remains absolutely unaffected by the distinctions and duality

¹ V.M p- 44 Also refer to Ch. VI 1 for an analysis of his arguments.

pertaining to the world, which is but a figment of Nescience and hence only phenomenally real. But (the followers of the doctrine of Pure Monism challenge Ś vehemently for his explanation of the 'Tadananyatva' section¹ which, according to them, clearly points to 'ananyatva' or non difference between the two, viz the cause and the effect, while S interprets it so as to convey the sense of 'mithyatva' or unreality on the part of the effect.) If the effect, viz the world, were not there at all, the Sutrakara would have stated 'unity of the cause' (Karanaikya) and not 'ananyatva', meaning identity. Again, the great teaching embodied in 'That thou art, which is explained by the followers of Mayavada as referring to oneness or identity of Br and jiva, would stand contradicted since, in their opinion there is nothing apart from Br that can really exist.

Again (the Mahavakya' has been interpreted by S and his followers on the basis of 'laksana' that is partially rejective and partially retentive (bhāga tyaga lakṣana), but that should be resorted to only when the primary meaning is incapable of being understood and applied. And, in fact, V does not need to have recourse to the secondary meaning, since he maintains that there is Pure non difference, without any reference to Mayā.

(A further scrutiny, however, points to a unique aspect of similarity between the views of Ś and V in so far as their interpretations of the text 'That thou art' are taken into consideration.) Although the traditionally accepted view is that Ś's explanation of 'That thou art' is based on 'bhaga tyaga lakṣana', which, no doubt, is true from the technical aspect of the statement yet, in essence what is meant to be conveyed is the idea of Oneness or Unity. The very concept that body, etc., are but products of Mayā and hence unreal is suggestive of the unity of or non difference between the jiva and Br. This stands for complete identity as represented in 'That thou art'. Thus, apart from the stylistic technicalities, the essence of this - Mahāvākya', as interpreted by Ś is absolute Unity.

(V also explains this text as referring to non difference (abheda), but according to him, even the jiva, the jagat, etc.,

¹ 'तत्र कश्चिन् तद्व्यपदेशान् प्रोक्तानि त्वमस्यादिवाक्यानि त्वीकृत्य जीवमात्रं च मह्यं स्वैक्यं तत्तिरिक्तमयं सर्वस्य कारणाराकार्यरूपस्य मिथ्या च परिकल्प्य तद्व्योपश्रुतीनां येन मिथ्या च वेदमन्त्राणि -- त्रिकार ।'—Anu II 3 29

Coming back to the topic of the 'Āvirbhāva-Tirobhāva' theory, we shall try to trace its sources (Dr. Glasenapp says that the very terms, viz. 'avirbhāva' and 'tirobhāva' make an antique impression) These terms are found in Ch Up VII 26 1², Sarvasāra Up 17, B S I 3 19, III 2 5³ (The Bhg often refers to 'antarhita' and 'pradurbhuta', Bhagavat (X-30-1), the Pancarātra-system is also said to mention these in terms of 'Icchaśakti' and 'Kriya-śakti' of the Lord, who possesses countless 'śaktis'.) Pāṇini also explains the terms so as to suggest the same meaning (though not likely in the same "technical" sense), as are offered by V (as referred to earlier) Even before S, there appears to have existed a school which maintained a similar view, since Ś refers in his commentary on B S II, 1 4 and II 1 6 to an 'ekadesi' view, which states that the absence (avibhavanam) of sentiency in the world, which is but an effect of the sentient Br, must be due to some peculiar differentiating transformation It is not unlikely that this reference in the Ś B provided confirmation, if not inspiration, to V, for the enunciation of his theory of Āvirbhāva-Tirobhāva as also of "Immutable Transformation" (avikṛta parināma). V lays down the 'emergence' of a pure and real world out of the pure and real Br, and thereby does not have to face the serious problem—which he thinks is involved in the explanation of S, in referring an unreal world to a real cause, viz. Br

(The 'āvirbhāva' and 'tirobhāva' are explained by Viṭṭhalanatha as the attributes of an entity, and since an entity exists for all times says the author of the V M, its attributes also are eternal.) He then shifts the emphasis from this aspect of his explanation to the rules and regulations pertaining to the manifestation or otherwise of worldly objects and finally proclaims that it is the wish of the Lord alone that works behind everything and hence 'manifestation' is nothing but the quality of becoming an object of the Wish of the Lord that a particular effect should take place or should "appear" or "be perceptible" at a particular time in that particular way, in a particular place, and 'concealment' is the quality of becoming

¹ Die Lehre Vallabhācārya's in "Zeitschrift für Indologie Und Iranistik."

² Please refer to Ch V-2

³ It may be noted that Ś, while commenting on Ch Up VII 26 1, explains these terms to mean 'Utpatti' and 'Pralaya' respectively

⁴ V M, p. 44, also refer to Ch VI 1

an object of the Divine Wish that it should not exist or "not appear" or "not be perceptible" like that at a particular place, etc.¹

C *Asiṅgta parināma vāda* or the theory of Immutable Transformation

The protagonists of the doctrine of Pure Monism accept Br as 'Causa materials' and 'causa efficiens' of the world. The theory of 'Vivarta' declares Br to be only the substratum of this world Māyā being its cause—as exemplified in the well-known "snake rope" case, according to the followers of Ś. But this is not acceptable to V and his followers, who challenge the upholders of the theory of illusion, as follows. The very term 'Vivarta' suggests that the world is "bhramātmaka" or of the nature of an illusion but the scriptural texts like "tadaikṣata", etc., posit reflection or pre meditation on the part of Br. Now, how can one, having thus reflected prior to creating the world, give rise to something illusory in nature? Even if this flaw may be attributed to worldly agents it cannot be ascribed to the highest principle of Reality viz Br. Secondly, if the Saguna, or the lower Br were the creator of the world, it remains to be answered whether the creation belongs to its conscious (cit) aspect or to the Māya aspect as represented by Īsvara, the Saguna. If the first, it would mean that creation could be attributed to 'caitanya' or intelligence—and this would be joining hands with the very doctrine of Pure Monism. If the latter alternative were accepted it would be tantamount to saying that the inanimate Prakṛti or Maya can be the creator—and Ś's eloquently convincing refutation of the Samkhyas in the "Īkṣatyadhikarana" would be rendered meaningless, if he himself were to ascribe creation to the non intelligent aspect of the lower Br. Thirdly, if Br is the efficient cause only how can the world or the souls, said to be its products, merge into Br at the time of dissolution (pralaya)? The effects are seen to merge and get dissolved into their material cause only as is witnessed in the case of pots etc., which when destroyed, lapse back into the form of clay, their

¹ 'एव सत्यम्भिनं कान्दरिनं दश इह कायमव भवति—आवे,यवमावभव तदा तत्र तदा तदा भवति—आवे,यवमावभव इत्यपे सुवन् ।' —V.M. p. '6

For a detailed analysis of the arguments following this, please refer to

change whatever. This is also supported by sūtras like 'Ātma-Kṛteḥ Paṇnamāt' and so on.)

The defects of change, etc., can cling to the earthly material cause, but not to Br, the Prime Cause of all.)

It may be noted here how V is fully conscious of the metaphysical problems that his postulates may involve—here, the Absolute "clay" of the non Absolute (changeable, changing) "pots". He knows that the Absolute *cannot* change—therefore he says that the changes in the pots cannot affect Him. But logic demands that real changing pots cannot be made of unchanging clay, because that involves a contradiction in terms. As a solution, he proposes that differences and changes are only partial—successive manifestations of the Immutable Absolute and yet that Absolute has no separable layers internally, and externally none else to manifest them to.

D *Mayā V's The Theory of Nescience.*

1 *The theory itself*

(It is true that 'Maya' plays a very significant role in the system of Ś, because it virtually occupies as central a position as Br does, even when the latter is accepted to be the Supreme Principle of Reality and 'Māya' as but a fictitious adjunct, which can neither be affirmed nor denied—yet, 'Maya' is not just a fruit of S's own free speculation,¹ as shown earlier, its germs or rather potential starting points are increasingly perceptible in the Vedas, Upan and the Gita (Refer to Ch II), and the fact that every commentator on the B S is obliged to accommodate this 'Maya' in his system—whether in the 'Sāṅkarite sense or otherwise—speaks for itself.²

¹ Refer to V M. A. 112 (also to our Ch VI 1 further down)

² Thibaut says: "The later growth of the Maya doctrine on the basis of the Upaniṣads is therefore quite intelligible, and that there has been no addition to the system from without but only a development from within, no graft but only growth"—Vedānta-sūtras, Introduction cxxv, S B I Series.

³ Even amongst the followers of Ś, there are diverse opinions regarding the problem of the material cause of the world, e.g. the author of 'Padārtha-nirnaya' thinks that Br is the unchanging while Māyā is the transforming cause, Sarvajñatmamuṇi, the author of 'Sāṅkṣepa sārīraka', says that Br is the material cause through the instrumentality

The term 'Māya' has been explained differently by different commentators in accordance with the general scaffolding of their own doctrines. A short resumé of Ś's concept of 'Mayā' may be given as follows

(The very name 'Absolute Non dualism' which the system of Ś bears indicates that Br is the One and Only Reality, absolutely unconditioned and transcendental. The experience of this world based on duality and distinctions is explained as having its root in Nescience (Avidya).) The *Prātibhāsika* or the illusory appearance (as witnessed in the experience of dream-objects), the *Vyavaharika* or the empirical experience (with reference to the worldly objects) and the *Paramarthika* or the Ultimate experience (which stands for the Oneness or Unity of the Self)—are said to be a threefold perception of reality in a graded manner. Ś says that (the objects experienced in dream are real—or are considered by the dreamer to be real—in so far as the dream lasts, but they are not verified or found to be so on waking up from the dream state. They appear to be real, but in reality, prove to be fictitious, and hence are said to be products of Māya. Similarly, the world-objects are unreal from the Ultimate (Paramarthika) point of view, but the jiva considers them to be real since it is labouring under the influence of Maya, but when the knowledge of the Highest as the only Reality dawns upon it, the world objects no more exist for it and the jiva becomes (or better, *realises* that it is and always has really been) one with that Supreme Reality, 112 "Brahmaiva san Brahma pyeti" —

The Vyavaharika state is compared to the state of dreaming, but there is a vital difference between these two categories since the unreality of the dream objects is experienced immediately on waking up while the same in the case of the worldly objects, *remains* to be proved by an experience of the Highest Reality—which (it is asserted) comes *later*. As for its actually taking place the word of the Śruti or the experience

(Continued from pre page)

of Mayā ¶ Vacaspathimisra maintains that Maya resting in the jiva associated with Br, jointly produces the world. Maya being the co-operative or auxiliary cause (sahakarī). The author of *Siddhānta muktavali* says that Mayā power is the real material cause and not Br, who is beyond cause and effect. (This information has been furnished from Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IV pp. 328-29.)

of the mystic, who has already attained to that state, has to be accepted. At the rise of true knowledge, the beginningless Māyā gets destroyed. (Thus, the dream objects as also the world with its multifarious agents and activities are unreal, being but 'Māyika' or products of Nescience.)

Ś says that the scriptures declare Prakṛti or the power of Māyā belonging to the Omniscient God to be the very essence, as it were, of him, extended in name and form, which are products of Avidyā or ignorance, which is inexplicable (indefinable), since it can neither be affirmed nor denied and forms the very 'seed' of the mundane existence.¹

The highest or the Ultimate reality is Br, and the seeker attains to Unity with It in the sense that the film of Nescience is removed from him and he realises his pristine unity with Br. This is the highest state of Reality.

Ramā explains 'Māyā' as 'something miraculous or marvelous', while vigorously launching an attack against 'Māyā vada' as postulated by Ś. The world, which is a matter of everyday experience, cannot, says Ramā, be unreal like the mirage, since the unreality of the latter is demonstrated on the basis of the unsuccessful character of the activity prompted by a mirage, while it is not so in the case of activity based on world-perception.

(Ś's explanation of 'Maya' as something 'inexplicable' (anirvācāniya) is challenged by Rama to be illogical, since the nature of a thing cannot be said to be 'indefinable'. No valid means of knowledge can testify to the existence of 'Maya'. The scriptures declare Maya to be some wonderful or miraculous power of the Lord and not an unreal and beginningless adjunct.) Rama explains that real ignorance consists in the fact that we fall a prey to the power of illusion not by regarding ourselves as real (which we are) but as independent of Br.

(According to V, 'Maya' is one of the powers of the Lord, with which He brings about the manifestation and concealment of the world. It is Avidya or ignorance which obscures the true nature of objects and gives rise to a notion of difference. The world is not unreal as Ś believes, but our experience (pratti)

¹ 'सर्वज्ञेश्वरस्यात्मभूत इति विद्याकल्पित नात्ररूप तत्त्वान्यत्राभ्यामनिर्वचनीये ह्यस्य प्रपञ्चदीप्तभूते नवत्रयेश्वरस्य मायाशक्ति प्रकृतेरिति च श्रुतिस्मृत्यारभिलप्यते ।'

of it is unreal or incorrect, says V. The jīvas wrongly regard themselves to be independent of and different from the Lord; ignorance is thus located in the human mind. Thus, it can be said that every 'avidyā' is also a 'Māyā' that represents things in a fictitious, unreal way, but that fictitiousness concerns not the *that* (the fact) of their existence and reality, but only the *how* (the way) of their *real* reality and existence. And, besides, that 'Avidyā' is, for Rāmā and V., not the apprehension of an illusory object (like Ś's serpent as an object-fictitious "upādhi" on the rope), but an error of judgment in the knowing subject concerning a *real* object, *really* perceived, but wrongly evaluated.

The explanation of 'Mayā' as offered by Rāmā to mean "something miraculous" also hints at the idea that this world is inexplicable, notwithstanding his attack directed against Ś's assignment of "Anirvacanīya" character to 'Māyā'. But the vital distinction in the views of these two Ācāryas is that Ś regards the world to be unreal from the ultimate stand-point while according to Rāmā it is as real as Br. On the other hand both Rāmā and V. agree in that they ascribe unreality to the notion of diversity and distinction (from the Absolute Lord) concerning the world, and not to the world itself, which is real. Again, for Rāmā and V., the power of Mayā is real, while, for Ś it is ultimately and essentially unreal. For the former, the words "mysterious, miraculous" are equivalent to "transcendent, divine, unfathomable" as to the ultimate "how" of its operation, but not as to the fact of its existence and reality or its definability, it is the real power of the Lord which really produces the jīvas and the jagat, which latter are, again, realities. But for Ś, 'anirvacanīya' means that such so called "mayā" together with its products *cannot be defined under any accepted category*.

The very name "Brahma-vada" denoting the doctrine upheld by V. suggests that it stands in sharp contrast to the 'Mayā-vāda', the basis of Ś's philosophy. Some modern thinkers are of the opinion that 'Māyā vada' as such cannot be ascribed to Ś himself, since the term, and concepts of 'Maya' and 'Vivarta' came to be understood and preached in the present light by the followers of Ś coming at least a century later than Ś. If that is so, what we say of Ś, applies directly to the Ś school and its interpretation to Ś himself only in so far as he held it.

V strongly criticises Māyā vāda (Anu II 3 18, 29-32 50 and so on) and questions its upholders as to how could an unreal and impure world come out of the real and pure Br. This difficulty does not arise in his case, because he speaks of the manifestation of the real and pure world out of the Real and Pure Br. According to him, Br is the substratum of contradictory attributes and any opposition that can generally be viewed on the basis of reasoning comes to lose its very contradictory character in the case of Br. All contradiction is said to get dissolved in Him like quarters in Space¹ (since North and South East and West—which are opposites—form the one Space). All 'coincidentia oppositorum' realises itself in Br (Anu III 2 19). The position of Advaita is not subject to contradiction in his case. V contends, because he seeks to establish the non-difference of 'the many realities' (jiva jagat, etc.) through his concept of the part and the whole².

But, it may be asked of the followers of Pure Non-dualism whether this world, which is said to be a 'part' of the Lord, is real in the same sense as Br or not, if it is there would result duality, if not, it means that the world is not as real as Br is—and hence it suggests 'grades' of reality. This would boil down to a mere verbal difference from the theory of Ś according to whom also, the world is 'real from the practical or phenomenal point of view'³.

Secondly, the question as to whether there is any loss to the 'Whole (Amśin) when its 'parts' are destroyed would ordinarily be a hard one to answer for the followers of Pure Monism but for their introduction of the concept of "eternal existence (nitya-satta) of an entity—which, however remains to be justified in itself"⁴. Moreover, the illustration of the emergence of sparks from blazing fire exclusively chosen by V to explain the manifestation of jivas does not seem to be analogously applicable, because the "entrance" or "merging" of the jivas into their primal cause remains unexplained—since

¹ T D N I 71

² 'स्वाशा ब्रह्मशा । तेनाशाशिनोरमेद । स च वास्तव इत्यर्थ ।'

—Śu M p. 28

³ 'नचामेदबोधकश्चुत्यनुपपत्ति । अशाशिभावेनैव तदुपपत्ते ।'—V M p 75

⁴ Refer to Ch VI 1 for a detailed analysis

Ibid

the sparks in the said illustration do not enter back into their cause i.e. fire¹

Many such questions could be raised which would be difficult to answer logically, but V propounds the doctrine of "Viruddha-dharmāśrayatva" of Br. and gives paramount importance to the Wish of the Lord—amounting (in his followers, at least) to total negation of universal and reasonably accepted truths and experiences,² such as 'fire is not hot' Now, if this could be accepted as authoritative there does not arise any necessity to explain anything at all

Such statements would point to the fact that V's system does not draw the line between unanalysed devotional dogma and philosophy and reason—or rather has not sufficiently thought out the relation between religion and philosophy. Such texts provide justification for critical opinions of scholars like Prof. Dr. Glisenapp quoted earlier (beginning of this chapter) *If one is out to preach religion or dogma, one should move about in one's own legitimate fields and should not confuse philosophy with religion and vice versa. Yet the two, if based on Truth, are bound to harmonise in rational man, and are not necessarily opposed to each other, but they unfortunately tend to acquire such character in the system of V as in most of other-sectarian religious systems. No religion is complete which does not integrate man's reason into its synthesis, and no philosophy is complete which does not account for the religious factors involved in man's nature and essence which means his essential relationship to the Ultimate Absolute Reality.*

In contrast to the statements of V's illustrious follower, Ś's commentary on the Gita (XVIII 66) may be noted—which runs as follows: 'Indeed, scriptures are authoritative only in matters not perceived by means of perception and other ordinary pramanas. A hundred scriptures may declare that fire is cold or dark, still, they possess no authority in the matter.'

¹ 'जीवानां ब्रह्मणः सकाशाद्दिभागे तदरात्वे च वाच्ये सति, तथाऽर्चोवत्त्वज्ञानन्ती यन्निररात्वनशेन सकाशाद्दिभागवचनगुत्त्वमशिनोऽज्ञान्तहत्व, पुनरशस्याशिनो प्रवेशयोग्यव, प्रवेशोत्स्यभेदप्रतीतिविषयत्व, पुनर्निमित्तनयाग्यव चाग्निविष्कुलिङ्गे प्रसिद्धमिनि सर्वधर्मबोध-सौकर्यार्थमग्निविष्कुलिङ्गदृष्टान्तेनोक्तवती ।' —V M p 96

² 'ब्रह्मणः सर्वरूपत्वेनापि बहनेरनुष्णत्वरूपत्वेनापि, बहिनरनुष्ण इत्यादिवाभ्यान्यपि प्रमाणाणि ।' —V M p 63

results in a perverted notion of reality (The ignorance which is the prime cause of Samsara in the case of a jiva is said to be five fold (T D N I 24) Its phases are —the absence of knowledge of the real nature of the individual soul, the forgetfulness of the same (nature), superimposition of the inner-organs, the vital breath, the senses and the body (by identifying them with it and vice versa) on the self.) The notions of happiness and misery are subjective only, since the soul cannot distinguish between the real and the unreal, and cannot realise that the manifestation or concealment of Divine Bliss is responsible for producing in it a feeling of joy or misery, in accordance with the degree of obscuration (Complete obscuration means a state of misery, its complete manifestation is pleasure, its partial obscuration is a state without misery—T D N II 286) Thus Samsara is fictitious and the jiva gets caught in the meshes of it through the five fold play of ignorance as shown earlier. The jiva is infected with a perverse notion, because of which it regards itself as different from Br. So, the unreal character (falsity) belongs to the idea and to the judgment about the objects and not to the object in question (It is the wrong perception of the world on the part of the jiva which is unreal (false) and not the world itself V himself says in this connection that¹ the world is an effect of the Lord, and it acquired that form through Maya, His power of Avidya giving rise to Samsāra in the case of individual souls. It is ignorance which confuses the soul and creates an unreal object in the mind similar to the worldly objects and projects the same on that object within the sense-range.) When the jiva tries to perceive the object, it is this unreal object that is cognised and the knowledge soiled by such unreal perception produces confusion. Thus it is such perception that is unreal and not the object (Refer to Ch II D for details)

The line of demarcation between jagat and samsāra is a special feature in the system of V, who subscribes to Anyathakhyāti for the explanation of an error (For the characteristics of the jagat, refer to Ch II D)

¹ 'प्रपञ्चा भवतः कार्यरूपो माययाऽभवत् ।

तच्छब्दाऽविषया स्वयं जीवसंसार उच्यते ॥—T D N I. 23

E 'Brahma vāda' Or 'Abhinnavimittopādāna kārana-vāda'

The belief that the Upaniṣads teach Br to be the 'Summum Bonum' proved significant in that the Vedānta commentators felt bound to embody in their systems 'the doctrine of Br'. V chooses the title 'Brahma vada' for his system (in addition to Śuddhā dvaita vāda, which is more popular) in order to convey that his is the only system which truly represents the 'doctrine of Br', as against the attempts of other thinkers

According to the followers of the doctrine of Vivarta, Br is the substratum for the illusion of an evolution, of which Mayā is the cause. It remains to be considered whether the above theory or the doctrine that Br is the efficient cause only or that Br is both the efficient and the material cause of the world applies to the 'Brahmavada' in the right sense of the term. This necessitates a bird's eye view of the historical background.

The Sāṃkhya (claiming to be based on the Upaniṣads) deduced the world to be a modification of the trine Prakṛti from the perception of the triple characteristic (happiness, misery and infatuation) to be found in all beings, basing their arguments on a realistic approach—what is in the effect must be in its cause. But this did not satisfy the Sage Gautama, since he saw that the non-intelligent Prakṛti without the aid or control of any intelligent principle, cannot be the cause of the world. Hence, he propounded his Paramānu vada which states that atoms, controlled by an Īsvara, bring about this world. The Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and the followers of Yoga accept the existence of an Īsvara, but each does so from a different standpoint and with a different purpose. In the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy, Īsvara is the creator of the world and the efficient cause, while in the Yoga system, Īsvara is known as the prime 'Guru' or the controller of the universe. The Naiyāyikāś criticise the theory of Parināma and postulate Ārambha vāda and for the sake of strengthening their own logical position, speak of an Īsvara. The Yoga darsana accepts the existence of an Īsvara for the sake of facilitating concentration etc., in the case of a meditator and for producing divine beauty through the grace of the Almighty. Each of the said systems defines the term 'Īsvara' in accordance with its concept of whether Īsvara is the efficient or the non-active cause of the world as the case may be. The Nyāya sūtra 'Īsvaraḥ karanam, puruṣakarmāphalyadarśanat' lays down Īsvara to be the efficient cause. The Vārtika

on this sūtra speaks of the latter as being a siddhanta sūtra while the Tatparya kara viz Vacaspati misra takes it to be a *prima facie* sutra and interprets the term Karana as meaning the material (upādāna) cause

Now if the view of the Tatparyakara were accepted it would mean that the doctrine of Īsvara being the efficient cause which forms the basic principle of the Nyaya School was not known to its founder This is rather inconceivable and appears obviously to go against the sense involved in the text itself

The Paramanu vada was not at all acceptable to any school of Vedānta—and Ś may be quoted for once as the mouthpiece of them all when he condemns this doctrine as absolutely unworthy of being accepted¹

When such was the state of affairs with different schools advocating different solutions and when sages like Audulomiśita Nārada and others were discussing the Paramanu vāda here came forth Vyasa the author of the B S

Now if Br were the efficient cause only the scriptural statements like Yato Va imani etc and Tajalan would stand contradicted since the dissolution of the world in Br as is referred to in the sruti texts is possible only if Br were its material cause In order to be faithful to the scriptural texts like — Tadbhutayonim paripaśyanti dh raḥ Kartaramisam purusam Brahmayonim as well as to give due importance to the express sense conveyed by the term Yoni occurring therein and to that of the statements declaring dissolution (laya) in Br (the author of the B S seems to have in view the theory of Br being both the efficient and the material cause Only in that case the Ch Up statement propounding the realisation of all through that of one can be vindicated Thus those who speak of Br as the efficient cause only are not real Brahma vadins since Abhinna nimittopadana karana is what Brahma vada stands for²)

(This theory is upheld by V and his followers who question the propriety of Ś's view which rests on the theory of illusion and the ascription of creation to the lower Br The followers of V raise the question as to whether this lower Br known as

¹ 'अनेवज्ञानान्तरनिसुदस्य वारु शरकारणशुनि कुरुद्वारु यतिप्रवैरुच सिप्यै मन्वा षिभ अररिगृह्णावत्वारु अदन्नमवानपद्धारिन्नु परमाणुवाद काया श्रेयाधिमिरिनि वात्यगद । —Ś B II 2. 17

² This extract is furnished from Brahma-vādaḥ of Śrī D's see Mahārāja.

Īsvara, who is the substratum of the world, is real or not, if real, it means the acceptance of dualism (dvaita), if unreal, it cannot be the substratum. And how can illusion arise in the absence of a substratum?

Again, when one speaks of 'Vivarta', it signifies that the world is illusory or unreal. Now, how can Br, who thought of creating the world,¹ bring about something illusory in itself? Illusion can never be preceded by thoughtfulness or reflection (īksana)—at least in the case of Br, the Supreme Reality. Secondly, even in the case of a juggler who gives rise to an illusory appearance and confuses the onlookers, the latter are *not* illusory, while in the case of Br creating the illusory world, the jivas, as forming part of the world, *are* unreal. Thus, the jivas, which are illusory, cannot be made to experience any illusion. Further, if Avidya resting in the jīva were the cause of illusion, there is no necessity of speaking of an Īsvara at all.)

Here, it is necessary to point out that Ś may answer the above challenge by clarifying his stand that even the wish to create, the creation itself and so on belong to the lower Br, who himself is part and parcel of the whole 'Play', and even statements like 'Sa devata', etc, refer to him only. When the jivas etc, are in a state of suspended animation (in one of the recurring world-dissolutions), this deity or Īsvara also is in a dormant condition and the desire to create, etc, can be predicated of him only, the highest Principle remaining absolutely unaffected. Thus, even when the world is said to be an illusion, the 'īksana' or reflection on the part of the creator does not come in its way, since the whole process along with Īsvara and his reflection forms the Illusion.

Secondly, the analysis of the illustration of the juggler (which the opponents point out to be incongruous) has to be re-analysed. It is true that the onlookers are *not* illusory, but they themselves do not form a part of the illusion created by the juggler, since they know their own nature as onlookers and that the 'show' is illusory, while in the case of the jīvas, they themselves form a part of the illusion and do not know their true nature. The parallel illustration would be that of a prince, who, through basic ignorance of his being a prince, considers himself to be the son of a farmer, etc. Illusion ('bhrama') can pertain

¹ 'तदेव न बहु स्वाम्'...etc

to a conscious entity ; thus, when the jīvas are said to be unreal, what is meant is that the jīva qua jīva is unreal, but when the veil of ignorance is removed from it, there dawns on it a complete Realisation of the Unity of Br. Again, the distinction of Cosmic Nescience (Māyā) from the individual ignorance (Avidyā) is very well known and it speaks for the necessity of an Īsvara

In opposition to the theory of Superimposition, as laid down by Ś, the followers of Pure Monism argue as follows. In the illustration of the sky, on which blackness, dirt, etc., are superimposed, the sky is not absent (unperceived) (apratyakṣa), since the pronoun 'idam' or 'this' in 'this is dirty' (Idam malīnam) refers to something which is known, while in the case of the Cosmic Superimposition which the followers of Ś speak of the substratum is said to be unknown, and there cannot be any superimposition on a substratum which is unknown. To elucidate, one should analyse the statement 'Idam malīnam', referring to the sky. Now, does the term 'idam' stand for the sky or for 'malīnya' (dirt) ? If the first, the postulate of the substratum being unknown is contradicted, if the latter, well, there is no case of superimposition since 'malīnya' as understood in connection with clouds, etc. supported by the sky is what is meant by 'idam'—and that is "the cognition of that as that"¹ and not the case of "atasmin tad-buddhiḥ", as the definition of superimposition would require. Therefore, Br cannot be the substratum, and if it is the substratum, it must be "Knowable" (known ?)—(tasya jñatavam) >

(Thus, the followers of Pure Monism secure their stand as the real 'Brahmavādins' and reject the claims of the Sāṃkhyas, Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and Kevalādvaitins to have preached the "doctrine of Br" in its true light >

This forms a unique feature in V's system which gives it the title 'Brahma-vāda', often used in place of 'Śuddhādvaita-vāda'. Śrī Dikṣitjee Mahārājī, an authority on the Śuddhādvaita system in his article on 'Brahmavādaiḥ'² labels the followers of the 'Vivarta' theory as the "enemy hidden in one's own house", since they do not accept Br to be the material cause, in spite of the fact that they profess to be 'śiṣṭas". Thus, Ś's attack

¹ 'तस्मिन्नेव तद्बुद्धिः ।

² Refer to Ch. VI 4

against the Sāmkhyas, etc., as summed up in their being unworthy of being accepted within the fold of 'Śistas' could be turned against himself, says the authors of the 'Brahmavada',

✓ *F. Puṣṭi or the Doctrine of Grace*

Like the doctrine of *Mayā*, which is commonly understood to postulate an absolute unreality of the world (while its upholder, viz Ś, attributes 'phenomenal' reality and not absolute unreality to the world, when referring to the latter as a figment of *Māya*), the doctrine of *Puṣṭi* as advocated by V has been misunderstood by many scholars¹ to teach Epicureanism. Gross injustice has been done to its founder, who attempted to open a new path of grace for the benefit of those who were unable to take their stand against the circumstantial forces and take recourse to the traditional paths of action, knowledge or devotion. These are the three well known means for the attainment of salvation, which consists, generally speaking, in the freeing of the 'entire' man—spiritually, emotionally and ideally. Different philosophers have advocated different paths as leading to this end—and Ś and V happen to represent the two extremities in that the former lays great stress on 'knowledge' versus other means, while the leaning on the aspect of 'devotion' is overwhelming in the case of the latter. However, neither Ś nor V omits or rejects the field of that particular means which was deemed to be of supreme significance by the other. Thus, even according to Ś, the highest end is not just the knowledge of Br, but the knowledge culminating in Experience of the Highest, which necessarily brings in the aspects of meditation, concentration, etc., which are not foreign to devotion' (The small poetic compositions attributed to Ś also endorse the same view.) In the same way, V also gives a place to knowledge in his system as an auxiliary or a stepping stone to 'bhakti'. Yet, the stress or emphasis that Ś and V lay on 'knowledge' and 'bhakti' respectively characterises them as representative of the two extremes.

V discusses the significance of the paths of action, knowledge and bhakti and their relative worth in the second chapter of his T D N and finally declares that the path of devotion characterised by the Grace of God is the best and the easiest of all.

comes from Him. This idea has received specific attention and importance at the hands of V, who maintains that 'divine choice' (varana) alone is the means, suggesting thereby the absolute inefficacy of other means—if not supported by "His Grace". V. says in his 'Pusti Pravāha-Maryādā' that since this doctrine of devotion has been declared (in the Bhg) to be the supreme path, there is no doubt with respect to the existence of Pusti or grace. (This 'grace' stands for the favour of the Lord and it is planted in particular souls who have a tendency or an inclination to follow the path of devotion for the attainment of the Lord. These are the "chosen" ones of the Lord and are called the Pusti souls. [For details, please see Ch V 4 (d)]

The Lord is known to be the rescuer or saviour of all and is called the "beloved of the destitute (have nots)" (Niskācana jana priya). In his Sannyasa Nirṇaya, V refers to the Gopis as the 'spiritual guides' since it is the examples of their spontaneous and selfless love for the Lord that directs one's course of life and the practice of particular means to attain the Summum Bonum.

Looking back upon the development of the concept of devotion in retrospect one can easily see that although the idea of devotion-cum grace was present in earlier works starting with the Upanisads down to thinkers like R and his predecessor Ālvars it is at the hands of V that it reached a state of complete systematisation and enjoyed the status of a cardinal doctrine in the 'Suddhadvaita' School of Vedānta. It enjoys supreme importance in the system of V and represents a distinguishing characteristic, as it were, of the Vallabha sampradaya.

In Anu 11.3.42, V distinguishes between the means and fruits in the case of the followers of Maryada and of Pusti, which are the two chief aspects of devotion. In the former (which we can call "dharma karma marga") God bestows fruits on men in accordance with their actions, while in the latter, there is no such expectancy or measure of correspondence since it is out of Grace alone that He offers fruits to human beings. The Lord's graciousness is the only "measure unmeasured". The followers of Maryada carry out the scriptural injunctions, depending, for the attainment of fruits, on their personal efforts and also acknowledge their dependence on the Lord while the Pusti bhaktas do not envisage any necessity

to the Lord is characteristic of devotion, but its wilful misuse at the hands of men who take the line of least resistance and fall a prey to passion is downright degeneration—although it must be admitted that such a “diseased” condition is due to the later interpreters and should not, therefore, be attributed to the founder of the Doctrine of Divine Grace

Apart from this historical aspect, the concept of Puṣṭi seems to put out of court the dignity of human efforts in that it postulates the utter inefficacy of all means except the Grace of God. If the fruits are the effects of one’s actions, and if the performance of actions depends solely upon the will of God, where is the justification for ‘goodness’ or ‘evilness’ of the actions performed or even for the expiatory rites or even for the rules and regulations pertaining to the attainment of fruits, etc? If God is the prime and sole controller of man’s destiny and doings, man should never be held responsible for anything at all

The characteristics of the Puṣṭi marga are described at length by Hariraya in his ‘Brahma-vadaḥ’. These are as follows. That is the path of Grace wherein the ‘Divine Choice’ has not even the smallest reason behind it, the ‘choice’ is through His wish, and is explained as “the acceptance of an individual as one’s own”¹—which, again, does not take place in strict accordance with his fitness or antecedent merits. This grace is such that even in the absence of any means, the fruit may arise, e.g. in spite of being most unfit, Pulindya attained to the highest, while the full paraphernalia of means may not yield any result at all². The path of grace stipulates that the absence of all means acts as the means³ towards the attainment of the Supreme fruit, the fruit itself becoming the means of its own attainment and fruition in Bliss.

The very idea of ‘grace’ precludes the necessity of performing any actions or of carrying out any scriptural injunctions. The ‘blessed’ do not in the least give any thought to defects, etc., on the part of the Lord, and always consider that whatever the

¹ ‘स्वीयत्वेनाङ्गवत् ।’

² ‘स्वायत्वेनाङ्गीकृतौ चावक्तव्यसाधनाना यत्र न कारणता, स शुद्ध पुष्टिमार्ग । यत्र साधनसद्गन्नेष्वपि न तत्फलं, यदत्यन्तायाम्येषु पुलिन्द्यादिषु दीयते ।’—P R p 20

³ ‘सर्वसाधनरा ह्यन्य फलान्तौ यत्र साधनम् ।

फलं वा साधनं यत्र पुष्टिमार्गः स कथ्यते ॥’—P R p 19

Lord does is for the best (The devotee accepted within the fold of "blessed ones"¹ does not look upon his body, etc., as his own, but dedicates everything at the feet of the Lord)

'Pusti' is the only thing an individual clings to when he realises the utter futility of earthly means and human efforts. V. does seem to be aware of the difficulty in assigning to the individual soul complete dependence on the divine wish, and in order to safe guard the position, he accepts that 'a bit of liberty' (*Kiñcitsvātantryam*) belongs to the *jiva* in that it can show an inclination² or otherwise towards the path to be followed. But, if this "inclination" (*ruci*) must also be planted into it by Lord Kṛṣṇa, this assignment of a "little liberty" proves to be nothing but a mirage, since all possible assignments, according to V's system, can ultimately come from Br alone³.

Thus, V. appears to be a thorough 'Predestinarian', as his doctrine of Pusti bears out. Although V's idea of selfless devotion and complete dedication to the Lord is most worthy of being translated into action, the total dependence on the Divine Wish which the concept of Pusti implies, leaves little or no scope for the human endeavour and its fruitfulness. V. tries to explain away the difficulty by pointing out that "the Lord takes into account the actions of the *jiva* in order to bestow

¹ It is alright to speak like this in the abstract but who is to decide whether a particular *jiva* is a 'blessed' one or otherwise? One *jiva* may say that it is the "chosen" one of the Lord and hence may not undertake any activity—(or even do evil deeds?) and still claim that it will attain to the Highest, since it is the 'chosen' one of God—and who can prove that or refute it?

² 'कृत्प्रयत्नापेक्षस्तु विहितप्रतिपिडावैयर्थ्यादिभ्यः ।'—'यथा बालः पुत्रं यत्मानं पदार्थं-
शुश्रूषो वर्णयन्नपि तत्प्रयत्नाभिनिवेशं स्पृष्ट्वा तथैव कारयति ।'—Anu II-3 42

(The words 'kiñ Cit svātantryam' are the clarification given by Śrī Dīkṣitjee mahārāja)

³ Yet a further problem deserves careful consideration—viz whether V. is not (gropingly) operating with the double sense that '*ruci*' can have one is that of *instinctively* felt attraction and the other that of the *willed* consent to that attraction. A person may feel strongly attracted to sugary dainties but he does not yield to that attraction because he knows he is diabetic and sugar is poison for him. Is it possible for the *jiva* even when the instinctive call of '*ruci*' is implanted in it by the Lord, to refuse to yield to it² by means of that "little liberty"? V's sense of realism which made him react against Ś's *Māyāvāda*, makes him alert to this central feature of the reality of the *Jivas*—but, if so, obviously at the cost of internal consistency.

the fruits thereof, and in making it undertake a particular activity, He considers its efforts; these efforts depend on the desire of the jiva, and the desire is dependent on the "pravāha" or the stream of transmigratory existence'. These considerations of different aspects are embodied by Him in the Vedas, and hence, not even the minutest of flaws can touch Br¹.

Viṣṭhala, the author of 'V M', refers to this explanation given by V and offering his own interpretation of the said, sūtra (II-3 42), concludes that everything depends on the wish of the Lord²

The grace of the Lord, says Prof G H Bhatt, an eminent scholar and a specialist in Vallabha Vedānta, is the "most powerful and unfailing means of enjoying the highest bliss". It leads to the attainment of the Lord, who is "Bliss par excellence?"

¹ "फलान्न कमापन्न । कर्मकारण प्रयत्नापन्न । प्रयत्न कामापेत् । काम प्रवाहापन्न
नि मयादात्तार्त्तं वै चकार । नतो न अल्पिणि तापगधोर्त्तपि ।"—Anu II 3 42
154

² Refer to Ch. VI 1 for details

³ 'The Cultural Heritage of India', Vol III

CHAPTER IV

THE PATH OF DEVOTION

WE ARE accustomed to call man a rational animal. While this is true in the sense in which the statement is made, it is equally true that man is an animal sharing emotionality or feeling common to all animals, though on a much wider and deeper range. The basic feeling common to the lower order of living beings is one of curiosity, surprise or fear at the sight of something unfamiliar. Man, from the very earliest times, has also reacted, with a sense of fear and awe, towards objects or phenomena, which may be unfamiliar or very often inexplicable and therefore mysterious, or even grand and majestic and beyond his control. In India, the earliest literary record of the Āryans, viz. the RV, bears ample testimony to this sense of fear and awe in the various hymns and prayers addressed to deities like Rudra, Parjanya, Maruts, etc., embodying the terrible or wondrously awful aspects of Nature. The hymns addressed to Usas breathe the joy, the admiration and the awe which this splendid phenomenon of the morning light evokes in the heart of the seer. However, the hymns addressed to Varuna appear to strike a different note altogether in so far as the poet conceives himself as a lowly person, whose deeds—good or bad—are accountable to the King, Varuna, who rules through his host of spies over the world and is the custodian of the physical and moral order—especially with regard to truth—in the universe. Varuna's figure inspires awe and fear but also a sense of confidence in his mercy and forgiveness to repentance in the heart of one who has contravened his regulation, consequently, the Varuna hymns have, besides the moral tone, a more personally earnest heart to heart approach, a lyrical element and a devotional fervour—rather unusual in the RV.

There is another basic feeling of instinctive attraction, love. Although in the hymns of the RV., deities are seen often addressed as "father" "mother", more often an "friend" (RV I 164 33., I 89 10, III 18 1, VIII 1 6, etc.), yet it would appear that these forms of address are rather formal than individual—in the sense that they do not express a feeling of intense affection or devotion to the deity concerned. And yet touches of a more heart-felt friendliness and attachment based on thankfulness are not entirely missing, especially with regard to some deities, Agni in particular. These are elements that form a favourable atmosphere for the development of the kind of loving devotion embodied in "bhakti", but they are not yet exactly the same. It is only later in the development of Indian culture and religion that this basic feeling of love is employed as a foundation for religious and philosophical systems characterised by devotion.

This basic feeling of love or the germ of devotion seems to have been pushed into the background by the increasingly deteriorating trends of worship-by-sacrifice, which was characteristic of the Brāhmaṇa-period. Such trends ending in the stagnation of the Brāhmaṇa literature were inimical to any kind of truly religious "bhakti", and hence the latter came to be suffocated in the professional circles and works of the period. But the elaborate and mechanical system of worship that had evolved then had to make room for religious speculations of a more natural and satisfying order. The Upaniṣad literature refers to 'Upāsana' or meditation of some type or another and it marks a step forward in the direction of "devotion"—although this meditation seems to be based more on intellectual concentration than on religious or emotional worship. In any case, 'Upasana' or fervent meditation on entities symbolic of Br magnified them, and the consequent glorification of the same led to an affectionate devotion.

(The Upaniṣads abound in descriptions of Br as possessed of attributes (Saviśeṣa) as also devoid of the same (Nirviśeṣa). The very concept of devotion connotes a personal God, who forms the personal response to and the pivot, as it were, of all the devotional thoughts and offerings,—and this being so, the Saviśeṣa texts of the Upaniṣads contribute chiefly to the growth of "bhakti". The T Up conceives of the Lord as having bliss (ānanda) as His essence; and one, who has,

experienced this bliss of the Highest, has nothing to fear¹ The Katha and the Mu Ups clearly refer to the idea of grace² which plays a very significant role in the full-fledged form that "bhakti" acquires at the hands of the later Vaiṣṇava teachers or theologians The Śvet Up mentions that "bhakti" is a deep attachment to the Lord³ The heart of a devotee is filled with a spontaneous love towards the Lord and it sings in praise of the same

The MBH has stored the floating mass of the thoughts that had become current by its times and its Nārayaniya-section in particular deals with the doctrines of the Bhāgavata-cult, which came to acquire special importance later But it is the Bhagavad-Gīta that gave a definite shape to the doctrine of "Bhakti" and preached it in a clear and attractive manner The new path envisaged therein represents a synthesis of the best features found in the Ups, the Sāmkhya and the Yoga systems and is thus the 'cream of the cream of religious trends then prevalent'. Thus the Gīta has brought about a synthesis between the Vedānta of the Upaniṣads and the new cult of Bhakti, thereby securing a tempering of the extreme rationalism of the former, and affording an equality of opportunity for salvation to all irrespective of caste and sex, and—what is equally important—an avoiding of the dangers of blind sectarianism by declaring preference for the "Jñāni bhakta", who may be presumed to know that the different sectarian Gods are really aspects of the same Absolute Principle and so, rising above mere blind sectarian prejudice, to inculcate a lesson of tolerance for all modes and forms of divine worship⁴ (Incidentally, it may be noted that the generally accepted date of the Gītā is the 4th Cent B C, while some modern scholars like Dr Belvalkar have rejected and refuted Dr Garbe's theory, viz, that it belongs to the period not earlier than 2nd Cent B C—2nd Cent A D⁵)

An object of adoration with some distinct personality rather than an abstract principle was necessary for the ordinary people

¹ 'आनन्द मह्यो विद्वान् विमेति कुतश्चन ।'

² 'जायमाना प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न भयया न बहुना श्रुतेन ।
यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यन्त्येष आमा विवृणुते तन् स्वान् ।'

³ 'यस्य हृद्रे परा भक्तिर्षया हृद्रे तथा श्रुती ।' etc

⁴ Belvalkar, 'Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedānta' (1925)—(p 116)

⁵ For details please refer to Dr Belvalkar's 'Lectures on Vedānta Philosophy', Part I, Lecture III

while the term, 'Bhagavata dharma' became current since it was preached by 'Bhagavan', the Lord Kṛṣṇa. Lord Kṛṣṇa belonged to the Sāttvata race¹ and hence the term 'Sāttvata dharma' came to be attributed to the religion promulgated by him. Offering different explanations of the term 'Pancaratra', Dr Belvalkar says² that the following explanation seems to be more legitimate than the others. It is "a treatise in which the great Puruṣa offers a 'Satra' for five nights as a means of obtaining pre-eminence in the world and, as a consequence of the 'Satra', assumes the five-fold manifestations in his Para, Vyūha, Vibhava, Antaryāmin and Arca forms."

This religion seems to have been in existence in some form before the spread of Buddhism (6-5th Cent B.C.), and after its development and formulation in the MBH, it gave rise to various 'Sampradayas' or more definite religious sects from the 11th Cent A.D. onwards.

From the historical point of view, this religion can be roughly divided into three periods: (i) from about 500-400 B.C. to the 3rd Cent A.D., marking its origin and the process of development upto this time when it came to be formulated in the MBH, especially in the Gīta, and became popularised in that formulation, (ii) from the 3rd Cent A.D. to the beginning of the 11th Cent A.D., the period representing its growth at the hands of the early Ālvars of the South or Tamil country, and (iii) from the 11th Cent to modern times marking the contribution of the Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas, starting with Nathamuni, Yamunācārya and Rāmanuja—to the present-day practices of the Vaiṣṇava-cult.³ The first phase marks the bhakti cult as taught by the author of the Gīta⁴ and other MBH authors and their predecessors against the atheistic attitude that had arisen consequent upon the overwhelming influence that the 'soulless' practices of the Brahmanic sacrificial cult were exercising then. Notwithstanding the theory of void and the ultimate denial of God as such which is envisaged by Buddhism and Jainism, these two systems gained wide spread popularity and support, since they

¹ MBH Ādiparvan, 218-12 (IX.9-49 Bhg.) as stated in Bhandarkar's V.Ś. and minor religious systems.

² Belvalkar's lectures on the B.S. (II n 44, pp 8, 9)

³ R.G. Bhandarkar's V.Ś. and minor religious systems, p 50

⁴ As its originator, Bhandarkar designates a conjectural Vāsudeva (a teacher later on confused with Kṛṣṇa) who fought in the MBH.

do admit of many deities and goddesses and refer to their founder preachers as objects of worship that increasingly play the role of a personal deity supreme. This is especially true of Mahāyana Buddhism, but it also applies largely to the Hinayana and to Jainism, at least for all practical purposes of life.

As against Buddhism and Jainism, the great Mīmāṃsakas like Śābaraswāmin and Kumārilabhatta promulgated the path of (sacrificial) action, their attention being chiefly focussed on the theoretical interpretation of different ritual texts rather than on the actual performance of sacrifices, etc., in accordance with the prescribed injunctions. But their ultimate aim was to give a methodical help for the correct performance of the ritual. Gaudapada and Ś cut to size the tall claims of the followers of the Karma-path, viz. that Karma alone is the means to the Summum Bonum, thus, on the one hand, these two great metaphysicians assigned to Karma its rightful position by subordinating it to Jñāna, and, on the other hand, re invigorated the withering tree of Theism in opposition to the Buddhistic stand. The Viṣṇuite teachers who succeeded them did not consider the path of knowledge as fully correct or adequately fulfilling man's aspirations and potentialities, and launching an attack against it, they enunciated the doctrine of devotion as the right crowning means to the attainment of Summum Bonum.

The path of devotion as advocated by the five great Vaiṣṇava teachers, viz. Rāma, Nimbarka, Madhva, Vallabha and Chaitanya, represents the "Vaiṣṇava" religion. Rāmā was the first such Vaiṣṇava teacher and philosopher, and his doctrine had its widest appeal in the South V, who is traditionally believed (though on no convincing grounds) to have followed in the foot steps of Viṣṇuvāmin¹ in the formulation and systematisation of his theory of Pure Monism, found many followers in Gujarāta, while the Chaitanya movement had its home in Bengal, and Nimbarka's more round about Mathura and Vṛndāvana.

Notwithstanding certain differentiating aspects in these schools, they all go under the banner of Viṣṇuism, since they exhibit a thread of similarity which runs through their fundamental postulates. They all accept Viṣṇu in one form or another

¹ For details please refer to Prof. G. H. Bhatt's article "Viṣṇuvāmin and Vallabhācārya" in the proceedings of the Seventh All India Oriental Conference, 1935 Baroda.

(either as such or as Kṛṣṇa or as Narayana and so on) as the object of meditation and advocate the path of devotion as the chief or even exclusive means for the highest attainment. Each Vaiṣṇava school has thus given us a particular type of philosophy, a set type of devotional service and God Viṣṇu etc. as the object of worship.

The first Ācārya we know of in this connection is Rama although there flourished before him many Alvars of the South. These are said to be twelve and are highly respected in the school of Rama. The credit of putting a check to the spread of Buddhism and Jainism in the South goes to these Ālvārs. The doctrine of Bhakti advocated by Rama is chiefly based on meditation or concentration on the highest principles. On the other hand, Bhakti as depicted in the Bhg. is of the Dravidian type which was preached and practised by the Alvārs. This type of devotion is rooted mainly in emotion and it presents a contrast to the more sober and intellectual type of devotion spoken of in Gita as also to the contemplative devotion as found in the teachings of Rama.

The term Bhakti and the concept of Bhakti

The term bhakti is derived from the root bhaj and its meaning is originally participation, partaking, then worship or service. This is its derivative meaning while it is normally understood to mean in a more technical sense mental service in the form of love. This devotion has nine characteristics² according to the description of it as given in the Bhg., the fourth basic work of supreme authority and the main stay of V's doctrine. The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics notes

The Bhg. was selected by V as the foundation of his system. The original purpose of the book was to symbolize spiritual devotion under the figure of earthly love, but in its interpretation by succeeding Mahatajas of the sect it was converted into a code of vicious immorality, not only sanctioning but enjoining the most ludeous sensuality. Being predominantly emotional this religion of devotion as propounded by V is more important in its practice than in its theory—and hence as Growse

¹ दृष्टमेवा मुक्ता वाया मान । सा परं नता ॥

चतनप्रयण सवा

(मदान्तुतावता—V 1cd—2a)

² धवर्णं कावने विष्णा रगरण पापमेवन । अ ल वान नारयं सख्यमा ननिदन्म ॥

नपनाऽपिता विष्णो भविष्यन्तकलवणा ।

has said¹—it was difficult to preserve the cult secure from sensuous passion. But V seems to be aware of the possibility of the tenet of Bhakti in its various aspects being abused in accordance with the prompting of one's lower instincts as it proved to be at later stage and perhaps that is why he warns against this at the very outset by stating that the love spoken of in the path of devotion is on a divine plane.

(The mental service of the highest order consists in the flow of the heart into the Lord. The pure form of devotion as advocated in the Bhg seeks no fruit and is said to be devoid of all personal motives. It is this devotion that tears off the dark veil of infatuation, etc., which encompasses the jiva. In the T D N, V declares that the only scripture is the Gita, sung by the son of Devaki, the only God is Kṛṣṇa, the chant consists of his names alone, and the one and only activity is the service of that Deity.² For V—as we have already indicated further up—devotion is the means as well as the end. He defines it in his T D N as “a firm and supreme love for God preceded by a full comprehension of His greatness” through this alone one can attain salvation.³ (It is the grace of God that directs one to the path of devotion. Even the law of Karma is dependent on the will of Lord. The scriptural texts such as ‘By him alone is He attainable whom He chooses’, etc. and ‘Him alone does He make perform good deeds whom He wishes to uplift, him whom He wishes to lead downwards. He impels to undertake bad deeds etc. support the same idea.)

Accepting the definition of ‘Bhakti’ as offered by V to mean ‘service of God through affection’, Gopeśvara, the author of Bhakti-martanda, develops the concept so as to refer to that state of mind which gradually suppresses the mental repercussions and acquires oneness with God. The notion of unity or the experience of the self in all or all in the self (Sarvatma bhava) is an outcome of ‘bhakti’ rooted in intense love for the Lord. This identity of the self in all should not be regarded says V, as an illustration of Absolute Monism, but that of a

¹ E.R.E II pg 345

² ‘एकं शास्त्रं देवकीपुत्रस्य नामकं त्वं देवकीपुत्र एव ।

मन्वाप्येव तस्य नामाने यानि कर्माप्येकं तस्य देवस्य एव ॥’—(T D N I 4)

³ ‘माहा न्यवानुभूयन्तु मुह्यन्तु मन्वाप्येव ।

एतद्वा भक्तिरिति प्राप्स्यदा मुक्तिं त्वदा ॥’—T D N I 42

is forgetting self attuning oneness in single minded devotion that sees all in God and God in all—like parts (amśa) variously reflecting the one (Amsin) —which brings about highest bliss as postulated by the followers of the Pusti marga

The idea that God is the highest Rasa or Bliss (Deliciousness)¹ is explained on the lines of the Alamkara sastra.—
Bhakti representing the best of the sentiments (internal savour of an ideal) and the only sentiment (savouring God) Affection or love is said to be the Sthayi bhāva resulting from the sentiment of devotion It affects the mind and the body with intense delight whereby feeling of oneness with the Lord arises which represents the Vyabhicari bhava or the transitory feeling of emotion (vī bhakti) The oneness is *not* the end in view but a means only since it is but a transitory feeling meant to deepen and enhance the permanent one it is devotion itself which is the highest attainment and the root of the rest Purity of heart is the principal means to the attainment of Bhakti Sixteen other means are prescribed² but the followers of the path of grace do not imply any necessity of personal efforts for obtaining bhakti It is at this juncture that the devotees bifurcate in accordance with their (free or predetermined?) acceptance of Maryada or Pusti paths Those who follow the Maryāda path subject themselves to certain moral discipline and believe in the efficacy of their personal efforts combined with the Divine Wish while the followers of Pusti depend entirely on God's grace and regard all human effort to be meaningless when the grace of God fulfils everything and delivers them from the meshes of mundane life The Divine choice (varana) is *the* means in the path of Pusti—and that is a cardinal doctrine in V's school) In Bhakti Vardhini V says that the seed of the Bhakti is planted in a jiva through the God This seed first develops into an inclination towards or affection for the Lord (ruci) when it is strengthened through chanting of His names listening to His tales renunciation worship and so on the inclination becomes an exclusive love (prema) involving a complete abnegation of one's human attachments (of all non God directed desires) and mental activities Even when the devotee is engaged in the performance

¹ रसा वै न । —T Up 27

² Refer to Dasgupta's 'History of Indian Philosophy' [part IV pg 35] for details

of his routine or household activities, his mind is fixed on Kṛṣṇa only. Then, progressively, love of God (prema) turns into a passionate attachment (āśakti), which brings about not only a total detachment from worldly objects but a positive aversion towards them as obstacles to perfect love—as a result of which the devotee may take to renunciation (sannyasa) But 'Sannyasa' as understood in the light of absolute renunciation for its own sake is not acceptable to V., and he maintains that in the present age, it only gives rise to repentance¹ He says that renunciation, in the path of devotion, is not an invariable consequence or condition, but is accepted only if the household duties and circumstances prove to be actual obstacles in the way of devotion or love for the Lord

The rise of 'bhakti' may be spontaneous or gradual 'Bhava' or inclination, 'prema', 'praṇaya' and 'sneha'—different progressive steps representing love towards the Lord, 'raga' and 'amurāga' meaning deep attachment for the Lord and 'vyasana' which stands for a 'craze' ('ardour') or a passionate attachment represent the seven steps in the gradual rise of 'Bhakti'. The last one, ॥८॥ 'vyasana' ('Amore languens') is the highest because it is an utter sense of desolation due to the feeling of separation from God, who thereby is realised as the Boon (beyond all other boons) for the yearning after whom the jiva is in misery—languishes unto death This stage of devotion is a surging emotion which "chokes the speech, makes the tears flow and the hair thrill with pleasureable excitement and often leads to hysterical laughings and weeping by turns, to sudden fainting fits and to long trances of unconsciousness All this rouses the passionate Bhakti leading to self-consecration to Kṛṣṇa and life-long devotion to his service"²

This love for God is a symbol of spiritual devotion and self-dedication, but as it is the subject of a mythological, human, colourful description and treatment in the Bhg, it has been charged of being sensual³ V stresses the point that in the case of divine 'Rasa' or 'Bhakti,' there is no room for any earthly instinct bound passion This type of the highest sentiment of love arises in such souls only as possess some kind of a divine

¹ 'Sannyāsa nirṇaya'—V 16

² J.N. Farquhar 'An Outline of the Religious literature of India' E.G. Rowse in E.R.E. II (P. 345)

³ E.G. Rowse in E.R.E. II (p. 345) also E.R.E. VII (p. 581)

seed in them. The Bhg. depicts the love of the Gopīs for Lord Kṛṣṇa, and the highest degree of familiarity is represented in the love of God in terms of joy of union with and sorrow in separation from the beloved Kṛṣṇa. The state of separation is envisaged to be superior to that of union, since it is in the former state that the heart of a devotee craves or yearns for Kṛṣṇa, whom it finally perceives in everything. The glowing poetry describing the 'Rāsa', etc., is condemned by many as purely sensual, but whatever the description may have meant literally and originally, it should not be forgotten that, for the true 'bhakta' or devotee, it should be considered to embody the spiritual ideal of unselfish devotion, amounting to a complete self-surrender and a total dedication at the Divine Feet. The teachers who founded and preached and practised this doctrine of devotion repeatedly mention that this love is unearthy and spiritual.

This, however, is worthy of note that at the end of the Rāsa-description, the Bhg. itself has to say "tejīyasām na doṣaya"¹—which signifies that even the author himself (or possibly a more cautious later redactor?) was pretty conscious of the high probability of its being challenged in future. Yet, it should also be borne in mind that the practices of some of the followers of this system who took the line of least resistance while understanding and interpreting this text literally should not be attributed to the founder of the system of Pure Monism. It would indeed be monstrous to state that V "not only sanctioned but enjoined the most hideous practices."² The perfect controlling of the sense organs³ is prescribed by V in no uncertain terms.

There has been a step forward as it were from the point of view of religion, when the place of the abstract impersonal Absolute is taken up by a personal God (esp. from the times of Rāmā onwards), who can satisfy the needs of the common man too. As a rule, all the Viṣṇuīte teachers have laid down 'bhakti'—personal devotion to a personal God—as the best and the easiest of all means for the attainment of the highest end—and V stands typically apart (like Mādhva) in the sense that he considers 'bhakti' itself to be the means as well as the end. The impact of this approach on the Indian religious mind is described thus: "The impersonal Brahma leaves our heart cold, however

¹ Bhg. X. 33.31

² E R E XII p. 582

³ T D N II 238, 233, 235

much his absolute light may satisfy our intellect. But a God who is the source of our being, of our awareness and of our joy, who uses his deluding power in order to enhance our bliss, transforms suffering and death into means of greater happiness and who finally wants to [possess us that we may possess Him, such a God must make an appeal to our heart and throw it into the unending trance of Prema”¹

The Lord Kṛṣṇa of the MBH as a whole and of the Gītā in particular is a clear attempt in that direction, well adapted, on the whole, to the end in view. But its adaptation is addressed rather to the cultured classes, and its attempt at a comprehensive synthesis of the three ‘margas’ involves a rather strong dose of eclectic ‘Jñāna’ (with Sāṃkhya Yoga-Vedānta components in their epic garb) so that the resulting composite concept of the deity partly remains too high an ideal for the masses to assimilate easily, as the awe-inspiring picture of his all-embracing universal form partly tends to dazzle and bewilder the common man and those innumerable and illimitable powers of his keep Him too far beyond the reach of the ordinary intellect. That is made up, to a certain extent, by the humanely friendly ‘bhakti portions. But still the need of the popular average heart was better served by the child Kṛṣṇa”, whose playful activities were fully described in the Bhg V, as we already know, has chosen this work as representing the highest truth, and added it to the normally accepted ‘prasthāna trayī’, as the fourth “starting point endowed with the maximum authority (T D N I 7 8). The play of the child Kṛṣṇa (followed by his sport as a boy and his ‘Rāsa līlā with the Gopīs) is the subject matter of the Bhg—and as it has such a natural human appeal, it gained an extraordinary popularity. Perhaps this was foreseen by V, who accommodated most of the Bhg tenets in his system, which won over a large number of followers in Gujarāṭa, Kathiāvāḍa, Marvāḍa, Mēvāḍa, Sindhā and Rājputāna. This particular aspect of devotion towards the child Kṛṣṇa was taken up by V and presented with all the paraphernalia that constitute the Sevā.

¹ P. Johanns—‘Light of the East Series’. Also compare Thibaut—Vedānta Sūtras, Introduction P. C. XXVII (part I).

² But, if Rāsa līlā and his playful activities alone were the centre of devotion as preached by V, who follows the Bhg, where is the necessity of bringing in the theme of Rāsa līlā? Again the difference between ‘vatsalya and Jāra Bhāva’ must be properly understood.

cult¹ { Thus, the Bhakti marga as preached by V. gave something concrete in the form of a personal God, who, again, was not a master sitting high up on the throne or judgment-seat and punishing people for their crimes, etc., but appeared as an innocent child who performed wondrous deeds and became an object of people's tender affection culminating in pure devotion } This attitude might have become all the more fervent because the people were then oppressed by extremely difficult conditions of life and by their more or less open and direct persecution on account of the Muslim imperialism. Moreover, the path of devotion offered an equal opportunity to the 'Sudras', women and the 'Vaiśyas,' as a result of which, the sect invited within its fold all who were desirous of spiritual elevation. And the eight-fold Sevā cult laid down by V is regarded as an attempt to strengthen the forces of pure devotion of the ordinary masses towards the Lord. And perhaps it is because of this feature that V.'s faith has, till to-day, remained a living religion. The service to the child Kṛṣṇa still occupies a central position in the life of a devotee or the follower of V-Sampradaya. This 'service' is three-fold—as offered with the aid of the 'body (tanuja), 'wealth' (vittaja) and by means of 'mind' (mānasi)—the first two representing the dedication of one's body and belongings to the Lord and that leads the devotee to fix his thoughts upon the Lord, transforming the two fold (external) service into the Mānasi-stage. The latter is said to be the highest, since in it, all mental activities are centred round God and the loving service to Him.

Public-worshipping or the necessity of going to the temple for offering one's services to God is typical of V's sect. The ceremonies such as the 'Śarana mantropadesa' and the 'Brahma-Sambandha'² are still current and form a necessary rite for the follower of the V-Sampradāya.

'Supernatural fitness (Alaukika Samarthya), an association with God (Sāyujya) and 'fitness of the body to worship' the Lord (Sevopayogī deha) are said to be the three 'fruits of Seva'

¹ For details of the 'Seva-cult, please see Bhandarkar's 'V S' and minor religious systems'—(P. 80-81)

² Please refer to M. T. Telivala's introduction (pgs. V-VII) to 'Siddhanta-rahasya' for detail of the ceremonies and different views of V's illustrious descendants on the meaning of the same.

³ 'Sevā pīṭhā' So. G.

or service of the Lord. The first, viz supernatural fitness, has been differently explained by different commentators, but the point of general agreement is that on acquiring it, the Jiva wins the Lord and makes Him dependent on it,¹ as it were 'Sayujya' stands for 'association with God whereby the jīva enjoys the bliss of union—(and not absorption in or merging into the Lord by one's very nature or Svarupa). Since a body is required for a formal participation in the divine sports of the Lord which is the ultimate end in the path of Bhakti—the possession of a supernatural body is mentioned as the third fruit of Seva, suggesting thereby that while ascending to a higher state, one has to acquire fitness, not only of the soul, but also of the body.

While these (Post Ś Visnuite) systems have been successful through their democratic appeal through devotion to a personal God in inspiring everyone high and low, they have at the same time sought a completely satisfying concept of God for rational man as a whole. They sincerely sought a personal God—not as a cheaper but as a deeper response to man's endeavour in the direction of the supreme realisation—whatever their success or the value of their arguments.

¹ Namely dependent on Jiva through love, like a Lover pleasing the beloved.

CHAPTER V

IMPORTANT WORKS OF VALLABHA

V HAS written about a score of works and many more are ascribed to him. The chief important ones—such as the Anu, which is commentary on the B S, the T D N with his own 'prakaśa' on it, the Subodhini which is a commentary on the Bhg [I II, III X, XI (1 4)] and the Śodaśa granthas or the sixteen small tracts—are here selected for special study and interpretation. Passages from these are selected in so far as they embody specific points comprising V's own doctrines either put forth in defence of his own stand or formulated in an attempt to carry the battle into his chief opponent's camp—both acts pointing to V's contribution as such to Vedānta thought. A correct perusal of these necessitates the isolation of the doctrine of Absolute Monism as propounded by Ś even from the later developments which it underwent at the hands of his own followers—(in the light of which he is very often interpreted and judged) and to assess it in a detached fashion.

(1) *The Anubhasya*, being but a commentary on the B S offers limited scope to its author for the enunciation of his personal doctrine within its range in so far as it is restricted to the interpretation of the B S. Still, V has explained the sūtras in the light of his own theories as is witnessed for instance where he stands apart (e.g. I 1 4, III 2 22 30, IV 1 1 14 etc.) from other commentators and gives original interpretations where he follows Ś in so far as the literal interpretation of the text is concerned or when he himself differs from the rest of commentators (I 1 18), but finally arrives at a conclusion diametrically opposed to that reached by Ś (e.g. II 3 18 II 3 50 etc.)

The Anu forms one of the most significant works in the school of V. It is traditionally believed¹ that its portion upto III 2 34 has been written by V, while the rest was finished by his son Vitthalnatha (There is internal and external evidence to the above effect, for which please refer to S Pāthak's edition of the Anu with the Balabodhini) In the following pages, some of the important passages and topics from the Anu are selected and critically explained with the aid of Śrī Giridhara's commentary on the same²

While explaining the first sutra viz "Athato Brahmajijñāsa"³ V says that the word 'atha', should not be interpreted to stand for 'anantarya' ("immediate consecution")⁴ as is done by S, since it involves four flaws (as given below) and also because the arguments employed to prove it are inter dependent. If 'atha' were to suggest 'anantarya', meaning after or consequent to the attainment of a detached attitude, restraint, etc. in the case of one who can undertake an investigation into the nature of Br, the investigation and the rise of detachment, etc. are inter dependent. To explain when one knows that Br is the highest end of man, and that the knowledge of Br alone is the means and that the performance of ritual, etc. is subordinate to such knowledge, he undertakes actions for that purpose, attains purity of mind, which brings about an attitude of detachment, restraint and so on. But all that knowledge is not possible except through the perusal of the Vedānta texts. Therefore, to say that the four fold spiritual means are antecedent to the enquiry or investigation into the nature of Br (in agreement with the interpretation of the term 'atha' meaning 'anantarya') is to argue in a circle.

(a) "किञ्च, अथाहात् शय कनव्य अधिकारार्थं प्व श्रेयान् ।" (p 5)

Double Authorship of The Anubhāṣya", Prof G H Bhatt (cf B biography)

¹ Although this point will be mentioned in its adequate place in the course of the treatment of Anu. It has to be brought to the notice of the reader that for the sake of continuity V has been referred to as the author of the Anu throughout even when the commentary on the sutras III.2.34 onwards is known and proved to be (see I Aa above) from Vitthalnatha's pen.

² Thibaut's translation

³ "तादृक्—अत्र परमपुण्याथले ज्ञान, तज्ज्ञानमेव साधनवेत्कमत्, तद्वैपत्वे च द्वापदीनात्काले, तत्प्रकनकरण, नित्तगुढी मत्या वैराग्यात् । इत् च वत्त विचारव्यनिरक्षण न भवति दन्वेन्याश्रय ।"—(Anu I 11)

“Moreover, something has to be supplied, or understood, and that is some term like ‘should be undertaken’, etc (i.e. some term suggesting an injunction). If it (the injunctive term enjoining investigation or enquiry) were there for one’s own sake, the statement (of the injunction) would be meaningless (i.e. if the enquiry has already been made by oneself, there is no object in stating an injunction of the same). If it (enquiry) were for the sake of others, it would not be feasible, for, others cannot think or undertake to investigate what they do not know about as yet. And this leads to the uselessness or futility of one’s own action (i.e. the injunctions, etc. prescribed by one would be useless when others cannot act accordingly).¹ And if some intelligent people can possibly undertake to investigate, well, there results inconsistency in that an enquiry into the nature of Br is prescribed to others, while the latter portion of the sūtra is for one’s own sake.”

Moreover, in the case of ‘atha’, meaning ‘commencement’ (‘adhikara’), there is a fulfilment of an object in view, which is not there if ‘atha’ were understood to stand for ‘immediate succession’—since it involves arguing in a circle, as explained earlier.

Again, there would result complete elimination of scriptures (as useless) through the impossibility of preaching in the case of a person qualified with the four fold spiritual means, who would get engrossed in (absorbing) meditation on getting fulfilment (of the knowledge sought) through hearing (the subject mentioned) alone. And also a contradiction to the scriptures (since the latter embody the explanations of the mystics and so on—intended for being used as such). Also because the means are dealt with later on (in the third chapter), therefore it is better to understand the word ‘atha’ to mean ‘commencement’ rather than ‘immediate succession’, since the latter case is stained by too many defects.

→ The above passage, refers to the defects that arise in the case of the acceptance of ‘Ānantarya’ as the meaning of ‘atha.’

¹ The meaning seems rather to be ‘And if neither the author nor the listeners can fulfil the command, the sūtra does not make sense i.e. the command does not fit the object.’

as accepted by the followers of Absolute Monism. These could be summarised as—

- (i) the impossibility of renunciation,
- (ii) the necessity of supplying an injunctive term,
- (iii) the lack of an object of human endeavour resulting from inter-dependence and
- (iv) the elimination of scriptural statements as useless

V says that the knowledge of sacrifice, etc is necessary even for those who have retired from worldly undertakings since it brings about purity of mind.¹ The glorificatory passages (arthavadas) are useful for the attainment of the knowledge of the greatness of the Lord. Here, it may be noted that V's statement, viz. 'Niradhyastaireva dehadibhih karmakarana sambhavat' stands in sharp contrast to what S has said in his Adhyasa—bhasya.² According to V, the existence and the activities, etc of a being are not based on superimposition, which the followers of Absolute Monism speak of. The employment of the particle 'eva' in the above statement points to the emphasis with which V declares his own stand against S and then corroborates the same with the illustration of the jivan muktas, who are acknowledged on all hands to be liberated, and hence beyond the range of superimposition—and are still seen to perform activities.

The jivan muktas, according to S, are liberated in the sense that in spite of engaging themselves in activities of daily routine etc (which persist on account of their Prarabdha Karma having started to exercise its influence), they remain untouched as it were by earthly considerations. It is the attitude of complete detachment and the abnegation of fruits and of the desire thereof that are characteristic of a 'jivan mukta'. V emphatically declares that no activity is possible in the event of the body etc being superimposed on the self, etc (since the world itself is a reality—and not a product of Ignorance as S and his followers postulate).

¹ 'निकृत्तानामपि योगादिभ्योऽवश्यकं चित्तुद्वयत्वात् । —(p. 19)

² 'न चान्यन्तान्मावत दहन कश्चिद्व्यभिचारे ।'—(Ś B p. 41)

meaning 'Nor can anyone act except through a body upon which the notion of its being the Self has been superimposed (a body of which the Self has said "it is mine, it is me"—thus identifying Itself with it and it with Itself)

The author then proceeds to explain the next sutra, which according to him, should be read as "janmadyasya yatah, Sastra-yonitvat" and not as two independent sūtras as Ś and other commentators have done (Refer to Ch VI 2) V says that the duty of the author of the sutras is to remove doubts pertaining to scriptural texts. Since the essential nature of Br has been laid down as devoid of all characteristics, there arises doubt with regard to the powers of knowledge and action, belonging to the Lord. The Vedas offer Br as the creator of the world, and, as the word of the scriptures is infallible in authority, one cannot and should not, says V, call it into question. The quality of being an agent (kartṛtva), like that of existence (as given in "Satyam-jñanam-anantam Brahma") does belong to Br, otherwise, in the event of its being totally quality-less, the other attributes mentioned in the definition of its essential nature could not be in apposition to each other. To explain, these attributes are so mentioned because each conveys a different meaning and they are, therefore, distinct from one another. Again, this 'agency' or 'agent hood' is not an empirical quality,—which would be so in the case of a human agent on account of the super-imposition of body, etc., but not so when divine or super worldly creation is in question.

The creation, sustenance and destruction of the world consisting of innumerable creatures elements, gods animals and human beings, comprised of many regions with wonderfully systematic arrangement possessing the form of crores of "cosmic eggs", whose creation is impossible to conceive of cannot be earthly' (p 31) V says that we cannot negate this, since, "one may refute a thing known or of which one is convinced, but not one unknown or that of which one is not conscious (or of which there is no proof) nor that which the scriptures postulate". The creation cannot be attributed to Prakṛti, the latter being inanimate (and unintelligent) nor to the individual soul, because it is not independent nor to anything else, because everything is eliminated through the negation of both the inanimate Prakṛti and the individual soul. Therefore, Br is the creator whose powers are supra worldly. So, Br is the one, from whom the origin, etc of this world proceed. The term 'etc' (ādi) may refer to the six modifications of being or

१ 'प्रतीतं च निरर्थकं, नाप्रतीतं न भ्रूनिप्रतीतम् ।'—

it may stand for its own substratum (being) and imply the other five (according to the power of suggestion based on retention of its own meaning), or 'janmādyaśya', may be understood to refer to the sky, as it is mentioned in the T Up 2.1¹ The first creation of the sky from Br is not opposed to the creation of the world, because the scriptures speak of the creation of all on the analogy of the emanation of sparks from fire. Thus, Br is the one from whom the origin, etc. of the world proceed, since it has been mentioned as the prime cause in the scriptures² V then states his own view that the origin, etc. spoken of in the śruti do not imply any modification or change on the part of the Lord, because these are but the phases of His powers of manifestation and concealment (p 36) This statement has in it the root of two theories, which form the basis of the Śuddhādvaita doctrine. These are the theory of Immutability and Transformation and that of Manifestation and Concealment. These form a unique feature in V.'s system (and are discussed in detail in Ch III)

V considers the whole Veda, including the Purva and the Uttara mimamsas as referring to Br as the cause of the world. Both the Karma kanda and the jñāna kanda are auxiliary to each other and there is no opposition between them, since both action and knowledge represent the two fold aspect of Br, these being His inherent capacities. Further, meditation etc. is dependent on 'śravaṇa' or hearing and hearing, in its turn, is dependent on meditation etc. for the clearing of difficulties and both are required for understanding the scriptures fully.]

[While explaining the Samanvaya' sutra, V says that Br cannot be exclusively the efficient nor the instrumental cause, because the powers of action and knowledge cannot belong to it in its said respective aspects. According to him, Br is the inherent (samavayi) cause, since it is inherent in all forms that exist, shine and delight through the manifestation of its triple aspect of existence, intelligence and bliss. The multiplicity pertaining to the world is subject to the Divine Will, and the names and forms are subsequent effects. Neither Prakṛti nor the Atoms can be the cause of the world. The two mimamsas are auxiliary to each other and thus there is no opposition between

¹ 'नरनादा प्ररनादा मन आकाश उन्मूत ।

² 'शास्त्रे यान्—शास्त्रान्कारयन् ।'

the two, yet each has its own field of study and end in view
The ignorant are not entitled to the performance of sacrifice

V says that the interpretation of this sutra (offered by Ś) as referring to the harmony of all Vedānta statements is not sound. According to Ś, Br is the cause of the origination, sustenance and dissolution of this world, since it is the source of all scriptures or is known to be so from the scriptures, on account of the harmony of all scriptural texts. Here, the harmony of all texts, as referring to Br alone, is a matter to be proved after the refutation of all *prima facie* views and removal of doubts, therefore, its mention as an established fact is improper. If it (i.e. 'Samanvaya') were already established, there would result the futility of later portions (of the sutras). V explains that even the mīmāṃsā thinkers accept that the Vedānta statements have Br as their object—therefore it is not the 'Samanvaya' (their harmony) that is sought to be established here,—but those thinkers maintain that these texts are subsidiary or auxiliary to the Purva kāṇḍa, while V asserts that the sūtra-kāra regards them to be principal, and it is because of this disparity that the reason is established in the sūtra "Tattu samanvayat" Br being inherent in all. Moreover, says V, the purport of the texts is not the attributeless Br, as the Mayavādīn lays down, since that is not what the subsequent sūtras declare. Therefore, this sūtra proves that Br is the inherent cause of the world.

Here, it may be noted that the sūtra, 'Janmādyasya' etc has already established that Br is the cause of the origination. Thus the 'Samanvaya' sūtra as explained by V seems only to restate the same.

→ V. states that if Br were not the inherent cause, most of the Upaniṣad statements would be meaningless. "See that which is this Self" (Br Up 2/4-5 4 5 7), "The Self alone is all this" (Ch Up 7 25 2), etc would stand sublated in their express sense. The object of the sūtra kāra is to reconcile the contradictory passages, and in order that none should consider the texts like 'Asthūlam' etc (postulating Br as devoid of qualities) to be principal, he expressly stated the sūtra. Not so, because it is the inherent cause (in all)", corroborating the sūtra "The origin, etc of this" and so on. Hence, Br having the qualities like non-grōssness, etc, himself remaining unchanged manifests himself in different forms. The feature of contradictory attributes (which appears as incompatible to rationality) constitutes

the glory and majesty of the Lord, who is the abode of all *contradictory attributes*, says V

The Smṛti statement that 'He is all, since He envelops all (Gītā XI 40) also supports the same view Br cannot be dependent on the actions of the jīva for creation, because this would imply an absence of Lordship or sovereignty. The defects of inequality and cruelty would accrue only if He were to create anything different from His own Self. The doctrine of the Māyāvādin that creation is firstly superimposed on Br and is later on negated of Him, is most unworthy of acceptance and its propounders are enlisted amongst the devils by Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa himself (Gītā XVI 8). V emphatically says that the nature of the human objective (man's ultimate goal) as well as of the meaning of the scriptures should be understood only as it is laid down in the scriptures, and should not be fancied to one's own taste.

It may be pointed out here that the same charge could be brought against V himself, since the contradiction between the two sets of scriptural passages has to be explained and that is what each commentator has, surely, tried to do, though each one in consonance with the reason—considered as fundamental and paramount (rightly or wrongly)—underlying the entire set-up of his philosophical system. But this necessarily implies the subordination of one set to the other, and the question then boils down to whether it is the Saguna or the Nirguna set that is upheld as principal. Any contradiction, whether pertaining to earthly entities or to revelation so-called, has to be explained in rational terms. If the staunch followers of the word of the sruti profess to be faithful to it, they should accept both the sets of texts—and hence the inherent contradiction also—as they are offered, and should not try to attribute greater importance to either. But this would result in blind faith,—and that may be acceptable to religion or dogma, but not to philosophy.

Thus, V's statement that "those, who having imagined the scriptural meaning according to their own fancy, seek to explain the Vedas in that light, are, indeed, too daring and deserve to be condemned by the good" can easily be applicable to one and all, including its author

¹ 'अत्र स्वबुद्ध्या शास्त्रार्थं परिकल्प्य तत्र वेदं यो नयन्तो महासाहसिका सद्विरूपेभ्यः ।'

The 'īksatyadhikarana' determines that Br is the purport of all statements referring to intelligence. The mention of 'reflection' or 'thought' on the part of Br refers to His 'cit' aspect. He thought of becoming an object of experience by way of creation, and still He remains beyond the sphere of the normal means of cognition. He created fruits (*i.e.* obtainable results) also in order that the jiva (His own 'part') may try to achieve them with corresponding efforts. He can become an object of knowledge, if he so chooses, but, otherwise, remains unknown altogether by the normal means of cognition. He manifests Himself through the Vedas, which are said to be His very breath, therefore, the Vedas can operate in the field of 'Brahmajñāna'. The express mention of the term 'Self' in the text 'The Self alone was indeed there in the beginning' precludes the possibility of the term 'reflection' being used in a secondary sense (*i.e.* in a *non absolute* sense, involving a worldly reflecting agent). Therefore, the inherent capacity to become all, on the part of Br is established and His quality of being the creator is witnessed in the world (like those of existence, intelligence and bliss), since the world is His effect.

V declares that all scriptures refer to the Nirguna Br, when they employ the word 'Self', hence the Nirguna Br is the creator of the world. Again this reference cannot be metaphorical (referring to a non absolute being, improperly to the Absolute), since liberation is spoken of him who has deep faith in the Self, *viz.* the one who is the creator of the world and is bereft of all earthly attributes. If this Self were not the Absolute, there would be no liberation but cycle of births and deaths for one devoted to it (I 1 6). The Self, again, is not laid down as something to be abandoned, therefore, the creator cannot be subordinate (a non absolute Being) and the 'reflection' etc cannot refer to the Saguna Br (I 1 7).

It should also be understood here that for V, the term 'nirguna' applied to Br means 'without material or worldly attributes' in contradistinction to its universally accepted meaning, *viz.* 'devoid of attributes'. Again 'īksana' or 'reflection' on the part of Br is in V's opinion, as integral and natural to Him as 'sat', 'cit' and 'ānand', and hence, 'īksana', like 'kartṛtva', belongs to the higher Br, who is both saguna and nirguna in the sense that He does possess attributes of celestial nature and is devoid of 'prākṛta' or material attributes. Witness his own statements.

“Ātmaśabdah punah sarveṣu vedanteṣu nirgunaparabrahma-
vācakatvenava siddhah Tasyaiva jagat kartṛtvam srutiraha”.
(Anu I. 1 5, pp. 19-20) And since the saguna (meaning *here*
the lower Br, viz the Akṣara) is not the ultimate-independent
agent, it is the Nirguna Highest alone that is the ‘Kartṛ’.

Therefore, according to V, qualities like ‘īksana’, etc as
possessed by the Para Br. do not make the latter “prakṛtiguṇa-
sattvaśambandhavān” or saguṇa in that sense (Anu I 1 5).

But what has to be noted here is whether, even in V’s own
terminology, there is any distinction between the ‘nirguna’ Para
Br. and the ‘nirguṇa’ Br or the Akṣara, which he himself
speaks of as the lower Br —when the concepts are so different
for V

It is indeed a pity that preceptors of such great learning
have to make attempts at clarification of their specific stand in
order that certain terms (like ‘saguṇa’ and ‘nirguna’), at
certain times, should be understood in this or that ‘special’
sense in dire opposition to their generally acknowledged sense

The jīva is named “svapitī” (Ch Up VI 8 1), says V,
when it merges into mere existence or a condition wherein all
limiting characteristics are suspended. In deep sleep, this jīva
daily approaches Br, an abode of strength or vigour, but
returns to the worldly existence (while waking up) on account
of its remnant of passions or impressions. This mention of
“svapitī” also corroborates the fact that Nirguna Br is the
creator (I 1 8)

Actually “svapitī (in the text) is not the name of the
Jīva, but it stands for the verb expressing the condition of
a jīva in deep sleep. The merging into one’s own Self or
approaching the Nirguna, as suggested by ‘Sata Somya tada
sampanno” etc as well as the consequent participation in
the Sat aspect of Br are open to challenge. As a matter of
fact, the jīva, in the school of V, is but a manifestation of the
sat and cit aspects of Br and—one would think—if it acquires
anything in the state of deep sleep it should be Ananda or
bliss, which is suppressed in it, and not the aspect of existence.
But, again, V will refer to the ‘śruti text which expressly
refers to ‘sat’ (all the more since the ‘cit aspect is suspended in
deep sleep) and the soul can be strengthened by contact with the

In liberation, everyone enjoys the same status, since they are all one with the Lord (I 1 9) Again, the scriptures throughout state the Nirguna Br of the nature of intelligence to be the cause of the world (I 1 10), as this adhikaraṇa propounds

The emphasis on the cit aspect should normally be in opposition to any inanimate cause being postulated, but any reference to the latter is conspicuous by its absence in the whole of the ikṣatyadhikaraṇa treatment by V. Actually, in this adhikaraṇa, the Nirguna Br is said by V to be the cause as against the Saguna, but V has nowhere directed his remarks against the theory of an inanimate entity being the cause, so as to legitimately wind up as he has done ("Evam cidrūpasya karanata nirupanena" etc) This concluding remark reminds one of the line of thought followed in the Ś B

The Ānandamaya Section, undertakes to remove the faulty notion that the term 'ānandamaya' occurring in the Bhṛgu-prapāṭhaka of the Taittirīya branch does not refer to the Highest, as it falls in the series of statement of things (like Annamaya and so on), which do not express Br. Against this *prima facie* view, V holds that Ānandamaya is the Highest, since it is repeatedly mentioned, which suggests that it is distinct from Annamaya, etc. The other things in the series starting with Annamaya have their culmination in Ānandamaya which is rooted in everything. The scriptural text, *viz.* 'the knower of Br attains the highest' (T Up 2 1) points out that one who knows the Akṣara attains the highest Br *viz.* Puruṣottama. The view of the Kevaladvaitin that the above mentioned attainment is of the nature of 'knowledge' only, is inconsistent, because, if the Akṣara or the Nirguna Br were the highest and that were meant to be the ultimate end in view, the śruti under discussion would be lacking in expectancy—and there would result sublation of the relation of means and end. Again, the Akṣara form does not manifest the bliss fully, since it has limited bliss, and, therefore, it cannot be deemed to be the highest end. The Mu Up statement (3 2 3) that 'this Self cannot be attained by means of preaching nor by intelligence, nor by great learning, by him alone does He become attainable whom He chooses', etc. clearly points to the futility of all means other than His grace. When the ignorance is set aside by the knowledge of Akṣara, purity is attained which leads to 'fitness of nature' for the realisation of Puruṣottama. Such a jīva is chosen by the Lord as His own

The T. Up text (2 1)¹ is explained by V. as follows • That which is manifest in the heart, the highest sky, is Akṣara Br, His abode The devotee who realises this, enjoys, along with the intelligent Br = all types of desired pleasures The instrumental use in 'Brahmaṇā' suggests that in the case of a Śuddha puṣṭi-bhakta, the Lord becomes dependent, as it were, on His devotee

V. then discusses different meanings of the root 'aś' ['aś' to eat (aśnāti), 'aś' to pervade (aśnute)] The first meaning should be accepted here, although the root termination favours the second one, says V In the first case, it would mean 'existence with Br', while according to the latter, it would mean that he pervades or controls the desires along with Br Or, that jīva, being together with or co-existing with Br, controls the desires. But these meanings are not applicable to the present context, says V, and therefore, 'pervasion' should be understood to mean 'making dependent on one's self' But, according to V, even this is not proper, and hence the root 'aś' must be taken to mean 'eating' or 'enjoyment'—and the disagreement of termination with its meaning points to the employment of non worldly or divine technique for the sake of teaching supra worldly powers¹

This is an unusually peculiar way of proving one's point of view,—but with V, it is more often that not that we come across such 'alaukika' explanations

The enjoyment of all desired pleasures in the company of Br is devoid of sensual elements and V explains that Yajñavalkya's statement "with what could one see whom", etc represents the state between the attainments of Akṣara and the Para Brahma, while the state that the knower of Akṣara may enjoy after the attainment of the Puruṣottama is referred to in 'He enjoys all pleasures, with the intelligent Br' etc This is a consistent feature of V's conception that the intellectual absorption in an 'It' of an essence is inferior to the personal communication and communion of knowledge and loving self surrender between conscious personalities

The Ānandamaya Br represents the inner core even in forms like Annamaya and others, but as these are lower manifestations

¹ 'वां वेद निह्न शुद्ध्या परम व्योमन्, सोऽश्नुते सुवन्दानान् सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिवा ।'

² 'वचनं पश्यन् चित्तम् हि विपश्चित्तम् विविधभाग चतुरस्य सह सुवन्दानानश्नुते इत्यर्थे ।'—(p. 26)

of His, one attached and offering worship to these attains lower fruits. The text "He enjoys" etc means that the devotee abandons his earthly body and acquires a body suitable for the worship of the Lord and of the nature of divine manifestation ("vibhūti") This 'body' stands for the conglomeration (samghāta) of the body, senses, vital breath, inner controller and the soul--wherein the gross body consists of the first sheath or the Annamaya form, the second, or the Pranamaya, the third and the fourth together or the Manomaya, and the last which represents the Vijñanamaya Into such a jiva, the Ānandamaya enters in the form of 'Rasa' ('flavour'), enjoying which the soul does not have to fear anything Just as ordinary metals, etc get transformed into gold at the mere touch of the celestial stone (sparśa manī), the earthly organs get transfigured, as it were, into divinity through the entrance of the Lord into them Intensely tormented by the pangs of separation from the Lord, the devotee sees Him everywhere, in all forms, and thus the Annamaya, etc. also mean nothing but Br to him The Lord then Himself assumes the nature of experience (anubhavatmaka) so as to make the devotee enjoy the sentiment of bliss Thus, V explains, on the lines of the Rasa theory, the whole allegory of His becoming the 'bird', having all parts made of bliss The Akṣara form represents the 'tail' of Br in the allegory, since it is subsidiary to Br, as forming His substratum or abode The censure implied in "Asanneva sabhavati" (T Up 2 6) refers to those who doubt the possibility of the sporting of Br in His form of bliss and question His independence

The 'Mayat'-affix should be understood to mean 'abundance' (Pracurya) and not 'modification' (Vikara), since the intensity and frequency witnessed in the text 'who could breathe, who could breathe forth, of that Bliss did not exist in the other' etc signifies the same thing, viz the abundance of bliss, the supreme bliss of the Highest (I 1 12) The śruti also declares Br to be the cause of all bliss (T Up 2 7), hence 'Ānandamaya' refers to the Highest only, the derivative affix 'Mayat' denoting abundance

The jiva cannot be meant by the term 'Ānandamaya', since, in that case, the majesty and celestial power of the Lord in creating the world would be improper as applied to it Again the mention of distinction in 'Only after perceiving a flavour can this soul enjoy bliss' precludes the possibility of the jiva's

being Ānandamaya, for, the subject who perceives cannot be the object perceived. Nor can Ānandamaya refer to the inanimate Prakṛti because of the predication of 'desire'. Moreover, the preaching about the jīva's attainment of the Ānandamaya in T Up 2 8¹ suggests that Ānandamaya cannot denote the inanimate Pradhāna, otherwise, it would mean that the animate, intelligent jīva attains as its supreme goal the inanimate Prakṛti or Pradhāna.

Thus, when neither the jīva nor the inanimate Prakṛti can be denoted by the term 'Ānandamaya', the only acceptable principle which could be referred to by it is the Para Brahma, says V.

(b) 'ये पुनरधिकरणमग इति सर्वं सुख्यम् ।' (p 38)

In this passage, V questions the propriety of the interpretation of this topic as offered by Ś. According to Ś, the term 'Ānandamaya' cannot denote the Highest Br, since the former is a member in the series of selfs consisting of food, etc. The affix 'mayat' cannot denote 'abundance' all of a sudden in the case of Ānandamaya after having meant 'modification' in the case of former sheaths like Annamaya and so on. Although there is no mention of the inner-self after Ānandamaya as is found after Annamaya, etc., yet the declaration of joy as its head ("tasya priyameva śirah"), etc. points out Br to be its tail or support, which proves that 'Ānandamaya' cannot denote the highest Br. because the same Br cannot both be the whole (viz. the self of Bliss) and a tail or support. Since joy, etc. are mentioned as its members, Ānandamaya may denote the Saguna or the lower Br, but even this is not proper, because the śruti declares it to be inaccessible even by mind, speech, etc. Again, the word 'abundance' in its expressed sense necessarily implies the presence of a small amount of its opposite, viz. pain, in the present context. But this cannot be predicated of the highest and hence the affix 'mayat' does not stand for 'abundance', but for modification. Moreover, the repeated mention is of 'Ānanda' and not of 'Ānandamaya' so as to justify that the latter stands for the highest. Therefore, 'mayat' denotes a mere effect, just as it does in the case of Annamaya and other following members.

The above alternative explanation is given by Ś in addition to the one normally accepted by all subsequent commentators.

¹ 'एतन्मानन्दमयमात्मानमुपसङ्गामति

The Anu passage quoted above and as explained below is directed against Ś 's second interpretation

(b) "Again, those who split the topic are ignorant, since, even for them it is obligatory to explain what the term 'Ānandamaya' refers to. It cannot denote the soul, because the knowldeer of Br, as said to be its end in the text ('with the intelligent Br. does he enjoy all types of pleasures') has Ānandamaya as its fruit—well, let it be inanimate, like heaven. Then, you must say what is the support of it, if its support also is non-sentient, it would be nothing else but the fruit of actions. If it were argued that 'Ānandamaya' is not the fruit of actions, but of knowledge,—the answer is no, for, knowledge can produce a fruit which is non-different from knowledge or bliss. It cannot be said that the main fruit of knowledge can be either non-sentient or sentient, since these latter do exist prior to knowledge and hence cannot become (its) fruits. If the opponent were to argue that the mention of Br being the tail (or support) of the Ānandamaya implies censure of and contradiction to the text, 'All other creatures live on a small portion of that bliss' (Br Up IV 3 32),—then, he should as well refuse to accept that Br is the highest end of human endeavour, basing his argument on the implication of distinction through the use of the Genitive (case) in the text "That one is the bliss of Br" (T Up 2 8) (Since the bliss, according to the opponent, would be different from Br as suggested by the Genitive) And if it were said that Br, as distinct from bliss, is the end to be achieved,—well, it means an opposition to what has been undertaken.¹ Even according to your own arrangement of this topic, "the tail of Br" does not mean that "the tail" is Br so as to offer a reconciliation (of the text with the sense propounded by you), but "the tail of Br" just means "the support" suggesting that the Akṣara-aspect of Br. forms the support or a resting place or an abode of the highest. This refers to differentiation only, and not to sublation or negation (Pūrva nyāya). It is not possible that even Br can sublimate the scriptures (if they are His

¹ Since 'सर्वविदानोति परम्' states the चानन्दन्य to be the highest end, and the ending portion 'एतन्नानन्दमयज्ञानानुपसृक्तमिति' etc refers to the same

Self-revelation) It would be foolish too. There is no flaw in considering 'Ānandamaya' itself as denoting the Br. He who imagines that it does not refer to Br and knowing that the Vedas teach Br as its 'tail', tries to reconcile these (the priority or otherwise of the Akṣara), is a great fool, since he should also understand what is primary between the object and its fruit (*i.e.* the Akṣara is important as an object of knowledge, but not as the highest fruit). The statement of its being the tail is for the sake of proclaiming that it is the object of knowledge, before the attainment of the highest (Pūrvabhāvitvāya). That is why it (Akṣara) is said to be the object of knowledge and the support of Br, the Ānandamaya has for its abode the Akṣara. The relation of the part and the whole is metaphorical here and that is also how the Selves consisting of breath, etc. are properly (in a metaphorical sense) said to be of the form of a flamingo. This shows that the external involucre stand for that form (Haniṣakāratvam) while the internal involucre stands for Ānandamaya in conformity with the external ones. Thus everything is properly explained.]

It may be noted here that Ś regards this topic as the first of a series of interpretations considering the problem whether certain scriptural passages refer to Br or not and the same is followed by V, while Rama considers it as the concluding portion of the preceding topic. The first interpretation of the term 'Ānandamaya' given by Ś seems to be the one intended by the Sutrakara, as the wording of the sutras suggests and as is generally explained by most of the subsequent commentators, while the alternative interpretation proving that 'Ānandamaya' does not stand for the highest refers to another possible way of explanation embodying the view of some, belonging, perhaps, to his own fold and which he could not well ignore. Again, this is not a single, isolated instance where Ś has given alternative explanations, since we come across such interpretations representing the 'Ekadeśī' view in his commentary a number of times (II 2 35 II 1 15, etc.) The view of Deussen that the second interpretation ascribed to Ś is a later interpolation does not seem to be correct, since it has been explained by all commentators and even the wording and the style do not exhibit any difference so as to justify such a conclusion. It is likely that after having given the first interpretation of his own

conviction, he proceeds to note another significant view current in his own philosophical circle

Secondly, the defect of 'splitting up the topic' which V ascribes to Ś is not warranted by facts, since the number and the arrangement of the sutras comprising the Ānandamaya section are exactly the same as read by both V and Ś. There is no dropping or an addition of sutras in either of the cases. And even in the alternative interpretation that Ś offers starting with the remark "Idam tviha vaktavyam", he expressly mentions the first three sutras (Nos 12, 13 and 14) of this adhikarana and explains them in accordance with the affix 'mayat' denoting 'modification', and states that the rest of the sutras should also be interpreted on the same lines¹

Thus, the whole passage cited above from the Anu which bears on the topic of 'adhikarana bhanga' is without a footing, so to say

The next adhikarana points out that the golden person seen within the sun and the eye is the Highest Br and not the lower superintending divinity. In the same way, the following sections demonstrate that the ether, the vital breath, the light, etc are nothing but the supreme Br

Under the treatment of the passage occurring in Ch Up V 18 2, it is discussed whether the term "Vaiśvanara" has to be understood to mean the gastric fire or the divinity of fire, the element or the highest Br. The word 'Vaiśvānara' is commonly accepted to stand for 'the fire within', but, says V, it cannot refer to anything but Br. This is so because this term "Vaiśvanara" as occurring in different scriptural passages and as understood to refer to different objects, can be rightly applicable to the highest Self only, since the latter alone is capable of becoming anything and is an abode of contradictory attributes. While explaining the sutras under this topic, V is seen to be harping on the same string² viz the impropriety of

¹ 'अपरायणि सुप्ता ए यथानभव पुच्छवाक्यनिर्दिष्टस्यैव ब्रह्मण उपपादकानि द्रष्टव्यानि ।'
(S B, p 191)

² 'न हि विमृद्धनाश्रकत्र भगवद्वयतिरिक्ते संभवति । सवभवनसाम्यभावात् ।'
(I 2 24) 'तस्मात् प्रमाणमवानुमतव्यम् । न युक्ति ।' (I 2 32)
'युक्तिरन्या त्वमहविद्यैव । ननु तथापि कश्चिदेतानुज्ञा या युक्तिवत्त्व्या राश्र-
माश्रव्यायात् चत् । उच्यते । विराय एव नाराज्ञाया वस्तुम्बभावात् ।' (I 2-32)
तस्मादानन्दारान्देवाय धसा यत्र स्वभिव्यक्तिस्तत्र विमृद्धनाश्रकत्वानि चकारार्थ ।'
(I 2 32)

accepting reasoning as a means to the knowledge of Br and the non application of contradiction to Br, who is an abode of contradictory attributes. Thus, it is from V himself that one comes to know that reason has no place in his system. According to V, śabda is the only authoritative means—but it is curious to note that V spent such great energy only upon the task of refutation and negation of the efficacy of reasoning as such, while thereby trying to strengthen the force of śruti. As a result, he was obliged to make statements of the above nature and to seek shelter under the Wish Divine!

After having explained the views of the authorities quoted in the sūtras in this connection, V. finally states his own view that in spite of the apparent contradiction witnessed in the scriptural statements pertaining to the “Vaiśvānara” as residing in a limited portion and yet meaning the all pervading Highest Br, there is nothing wrong in maintaining that “Vaiśvanara” stands for the Highest, who is an abode of contradictory attributes. Hence, says V, all those commentators who try to reason out why “Vaiśvānara” should mean the highest Br are confused, since they miss the very core, viz the power to become anything and everything (Sarvabhavana Sāmarthyā) and the possession of contradictory attributes on the part of the Lord (p 318)

(c) अज्ञानं नाम चैतन्यात्तर्भूतं तच्छक्तिरूपमनादि ।

... ब्रह्मविषयावेव न जीवविषयो । (p 381)

The passage, occurring under the explanation of sūtra 1315, is directed against the Mayavada of Ś and it also embodies a hint at V's own theory of the part-and-the-whole in connection with the individual soul and the Highest. The sūtra in question viz “Gati śabdabhyam tathahī dr̥ṣṭam lingam ca” forms one of the main reasons why the word “dahara” or ‘small (ether)’ should stand for the Highest and it means that ‘on account of the action of going (into Br) and because of the word “Brahmalokaḥ” the ‘ether’ refers to Br only, since the jīvas go into Br (as is stated in scriptures), and thus it constitutes an inferential sign for asserting the proper meaning of the term “Brahmalokaḥ”

The passage quoted above and translated below points out why the division of Br into jīvas cannot be fictitious

(c) ‘Ignorance, indeed, should either be beginningless and an inner power of sentiency (caitanya) or an external agent like (the Prakṛti of) the sāmkyas. Not the latter, since, if it were

external, it stands refuted through the refutation of the sāmkhya view. Nor, on the other hand, an internally abiding agent, of the nature of a power (or potentiality) if not opposed to the object (within which it resides) can differentiate the nature of that object (i.e. either this internal capacity is opposed to the nature of the object or it is not, if the former, this inherent power should extend to the Highest Br also and then it would cease to be His power, if it were not opposed to the nature of the object (*viz* jīva), the jīvas would not be affected by it and there could not, in that case, be any division or distinction) since, there would result an annihilation of the substratum itself (if the power were opposed to the very essence of jīvas as also necessarily of Br, it would destroy its own substratum *viz* Br.) And there is no basis for assuming that this ignorance (Ajñāna) in its primal existential capacity acts as an adjunct in the case of Br, while in the case of the jīvas, it has mixed characteristics—because, an outside agent alone, like an axe, could be a distinguishing agent. Nor could it be justified to be an internal agent on the analogy of wind, because the case under consideration is different, as ignorance is a power of the Lord, while ‘vayu’ is not accepted to be so. Moreover, what sort of violent hatred is this against ‘Brahmavada’ which prompts you to fancy ‘Mithyavada’? If it is due to ignorance, your theory is as good as the cognition of a white conch as yellow. And this wrong perception would be corrected only on approaching one who has realised Br, like the removal of the yellowness (seen in a white conch) by eating sugar. This section has been written by Śrī Vyasa the omniscient, as he could foresee the necessity of refuting Mithyavada. Therefore, since ignorance is seen to pertain to the jīva only and because Br is acknowledged to be omniscient, the ‘going’ (to Br) and the word ‘Brahmaloka’ refer to Br only and not to the jīva.”

In the above passage V's stand is explained as suggesting that the division or separation of the jīvas from Br is not fictitious, the whole discussion turning on the point whether the opponent adheres to the theory of jīvaśritāvidyā or Brahmaśrita vidyā,—V finally refuting both and asserting that Avidyā can neither have the jīva nor Br as its substratum.

The fourth quarter of the first adhyaya attempts a refutation

of the claim of the sāmkyas to have the backing of Vedic authority. The sūtra 1 4 2, viz 'sukṣmam tu tadarhatvat' is explained by V as pointing to the non-difference between the attributes and the possessor of them. The word "sukṣmam" is equivalent to "avyakta", or unmanifest and is interpreted to mean 'His grace', which is not manifest in all forms. According to Ś, "Avyakta", denotes the subtle causal body, while Rāma states that the "Avyakta" refers to Br.

It should be noted here that even when the dharma and its dharmin may not be perceived to be different from each other, there does exist distinction between the two in that one is a 'Guna' while the other is a substance (dravya). The very relation of 'dravya guna' is based on difference between its own members. Thus, Br and his attributes cannot be identified from this point of view.

(d) 'ज्योतिरुपक्रमात्, तथा ह्यधीयत एके ।'—(1 4-9)

(d) 'But the (divinities) beginning with 'jyotiḥ' (are meant by 'ajā'), since some read so in their text.'

This sūtra has given rise to a controversy as to whether the word 'aja' occurring in Śvet Up IV 5 suggests the Prakṛti of the sāmkyas or stands for anything else. The very initial statement of the mantra in question points to the fact that 'jyotiḥ' (luminaries) is what is meant by the term 'aja', although the word 'aja' is nowhere understood to convey the sense of 'jyotiḥ'. What is referred to by it are the shining divinities like the fire, the sun, the moon and the lightning (Br is stated to be 'jyotisman' and having 'catuskala' formed of the fire, etc. in Ch Up). And since Br created 'Tejas' ('Tattejo sṛjata'), these first evolved divinities are but His partial manifestation. Or, the triplication ('Trivṛtkarana') of light, water and food is the characteristic of this divinity which was created by Br in the beginning. This represents the chief creation, and the two other 'ajas' spoken of in the same mantra (Śvet Up IV 5) stand for the individual soul and Br. The fire is said to be red because that is the characteristic of Tejas, the white and the black aspects referring to the respective characteristics of water and food (Ch Up VI 4 1). Br and jīva are said to have entered into these evolved entities ('anena jivena') and thus, through their sentient substratum, these are distinguished from the manimate Prakṛti.

Therefore, the term 'aja' does not stand for the Prakṛti of Sāṃkhyas. The interpretation of this sūtra as given by V differs from that offered by Ś in the sense that Ś explains the term 'aja' as the material cause of the four classes of beings, sprung from Br and beginning with light, etc., while according to V, it stands for first evolved divinity. But for this difference both are at one in so far as the refutation of the Sāṃkhya stand is concerned, viz. that 'aja' refers to Prakṛti.]

(e) 'वाक्यान्वयात्' (1 4 19)

(The Highest Br is meant in the Br Up IV 5 1 15, embodying the conversation between Yajñavalkya and Maitreyī), on account of the integrated meaning of the statements.

The *prima facie* view is that the jīva is meant in the topic under consideration, as warranted by the initial, middle and the concluding remarks. But this is refuted both by Ś and V on the basis of the contextual statements. The whole section has the highest Br in view, since all the statements referring to the Self as the central object of love can become applicable to the Self only through its being connected with Br, which is the chief end, being the highest Bliss. Therefore, the Sāṃkhya view that the individual soul is meant in the discussion is unwarranted.

(f) 'अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्न 1' (1 4 22)

'(The initial statement is made) because Br exists in the state of an individual self, so Kāśakṛtsna holds.'

While summing up different views on the purport of the Maitreyī brahmaṇa passage occurring in Br Up, as offered by Āsmarathya, Auḍulomī and Kāśakṛtsna V refers to the last view under this sūtra and explains the same. The jīva forms the object of discussion occurring in the Maitreyī brāhmaṇa passage, wherein the initial, middle and the concluding portions refer to the same, viz. the jīva. This has raised the question whether the whole discussion corroborates the Prakṛti vada of the Sāṃkhyas or embodies the Vedantic doctrine viz. that Br. is the end in view. Āsmarathya thinks that the jīva is a part of Br created by Br like a spark (from the fire) for the sake of His own enjoyment, while Auḍulomī states that the jīva is a beginningless entity comprised of mere intelligence, which enters into a conglomeration of body, etc. and is called a 'jīva', and, when it enters back into Intelligence in the form of mere intelligence, it is said to have attained liberation (1 4 20). Kāśakṛtsna speaks of the jīva as but a condition of the Lord, and

therefore, the jīva, according to him, is nothing but Br. even in its state of transmigration, otherwise, *i.e.* if the jīva were not an "avasthā viśeṣa"¹, how could the scriptures lay down that everything is dear for the sake of the Self?—since nothing except the Lord could account for the love of one and all "Avasthā" in this sūtra (I 4 22) stands for "a particular condition of the Lord as jīva" and it implies activity on the part of the jīva, but when the latter enters back into Br in the form of mere intelligent spirit, there is no such activity. Thus, the beginning made with reference to jīva in the 'Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa'-passage does not go against the concept of Br being the purport, since the jīva is but an "avasthā-viśeṣa" of Br.

Thus, the causality of Prakṛti does not stand to reason. If the opponent were to claim joint causality of Prakṛti with Br, this stand also is refuted in the following sūtra, I 4 28,² which means that Br is also the material cause, since this view is not opposed to the assertive statements and the illustrative instances adduced. The Sāṃkhyas argue that even if Br were the efficient cause, the material or the inherent cause ("samavāyī") has to be different from the efficient cause, and hence Prakṛti could have its stand affirmed as an inherent cause. To this the Vedantins answer that Br is material or inherent cause, because the assertive statement, *viz.* the knowledge of all through the knowledge of One, as also the illustrations can be explained only if this were so. The illustrative instances in view are like the knowledge of all things made of clay through the knowledge of clay and so on.

(g) 'उभयोर्ग्रहणमुपचारव्यावृत्त्यर्थम्

विकारो नामधेयम् ।'

(Ch Up VI 14, p 116)


'The mention of both (*viz.* the assertive statement and the illustrative instances) is for the sake of excluding the application of a secondary or metaphorical meaning, like in the case of beginning and conclusion (by which when an object is established to be the centre of the issue, there is no scope for any doubt whether it could be secondary.) If the assertive statement

¹ Rama also maintains that jīva is an "avasthā viśeṣa" of Br (cf. "तद्वानुमाविरात्तदनुप्रविश्य" इति कारणवस्थायामात्मनयाऽवस्थितं परमानैव स्वरूपं विप्रियमण्ड्रं यस्याया नत्याऽवस्थाय तत्तदभवदित्युच्यते ।')

—(श्रीभारत I 4 27)

² 'प्रकृतश्च प्रतिज्ञाऽप्यान्तानुपरोधान् ।'

alone where there (as forming the reason to prove Br to be the inherent cause), this could be attained even through an unseen means (with the aid of which, the mystics, etc can come to realise their object in view) and then this statement alone would not be able to prove that Br is the inherent cause too. If the illustrative instances alone were adduced, in an inferential manner, Br would be proved as something to be known¹, but not to be the inherent cause. But when both (pratyjñā and drstānta) are mentioned, that door alone which has been pointed out by declaratory statement must be followed (on the basis of perception and not inference) and thus results the establishment of Br being the inherent cause. The lump of clay, iron nail and nail clipper are referred to for the sake of refuting the stand of (absolute) difference as well as (absolute) non difference between the cause and its effects².

This being so, (viz that the effect is but a special condition of the cause), if Br. is known in one place, it becomes known everywhere (sarvatra) and it is for the sake of removing this juxtaposition characterised by a common genus that it is laid down 'Name is but a modification beginning with speech', etc 

Further on, V states that the mention 'clay alone', etc is for the sake of putting out of court the theory of unreality. As this world is but a form of Br, Br alone can be its inherent cause³.

Thus, this section ends here with a note that causality could not be attributed to Prakṛti as the Sāṃkhyaś believe.

The 2nd adhyāya aims at establishing a harmony between the śruti and smṛti texts as also between apparently contradictory śruti texts⁴.

¹ 'सर्वं सत् ज्ञेयत्वात् इत्यनुमानविधया ज्ञेयत्ववत् ब्रह्म भवति न तु समवायिकारणम् ।'

(Commentary on Anu by Giridhara)

² V only states that the illustrative instances prove that the Bhedābheda theory viz that jiva is both different and non different from Br is untenable but he does not give any reason for his statement. Actually, if the jiva were regarded as a specific condition of Br, it can neither be different from Br absolutely nor non different in absolute terms.

³ A complete analysis of this topic follows in the concluding chapter.

⁴ Attention is directed to the fact that the stanza Bhrantimulataya etc that is given by V in the beginning of this adhyāya also occurs in the Madhava's Bhāṣya on the B. S. (II 1 1). This is an instance of borrowing without acknowledgement on the part of V. (We are indebted to Dr. B. N. K. Sharma for his having brought this point to our notice.)

(h) 'नोव्यापत्ते रविभागश्चेत्सयात्सोऽदत् ।' —II 1 13

"If it be said that there would result non-distinction ('avibhagah') because the objects of enjoyment would pass over into the enjoyer,—let it be so, as witnessed in ordinary experience. If the world were non-different from Br, then the objects of enjoyment would pass over into the state of the enjoyer, and if it were argued, in order to do away with this possibility, that there is no distinction between the enjoyer and the thing to be enjoyed, since when the *karya* (*jiva*) merges into the Unqualified Br, its distinctions also get merged into it,—well, let it be so, says the commentator, as is witnessed in the world. We see that gold is the material cause of the bracelets, etc. and as such non-different from them all,—still, the fact that bracelets do not turn into or become non-different from earrings, etc. is sufficient to show as a counter illustration that the objects of enjoyment do not become the enjoyer."

In the next *adhikarana*, V points out that the *sutra* "Tadananyatvamarambhana śabdādibhyah" speaks of the non-difference ('*ananyatva*') of an effect from its cause and not the unreality ('*Mithyatva*') of the effect. Those, who postulate the theory of unreality of the world, have, in V's words, 'their intellect clouded by ignorance' and this section is begun by the *Sutrakara* in order to 'kill the thief who has entered inside'. Any fanciful interpretation is inadmissible in the field of supermundane objects. The fact that mere reason (*tarka*) is unstable, that the sense of 'unreality' is impossible to conceive of in the aforesaid *sūtra* and that the assertive statement of the knowledge of all through the realisation of one would be violated thereby—proves that one, who is prepared to read the sense of unreality, notwithstanding the triple opposition that would be involved, is "too adventurous" (fool hardy). The world is a matter of perception, and perception ("*upalabdhih*") is possible in the case of an existential entity alone.¹ The *Mithyavadin* has to read the *sutra* '*Bhave copalabdheh*' as "*Bhavaccopalabdheh*", since the '*ca*' in the former emphasises the reality of the world, as pointed out in '*Mirttiketyeva satyam*', etc. (For a detailed treatment of this topic, please see the final chapter)

¹ This statement does not embody truth in its entirety since a 'mirage' may be perceived, but its perception cannot prove its existence, nor reality

(1) 'इतरव्यपदेशाद्विजाकरणादिव्यप्रसक्ति १' (II 1 21)

'अधिक तु भेदनिर्देशात् १' (II 1 22)

The first sutra states the *prima facie* view that if Br is the cause of the world, and because the jiva (itara) is designated to be non different from Br, there would arise a contingency of not doing deeds beneficial to jiva. The next sutra refutes this view by declaring that Br is 'adhika' or superior to the jiva as also to the jagat, because of the statement of distinction such as "He is to be seen", etc and also on account of the description of the jiva as of the nature of 'vijñāna' and of Br as of the nature of Bliss (Commentary by Giridhara, p 74). Only if Br were just equal to the jiva, the above-said flaw of not doing deeds that are beneficial to the jiva would affect Br. Nor is seen in the world a person necessarily doing good to every part or limb of his, e.g. he has to cut his hair, nails, etc. Thus the Lord also, through sport, bestows good on some of his 'parts' (jivas) and evil on others—without which there would be no accomplishment of the Divine sport (p 74). The distinction and non-distinction, as going hand in hand, is the purport here, and not absolute non difference, says Giridhara in his commentary on the sutra (Does this not support the Bhedābheda doctrine?)

Here, it must be said that the illustration of a man not doing good to all his limbs is not adequate and as a matter of fact, is fraught with inherent fallacies. Firstly, the cutting of hair and nails is not painful to the hair and nails themselves as limbs of the person concerned. But even granting that it involves a loss and decay for them, it is indeed strange that V tries to drive his point by comparing the sentient jivas with non sentient hair and nails! Again, the 'Divine Sport' which necessitates the imposition of suffering upon some jivas just for the fulfilment of His desire to sport is hard to conceive¹

The high and low gradation of jiva is compared to the distinctions witnessed in a diamond, a jewel, a stone, etc though they are not non different in the sense that they are all earthly. The effect, viz jiva, is different from Br who is absolutely independent of these effects, though its effects are absolutely dependent on Brahman.

The sutra "Vikarapatvanneti cettaduktam" refutes the *prima facie* view that Br cannot be the creator, since Br

¹ 'लीलया कुप्रचिरो सुख कुप्रविदु स करोत्यवे यथ । इत्यथा लीलासिद्धि रयादिति भाव १' (p 74)

is stated to have no distinction of parts (or organs), and that only a person having organs, etc can fashion anything. But, says V., in the case of Br., whose majesty and greatness are unfathomable, such worldly comparisons do not find any application. He eloquently enjoins maximum attention to the scriptural authority¹

The Divine Sport (līlā) is termed the highest attainment or liberation². V. tries to explain away the charges of inequality and cruelty on the part of Br. by first saying that God takes into consideration the good and bad actions of the jivas for bestowing happiness and misery on them,—but he hastens as it were, to state that this is so said for the sake of instructing the antagonists, since, as a matter of fact, “there is no possibility at all of inequality, etc arising in the case of Br’s “Ātma sṛṣṭi”. The text “Him alone does He make perform good deeds whom He wishes to uplift” etc is quoted here in support of his theory of grace and the divine majesty of the Lord.

✓ There is a common agreement as regards the purport of the second pāda of the 2nd adhyāya that it aims at ‘paramata nirākarana’ and there is hardly any point which is noteworthy therein in so far as our subject is concerned—except that in its concluding section, V explains that the Sutrakara has in view the refutation of a portion of the Pancaratra doctrine, viz the Caturvyuha (or the four fold forms of Br.) being the originator of the world. It is important to note that notwithstanding the high veneration in which the Bhg is held by V all its tenets are not acceptable to him. He does not accept that Vasudeva, Sankarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha together form the cause of the world, where Vasudeva is Br., Sankarsana represents the jiva, Pradyumna the mind and Aniruddha the ego. If Vasudeva gave rise to Sankarsana, from which came Pradyumna (mind), the position of the creation of mind out of the jiva would not be sound, since an instrument like a stick, etc is not seen in the world to rise from a potter (II 2 43). Again, the concept that the four forms represent the creator suggests that Br and jiva, as represented by Vasudeva and Sankarsana, respectively, are on

¹ ‘श्रुवाचीनविकल्पविचारकुतर्कप्रमाणाभामशास्त्रकलिलान्त करणदुरवग्रहवादिना चादानवदरे सुर्वभवत्समर्थे ब्रह्मणि विरोधीभावाच्च ।’—(II 1 27)

² ‘सा लाला कैवल्य मोक्ष ।’—(II 1 33)

the same level or in the same category—which is absurd, says V. Moreover, the idea (of many rulers or creators) itself is improper. Therefore, the Caturvyuha doctrine is not acceptable.

It has to be remarked here that in spite of degrading 'yukti' as such, V does have recourse to it as and when required by him,—one may easily see how he refrains from applying here his fond maxim of "Sarvabhavana samarthya" and "Viruddha dharmasrayatva" on the part of the Lord.

The sutra II-3 16¹ explains that the jiva is unborn and eternal and that birth and death, as applied to it, are only metaphorical being in reality meant to be applied to the body only. The presence of the jiva is experienced on account of its association with the body, but the jiva has no 'utpatti' as such. This is, of course, consistent with V's doctrine on the nature of the jiva. The next sutra supports the same on the authority of scripture.

□ The sutra II 3 18, viz "jñā'ta eva" is interpreted by Ś to mean that the jiva is knowledge (jñānam), while V explains it as stating only the *prima facie* view, viz that held by S that jiva is knowledge and therefore Br itself, all distinctions being products of Maya. Then he states that jiva is a part of Br since it is related to the latter like the spark to the blazing fire. And this relation with or emergence from Br, which is beginningless cannot be termed 'fanciful' (due to 'maya') in the absence of any substantial proof for terming it so. Therefore, says V, "the upholder of the doctrine of Mayā is only an incarnation of the idealist Buddhist, who takes his stand on those statements alone in which what is really a part is spoken of in terms of the whole, trying thereby to make his doctrine acceptable to scholars." In short, V speaks of the jiva (in the explanation of this sūtra) as a knower, not as knowledge (which seems to be more in consonance with the form 'jñāḥ' vs 'jñānam')

The following sutras (19-32) are differently grouped by different commentators and there prevails a difference of opinion with regard to the general purport. Ś considers that all these together form one independent adhikarana, sūtras 19-28, embodying the *prima facie* view, which the next four sutras undertake to refute. Rama includes even the previous sutra (18) in this adhikarana and interprets the latter to explain that

¹ '३ । उच्यते श्रुत्यनु स्यात्तदप्यप्यशा भावस्तथावमावि बन्व ।'

the jīva is atomic in size, while V regards sutras 19 28 and 29 32 as forming two different adhikaranas although the general purport of these is the same, viz the jīva being atomic in size

The most important turning point is found in the sutra 29¹ "But, on account of that quality (or the quality of that) being the essence, there is that designation, just as in the case of a jīva in deep sleep" Ś views this sūtra as postulating the 'siddhanta', viz that the jīva, though all pervading and non-different from Br is termed 'anu' or 'atomic' since the qualities of Buddhi, the limiting adjunct, form its essence (tadgunasa ratvāt), so long as it is in the state of mundane existence. The atomic size of 'buddhi' is metaphorically applied to the jīva, and although this connection with 'buddhi' is not manifest in the state of deep sleep, it is present all the same

V states the above as forming his *prima facie* view and refutes it by explaining that the jīva is atomic, but is identified with Br in texts like 'That thou art', only because the qualities of Br form the essence of it, distinguishing it from the non-sentient world

Here, it must be pointed out that if Br's qualities of 'sat' and 'cit' are said to form the essence of the jīva and if that constitutes the reason for its identification with Br the quality of 'sat' as manifested in the world should also make the world qualified for being identified with Br—to which V agrees with his usual systematic distinction. Still except for this point, the interpretation of this sutra as offered by V seems to be more satisfactory than that given by Ś's interpretation of 'tad' occurring in this sutra, as referring to 'buddhi' all at once—in the absence of its being mentioned in any of the immediately preceding sutras,—there seems to be a lack of logical connection (balance) and propriety □

V proceeds to explain in the next sutra a reference to jīva as all pervading. The jīva acquires 'vyapakatva' or 'all pervasiveness', when it becomes Br or when the bliss of Br is manifested in it. The following sutra (II 3 31) further explains that this bliss is not totally absent even in the state of its being a jīva, but it is suppressed like the masculine qualities and powers remaining latent in a child and manifesting themselves at the advent of youth

¹ 'तदुपनास्त्वात् तदनपदेन' प्राङ्ङत् ।'

Here the question arises whether the all pervasive character, attained by one jiva, in the state of liberation or at the manifestation of the bliss aspect is distinct or non distinct from another jiva which has also attained this all pervasive character. If the first alternative is chosen, the very concept of 'vyapakatva' would be sublated or else there must be different grades of 'vyāpakatva' leading back to different grades of liberation as well. If we take the second alternative, it is tantamount to all liberated jivas merging into one all pervasiveness, viz Br, and this cuts across V's theory of the jiva's individual existence and its participation in the divine sport, etc. in the state of liberation. Again the statement that "even in the state of mundane existence, this 'vyapakatva' does exist in the jiva, but that it is suppressed" is open to challenge. If the jivas are 'vyapaka' they cannot be termed 'anu', and vice versa. The suppression of bliss in the jivas, according to V, leads to their being atomic in size. But this leaves unexplained his theory of distinction of one jiva from another. Moreover, how can 'vyapakatva' be suppressed and by what? Thus, it is obvious here that there is a confused connotation of a term like 'vyapakatva', etc.

The sutras (33-40) deal with the topic whether the jiva is an agent or not. Ś regards 'kartṛtva' on the part of the jiva to be fictitious or superimposed, while other commentators are at one as regards the general purport, viz that the 'kartṛtva' is natural and real. The sūtra 'yathā ca taksobhayatha (II 3-40) meaning, 'just as a carpenter is both or does both ways forms a crucial sūtra as it were, since it is interpreted differently by different commentators. Ramā explains it as meaning that 'just as a carpenter, though an agent is sometimes active and sometimes not',¹ in the same way, the jiva has 'kartṛtva' as its natural attribute, but sometimes it is seen to operate and sometimes not.

Here, it has to be pointed out that if 'kartṛtva' forms an essential or natural attribute of the jiva the question arises how can it be discarded sometimes? Just as sentiency (caitanya) being the nature of a jiva, cannot be negated of it in so far as it is. Now if kartṛtva thus is not natural in the case of the jiva it must be unreal or superimposed. This analysis tallies with what Ś has to say with reference to 'kartṛtva'. According to

¹ Rama reads the sūtra as 'यथा च तक्षामयथा ।'

as against the general reading 'यथा च तक्षामयथा ।'

Ś, this sūtra answers whether 'kartṛtva' belongs to the jīva by its very nature or is attributed to it. The preceding sūtras (19-32), which have proved that the jīva is an agent have to be reinterpreted by Ś in accordance with his theory of superimposition. In so far as the technicalities of the sūtras are concerned, Ś's interpretation of the section containing sūtras 19-32, as also of this sūtra (40), is rather objectionable, since he has to introduce a new word 'buddhi' in the former, in the absence of any reference to it in the previous sūtras (as already pointed out), and in the sūtra 40, he has to read 'ca' to stand for 'u'. But as regards consistency in the system itself, there is nothing that is challengeable. He explains that just as a carpenter is an 'agent' while working with the tools and becomes miserable, but the same carpenter, leaving aside his tools and on coming home becomes 'inactive' and is happy—in the same way, the jīva in the states of dream and waking is an 'agent' since it is under the influence of ignorance and hence becomes miserable, while in the state of deep sleep, it is free from mental activities and remains inactive and happy. It is not in order 'to clear off his conscience' (as Dr. Ghate thinks) that Ś says that the illustration of the carpenter has to be understood only so far—but the very idea of analogy is based on points of similarity as against those of difference. Points of differentiation must be present between the illustration and the thing illustrated, as the very definition of a simile demands 'साधर्म्यं उपमा श्लेष', but when a thing is compared with another, only those aspects that constitute similarity have to be understood and not others. Therefore, it is but appropriate when Ś says "so far" and no further. In the illustration of the carpenter to corroborate the view of the jīva's 'kartṛtva' being natural, there is no point in saying that the essential attribute of 'kartṛtva' belonging to the jīva is sometimes in force and sometimes not. Again, if 'kartṛtva' were really natural, as is common experience and understanding, it is not necessary for the scriptures to prove it, just as one does not require the scriptures to teach him that the fire is hot. So, it is only what cannot be known through other means that scriptures profess to teach. Therefore, the 'kartṛtva' which appears to belong to the jīva does not in reality belong to it, since it is on account of the limiting adjuncts that kartṛtva is ascribed to the jīva.

'kartṛtva' alone that is under consideration here and there is no previous mention of 'bhokṛtva' at all ~

Apart from the slight difference in the reading of the sūtra II 3 40 by Rāma, his interpretation of it seems to be the most straight-forward

The concluding adhikaraṇa of this quarter comprised of sūtras 43-53, is significant, since it deals with the question of the relation between Br. and the jīva. Sūtra 43¹ literally means that the jīva is *a part* of Br on account of the mention of difference, and even otherwise, because of the reading in one text that Br is of the nature of fishermen, knaves, etc. Commenting on this sūtra, V advises that the scriptures declaring Br. to be both partite and impartite should be adequately interpreted and the reasoning employed for their interpretation should be in consonance with the texts rather than go at a tangent to them "If the texts are incomprehensible by themselves, one should ponder over them ("Tapo vidheyam") or consult learned scholars, but never make a mess of them" The jīvas and the inanimate world emanated from Br like the sparks from fire, Br. having hands, feet, etc. in all directions, and yet by His own essence or nature remaining impartite. Explaining this, the commentator says that the contradiction involved in speaking of one and the same entity, viz Br as possessed of parts and also impartite at the same time, does not arise in the case of Br, since the latter is said to be the *substratum of opposite or contradictory attributes on the basis of the scriptural statements like "Apānīpādo javano grahīta", etc.* This proves that the jīva is a part of the Lord, the whole, and that this 'amśatva' is not metaphorical

Another point of doubt arises here, namely, that if the jīvas are parts of the Lord, they would be similar to Br or fall within the category of 'intra-genus' ('sajātyatva') with reference to Br. This is solved on the basis of the obscuration of the bliss-aspect in the jīvas (which prevents them from being fully on a par with Br), and their consequent state of embodiment. As for their being "sajātya" to Br on account of their possession of the cit aspect of the Lord, well, this 'sajātyam' as V calls it, is welcome (If so, Br does possess 'सज्जस्य मेः' as against 'त्रिविधमेदविश्विनासा' But V will say that since the 'cit'

1 'संज्ञो नादाह्वयद्रागद्वेषा ज्ञानि दारादिभवादि वस्तुभूयत एके ।'

is fundamentally one and Br's own, there is only one 'jāti', not two, hence no 'bheda' in the 'cit')

This sūtra puts out of court the theory of Ś that jīva is absolutely non-different from Br. Here the Sūtrakāra precisely states that the jīva is both different and non-different from Br. and hence a part of the latter. It is at places such as this that Ś has to put forth his explanations that the texts expressing non-difference alone are true and of ultimate value, while the texts suggesting difference are meant to be refuted later, and that the term 'amsah' should be understood as 'amśah iva'. Thus, Ś's interpretation of this sūtra is unwarranted and forced as it were, and the explanation of the sūtra text offered by V, who follows more or less in the footsteps of Rama is obviously more satisfactory and natural.

The concept of the jīva's being a part of Br is corroborated by the following two sūtras that refer to the RV mantra "Padosya visva bhutani", the Gīta statement "Mamaivamso jivaloke", etc. The sūtra (II 3 46) viz "Prakasadivannaivam Parah" meaning 'as light, etc. are not affected as such, so the Highest is not affected', is explained by V as follows. The doubt that if the jīva were a part of Br, the latter should be affected by the happiness, misery, etc. arising with respect to its parts, viz the jīvas, is refuted on the analogy of light, which is not affected by the defects pertaining to the objects it illuminates. Just as the heat of fire does not affect fire itself, nor does coolness affect snow, as stated in the Bhg., in the same way, happiness, etc. arise in the case of the jīva only, who labours under the notions of duality, and do not refer to Br.

S. interprets this sūtra as meaning that just as light, etc. although apparently assuming different forms with reference to the objects they illuminate are not really affected by them at all, so it is with Br in relation to the jīvas. But, if the jīvas were absolutely non-different from Br, as Ś contends there is no necessity of discussing such a question at all.

In the commentary on sūtra II 3 48, viz 'अनुज्ञापरिहारो देहसम्बन्धज्योतरदिवत्', V discusses this question. If all jīvas are parts of Br what is the propriety and possibility of injunctions and prohibitions laid down for different jīvas. He points out that the injunctions, etc. pertain to the jīvas, since the latter are connected with a body. This connection or embodiment on the part of the jīva may either be superimposed (by

Nescience) or brought about by the Lord. If it were superimposed, it should come to an end at the dawn of knowledge, if the latter, it can be terminated by the Lord alone. Even the 'jivan muktas', who are acknowledged to have attained correct knowledge or realisation, are seen to engage themselves in activities. Thus, V suggests that the jiva's connection with a body is not fictitious and that injunctions, etc. are meant for the jivas because of this connection. Just as fire and water as such are not impure, but, because of their contact with certain places, etc., the same are considered to be impure and are shunned (e.g. the fire in a cemetery or water from a low born's vessels), in the same way, injunctions, etc. are enjoined for jivas, although the latter are all alike parts of Br.

V explains sutra II 3 50 viz 'Ābhasa eva ca' as referring to the jiva as an 'abhasa' or appearance of Br, and not Br itself, since the bliss aspect of Br is suppressed in it. The particle 'ca' in the sutra is so interpreted as to suggest the absence of form, i.e. possession of four arms, etc. in the case of the jiva. V then challenges Ś's view and points out that the jiva could not be just a reflection of Br as Ś holds, since even the representation of an object and its multiple images through different media, as cited by Ś refers to multiplicity ("anekatva") and not to unreality ("Mithyatva"). Ś interprets it to mean that the jiva is just a reflection of Br, neither the same as nor different from Br. Just as the reflections of one and the same object that are cast through different media are not confounded with one another, in the same way, the acts of different jivas are not confounded, although the jivas are all non different from Br. If the jivas were mere reflections and hence unreal as Ś maintains, there is no possibility, says V, of superimposition of an unreal entity, and, secondly, scriptural texts like "dva suparna etc. would stand contradicted,—hence, "abhasa" does not mean 'a fictitious appearance' but stands for 'an entity apparently the same, but not just the same'.

Here, both the interpretations of 'abhāsa' seem to be equally sound or justifiable—except for the particle 'ca' (in the said sutra as explained by V), which is interpreted to mean 'Caturbhujakarasyapyabhavaḥ' which is, indeed, far fetched and unsatisfactory.

The first adhikarana of the fourth pāda of the second adhyāya asserts the production of 'praṇas' from Br, according to all

commentators except V The sūtra "Tathā Prānāh" means, according to Ś and others, that the 'prānas', like ether and other elements, are produced from Br As against this, V declares that the 'pranas' are unborn like the jivas, the only distinguishing characteristics between them (i.e. prānas and jivas) being the manifestation of the cit aspect of Br in the jivas, while the same is suppressed in the 'pranas'. This is naturally consistent within his system

The construction of "Yathā jivāh", as anticipated by the term 'tathā' in the sūtra, is V's own, as opposed to that of Ś and others, who connect the sutra with the production of ether, etc as laid down in II 3 1 Ś offers an explanation (based on the Jaimini's nyaya on Somapana) for referring the 'prānas' back to ether, etc spoken of in the beginning of the previous pāda on the grounds of similarity between ether, etc and pranas, which are produced, rather than associating them with the jivas

On the other hand, V construes 'tathā' in connection with "Yatha jivah", since the jivas are mentioned in the immediately preceding adhikarana and are unborn like the prānas, which are the subject of the sutra now under consideration

It may be remarked here that mere juxtaposition is not the criterion for establishing the contextual reference, yet, since both the pranas as well as the jivas are unborn in V's opinion, the factor of similarity is also present, and therefore, his interpretation of this particular sutra is at least as satisfactory as that given by Ś and others, with the only difference that V does not emphasise the point whether the pranas are born or not (which Ś and others do), but refers to going away, coming, etc in connection with them

The first two adhyāyas of the B S deal with the essential nature of the Highest principle, while the third and the fourth set forth the means and the nature of attainment (of It) respectively The first pāda of the third adhyāya refers to defects pertaining to the jiva and the five fold places (āhūtis) it enters with its subtle body from birth to birth This is intended to give rise to an attitude of detachment from worldly objects in one desirous of salvation

The whole pāda is interpreted on the same lines more or less by the different commentators, except for some minor points of difference as witnessed in the interpretation of sūtra 6, viz /

“Asrutatvāditi cennestādīkarīnam pratīteh” as offered by S and others on the one hand and V on the other. According to Ś and others, it discusses whether it is the jivas that are accompanied by water, when water alone is expressly mentioned (Br Up V 3 3) and there is no mention of the jivas. The answer is furnished in “īstādīkarīnām pratīteh” meaning that the performers of good deeds such as sacrifices, etc. are meant here. V refers this sūtra to the topic whether all kinds of jivas are invested with the subtle elements, since no particular types of jivas are specified, and he concludes that only the performers of sacrifice, etc. are accompanied by the subtle elements and not all.)

Thus, the first pāda of this adhyāya describes the course of a jīva from one birth to another and but for minor differences such as splitting of the adhīkarānas, etc. there is no material difference of importance in the interpretations offered by Ś and V.

The second pāda of the third adhyāya deals with the nature of the dreaming and sleeping states of the jīva. Ś discusses here in the first three sūtras the question whether the dream-creation is as real as the one by which a jīva in the state of waking is surrounded. The first two sūtras state the *prima facie* view that the dream-creation is real, because the scriptures declare it to be so and because the Highest Br is mentioned to be the creator of it (viz. the dream objects).

(j) मायामात्रं तु कालस्यैवानभिष्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात् ।’ (III 2.3)

‘This sūtra is of special significance since it is here, for the only time in the B S, that the “knotty” term “māya” occurs. It states the siddhānta, viz. ‘But the dream world is mere ‘illusion’, since it does not manifest itself with completeness (of the attributes of reality such as time, place, etc.)’ The next sūtra (4), according to Ś, is to be connected with the one just explained above, and it means that the dream world is not altogether unreal or illusory, since the dreams are indicative of good and bad fortune.

But this interpretation implies that the dream world is not altogether unreal—and hence has partial reality, in order to explain which, Ś has to add that the thing indicated may be real, but the indicative dream remains unreal, because it is sublated on waking up.

This explanation of Ś is based on the classification of the cognition of reality into Prātībhāsika, Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika categories upheld by him. The dream world

belongs to the first category mentioned, since it is only an appearance of reality that is characteristic of the dream-experience and it stands negated as soon as the dreaming person wakes up. Thus, it does not seem proper to dismiss Ś.'s explanation of at least these four sūtras here as 'unsatisfactory'¹, nor does he seem to be bound to offer any explanation in order to do away with the 'unsatisfactory character of the interpretation', since it is but proper and natural that the Pratiḥhasika category should be referred to here, when the dream world happens to be the subject matter.

The next sūtra, "Parabhūdyānattu tirohitam tato hyasya bandha viparyayau" is explained by Ś. as meaning 'But by the meditation on the Highest, that which is hidden (the real nature of the jīva) (becomes manifest), since from Him are its bondage and its opposite (i.e. liberation)'. The sūtra (6) "Dehayogādva so pi" is explained as: 'Or that (viz. the concealment of the jīva's powers) results from its connection with the body'. Ś. understands these sūtras to discuss why the dream-world could not be the jīva's creation, when the jīva possesses the powers of knowledge, etc. in common with Br.

It must be said that Ś.'s interpretation of these two sūtras is entirely far fetched—especially of the former sūtra—since he is obliged to read so much as 'what is hidden becomes manifest' in the simple word 'tirohitam' occurring in the sūtra.

The term 'maya' is (very differently and peculiarly) explained by Ramā to mean the 'wonderful power of the Divine'. The dream world must, according to Rama, be attributed to Br, since such a marvellous power (Maya) cannot belong to anyone but the Lord. V. says that this adhikaraṇa is meant to point out the unreality of the dream world. The first two sūtras represent the *prima facie* view that the dream world is real, while the next sūtra forms the siddhanta, viz. that it is mere illusion, since its complete nature in relation to place, time and entity is not manifest.² The scriptures mention the creation of

¹ 'The Vedānta—Ghate (p. 118). Yet it must be noted that Ghate's criticism is not about the interpretation of the first three sūtras but about the logical connection and interpretation of the fourth sūtra by Śaṅkara—and in that he seems to be right (cf. *ibid.*)

² 'कृत्स्नत्वेन यस्य दादश स्वरूप देशकालवस्तुनापेक्ष तथामिव्यक्ति का रन्येना भव्यक्तिस्तद्भावात्।—(Aṅg. III 2 3, p. 184)

the dream-world, but not its reality¹ The dream is suggestive of good and bad fortunes to come but that does not mean that the dream-world is real The sūtra 5, viz. "Parābhidyānāttu", etc is explained as follows. An objection that the jīva cannot be miserable if it is accepted to be a part of the Lord is refuted by postulating that through the wish of the Lord ('Parābhidyānāt') to sport and enjoy, the divine qualities like sovereignty, etc got obscured in the jīva, which consequently became dependent, miserable and so on The concealment of sovereignty (aiśvarya), valour (vīrya), fame (yaśas) and glory (śrī) gave rise to bondage (bandha), while total perversion (viparyaya) or erroneous apprehension resulted from the concealment of the divine attributes of knowledge (jñāna) and detachment (vairāgya) in the jīva The obscuration of the Bliss aspect in it preceded the obscuration of the above-mentioned six divine attributes and is responsible for the very 'jīvabhāva' V declares here that sleep (Nidrā) is a power of the Lord, and it all the more induces obscuration Or else, the concealment of sovereignty, etc is due to the jīva's connection with the body (sūtra 6), as others believe He objects to Ś's interpretation of the word 'viparyaya' meaning 'the opposite of bondage', and hence standing for 'liberation', which he regards to be "the view of the confused", who does not at all understand the Doctrine of Br etc

In so far as this particular sūtra is concerned, V's interpretation seems to be more natural than that of Ś, since V does not have to add anything to the wording of the sūtra in order to make it yield a sense, while Ś has to read what is not given in the text of the sūtra, as already pointed out earlier Rama also interprets 'parābhidyānat' as meaning 'the wish of the Lord' as against Ś, who explains it as 'jīva's meditation on the Highest' But it must be confessed that the wording of these sūtras is unclear—both of 'parābhidyānat' and 'tirohitam' in 2,5 In itself, the interpretation of 'viparyaya' as "the opposite of bandha" is more natural than V's own But it is difficult to see how the grammatical and logical connection can be made satisfactory Hence each commentator feels free to adapt the meaning to the frame-work of his own system But what was the original meaning intended by the Sutrakara is not easy to see (cf Ghate, 1 c)]

¹ 'श्रुतिं सृष्टिमेवाह न तस्य सत्यत्वमपि ।'—(Anu III 23)

(k) 'न स्यात्तोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्ग सर्वत्र हि ।'—(III 2. 11)

'न भेदाविति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात् ।'—(III. 2 12)

'अपि चैवमेके ।'—(III 2. 13)

These sutras form an independent adhikarana, which is differently explained by different commentators Ś. thinks that it discusses the nature of Br. to which the jiva attains in the state of deep, dreamless sleep, the latter being discussed in the previous adhikaranas ; while according to V , this section deals with the question whether the attributes of the jiva and the inanimate world which are sometimes predicated of Br. and sometimes negated, do in reality belong to Him or not.

V. points out that some try to reconcile the contradiction involved in scriptural passages of positive and negative import in connection with Br by asserting Br to be subtle amongst the subtle, gross amongst the gross, etc and as all-fragrance in Earth, while devoid of fragrance in water, etc Thus, the possession of both positive and negative characteristic marks, in the case of Br , with reference to 'sthāna' is proper Another explanation is also offered by saying that the cause itself (i e Br) possesses form and is formless through the (avacchedabheda) de-limitant factors or on account of the possession of inconceivable greatness—since, otherwise, there would arise the contingency of the production (creation) of an entity out of nothing (asat) This is said to be suggested by the term 'api' in the sutra But, neither of the above explanations holds good, says V , since the Highest Lord is spoken of throughout the scriptures to be so, viz the possessor of contradictory attributes, and hence, there is no necessity at all to try to remove or reconcile any scriptural contradiction Therefore, it is not possible either to posit or to deny (exclusively) the existence of the attributes of the jiva and the inanimate world with reference to Br (III 2 11)

In the next sutra (12), he refers to another method of reconciling the contradiction, and then refutes the same "(The contradiction) does not (arise), because of the difference (between the cause and its effect), (to this) "no," since every (scriptural text) expressly states the non (a-tad) difference" Explaining this, V says that the scriptures assert the non-difference of the cause and its effects and, therefore, it is not possible to manipulate the scriptural texts on the basis of difference

The same is intended to be conveyed through the express censure of the perception of duality—or difference (Kaṭha 4 11)¹ (III 2 13)

Ś explains these three sūtras as follows Sūtra III 2 11 states that Br cannot be both qualified and absolutely devoid of attributes, even on account of the limiting adjuncts (sthānatah), for, everywhere Br is described as devoid of attributes. Even the varied descriptions of Br in scriptural texts cannot establish it to be both qualified and otherwise, since in each of the passages offering Br as qualified, all distinctions are expressly negated (III 2 12). There are scriptural texts which postulate absence of diversity and distinctions, as also condemn diversity (III 2 13).

The interpretations of these sūtras as offered by Ś and V, are based on their respective concepts of Br as absolutely bereft of all predication and as an abode of contradictory attributes respectively.

[(I) 'अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् ।'—(III. 2. 14)

Ś interprets this sūtra to mean that Br is devoid of form, since the scriptural texts describing Br as quality-less have Br for their principal subject (tat pradhānatvat), while those referring to its qualified aspect are for the sake of meditation and hence secondary. V interprets the term 'Arūpavat', in a peculiar fashion when he states that "what can be formulated or narrated or dealt with is 'Rūpa' or Form, which can become the object of all dealings (or statements). One that possesses this characteristic is 'Rupavat', viz the world. But Br is distinct from the world, since the cause and its effect, the whole and its part, are different from each other." Thus, Br is 'a rupa vat'—'not like the world'. It is not proper to understand non-difference of the two here on the basis of Br being the cause, since Br is the chief object (of narration) (tat-pradhanatvat), and hence the attributes of Br are of principal significance and not those of anything else. It is the same case as with 'Praśāsanatva' or the attribute of being the Governor (controller), which belongs to Br as its chief attribute as compared to other attributes like 'Sarvakarmā' and so on, which are predicated of Br on the lines of earthly qualities, which are of secondary importance. In the same way, says V, when the distinction of Br from the world is intended to be

¹ 'मृत्योः स मृत्युमान्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ।' etc

conveyed, the Sūtrakara especially employs the term 'arūpavat'¹ instead of 'arūpam', therefore, since the attributes of the effect, like the effect itself, are but 'kārya', these belong to the Lord as His own, and not as His attributes²]

In the comm on the following sūtras of this pāda, V points out that the scriptural passages of seemingly contradictory import refer to Br who is the substratum of contradictory attributes His view can be briefly stated in his own words as follows³

Summing up, V states in III 2 27 that it is not the two-fold nature of Br (as Ś thinks) but the "viruddha-dharmaśraya-tvam" of Br that is referred to in these sūtras, since Br is Sākāra and Nirakara⁴ Then the question whether the attributes having Br for their substratum are different from Br

¹ "different from the jagat and hence extra-ordinary "

² 'अरूपमिति वक्तव्येऽरूपवदिति वचन भिन्नधर्माणामेवैव निर्णयो न तु प्रशासनवद् भावद्वयाणाम् । तस्मात्कार्यवत्तद्व्याणामपि कार्यत्वात् भगवच्च न भगवद्धर्मत्वमिति सिद्धम् ।'

—Anu III 2. 15

This clearly points out that V has to use special pleading in order to justify his own interpretation, which, he knows, is far-fetched and forced

³ 'वद्विद्वान्मातृ चमन्तर्मावाद्भयसामञ्जस्यादेवम् ।'—'महानवकाशोऽल्पोऽवकाशो लपाकुसुमलौ द्वैतवदन्यधर्मत्वाभावात् ।'

—III 2 20

'दशनाच्च ।'—' भगवति त्वे विरुद्धधर्मा दृश्यन्ते । न हि दृष्टे अनुपपन्न नाम । अगमनात् । चकाराद्गुणत्वबन्धादिप्रत्यक्षमेवोभयसाधक दृष्टमिति । सर्वविरुद्धधर्माश्रयत्वेन ब्रह्मप्रतीतर्न विरोध ।'

—III 2 21

'प्रकृते तावच्च हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूय ।'—'प्रकृते यदेतावन् परिदृश्यमाना यावन्त पदार्था लौकिकास्तेषामेव धर्मान् निषेधति । प्रतीतस्यैव हि निषेधान । युक्त्या निर्णय ।'

—III 2 22

'अपि सुराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम् ।'—

'तस्मात्प्रयत्नानुमानाभ्या ब्रह्म साकारमनन्तगुणपरिपूर्ण रूपमपि ब्रह्म ।'

—III 2 24

⁴ It may be noted here that Dr P M Modi offers an entirely different interpretation of this sutra (III 2 14) in 'A Critique of the Brahma sutra' and declares that the two aspects of Br which is "the most striking characteristic" in Badarayana's system are 'arupavat' or 'nirakara' and 'rupavat' or sakara —either of these having its own peculiar attributes Thus, according to him, the 'arupavat' aspect does not correspond to the 'Nirguna' aspect of the Śaṅkara school The sutra is explained as 'The arupavat aspect is the chief (pradhana) of the two and that, therefore, Br may be said to be only arupavat', and attributes like Bliss refer to this 'arupavat' aspect"—'A Critique of the B.S'—Part II, pp 3-4

or not is tackled and the illustration of light and its substratum viz the sun, etc is cited (III 2 28) to point out that these are neither absolutely different nor non different from Br Both the views, as expressed in III 2 28 and III 2 14 18 stating Br to be possessed of attributes and secondly as devoid of attributes are acceptable to the Sutrakara, says V (III 2 29) In the concluding sutras (40, 41), Jaimini and Badarayana are stated to be the upholders of the theories of Karma and the Lord respectively being responsible for the rise of fruits The Kauśitaki text (3 9), viz 'Him alone does He make perform good deeds whom He wishes to redeem' etc is quoted in support of the view attributed to Badarayana, the author of the sutras, and V says that not only is the Lord stated therein to be the inspirer towards activity, but also is He mentioned as being the bestower of the fruits The important question as to what is the necessity of making a jiva perform any action when Lord Himself determines and offers the fruits to that particular jiva is referred to and the commentator (Vit) here makes a reference to his own commentary on II 3 42 ('कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षस्तु' etc) and also to this discussion in the V M This reference here to the V M of Śrī Viṭṭhala, who comes much later,¹ seems to be a case of anachronism and provides one of the points of internal evidence to the question of double authorship of the Anu It offers a very tangible, internal evidence to the effect that the Anu was left incomplete by V and that at least the portion from III 2 41 (wherein this express reference to V M occurs) onwards came to be written by Vit² It is traditionally believed and also established on grounds of internal and external evidence that Viṭṭhala's commentary begins from III 2 34³ }

The third pada deals with the question whether different cognitions of Br forming the subject of various scriptural texts are different from one another or not For example, different

¹ Vallabha cannot refer to the works of Viṭṭhala who was only fifteen years old when the former breathed his last — Prof G H Bhatt in 'Double Authorship of Anubhāṣya' (p 804) of next note

² For details on this subject please refer to Double Authorship of Anubhāṣya (Prof G H Bhatt) in the Proceedings of the fourth All India Oriental Conference pp 799-806 Also Śrī Pathak Shastri's Introduction to his edition of Anu (Bombay S S) Vol I

³ For the sake of convenience easy reading and continuity, we shall refer to the author of the commentary III.2 34 onwards by the name of V although Viṭṭhala happens to be the commentator (Please refer to the beginning of this chapter)

statements establishing the subject of attributes only being material" 2)

It is indeed strange why the author has selected this illustration based on an 'abhāva' to prove his point, viz. that the same Br becomes manifest in different incarnations. It is not only lacking in clarity of expression, but also presents difficulty in understanding its meaning.

In the commentary that follows, V speaks of the great and natural powers of knowledge and action that belong to the Lord, as the Śvet Up 6/8 says, and declares that the use of the term 'Svābhavikī' has in view the refutation of the idea of their (the powers) being products of nescience. The objection, as to how can One and the same Br, being impartite be represented as parts on the one hand (e.g. the jivas, etc.) and as the whole on the other, is set aside on the following basis¹

[["The quality of existence (sattva) is said to be His beloved form. This 'sattva', being by nature the very abode of the Lord (as pointed out in 'the pure existence is thy abode, which is tranquil', etc.) is non material, something of the nature of the Lord's attributes.

In whatever form the Lord wishes to carry out an activity, He manifests it (sattva) in that particular form, and having inter-penetrated it, like the fire in an iron ball, He performs those particular deeds in specific incarnations—and is called a 'part'. There the form or body which He assumes is perceived to be the manifested nature of Br. Since the body is of the nature of 'sattva', it is of the form of an attribute, and because only that which is manifested therein is Br, and since their combination (the body and the embodied one) is considered to be an incarnation, only a portion of Br is of the nature of Br and is therefore called a 'part'. When, on the other hand, the pure Br Himself becomes manifest as the personified (sakara) Brahma, without any regard to substratum, for the sake of the devotees, He is called the Perfect Lord Himself" 2)

¹ 'सत्त्वं यस्य प्रियं मूर्ति । विशुद्धसत्त्वं तद् धाम शान्तम् । इत्यादिवाक्यैरप्राकृतो भावस्थानभूतः सत्त्वंनामा भगवद्भूतः एव कश्चनास्ति । यादृशेन रूपेण भगवान् कार्यं कर्तुं निच्छति तांश्रुतं तं प्रकरीकृत्य तस्मिन् स्वयमाविर्भूयाद्यपिण्डं बद्धित्तकार्याणि करोति यस्मिन् दास्यन्नन्तरं स सारा इत्युच्यते । तत्र हि विमलसत्त्वाविभूतं अक्षयकल्पं च प्रीथते । विमलस्य सत्त्वात्कृत्वेन धनरूपवात्तत्राविर्भूतस्यैव अक्षयान्नुत्तिरन्यादन्तरत्वेन गणनान् तत्रैकस्यैवाराय तद्रूपं व दत्तवारावन् । यत्राधिष्ठानं नपद्य स्वयमेव शुद्ध साकार इत्यादिवाक्यैः सत्त्वं सत्त्वं पूर्णं सावान् इत्युच्यते ।"—(p. 213)

contained one, consistent, timeless body of truth for whose validity mere historical succession was of scanty value—except that the later works could contain clearer statements of the old truth. The sūtra (10) is interpreted to show that since the Lord is all pervading too, and just as the sport-objects manifest themselves along with Br to a particular devotee, in the same way, they manifest themselves elsewhere in the case of other devotees of the same nature at that very moment.¹ These sport objects are attributes of Br. Those attributes of the Bliss-nature of Br which are indirectly stated in the Path of Devotion form the object of perfect meditation (“Ā-dhyanaya”), and these alone should be included and not others (III 3 14)

(n) The sutra (III 3 26)² treats the Mu Up text (3 1 3) which speaks of the knower, who, having extricated himself of merit and demerit, attains to “Paramam samyam” The author explains the term “paramam” to mean Br and “SAMYAM” as ‘the possession of attributes of the common genus’ Thus, according to him the knower attains Br first and then comes to possess ‘samya’ (p 229) The ‘samya’ or the possession of common attributes (in the case of jiva and Br) may either stand for some attributes or all attributes without any reserve. The jiva cannot possess all attributes of Br, since the Śvet Up text (6 8) expressly stating Br to be superior to the jīva would otherwise stand contradicted ‘Hanau’ in the sutra under consideration suggests the separation (or alienation) of the jiva from Br, consequent upon which the divine attributes like bliss, sovereignty, etc got obscured in the jiva. When the jiva comes into contact with Br (“Brahmasambandhe sati”), these attributes become manifest in it, yet the possession of the bliss etc in the case of the jiva then is meagre (‘alpa’) as compared with the bliss of the Lord, and hence, it is but a metaphorical way of referring to the jiva’s “Brahma samya’ on the basis of “common attributes. In reality, these attributes do not qualify it for that position of equality with Br and thus the Śvet text (6 8) remains uncontradicted. That is the reason why the author of the sutras has used the term Śabda in connection

¹ “ब्रह्मणो व्यापकत्वात्लीलायाश्च तत्र हृदयभटात्तथावादेवमै भवाय दया ब्रह्मणा सुहृत्त्वात् तदीयाः शक्तिः तदीया यथापि भक्तस्य मनसोऽपि शक्तिः शक्तिः सुहृत्त्वात्कृत्यात् ।”

—(p 218)

² ‘हानौ तूपायनशश्वरौषवा कुशाच्छन्दः स्तु युपाननः तदुक्तम् ।’

with 'attainment' (upayana), so as to suggest that this 'word' (samyopāyana) alone has to be understood and not the meaning that this word conveys¹ Again, this possession of common attributes does not bring in the concept of complete identity of Br and the jīva, even if it does so in the case of the chanting of the formula in connection with sacrificial 'Kūśas' The argument that wants it to suggest complete identity on the basis of scriptural texts like "That thou art" is refuted ('taduktam') earlier in sūtra 11 3 29 Moreover, it should not be forgotten that this 'taduktam' also reminds us of the suppression of the divine attributes in the jīva which acts as a reason for its (the jīva's) being caught in the meshes of "samsara"—as pointed out in sūtra III 2 5.

Thus, the author has explained under this sūtra his theory of the concealment of divine attributes in the jīva on its emergence from Br

Having given different explanations of 'samparaya' in consonance with his own theory of devotion,² he specifies that 'devotion' can arise in the case of one whose sins have been destroyed and since there is an absence of the sins, etc to be crossed over in the case of a devotee, the path followed by the latter is different from that of knowledge³

This 'papanasa' or destruction of sins, is antecedent to 'bhakti' as shown above, but the Lord, in order to show that the devotees included in the desired sport were neither possessed of conditioned affection nor were they connected with good action, etc, fashioned some Gopīs as possessing attributes contrary to those stated above, and He himself put impediments in their way to reach Him, and, having Himself put an end to this condition of the Gopīs, made them participate in this sport (III 3 28) The explanation is typical of V's theory But this is an exception rather than a rule, and, the exception being based on His desire (chandatah), it cannot be said that the 'Papanasa' is not an antecedent to 'bhakti,

¹ 'अथ एव सूक्ष्मकृत्ता साम्यसुरैतीति साम्योपायनशब्दमात्रं न तु साम्यवन्तार्थं स्वस्मिन्कोऽत्रास्तीति भावप्रवृत्तनाथ शब्दशब्द उक्तः ॥—Anu III 3 36

² "भपराय परलोकरतस्मिन् प्रान्त्वा सनी यथ । अथवा परं पुष्पोत्तमस्तस्यायो हानम् । तथा च सम्यग्भूतं पुष्पोत्तमज्ञानं यत्तु सुपरायो भक्तिमात्रं इति यावत् । अथवा परे पुष्पोत्तमे अयनगो गमनं प्रवेश इति यावत्तथा च नन्दनं परायो यत्तु स तथा भक्तमात्रं इत्यर्थः ।

³ "ज्ञानागौतरप्राप्त्या भक्तिमात्रं पुष्पोत्तमप्राप्त्या तस्माद्दिशेषमत्र आप्चितुमेव वचनम् । अतो भक्तेः पूर्वमेव पापनाशो युक्त इति भावः ॥"

even in a reverse order. In their case, 'śravana', etc. no longer continue to be 'means' but become of the nature of 'fruits', since they cease to be injunctions on being carried out through intense love (III 3 29)

This is an interesting parallel to the old augustinian saying . "Love and do what you like"—for, if you truly love, you will like to do only what your beloved loves and likes, and love will impel you to do far more than any command could order—and far better And you need not look for any particular activity as means, since your love will be in the most intensest possible activity to find more means to express itself than any regulation can devise

In the sutra III 3 33, V interprets T Up text (2 1) as suggesting that the knower of 'Aksara' attains the Highest, i e the attainment of the 'Aksara' is lower than that of Purusottama, and in support of the same, he quotes Gītā (XV 18), viz "I am higher than the Aksara even", etc In reality, says V, the devotion towards Puruṣottama is itself 'mukti' The doubt, as to how some of the meditators upon the 'Aksara' can attain 'bhakti' while the rest are excluded, is resolved on the analogy of the ritual of Upasada

'Taduktam' in the sutra refers to what the Lord Kṛṣṇa said in the Gīta, while pointing out the distinction between the attainments of Aksara and Purusottama, This is poetically described by V, who then profusely quotes the Gīta, T Samhita and the Bhg to drive his points home, viz that the followers of Aksara are not the followers of Purusottama, the latter being attainable through devotion alone,¹ and that the Akṣara is but an abode of the Highest Lord Thus, devotion to Kṛṣṇa is the best means, and the means having connection with Akṣara (Aksaradhīyām) are subordinate since they end in the state of emancipation only The bliss of Br is inferior to the bliss of Bhajana (III 3 35), the path of devotion is superior to that of knowledge—in the sense that the home, wife, son, etc of the devotee do not become obstacles in his way to Bhakti, as they prove to be in the path of knowledge, because the bhakta dedicates everything at the feet of the Lord Thus, "even the obstacles prove to be the means" in the path of devotion (III 3 39) V terms the sutra III 3 42 as 'Prasangika' or casual (digression) and discusses therein the question whether karma is to be performed

¹ "अनेनाचारापरस्य स्वस्य भक्तयकलभ्यवसुक्तम् ।"

or not by one who knows the Puruṣottama, and says that it is two fold, *i.e.* the performance or otherwise in accordance with the Maryāda and Puṣṭi division of Bhakti. The devotees of both types may or may not engage themselves in activity, 'एव सलुभयविधाना मय्ये मम कामकरणे प्रमोरिच्छास्तीति यो निर्धारयति स करोति य एतद्विपरीत म न करोति ।'—thus tracing everything—activity as well as inactivity—to the divine wish.

Here we have to take V at his own valuation and must accept as sincere his desire to be guided in everything by the Divine Will and Love. An exalted ideal in itself! And, as we know from other contexts he would be the first to warn from following selfish emotions as the supposed will of the Lord. He would also surely counsel an all embracing circumspection of all that enters into the Lord's plan and will. And yet, since it is man fallible, weak man who has to decide how easily will he be exposed to error and self-deception, if he lightly considers himself beyond the pale of the common law! Here we have the eternal tension between love and duty, between personal situation and responsibility on the one side and social bonds and legislation for the common good on the other. But it would not be fair to V's intentions to accuse him of abandoning human conduct to the anarchy of mere caprice. He wants the conscientious seeking for the will of God (*nirdharayati*) to be the pole star of man's decisions. And that is no mean ideal to set before man—especially when inspired by an all embracing God centered love. Yet the danger of abuse will not fail to beset that path.

In his commentary on the sutra III 3 50 V treats the Ch Up passage (7 24 1) *Sve Mahimni* etc as embodying the concept of the identification of one's self with all (*Sarvatma bhava*) and maintains that a complete and proper experience of this state termed *mahima* can be had only at the rise of a feeling of separation from the Lord. An intense love for the Lord makes the devotee perceive Him everywhere. This Lord *Puruṣottama* an object of absolutely unconditioned love is referred to as the Self. There is a spontaneous rise of various feelings born of love in the devotee who comes to acquire humility on knowing the utter futility of all means employed by him earlier. This type of devotee is different from one desirous of salvation and the Lord fulfils in his case that particular type of object as is in consonance with his intellect concerning

the Lord . thus, the self-identification does not result in salvation as such. The Lord is dependent as it were (Bhg. VII.4.66 ; IX.4.63) on his devotees by lovingly attending to the fulfilment of their desires—while, in turn, the best of His devotees do not aspire for anything but service to the Lord and shun the attainments such as Sālokya, Sārsti, Sāmīpya, Sārūpya and even Ekatva or unity with God, if these are unaccompanied by the loving worship to the Lord (III. 3 50). V. explains under sūtra III.3.56 ('Mantrādivadvāirodhah') that some jīvas attain to devotion through the grace of God, after having carried out scriptural injunctions, etc. while there are other jīvas who acquire devotion after having obtained knowledge, even as some mantra is employed in various rituals, some other mantra in two ceremonies while some other mantra again in just one.

Thus, the whole of the third pāda of this adhyāya, as explained by V., teems, as it were, with the various aspects of the theory of Puṣṭi in contrast to the concept of Maryādā, the superiority of devotion to all other means being emphasised and the Bliss-form of the Lord being repeatedly referred to therein. Thus, V.'s interpretation of the whole pāda as such is prompted with a zeal on his part to enunciate the doctrine of devotion and Puṣṭi on the lines of the Bhg. teachings, and hence—as a genuine explanation of the sūtras—it seems to be at least as objectionable as Ś.'s distinction of the Saguna and the Nirguṇa Br. is considered to be by many scholars. Moreover, it requires to be repeated here that Ś.'s theory of the two-fold nature of Br. is founded on the teachings of the chief Upaniṣads, which are acknowledged by all Vedānta philosophers to be a member of the triple-canon of authority, while the method that V. adopts in trying to explain the Upaniṣad texts and the B.S. in the wake of the Bhg., which is almost modern is in itself challengeable—when it means "reading into" and not genuine search for objective "roots" in the older texts

[(o) "एवं सति यज्ज्ञानसाधनत्वं यज्ञे

ये पूर्वपक्षास्ते पूर्वपक्षा एवेत्यलमुक्त्या ।"—(III. 4. 8), pp. 271-72.

With reference to the question whether the knowledge of Br. is subordinate to Karma or not, the sūtra III.4.8, stating Bādarāyana's view, is interpreted to refute the *prima facie* view, viz. that the knowers of Br. should undertake renunciation of everything (III 4 2) and that the ātma-jñāna has no indepen-

or not by one who knows the Puruṣottama, and says that it is two fold, i.e. the performance or otherwise in accordance with the Māyādā and Puṣṭi division of Bhakti. The devotees of both types may or may not engage themselves in activity, “एव मत्सु-भयविधाना गच्छे मत् कर्मकरणे प्रभोरिच्छास्तीति यो निर्धारयति स करोति य एतद्विपरीत म न करोति ।”—thus tracing everything—activity as well as inactivity—to the divine wish.

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the Lord thus, the self-identification does not result in salvation as such. The Lord is dependent as it were (Bhg VII 4 66, IX 4 63) on his devotees by lovingly attending to the fulfilment of their desires—while, in turn, the best of His devotees do not aspire for anything but service to the Lord and shun the attainments such as Sālokya, Sarṣṭi, Samīpya, Sārūpya and even Ekatva or unity with God, if these are unaccompanied by the loving worship to the Lord (III 3 50). V. explains under sūtra III 3 56 ('Mantrādivadvavirodhah') that some jivas attain to devotion through the grace of God, after having carried out scriptural injunctions, etc. while there are other jivas who acquire devotion after having obtained knowledge, even as some mantra is employed in various rituals, some other mantra in two ceremonies while some other mantra again in just one.

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With reference to the question whether the knowledge of Br. is subordinate to Karma or not, the sūtra III 4 8, stating Badarāyana's view, is interpreted to refute the *prima facie* view, viz that the knowers of Br should undertake renunciation of everything (III 4 2) and that the ātma jñāna has no independent fruit. V cites the Br Uo. text (4 4 ?) and states

“This being so, when sacrifice is auxiliary to jñāna, how can jñāna be subordinate to sacrifice? But sacrifice is auxiliary to the knowledge of Br. This has to be understood as refuting the stand, viz. that the sacrifice being of the nature of Br. has jñāna as its auxiliary; because the knowledge of Br. has sacrifice as its preliminary aspect, the knowledge qualified by such aspects (knowledge of the sacrifice, etc.) becomes a means to the realisation of Br. But it should not be said ‘There was, in the initial stage, a general knowledge of Br. and when there arose its specific knowledge through the performance of sacrifice, the perfect fruit of karma comes about by again performing the sacrifice and therefore, it (knowledge) is not non-auxiliary to sacrifice.’ The answer to that assertion is that because the Br. text “Having known Him only, one becomes an ascetic, aspiring to this (transcendent) very world the ascetics take to renunciation,” etc. speaks of knowledge of Br. as opposed to the householder’s stage of life and hence knowledge of Br. cannot be auxiliary to karma. And he who is untouched by the fruits of good and evil karma should not be termed an ‘agent’ even when he carries out activities, hence the ‘kartṛtva’ (agency) belongs to the embodied soul and not to the Highest. Nor should it be said that it is not so on account of their ultimate non-difference; because on the strength of the above scriptural text, this ultimate non-difference would all the more facilitate the predication of ‘agency’ on the part of the ‘jiva’. This concept of the absolute non-difference (between the jiva and Br.) has been already refuted earlier, and suffice it to say that those who build their attack on the basis of it (i.e. the absolute non-difference) are real ‘Purva pakṣas’ (lit. having their backs in the front, or taking up the part that has been previously refuted)”

Thus, V. explains in his own way how and why ‘knowledge’ cannot be subsidiary to ‘Action’. He finally turns his attack against the concept (of absolute non-difference between the jiva and Br.), of § Shifting the emphasis from the topic, viz. the superiority of ‘Knowledge’ to ‘Action’ towards his own accepted ideal of Bhakti, V. quotes profusely from the Mahānārāyanopaniṣad and comes to the conclusion that Bhakti is superior to both ‘Action’ and ‘Knowledge’, the latter being auxiliary to devotion. He specifies at the end that in the path of Puṣṭi bhakti, even knowledge is not deemed worthy of being

accepted as auxiliary, since there the only means is the grace of God, which is supposed to instil the divinely-given knowledge and love (as natural factors of true Bhakti), not man earned but infused from above—

The sūtra (III 4 25) 'सवापेक्षा च यथादिश्रुतेरश्वत्' is interpreted by V as pointing out the necessity of Action, knowledge and bhakti for the rise of the knowledge of the Lord,¹ since the scriptures enjoin sacrifice, etc. The employment of the particle 'ca' in the sūtra is said to be suggestive of the fact that in the case of a jiva accepted within the fold of 'Puṣṭi', there is no expectancy or necessity of any means. The means such as Action, etc. act as means, yet only in so far as the removal of obstacles—phenomenal, spiritual and divine—is concerned, but they do not lead to the attainment of the Lord, nothing but bhakti is deemed worthy of being resorted to by devotees having supreme love of and attachment to the Lord. The performance of duties in consonance with one's stage of life, etc. is viewed as an impediment in the case of a devotee, since the rise of fruits proves to be detrimental to the experience of the divine Bliss (III 4 35). The Bhg (XI 20 39 6 14 6) states that even knowledge, detachment, etc. are of the nature of obstacles in the path of devotion (III 4 36), the latter being superior to knowledge, etc. in so far as it is characterised by the grace of God, which makes the devotee stand against (as superior from) those who have attained 'mukti' (III 4 37). Again, there is no possession of body, senses, etc. when salvation (mukti) accrues in the case of a jñānin, therefore, the latter cannot experience the bliss of the Lord, while the devotee retains his body, etc., which are transfigured by manifesting their nature of Bliss, and hence he can employ these in the service of the Lord (III 4.38). Thus, V points out the superiority of bhakti to jñāna. The Bhg speaks of detachment from the worldly objects for the sake of concentration on Br (Bhg XI 7 6) (Anu III 4 42). The contradiction involved in the scriptural texts laying down 'choosing' (Varana) alone as the means, on the one hand and referring to self control, restraint, etc. as the means in the same breath, is explained away on the basis of the two fold nature of devotion, viz. Maryada and Puṣṭi. The texts laying down other means as auxiliary are meant for the followers of Maryada, while in the path of grace (Puṣṭi),

¹ 'सर्वेषां कर्मज्ञानयत्नीनां पुरुषोत्तममहाज्ञोत्पत्तावस्यपेक्षा ।'—(p 286)

there is neither any expectancy of such means nor any possibility of contradiction (III 4 46) The means, again, may be bodily, verbal or mental Even the followers of Maryada have to pursue these only in so far as the love for God has not arisen, but when they come to possess that state, even the mental approach, serving as the means, is rendered unnecessary Some devotees, looking after their household duties, etc worship the Lord at the same time and being content with the service to God, regard even 'mukti' to be worthless (III 4 47) Thus in the path of devotion, there are no hard and fast rules, but self-dedication to the Lord is the key note The Lord is of the nature of 'Rasa' and this 'sentiment' or 'joy' (Deliciousness) increases when the devotee conceals from others his love for the Lord, therefore, silently worshipping the Lord, while in his stage of a householder, a devotee establishes an intimate relationship with the Lord (III 4 49) The experience of the Deliciousness of 'Bhakti' is higher than the attainment of 'mukti' since the former is absolutely dependent on the divine wish, other means cannot lead to it in the absence of this grace and, thus there is no set rule as regards the same (III 4 51)

Thus, the whole of the third adhyaya, in its treatment at the hands of V, assumes the shades of Bhakti-doctrine in its varied aspects—which is the very back bone of V's theory of Pure Monism—but, it remains to be judged how far the interpretations offered by V are warranted by the text of the sutras themselves and whether it is legitimate to read the sutras in the wake of the Bhg teachings

This whole exposition brings out more clearly the very original and distinctive feature of V's system—to consider a supreme value the personal self giving in selfless love far above the mere attainment of a self satisfying or self reposing and fulfilling mukti

In the introductory stanzas to the 4th adhyaya, which is dealing with the nature of the "Summum Bonum", V accuses Ś of having annihilated the scriptures through ignorance and infatuation and he refers to the meditation on symbols as but subsidiary since these are based on a notion of duality, and Purusottama is not the object thereof V explains the first sutra, viz "Āvṛttirasakṛdupadeśat", as teaching meditation on the Self to be repeated again and again till the rise of fruit takes place and then perhaps he may be justified in the fact that

this meditation, etc should go under the 'Sādhana'-chapter, while the fourth adhyāya is known as the 'Phalādhyāya', V explains it differently to refer to the fruit of Action as against those of knowledge and bhakti. V. relegates Action to an auxiliary condition to knowledge and bhakti, which offer 'best' and 'the best' fruits respectively¹. Thus, transmigration (Āvṛttih) is repeated indefinitely (asakrt), meaning that Action as such cannot put an end to transmigration, it can only act as an auxiliary to knowledge and bhakti.

Thus, V.'s second interpretation of sutras IV 1 1-2 is arbitrary rather than natural. There was no need to feel that the first meaning was out of place, since it had to do with the 'phala' and the way of its appearing.

(g) 'न प्रतीकेन हि स १'—IV. 1. 4

V. reads this sūtra as meaning that 'moksa' does not arise through meditation on a symbol since the Lord is not that. (His reading "pratikena" for "pratīke na" is not natural) V explains that the meditation on a symbol, which is not the self, cannot bring about liberation in the case of a follower of the path of knowledge, or, that the Highest Lord is not the object of the meditation on a symbol, so as to manifest this Bliss. Thus, symbolic meditation is no means to the attainment of liberation, etc. But, the perception that Br is all and everywhere does not belong to that symbolic meditation since, everything, in reality, is of the nature of Br, and this type of cognition arises spontaneously in one who is eligible (as having the right disposition) for the same-(IV 1 5), and that is why it is not taught, but just referred to ('सा च नोपदेशसाध्याऽऽतो नोपदिश्यते, किन्वनूद्यते ।')

Under sutra IV.1.12 ('अप्रायणात्तनापि हि दृष्टम् १') V explains 'Prāyana' as the highest, supra-worldly fruit on the lines of the Bhg (11 11 48). The word 'dṛṣtam' in the sutra, says V, clearly points out that this highest fruit is "something visible", viz: "the touch, etc of the lotus-feet of the Lord, familiarly conversing with Him, looking at Him, etc" and it does not mean 'union' ('sāyujya') because the devotee belongs to the 'puṣṭimarga', for how can the possession of the said feelings be there in the case of any but one accepted within the fold of

¹ 'ज्ञानमत्तयोरेव क्रमेणोत्तमत्युत्तमफलकत्वमतरतसाधनवेनैव तत्कर्तव्यं न तु स्वानन्देणेति

'Pusti' ? This explains the propriety of 'Hi' in the sutra. The followers of the Maryada path, which stipulates knowledge to be an invariable antecedent, necessary for 'bhakti', get their sins destroyed through the force of knowledge (IV 1 13). The next sutra, viz. 'इ रक्षाश्चमृतुश्च पाते तु' removes the doubt whether the merit ('punya') (= 'itara' by contrast with 'agha') also gets destroyed along with the sins, etc. in the case of one passing away. The Mu text (2 2 8) stating 'His deeds get destroyed, etc.' and the mention of 'all actions' in Gita (IV 37) as being put an end to by the Fire of Knowledge support the view that even the good (punya) deeds are terminated. 'Pata' in the path of Devotion means fall from 'the condition of being one with the Lord', 'tu' in the 'sutra' is interpreted as standing for 'api', and since the word 'tu' is itself used here in its restrictive sense, the idea of sins, etc. is impossible of application in the path of devotion. V warns that the word 'pata' should not be interpreted to mean 'the fall of the body', nor should the particle 'tu' be understood in the sense of determination (avadharana), since the attainment of 'moksa', as the above mentioned interpretation would suggest, does not necessarily follow the fall of the body (p 312), and no such word as 'mukti' is used in the 'sutra'. When there is again a fall from 'the condition of being one with the Lord', as in the case of Bharata and others, owing to their attachment to worldly objects, only the evil or demerit (papa) ceases to exercise its influence and not the merit or resultant of good deeds ('punya')—(Whatever the merit and logical consistency of V's system, this interpretation of the sutra is violent [cf Ghate]).

Commenting on the sutra IV 1 16, Ś states that actions like Agnihotra, etc. are not required to be performed by one who has known Br, but in so far as the 'Saguṇopāsaka' is concerned (*i.e.* in the lower lore), the performance of such Nitya karmas does hold good, since there is, in his case, non-cessation of the notion of his being an agent. And even if there is an absence of attachment on his part, it is logically proper that knowledge arises on account of the absence of any other actions. Ś expressly states that there is no action to be performed by a 'Br-vid'.

¹ 'सदुपासु तु विशु कृतं तन्वृत्ते समस्त्यागाम्यग्निहोत्रादि । तस्यापि निर्मिन्धनं शान्तरानवादिपातुंशुपर्यंत ।'—Ś B IV 1-16.

² 'अत एव चानिदं विदमस्तु कर्तव्यं क्वाभिधानम् । न हि कर्तव्यं अगाम्यग्निहोत्रादि संसृति ।' etc

In view of this, V's remark, viz "Kecittu jñānasya" etc as directed against the view of Ś, is applicable to Ś's statement concerning a 'mumukṣu' or a 'Sagunopasaka', and it cannot refer to what Ś has said in connection with a 'Br-vid', since S's stand is absolutely clear from the statements he has made, as quoted earlier. Hence, V's (Viṭhala's, as we know) remark to the effect that Ś lays down that Agnihotra, etc should be performed by a 'jñānin' even after the attainment of 'jñāna', is unwarranted. Therefore, in so far as the Anu statement is concerned, it can be said that if it is directed against Ś's view, it does not correctly and properly represent the Śankara stand.

Actually, Ś and V both, while discussing the state of a 'Br-vid' (which is here the subject under consideration), to whom no actions and their fruits can cling, bring in the topic of the Sagunopasaka and the Maryada devotee respectively,—and if the interpretation of one is inaccurate and unfaithful to the Sutrakara's intention, that of the other is equally challengeable—thus, for us, there is hardly anything to choose between the two. Yet, from the technical point of view, based on a stylistic procedure, Ś is in a better position to defend his case (viz that of the introduction of Sagunopasaka in a context where 'Br-vid' is the matter in hand), since he reads sūtras 13, 14, 15 and 16-17 as separate adhikaranas, while V reads sutras 13-16 to form one adhikarana.

According to V, 'Nitya-karmas' like 'Agnihotra', etc may be undertaken by a 'Br-vid' for the sake of putting an end to his 'Prarabdha karmas' only. Thus, 'tatkāryāya' in the sūtra is explained by V to stand for 'Bhogakaryāya' while Ś explains it as 'jñānakaryāya' (in connection with a 'mumukṣu' and not a 'mukta').

Another point, by the way, may be noted that Rāmā may be the target of V's attack, since the Śribhasya states ¹

“विवाख्यकायावैव हि विदुषोऽग्निहोत्राद्यनुष्ठानम् ।”—(वेदान्तग्रन्थरत्नमाला, ed 1910 p 418). The enjoyment of the results of one's 'prarabdha' actions is not necessary in the path of Puṣṭi (IV 1 17), V declares that “in the case of a devotee, who is an object of extreme and intense grace of God, the Lord Himself, getting

¹ The probe into this aspect of the matter has been inspired by Dr Modi's query whether V's statement (in IV 1 16) against the Śankara-stand correctly represents the latter, and we acknowledge our indebtedness to him for the same.

impatient by the delay in his obtaining Him, transfers his 'prārabdha' to someone connected with him and makes him experience its fruits. He does not just destroy the 'prarabdha' actions, because He considers that the Self-made rule, viz. that the fruits of one's actions can come to an end only through 'bhoga' or enjoyment of the same should be abided by. It should not be said that this is improper on account of the abstract nature of these two (merit and demerit) and because of the contingency of reaping fruits of such actions as are actually performed by one,—since as an *Īsvara* or Almighty God, He could have done it even otherwise.¹

Since the path of Puṣṭi is of a contrary nature to that of *Maryāda*, there is no need of anticipating any incongruity, because incongruity (with the normal karma standards) far from being a defect or a flaw, is the very jewel ornament of the Puṣṭi mārga. Hence only (since the 'puṣṭi' souls are rather rare) says V, the wording 'of some' suggests that such a privilege is very rare (p. 314).

The above interpretation clearly throws light on the concept of Puṣṭi as expressed by V in his own words. It also lays bare the overwhelming importance that V attaches to the "Divine Wish" and God's grace which can do and undo anything—even in direct opposition to the Law of Karma, to which V himself subscribes, since it forms one of the very basic tenets of the 'Vedānta'—but he modifies it in the sense that it has been placed in a subordinate position to the Will of God. It is quite clear that V intends to stress the supremacy and absolute independence of the Lord but it is none the less clear that in trying to do so he has ventured either to modify or to do away with principles of the highest importance like justice, the role of love, human freedom to choose and work

¹ This is a peculiar conception of God and His powers. It again leads us back to the question of the value of human endeavour which is so readily sacrificed at the altar of the 'unfathomable majesty of the Lord' by V. But in so doing here V shows glimpses of the problems (and attempts at solutions) of the theory of karma which have beset the karma theoreticians right from its beginnings in the brahmaṇa upaniṣad literature. The idea of transfer of the karma fruits has its root there too. But the chief point here is V's insight into the fact that the generally accepted necessary link between karma' and 'bhoga' (as usually understood) is not an intrinsically logically necessary one, but one due to a free determination of the will of God.

out one's destiny, etc which the Law of Karma implicitly accepts and strives to explain. The one-track solution (in the Divine Wish) of problems of rational appeal throws light on the stand that the followers of Pure Monism take, and it is no exaggeration to say that this "running to the Wish Divine" ('Īsvarecchā-paryantadhavana) often lays itself open to the charge that it completely sets at naught the light of reason.

As against the charge V's own answer is that he considers the light of *human* reason as infinitely inferior to the light of *divine*-reason as shown through revelation.

The followers of Pustī do not meet with any obstacles on their way to the Highest, and, having dropped their gross bodies, they acquire special bodies, suitable for participating in the divine sport of the Lord and enjoy, along with Br, all the spiritualised pleasures (IV 1. 19)

In IV. 21, V. describes what is meant by the dropping of the gross body in the case of one following the path of devotion. All the senses, etc of the specially blessed devotee of the Lord get absorbed in Him and such a 'jīva' is yearning for the divine Self ('Ātmakāma') with an intense love and even a moment's delay in the Lord's manifestation is enough to bring about his death (p 317). This manifestation of the Lord is the supreme fruit in Bhakti marga which brings satisfaction to the 'jīva' ('Āpta-kama'). Such devotees crave for a spiritualised embracing of the Lord and so on, for which the possession of gross, material bodies is improper and unsuited, hence, these gross bodies, etc get transfigured into the nature of the Self whereby they can participate in the divine sport, thus, becoming similar to Br ('tādīśaṅ san'), the 'jīva' attains the very nature of Purusottama and enjoys the deliciousness or bliss of the sport of the Lord.

Having thus explained the nature of the Pustī soul, V. refers it to the text of the sūtra (IV 2 1) that the Lord desires that this 'jīva' should see Him since he is very anxiously awaiting the manifestation of the Lord with intense affection, and then He creates in them (who were enjoying the nectar of His form with their eyes and mind) a deep longing for engaging themselves, with all senses, etc, in activities with the Lord, and then these senses, etc come to be united with Bliss. The expression 'वाङ् मनसि' in the sūtra is referred to a desire to speak with the Lord subsequent upon perception of the Lord (p 318)

V. warns that the absorption of the functions of the senses into the mind, of mind into the vital air, etc as suggested by Ś is not proper, since the sūtra does not mention the 'function' ('vṛtti') of senses, etc but just the senses, etc and in understanding 'function' in the place of the functioning senses, one has to resort to metaphor ('lakṣanā') Moreover, the word 'manasi' in the sūtra would be meaningless and there would arise impropriety in avoiding the general order stated in the text (IV 2 2) 'Śabdācca' in the first sūtra suggests that even in the absence of visual perception, mental absorption can take place, as in the case of the notes of the flute, whose mere sound produces it

Ś's interpretation of these two sutras refer to the state of the inferior 'jñānī' after death

He states that the senses of the lower 'jñānī' get absorbed into the mind, the mind into the vital air, the latter into the 'jiva' who, with all these, is merged into the subtle elements In the place of the senses, etc, Ś has to read the function of the same, but, if Ś's interpretation is charged with being based on a preconceived notion of a higher and a lower Br and the two types of 'jñānins' etc, it is no less legitimate to state that V's peculiar method of explanation of the sūtras in the light of the tenets of the Bhg is absolutely unwarranted—in point of matter as also of chronology Both err in introducing or reading into the sūtra text a distinction which is part of their system, but which the other schools rightly consider as alien to the sūtrakara's own system (cf Ghate)

As for the followers of Maṛyādā, says V in IV 2.4, on account of the absence of such an intensity of affection for the Lord (as is witnessed amongst the Puṣṭi-devotees) there results an entrance into the Akṣara Br only, and their senses, etc get absorbed into the elements (IV 2 5) and not into the Lord This is true of both the 'jñānī' and a devotee following the path of Maṛyada Although the salvation accruing in their case is devoid of the characteristics of the mundane existence, yet, as compared with the state of participation in the eternal sports of the Lord which the Puṣṭi devotees attain to, it is as good as being termed "samsara", since it lacks the Bliss experience of the Puruṣottama worship (IV 2 8) This path of grace or Puṣṭi is very subtle and difficult to understand, even as the texts declare "from which the speech turns away"

and so on It is possible to be comprehended through God's grace alone

The Lord is of the nature of Bliss or "Deliciousness" ('Rasarupah' T U 2 7), and the torment of separation is but His quality (or aspect) One in whose heart the 'sthayibhava' of the nature of deliciousness of the Lord is manifested, becomes tormented in the absence of attainment of the Lord and later on, he invariably attains Him This torment itself is delicious since the conception of Br is centred in "Deliciousness par excellence' (IV 2 11), and the very sense of absence makes the "jiva" deepen the realisation of its sweetness This "deliciousness" can be fully experienced only by undergoing the states of union and separation, which are really of the nature of joy The denial of suffering (Ch Up 7 26 2) refers to the sufferings due to the state of embodiment and the bonds of action, which cease to exist, and not to the pangs of (yearningly-loving) separation (IV 2 12) which are not worldly

(r) ' तादृशस्य जीवनसपादन प्रभोरावश्यकमिति जीवेदिति वार्थ ।'
—(IV 2 13, p 325)

Referring to the condition of a devotee tormented by and going to die from the pangs of separation from the Lord, V states

"The 'eva' in the T text (2 7) [This one alone, verily, is the bestower of bliss,"] is to suggest that the Lord himself alone can bestow life on such a devotee The term 'ananda' suggests that even that which is of the nature of affliction becomes (or is) of the nature of bliss Then the lamentation, chanting His qualities, etc are but His attributes (since He is 'rasatmaka with two aspects union and separation for qualities), and even when there arises a feeling "let the dark one whose complexion resembles a dark cloud go away from my heart—because of the excessive desolation (torment)," it is not possible to forget Him or remove Him from one's heart,—this is what is meant by the use of the word 'akasa' (because the latter cannot be expelled from any locality) Later on, having manifested Himself, who except the Lord could make him recover a blissful life by offering the Bliss of His very Self through sight, touch, embrace, talk etc ? This means who else would fill one's life with bliss, preceded by the removal of previous sufferings ? The first statement itself, viz. "Having obtained this joy (delicious

ness) alone, does one become happy" (T. Up 2 7) makes it characteristic (or distinguishes the joy of the attainment of the Lord from other pleasures) and the attainment of bliss is for the attainment of the Lord which is again stated in the form of negation ("vyatireka") (i.e. in the statement "if this Ether were not bliss", etc.), and there again as the cause of life, and which again is twice mentioned first in general, and then particularly—by all this it can be determined that the purport of the text is of the said nature only pertaining to the condition of separation. Otherwise, in the absence of any cause of death, (the text) would not speak of the cause that restores one's life. The meaning is "which person in that condition would be able to keep his life" ॐ

Here it is well to pause to analyse the interpretation of this sutra (IV 2 13) that V offers. The picturesque delineation of the "Deliciousness" of the Lord, which finds an elaborate and extended meaning here (in practically the whole of this 'pada') claims to have been based on the T Up text 2 7, which this commentator explains in accordance with his own conception of the Lord as "Bliss par excellence", the highest end in view for a devotee, who suffers the pangs of separation from Him, craves for touching and embracing Him, and so on. It is rather curious that the condition of a devotee separated from the Lord and hence intensely tormented by the pangs of separation, etc. should be referred to the T Up text in question, which simply describes Br as of the nature of 'Rasa'. It not only means reading *into* the text such a preconceived meaning, in the light of what Bhg has to offer by way of describing the youthful activities of Kṛṣṇa, but also amounts to a complete twisting of the sutras concerned, which are conspicuously silent about Puṣṭi-Māryada, the Rasa theory in connection with the Highest, the pangs of separation and so on and so forth.

The afore-said passage (r) throws overboard the claim of the Suddhādvaitins that their doctrine of Pure Monism represents the intention of the Sutrakara. V states that the manifestation of the Lord, having 'deliciousness' as His essence, the feeling of separation from Him and the consequent pangs, the intensity of love and the experience of the bliss of the attainment of the Perfect Puruṣottama—all these, though not seen in the world, do exist in Gokula (IV 2.15). The objects connected with the Puruṣottama exist at that place only, where the Lord manifest's

Himself As regards those who have secured access to His Sport, there is no distinction, and they experience the highest Bliss for ever, since the Divine Sport itself is eternal (IV 2 16)

Thus, the whole 'Pada' is dedicated to the promulgation of the theory of Puṣṭi and Maryada. It is rather a curious fact of history (cf Ghate, p 155) that the distinction between the Puṣṭi and the Maryada paths that V expounds in the interpretation of these sutras is comparable to the distinction that Ś speaks of between the higher and the lower attainments—with the vital note of difference, however, that while V's views are much too peculiarly Vaiṣṇava or Viṣṇuīte to be considered as representing the view of the Sūtrakara in the case of Ś, the interpretations may not faithfully represent the Sūtrakara's viewpoint, yet they are free from such extraneous influences and are consistent in so far as his own theory of Absolute Non dualism is concerned.

Ghate introduces the third pada as follows, 'After having described in the second pada the departure of the soul with its subtle body from the gross body of the dying devotee, the Sūtrakara in the third pada proceeds to describe the path along which the soul goes up to the Brahman and the nature of the Brahman attained thereby.' There is not much difference in the explanation of the first sutras 1 6, except for the fact that where other schools refer them to the jnanin in general Ś and V refer them to the *lower* type of their own division of jivas (lower 'vidvat' and 'maryada' jiva respectively) V has the peculiarity of reading one extra sutra *vī* 'varunaccadīndraprajapati', which he declares as "spāṣṭam idam" and only adds alternatives to the foregoing sutras.

Of special interest is the explanation of the following sutra

☐ (s) 'उभयय्यामोहात्तत्सिद्धे ।' (IV 3 6)

While describing the path along which a Maryada devotee goes after death, V interprets the above sutra as "This (the path of Divinities) is established since the followers of the Jñāna and Maryādā paths are infatuated.' This Path of Divinities is also created by the Lord, and if there were none to follow it, its creation would be meaningless, therefore, the Lord causes infatuation in some of the followers of jñāna and Maryādā paths, in order that they desire to follow this and come to receive their respective fruits.

on V's own terms, seems naive and lacking in depth. The Lord, with His Omniscience, would not have created such a 'Devayana' unless he had foreseen (even without having to force anyone) that some jivas would, of their own, freely choose to enter upon it. But V seems to be the prey of his own principles—since he cannot admit such a free choice in his system. Hence his naivety looks rather like helpless clinging to his own system—of the type that makes one suspect that there is something wrong with the very assumptions of a system that inevitably leads to such startling consequences.

V says that the explanation offered by Ś (as given below) is not proper. This 'infatuation', Ś says is the absence of independence in the case of those jivas who go along the 'Archimārga', etc. separated from their bodies and accompanied by a lump (conglomeration) of senses. And this state of conglomeration renders the jiva incapable of independent action, which is termed as 'vyamoha' (infatuation, bewilderment, swoon like state) in their case. And 'Archih', etc. are inanimate and their lack of any consciousness renders them dependent and that is what is called 'infatuation' in their case, meaning the inability to direct the carrying out of an action. So, the fact is established that the jivas have to be led by the superintending deities who preside over 'Archih', etc.

This interpretation as offered by Ś is not adequate, V holds, since the term 'vyamoha' stands for 'anyathajñāna', and hence it does not suggest 'inability'. If it were so, the jiva may not even reach the 'Archiloka'—on account of the absence of a leader or a guide (prapaka).

In sutra 16, (No 15 according to others), he states that only those who regard all things to be the pure Br and meditate on them as Br attain to Br, while those who see difference between things and Br and then meditate on the former as identical with Br do not reach Br ('pratīkalambanam'). However, the followers of Bhakti attain the highest Purusottama.

(1) 'प्रदीपवदावेशस्तयाहि दशयति' (IV 4 15)

This last Pada of the fourth Adhyaya refers, according to V, to the state of the released jiva who has followed the path of Pusti. The Lord enters into his 'Bhakta' who thus becomes similar to the Lord and is able to enjoy all pleasures along with Him, even as a light enters into the wick and enables it to

function like itself, and becomes dependent on oil (resembling affection of the devotee for the Lord)¹ The Lord is the master of all the beings or jivas by His very nature, however, it is only those particular jivas whom He blesses with His grace, choosing them as His own that He acts as the real Master or the Husband and supports them, while He Himself is, in turn, being worshipped by the devotees with intense affection. Thus, He is dependent as it were on His devotees (by lovingly fulfilling their love for Him and yearning after Him) and the devotees are also dependent on Him (who alone can fulfil their love). It is for the sake of bringing forth this aspect of intense affection that the Sutrakara chose this illustration of the lamp and its wick with the 'sneha' (=oil and affection!) instead of that of the iron ball etc which do not involve the 'sneha' factor. Finally, V gives all possible etymological explanations of the term 'Deva' as given in Nirukta (since the word occurs in 'एको देव बहुधा निविष्ट') and somehow makes them suit his theory of worship, service, dedication and sportive enjoyment.²

Sutra 17 is explained to refer to the absence of the slightest idea of worldliness (as earthy sexualness) in the Divine Sport and the participation of the devotees in it—(Jagadvya-paravarjam). The Pusti devotees attain the highest fruit, viz the fruition of all types of joys with the Lord and this divine enjoyment should not be mistaken for the quenching of one's earthly passions (IV 4 21). The jñānins do not have to come back to the mortal world although their ultimate end is different from that of the pusti devotees. The latter (Pusti devotees) on their part obtain the rare privilege of hearing the notes of the flute of the Lord, and there is no return in their case either (IV 4 22).

Thus the fourth Pada deals mainly with the nature of the attainment (by the followers) of the path of grace and throws light on V's method of introducing a twofold difference with reference to 'Mukti' as also to devotees, while Ś refers it to

¹ 'यथा प्राचीन प्रकृत्यो दीप स्नेहशुभावा वर्यामवासीनायामादिष्ट स्वसमान-
कायसमा तां करोति स्नेहाहीनस्थितिश्च भवति स्वय तथात्नापीयथ ।' (p 354)

² 'किं च भक्तानां कामभावनार्थं क्रीडाकरणान् क्रीडायामेव जय-लक्षणान् भक्तप्रपत्ति-
दर्शनेन कालीय-ननादौ मोदकरणान् तेष्वेव भक्तिमदकरणान् ते स्वप्नेऽपि प्रियमेव पश्यन्तीति
स्वप्नवस्थान् तन्निवृत्तिमनादपि देव ।'

the twofold distinctions of the knower, the way and the object of knowledge—both these teachers revealing a peculiar type of affinity in spite of their doctrinal differences of extreme importance

2 'Tattvarthadīpa nibandha'

This work of V, popularly known as 'Nibandha' is in prose and verse, and consists of three chapters, viz, the Śāstrartha, the Sarvanimaya and the Bhāgavatārtha. The prose portion (Prakaśa) throws light on what is said in the Karikas, but the Prakaśa commentary on the last chapter is only fragmentary (1st skandha of the Bhg to 5th skandha, 135 Karikas) [Refer to our introductory remarks, Ch V 2 iii]

(i) In the Śāstrartha chapter, V states that the only scripture is the poem sung by Lord Kṛṣṇa (v 4), assigning thereby supreme authority to the Bhagavadgīta. Only the words of Lord Kṛṣṇa as embodied in the Gīta have to be understood as denoted by "śāstra". Thus, 'sastrartha' is but another name for 'Gītārtha' chapter.¹ The manifestation of Lord Kṛṣṇa is for the sake of the upliftment or salvation of all beings. V refers to himself as a form of 'Fire' (v 3),² who has undertaken to explain the essence of the Bhg. The Lord Kṛṣṇa sports in the world (or is becoming the world)³ through the distinction of names and forms. The devotees of the Lord who possess goodness, etc. are fit for liberation and the performance of something—over and above the activities prompted by one's own nature and status ('antahkaranabhava' and 'dehabhava')—constitutes this element of 'Sattva' or goodness. It is only such devotees as also those who have dedicated themselves to the service of the Lord without any selfish desires that are deemed worthy of attaining salvation.

The Bhagavatārtha chapter is but an exhaustive treatment of the Śāstrartha-chapter, even as the Bhg is of the Gīta. The Sarvanimaya-chapter has in view the removal of any suspicion, doubt or perverted notion in the field of knowledge. The supreme principle is known as Br in the Upaniṣads, as Paramatma in the Smṛti literature and as Bhagavan in the Bhg.

¹ 'Śāstrārtho Gītārthah' (p 30)

² V is traditionally believed to be the incarnation of Agni and it is here that he himself alludes to the same.

³ For a detailed explanation of this verse, please refer Ch II C (pp 53-54) of this work.

V regards the Vedas, the statements of Lord Kṛṣṇa as occurring in the Gīta, the B S and the Bhg to be the four texts of maximum authority and states that the harmonisation of these leads to correct knowledge (p 38) The importance of these works is formulated in a progressive, pyramidal order, thus, the Bhg is the 'magnum opus' in the school of V Anything that is contradictory to this four fold canon of authority, should not be regarded as valid—or else, V suggests that since everything is but a form of the Lord, and since difference consists in mere names and forms, everything may be considered to be valid This elimination of the aspect of contradiction could be through the divine powers of the Lord or due to its being all (p 41)

The Purva kanda embodies the Lord in the form of sacrifice, while in the Uttara kanda, He is of the form of 'Brahma-tanu'—the word 'tanu' specifying that it is the 'Sakara' Br that is laid down in the Uttara-kānda The Bhg. represents the full manifestation of Lord Kṛṣṇa, exhibiting the aspects of both action and knowledge as witnessed in the previous two The Lord created the path of Devotion in order that His devotees may attain Him Lord Kṛṣṇa represents the prime form of divinity and should be worshipped with a desire to attain union ('Sayujya') with Him The attainment of union with other deities is 'Saguna' as compared with the union with Lord Kṛṣṇa The followers of the path of knowledge also belong to this 'Saguna-path',¹ although the ultimate aim in their case is the attainment of the 'Nirguna'—and hence, the superiority of the path of devotion to that of knowledge The meditation on the Akṣara also means the same One who has acquired knowledge disentangles himself from attachment, etc and becomes a 'jīvan-mukta', but, according to V, even in the state of 'jīvan-mukti', the notion of the self is present and it vitiates the knowledge of the liberated one making it dependent on ignorance Thus, even 'jīvan mukti' or liberation in the state of embodiment is regarded to be a lower attainment as compared to the attainment of Bhakti (pp 50-51) But, says V, he is really great who, following the path of knowledge first, tries—after having attained knowledge and having given up his attachment for it (the path of knowledge)—to worship Kṛṣṇa or offer service to Him² The

¹ 'यद्यपि ज्ञानमार्गेऽपि विषयो निर्युक्तस्तथापि मार्गं भगुण इति भक्तिमार्गयोग्यम् ।'

(p 51)

² 'यस्तु पूर्वं ज्ञानमार्गे प्रवृत्तः प्राप्तज्ञानं कृष्णसेवार्थं यत्ने तन्निष्ठा परित्यज्य, स महानित्याह ज्ञानी चैवमजने कृष्णमिति ।' (p. 51)

incarnation in the form of Buddha is said to be for the sake of confusing and leading astray the devilish or demoniac persons (compare Subodhini, II 7 37) The various systems such as promulgated by Kanāda, Gautama and Śankara divert people from the path of devotion by giving rise to confusion,—yet, the Lord himself is believed to have ordered them thus¹ as described in the Padmapurāna, Rudraṅgita, etc The infatuation consists in engaging oneself in the scriptural study with an attachment to false knowledge and in not resorting to Kṛṣṇa For those dragged by 'Karma', there is nothing but transmigratory existence characterised by misery V briefly describes the fruits of one's dedication to jñāna, karma and bhakti to be omniscience, purity of mind and the grace of God respectively (v 17) One's devotion to or deep attachment for a particular path is judged from the means one employs V states that in this modern age of Kali, one who undertakes to worship Kṛṣṇa—not in accordance with the prescribed rites, but with a feeling of devotion—is a pure follower of the 'Brahma vada', a true devotee of the Lord Devotion represents the purport of the scriptures, and hence anything else that is propounded is imaginary and not based on the correct meaning of the scriptural texts (v 20 21) The world is a creation of the Lord, a form of His, brought about through His Mayā power, whose nature is the capability to become anything Thus, it is with His own power that the Lord created this world, of the nature of His own self, without depending on anything else Some do not discriminate between world (jagat) and transmigratory existence (samsara), hence, it is for the removal of infatuation in their case that the distinction between these two has been pointed out here 'Avidya' or 'ignorance' is also a power of the Lord which gives rise to 'samsara' with respect to a 'jiva' V. says that the world does not have Prakṛti as its material or inherent cause as the Sankhyas propound, nor is it brought about by atoms as maintained by the Naiyayikas, nor is it of the nature of illusion as Ś lays down, it is neither caused by an Unseen Principle as the Vaiśeṣikas believe, nor produced out of nothing as the Buddhists propound it has Br for its cause and is itself but a part of His, states V Since the two distinct powers of Maya and Avidya are at work in bringing about jagat and samsara respectively, the latter two are different from each other, in as much as their

¹ 'नापि तथाकरणे भगवतो विस्मयति, भावन्तेव तथा द्वापन्तु।' (p 53)

causal powers are different,—the jagat being a real manifestation, while the samsara, being unreal, is based on the confused perception of a being. The manifestation of the Lord in the form of jagat is for the sake of sport, which involves variety, hence, the multiplicity and distinctions in the world. Thus the beings, their activities, the means they employ and the fruits they reap are but His sportive manifestations. Therefore, one who considers oneself to be the doer, the recipient of fruits etc is labouring under ignorance since he does not know that Br is at the root of all this. These notions of I and 'mine' are characteristic of the 'samsāra' which is aptly described as 'conceptual' (or imaginative) rather than as a 'creation'. It is this 'samsara' that can come to an end at the dawn of correct knowledge, but not the 'jagat', since the latter is a form of Br.

(a) “ननु प्रपञ्चस्य तथैव मत्तव्यमिति ।” (pp 62-63)

In the above passage from V's Prakasa+portion on the twenty-third Karika, the distinction between 'prapañca' i.e. 'jagat' and 'samsara' is objected to on the following lines

“Just as pots, etc. which are phenomenal (prapañcātmaka) in character, can be destroyed by a stick or a dumb bell which is also phenomenal in character, in the same way the 'samsara' which is a part of or falls within the sphere of the phenomenal may well be destroyed by right knowledge which is also phenomenal in character, hence, it should not be said that the 'samsara' is not unreal or not caused by ignorance, since it is of the nature of Br on account of its being included in the phenomenal sphere. Nor should one consider that thus, through the contingency of the 'samsara' being eternal, there would result total negation of release itself, because it is proper that a particular person is said to be in the condition of 'samsara' for a period during which he is manifested in the form of 'samsara' while he is said to be released when he is manifested in the form of release. For example, a pot, etc. in its unbaked or raw condition, is called black, since it is manifested as black while it is called red when heated since (then) it is manifested as red. Nor should this be denied on the basis of the scriptural texts like 'the bondage is due to ignorance', since even the application of (such texts) enjoys the same fate as do the pots, sticks, etc.

Thus, O wise one, Pure Brahma vada is established, and

would not even the minutest change make it tantamount to the *Mayā-vāda*

It would not, since it is on the strength of the scripture that the jagat is said to be of the nature of *Br*, on account of its being eternal. Manifestation and concealment are laid down, and these can belong to an existential entity only and not to non-existent (unreal) objects. And unreality cannot be predicated of real things. Moreover, the scriptures state that 'samsara' has *Avidya* only as its cause and it is not of the nature of *Br* like the 'prapañca'. After having laid down manifestation in the form of the 'prapañca', the text speaks of transmigratory existence through ignorance, and its absence of it (samsara) through knowledge, hence it is necessary to accept that 'samsara' is different from 'prapañca'. This being so, the 'samsara' is established to be unreal. And what is said by way of the illustration of the rod, the dumb-bell, the pot, etc., viz. that bondage and release, caused by ignorance and knowledge, enjoy the same status as do the rod, etc., we say that it would be so, if 'samsara' were to fall within the phenomenal sphere, but it is not so, on account of their causes being different. This is not reasoned out in the scriptures but since it is based on 'sruti' (scriptural authority), it should be regarded in the same light by those who believe in the existence of God."

In the above passage, *V* distinguishes between 'jagat' and 'samsara'—a feature which finds a unique expression in the system of *V*. The 'samsara' is rooted in ignorance and is explained to be an aspect of manifestation, differentiated from other aspects of it through the limitation of time. It is not included in the 'jagat' or the phenomenal sphere, since the scriptures declare different causes in their case. This 'samsara' comes to an end in the case of one who attains salvation or release, but the 'jagat' never gets destroyed. The latter gets merged into the self of *Kṛṣṇa*, when He desires to sport within for the good of all.

Commenting on this, the author of '*Āvaranabhanga*' says that if the 'samsara' and the 'jagat' were non-different, there would be no material body left in the state of 'jīvanmukti' that is attained on the termination of 'samsara'—and the very concept 'liberation while in the state of embodiment' would be annihilated (p. 63)

The five fold ignorance, born of the Maya power, concerns the jiva while Br is all pervading. It is by means of His power of Maya that He covers or encompasses His own attribute of all pervasion¹. He is said to have hands, feet, etc in all directions and He possesses endless forms through His desire to be many, He is impartite and yet is divisible. V explains 'Srstyadau' (occurring in verse twenty eight) to mean 'in the first creation' (prathamastau) and states that in the beginning of the first creation, there emanated from Br, merely through His desire for a high or low creation, innumerable jivas having intelligence ('cit) as a predominant factor. Explaining the graded manifestation of His triple aspects of Sat, Cit and Ānanda in the jagat, etc, V says that the term 'Nirakarah' as applied to the jivas suggests that the latter are devoid of bliss of which the hands, feet, etc of the Lord are comprised. This interpretation is unusual and it tries to explain away the contradiction implied in the simultaneous use of the term 'sākarah' and 'nirakarah' with respect to the jivas. Thus, the 'form lessness' in the case of the jivas should be understood to stand for the 'concealment of bliss' (p. 70).

The powers of ignorance and knowledge are caused by the Lord's power of Maya, and these two bring about misery and dependence (absence of Lordship) in the jiva. The five facets of ignorance are (i) the superimposition of the Antahkarana, (ii) that of the vital breath, (iii) that of the sense organs, (iv) that of the body and (v) the forgetting of one's nature. Conditioned by all these together the jiva whirls round in the stream of births and deaths. Knowledge on the other hand, brings about release by the destruction of ignorance, this release consists in the absence of superimposition of body, etc, but it does not destroy the body etc. Purusottama's commentary on this clarifies that the (explicit) mention (in the text) of body, senses and vital breath alone while not mentioning the Antahkarana suggests that the Antahkarana remains some-

¹ 'इह मायाशब्दमृतीयोऽशवेऽनशब्देन समयने न तु मायाशब्दयश्शब्देन समासः । एव च ब्रह्मणोऽशवेऽपि न वे मायाया हेतुचमः । तच्च युक्तम् । माया हि भगवन् सर्वभवनमानन्धरुपा शक्तिस्तया भगवान् स्वयं व्यापकत्वाद्वाद्यनि, तया व्यापकत्वरूप धमतिरोधान परिच्छिन्नत्वरूपो ब्रह्मण आविर्भवति, तत्र परिच्छिन्नत्वरूपधमतिरोधाने श्रगैर्वेऽपि न ब्रह्म भवति ।'

what under the spell of superimposition¹ Even when there is no superimposition, the existence of body, etc is there, as witnessed in the case of the 'jivan mukta's' (Compare the Anu statement निरध्वन्मैरेव दहादिभिः कनकरयन्मकार्, etc (I 1 1, p 7) as against Ś's theory of superimposition, vide Chapter V (1) of this work)

In the Udgitha brahmana of the Br Up, the senses are first spoken of as deities, and these, as such, constitute the form of the Lord, just as the organ of speech is said to be of the nature of fire and Fire is the mouth of the Lord, thus, the organ of speech attains the position of His mouth in the same way, all spiritual senses are to be referred to the divine (adhidaivika) aspect This merging of the conglomeration of senses into divinity, as explained by the author of Āvaranabhanga, can be had, not only by meditating on the Asanya or the chief breath, but also and in a superior manner through the worship of the Lord, since the latter course leads to 'Brahma bhava', while the worship of Asanya is founded on 'jīva bhava' or the existence of the jīva A flash of the bliss aspect in the case of the jīva leads to 'Brahma bhava', which denotes "the highest type of similarity" with Br as suggested by the text "It attains to the highest type of similarity etc" It means that the jīva acquires the quality of all pervasiveness along with other divine attributes² The manifestation of the (so-far) suppressed divine aspects stands for this 'Brahma bhava' For this manifestation, it is only the Divine Wish that acts as the causal factor, and therefore in consonance with its being absolutely unconditioned there may result union with the

¹ अत्र दृष्टिवायुना सर्वेषां निरध्वन्मैरेव दहादिभिः कनकरयन्मकार् इत्येव च कथयन्त इत्येव किञ्चिद्व्य-
क्तं शिष्टेन त्रैमात्रेण नादाचारद्वारान्मकधनुकारभूता । तत्रावात्म्यादित्येव न
न शक्यं किञ्चिद्वदन्ना न्मनोनात् तथैव किञ्चिद्वदन्मन्त्र, ननुपानिनि हृदयन् ।

—(Āvaranabhanga, p 74)

It is curious that the followers of Suddhadvaita maintain Māya to be a power of the Lord when they do not accept Māya to be the material cause—and yet explain it as "हान्मक धनुकारभूता"—which does not mean anything but the material cause

—They may perhaps answer that the material cause for them is not something different from the Lord but the Lord Himself through His Māya-sakti

² Refer to Anu. III 3 2f p 229

³ Āvaranabhanga p 76 (yet not leading to complete identification since it is said to preserve the 'amśamśa' relationship)

Lord in the form of Alaka, Kaustubha, etc., or, perhaps, union with the Aksara Br.—but either of these said fruits arises only through the worship of the Lord and of none else (pp 76-77)

Mentioning different modes of creation as stated in the scriptures, V says that if this creation were a product of nescience, even knowledge, etc would be nothing but a mere verbal affair and would not serve as means to the end in view (v 38) The powers of the Lord are inconceivable and innumerable, hence comes the reference to creation in various ways, for the sake of describing somehow His glory (v. 40 41) The knowledge of His greatness and glory leads to the propitiation of the Lord

V defines 'devotion' as a firm and supreme affection for the Lord preceded by the knowledge of His greatness, and emphatically declares that release can be had only through devotion and in no other manner¹ He lays down that service characterised by affection towards the Lord is the means which finds favour through His manifestation² Mere knowledge of the nature of Br is futile, since its inefficacy is witnessed in the case of those 'moderns', who know the textual meaning but fail to attain the Highest Again, realisation of Br. depends on Him, because it is only when He is pleased that He manifests Himself Thus, the human efforts should be directed only to the knowledge of His greatness so as to produce a feeling of loving adoration towards the Lord The scriptures refer to His greatness in order to negate defects of wrong knowledge, etc or lay down Br to be the self in all for the sake of producing a firm love towards the Lord Therefore, one should strive after the attainment of His grace or favour. The author of 'Āvaranabhangā' notes in this connection that the concept of His grace is based on the teachings of the Upaniṣads, and hence, it should not be regarded as lacking in traditional and authoritative support³ Thus, the followers of

¹ 'माहा न्यजानपूर्वम् तु' इ सर्वतोऽधिक ।

महा भक्ते रित प्रानस्तया मुक्तिर्न चान्यथा ॥"—(v 42)

² Puruṣottama s 'Yojana' aptly summarises this as एव माहाभ्ये हान रेवा भवेत्, प्रा न्नेन हाने स्नेहो भवेदिति प्रेमवाग्निद्वय एतदुभयात्किरिति श्रुचमिप्रायो निरुपाधे -तद्वशाया पुष्टिभक्तावेवावगम्यते ॥"—(pp 81 82).

³ 'न च तथाव श्रौतत्वं प्रवादस्य शाल्यशङ्कनिर्नि वाच्यम् । "तत्राकर्तुं पश्यति वीरगोको धान् प्रवाणं तदेताननीशमे" नि श्रुती प्रवाददेव दशनकथनान् ॥"—(p 82)

Suddhadvaita doctrine try to trace the idea of Puṣṭi back to the Upaniṣad times

Different forms of God are then enumerated and the pristine form of the Lord is described as possessing attributes purged of their evil nature, self subsistent, devoid of all 'prakṛta' qualities, having hands, feet, etc constituted of bliss alone and devoid of the triple distinctions¹

The five facets of 'Vidya' or knowledge are (i) the absence of attachment to sense objects, (ii) abandonment of everything, preceded by discrimination between the eternal or the non eternal, (iii) the practice of 'Yoga' with its eight fold members, in a secluded place, (iv) 'tapas' or 'thoughtful observation or concentration, and finally, (v) supreme affection towards Kṛṣṇa through the constant remembrance of Him Possessing these, one realises Br and attains an 'entrance into the Lord' The places of pilgrimage like Kāśī, etc may purify one and extricate him from the snares of transitory existence provided he is blessed by the Lord and is an object of His grace If one were to resort to Kṛṣṇa with an unswerving faith and to undertake 'śravaṇa' etc after having given up everything, he would be freed from the shackles of—not only Avidya but—Vidya too²

V distinguishes between the fruits of Maryada bhakti and Puṣṭi bhakti in verses 50-51, and points out that in the case of Maryada followers, 'bhakti' is the means and liberation the fruit, but one liberated through the practice of Maryadā gets rid of his body and merges into Br, while Puṣṭi devotees experience the divine bliss of the Lord by means of all their senses Antahkaraṇa and by their very nature Hence the stage of a householder, who is endowed with His grace, is far superior to the state of jivan mukti, says V (p 91) When the veil of infatuation is removed, one's vision gets cleared and it is then that a person comes to believe in the efficacy of the word of the Bhg

The jīva is as minute as the point of a rice grain but its quality of intelligence spreads all over the body, like fragrance (gandha³) spreading to places in addition to the

¹ Please refer to Ch II (c) of this work for a critical appreciation of this stand

² 'इह तु विजानि वृत्तिरप्यभिप्रेयत इति पुन कथनमुभयनिवृत्तौ प्रादुर्भावात्पुनश्च — (Āvaranabhanga, p 90)

one occupied by the object ('dravya') it resides in. The texts, which speak of its being pervasive in character, refer to the condition of the jiva when it attains the qualities of the Lord. When the bliss-aspect is manifested in the jiva, innumerable 'Cosmic Eggs' arise in it, therefore, it should not be regarded that the jiva is all-pervasive, since the scriptures affirm it to be atomic in size, and "when the celestial or non-earthly attributes form the subject-matter, one must accept the scriptural testimony only and not earthly reasoning," says V. On account of the manifestation of sentiency or intelligence, which is refulgent by nature, the jiva appears to be the possessor of intelligence. Even the refulgence in the case of 'Tejas' or 'Light' is due to its being the Prakṛti of Br.

Ś's theory that the jiva is a reflection of Br is not proper, since the illustrative instance of the one moon as seen reflected in water which appears to be many suggests the idea of one becoming many and there is no scriptural reference to reflection. What is really explained thereby is that in spite of the perception of the many, there is a non-difference between the jiva and Br on account of the non-difference between the part and the whole, and because of their being cogenous (having a common genus) or endowed with the same essence.

The 'prati-bimba' or reflection can only represent the (outward) form of the object, while the other aspects like 'touch', etc. would not be present in it. A reflection is capable of being perceived when its substratum has qualities similar to its (the reflection's) nature, and it responds in accordance with the object which is facing it (and is situated in a suitable place)¹. It is different from 'abhasa' or mere appearance. The concealment of the bliss aspect in the jiva is responsible for its appearance as a jiva, while the manifestation of that same bliss-aspect restores it to the status of being like Br. The rise of the isolated 'sat' aspect constitutes the nature of 'abhasa', (which is mere perceptible reality, unconscious), while the manifestation of both 'sat' and 'cit' (which constitutes the conscious jiva) corresponds to the 'prati-bimba', the manifestation of 'sat', 'cit' and 'ananda' together bringing about 'Brahmatva'. V warns that 'ābhāsa' here should not be mis-

¹ 'नत्र रजामरचभावानुविगच्छिवे सति नमुत्र श्वितानुविगच्छिवेन प्रानियोग्यो हि प्रतिबिम्बः ।' 'नाम्सु कञ्चात्तानुविधानानुद्दरावम, न तु पुरोऽन्वितम् ।'

taken for 'unreality' ('alīkatva') from a 'worldly' point of view. It is 'sat' manifested and perceptible, but isolated from the other two aspects.

The 'Mithya vada' of Ś is briefly stated by the author of 'Āvaranabhanga',¹ summarizing points of difference among the followers of Ś V. Ś V says that for establishing the theory of reflection, it is necessary to bring in something of the nature of a screen or a cover. Again, this must be Maya or the like, but anything that covers up the nature of a thing cannot act as a reflecting surface just as a man cannot be reflected when there is a screen on the mirror (the reflecting surface). Secondly, a thing cannot be reflected in the very place where it exists, like the line on the mirror. Again it is against reason that the object is at a stand still while its image has activity—as the theory of reflection would suggest in the interpretation of the text 'the two birds, of the same age', etc. The activity seen in the case of a reflection (image) is dependent on the object, and the two, viz. the object and its image cannot reside in the same place. Again, the jīva and Br are declared in the scriptures to have entered the cave, etc., suggesting that both can occupy the same place—this also proves the impropriety of the reflection theory, wherein the object and its image must be differently situated. If it were argued that in the text 'the (two) have entered the cave', etc. the mention of the jīva as a 'shadow' (chaya) can refer to its being a reflection only,—the author replies that since the Lord himself states in the Gītā that the jīva is an 'amśa' or a part even the term 'chaya'

¹ 'अत्र तस्मत्प्रसिद्धा पदप्रज्ञा । अनानिनिवाच्या भूतप्रकृतिश्चिन्मादत्तन्वधिनी माया । तस्या चिप्रतिबिम्ब इश्वर । तस्या एव परिच्छिन्नान्प्रदशरवाकरणं विपरीतविन्दवद्यभिरानेषु चिप्रतिबिम्बो नाव इत्यकं नम् । त्रिपुरामिकाया मूलप्रकृतमाया चाद्विद्या न न्वभव भवतीति श्रुतिमिदं रूपद्वयम् । तत्र रत्नरत्नानिभिमूतशुद्धमत्त्वप्रधाना माया, तस्या चिप्रतिबिम्ब इश्वर । तदभिभूतमलिनमत्त्वप्रधाना विद्या तस्या चिप्रतिबिम्बो जीव इत्यकं नम् । विपरीतविन्दवद्यभिरानेषु मायाशब्दिनाया मूलप्रकृतावव चिप्रतिबिम्ब इश्वर । आवरणशक्तिप्राधान्येन तत्रैव चिप्रतिबिम्बो जीव इति नृतायम् । अविद्याया चिप्रतिबिम्ब इश्वर । अन्तःकरणं चिप्रतिबिम्बो जीव इति तु नृतायम् । घटाकारबलाकारान्हाकारानघावावाशवत् कृत्रमीवमनेश्वरमेव तत्रैक्यमातुर्विचित्रात्तनात्तु अज्ञानाश्रयमायात्तन्मनि विद्यतासु मवप्राणना धावान्नासु प्रतद्विबित्तैतयनीयका । तन्मूलात्तदा च्छन्नकन यत्तत मायावत्पितृन्त कस्य प्रतिबिम्बो नैतय जीव इति पन्थनम् । एव प्रतद्विन्देवक्यादमत तु ज्ञानाया पनात्त करणान्ति एव च्छन्नकनैतयनाश्वरा विन्दभूत । अज्ञानं तप्रतिबिम्बा जाव । तदायज्ञानपरिगणानभूतं तत्तर जीवय विरापाभिव्यक्तिरित्ययम् ।' (Āvaranabhanga p. 102.)

conveys the sense of the jiva's being of the nature of lustre (kānti) ¹

Thus, says V, having refuted, on the strength of the scriptures, the theory of reflection upheld by the Māyā-vādins, we can undertake to challenge it on the basis of reasoning. If the reflection-theory were maintained, i.e. if the jiva were regarded as the reflection of Br. in ignorance, the liberation resulting from the annihilation of ignorance would mean destruction of the jiva itself, and thus, liberation would no longer remain the goal of human endeavour. Moreover, it has to be considered where Br. is reflected. It can be either in the Antah karana or in Avidyā, but since both these are impure, it is not possible to get anything reflected in either. Even if it were granted that it is reflected in the Antah-karana, there would not result any liberation at all, since in so far as there is Antah karana, Avidyā will persist, and if this Antah-karana is also destroyed along with ignorance by means of knowledge, there cannot result 'jivan-mukti' in any case. Nor can it be said that the 'jivan-mukti' is somehow possible, because, at the dawn of correct knowledge, ignorance (which is the basis of reflection) would get destroyed and then would arise the contingency of the absence of the jiva itself. Therefore, the reflection can neither be cast upon ignorance nor upon the Antah-karana.

Again, if the jiva were a reflection, the body of a 'jivan-mukta' would not be able even to stir, because ignorance, which is the very substratum, has been destroyed in his case. If the existence of the body in that state of liberation is regarded as due to the remnant 'prārabdha' actions in the case of the jiva concerned, even then this remnant 'prārabdha' can warrant mere existence and not any activity. But since activity is seen to persist in the case of a 'jivan-mukta', the theory of reflection holds no water ².

V declares that the text 'that thou art' should not be interpreted to suggest the identity of the jiva and Br. and neither should this particular text be deemed to be a 'Mahāvākya',—since the context in which it occurs embodies the concept of

¹ It is rather unusual to interpret the word 'chayā' (which has been used in conjunction with ātapa' or 'sun shine') to mean 'lustre' (kānti), when it clearly expresses the opposite of lustre.

² For a detailed analysis of the whole topic, please refer to Ch. VI (1) of this work.

the knowledge of all through the knowledge of One,—which is possible only when, being just One, Br. can become all 'Ātadatmyam idam sarvam' lays down Br. to be the self of all that is even inanimate. The statement, 'Sadeva Somya', etc with which the discussion starts, refers to the reality of the world 'Sa Ātma' serves as a reason (hetu) for the same, viz that Br is the self of the inanimate world. Then the statement 'that thou art' lays down that Br is the self of the jīva also. V designates this statement as "a preaching", since it has been repeated many times. He advises that the whole topic should be regarded as embodying the real preaching and not the above statement (viz 'that thou art') alone, as torn from its context. Nor is Svetaketu, to whom these words were addressed, an incarnation of the Lord, so as to justify the preaching of identity. Hence, the text 'that thou art' does not teach identity of or non-difference between the jīva and Br, since it would involve the defect of 'Vakyaabheda' or splitting of the statements and contradiction of what has been begun (pp 107-108) ¹

Br is a principle that precludes the possibility of being fully realised by mere logical reasoning, an analysis of the 'jada' and the 'jīva' is offered so as to suggest His omnipresence. The Highest Br can be known perhaps by means of concentration (meditation), by means of reasoning in consonance with the Vedic texts and through the grace of the Lord, and still, says V, one may not attain 'Brahma bhāva' as well as 'Sayujya' after having ascertained the meaning of the Upaniṣad texts. In reality, the attainment of 'Brahma bhāva' is also a phase of Āvirbhāva, and Vidya and Avidyā are concealing and revealing each other like waking and sleeping conditions. Therefore, since ignorance may suppress knowledge, it is but futile to resort to the said-means. One should worship the Lord in every manner so as to attain to 'bhakti' and union with God.

Describing the nature of Br, V says that Br is of the nature of existence, intelligence and bliss, is all pervading, indestructible, omnipotent, independent, omniscient and yet devoid of attributes (material) is untouched by all distinctions—either intra genus, extra-genus or internal, "possesses thousands of

¹ For a detailed criticism of this, please refer to Ch. VI (1) of this work.

² 'सुखा दीपविशालायावत्सर्वत्रानु—सुखानीदृति । मननीया जीवा, विज्ञानीया जडा, स्वमता अक्षयनिगा । द्विगुणि भवा-नुगुणविरूपपरत मवर्तन्तै नैर्निर्दिता द्वैत भेदलक्षितान् ।'—(p 113)

attributes like truth, etc is the substratum of all, governs Māyā (Vasya mayam), possesses the form of bliss, is higher than even Akṣara, is distinct from all entities belonging to the material world, is the inherent cause as well as the efficient cause of the world, sometimes sports in His own creation and sometimes within Himself by involution, all cases (vibhakti) and their modes refer to Br. alone and the Prakṛti, Purusa and Kāla also stand for Br only He is immanent in all and yet remains unaffected by the entities interpenetrated; He shines having entered into bodies, is beyond the reach of all arguments and is still the object representing the harmony of various conflicting arguments—since He has the power to become anything He chooses and is the abode of contradictory attributes He possesses endless forms and yet is immutable as well as mutable, being the abode of contradictory attributes, He remains beyond the reach of (mere logical deductive) reasoning

Here V describes 'Āvirbhava' as manifestation in the form of a fish, etc —*i.e.* an incarnation, while the termination or conclusion of the respective incarnations is 'tirobhāva'¹ These two along with their varied modes, bring about infatuation in the jīva. The miracles are witnessed in the age of incarnation of the Lord on account of His wish and not because of the power of the sense-organs belonging to those who perceive them (p. 120). The blissful aspect is His very form,² but while He manifests Himself in the world He assumes different forms like 'śyāmatva', etc He assumes different forms in consonance with the time factor, e.g. in the Kṛti-aeon, His form is white, possessing four arms, etc Br, like the sky, appears as possessing different forms, etc but in reality, what

¹ It is noteworthy that the concepts of 'Āvirbhāva' and 'Tirobhāva' appear to be differently defined and explained by V in different works of his e.g. the above explanation seems entirely different from the definitions of 'Āvirbhāva' given in An 1 V M etc as *सर्वमाश्रित्य बद्धात्मा*, etc Yet if one looks a little more carefully one finds that it can still be conciliated if all depends on whether the terms are applied to ordinary objects of knowledge or to the extraordinary one which is the Lord Himself. In the latter case one can still say sufficiently appropriately that an 'avatāra' is in a very real sense *anulāvaṅgavāyavavyatā* applied to the Lord, *one who incarnates*. He becomes the object of experience and perception

² *सर्वं तस्मै सारं तस्मै सारं सारं सारं सारं*

is meant to be conveyed by this is that He is beyond the range of sense-organs, as the senses are made 'facing outwards' ('parancikhāni', etc.) It is like a mass of concentrated salt, which is of a homogeneous nature from within as also from without, and in spite of its being regarded as having many forms, it is nothing but Pure Br. Even in the age of incarnation, there are some people who do not come to realise the Lord, since He does not wish them to, just as even an existential entity cannot shine in the absence of an illuminating source, in the same way, the absence of His favour keeps them in the dark. Any incongruity apprehended anywhere, (in the above description) has to be discarded as unreal, says V since "this Entity itself is such, and the nature of an entity should not be subjected to the test of reason."

The faults of inequality and cruelty do not (and cannot, according to V) accrue in the case of Br, because the high and the low world is but "a Self creation,—by Himself and out of Himself" (Ātma sṛṣṭi). Thus, the view of S that the fruits are given to one in accordance with the good and bad actions performed by one in one's previous birth is not sound, because it relegates Br to a subordinate position to the Law of Karma for the bestowal of fruits. Therefore, V declares that 'Ātma sṛṣṭi' alone explains how these logical flaws do not arise in His case. The sūtra in question (II 1 34) just follows commonsense or ordinary man's view, otherwise, the section 'Phalamata upapaiteh', etc. would stand contradicted.

It is He alone and not the Saguna that is the cause of the world. The belief that the Lord as the creator is Saguna is based on the conception of attributes with respect to the jivas, which are His parts. V states that the creator has to be an independent principle¹ and if the creator were Saguna, His independence would be contradicted.

¹ 'कर्ण स्वच्छ एव न्यात्तु मुमुक्षुश्च विन्दयते (I 77) Now, if this were accepted, does it not suggest that the Saguna Br, which is the highest according to V, is not independent? We often come across such cases of confusing terminology in his system. (Also confer our remarks on the 'Ikṣatyad'ikarāṇa"—treatment in Ch V. I)

The term 'guṇa' has also been understood and employed by V in its narrowest sense, i.e. that denoting a quality, so that attributes of any kind that can be predicated of one are and should be generally understood thereby. Thus, 'creation'—one would conclude—which is attributed to

“Here, at the commencement of the topic, there is a mention of the presence of a common characteristic of the nature of things such as by the knowledge of a lump of clay, all that is made of clay becomes known. In the illustrative instance given, both the cause and its effect are objects of perception, while in the thing to be illustrated, the effect alone is perceptible and both the cause and the nature of it are to be understood from the śruti. Here, it must be understood that the cause and the effect are non-different or else, the knowledge of all through that of one would not be possible on account of the different modes (of the effects) being unknown. Hence, for the sake of dealings in the world, the modes of the effect are designated through a convention based on their objectives through modal, reality as ‘a pot’, ‘a piece of cloth’, etc. But these forms as such ‘a pot, etc do not constitute their substantial, but only their modal reality. If these names, etc. were to represent their essence, the knowledge of all would not result from the knowledge of one. But substantial reality belongs to “clay alone”, in its capacity of a cause alone though it is a really modified clay. Hence, the text teaches the non difference of the cause and its effects and not the unreality, like that of the silver seen in the nacre. If it were so intended, the author would have given the illustration of the silver-nacre only. Again, in the illustration of superimposition, there is no generalisation intended, since ‘bhrama’ or confusion has an endless variety of forms. Therefore, the ‘Vācārambhana’ texts cannot convey that the world is unreal. And that is what the Sutrakara has said in the sūtra “The non difference of that, on account of words like ‘arambhana’, etc.”

This ‘Vācārambhana’ text has been treated in various fashions by different commentators, and since the interpretations given are so different and even opposed to one another, teeming with multiple implications bearing on one of the fundamental problems of philosophy, it will be very useful to examine the problem of the interpretation of this passage *de novo*, taking into consideration the different interpretations of scholars, both ancient and modern.

Svetaketu, who was puffed up with his vaunted knowledge of the scriptures and who had not received the final flash of self-realisation, was asked by his father whether he knew “that” by

the knowledge of which everything else becomes known. Giving answer in the negative, Śvetaketu requested his father to teach him about 'that'—this, the 'pratijñā' or the assertive statement is 'the knowledge of all through that of One'. Then, in order to illustrate this, three instances are adduced—of the lump of clay, iron and gold, by the knowledge of which, anything that is made of clay, iron and gold respectively, becomes, at once known.

Now, the text ¹ 'Just as all that is made of clay becomes known when a lump of clay is known, an effect (is but) a name, a (mere) matter of speech, (while) it is clay alone that is real,' which is the first illustration in the series {As against this, some hold that it means 'the vikāra (which stands for the difference in form or shape, change or modification) is a handle or justification for speech-designation, (a thing) to be given a (characterising) name, while it is clay alone that is the true (substantial) reality'} If language is a medium of translating one's thoughts in the form of words—and if words can express any sense, the above text, when viewed impartially, without any vested interest in this system or that, conveys the meaning that it is clay alone which is real and not the form and name. The term 'vikāra' itself is used and is explained as '(nothing but) a name, a matter of speech'—suggesting thereby that the change or modification as witnessed in a pot, etc. does not constitute reality (satya), since it is clay alone, its material cause, which is real.

Here even if we do not label the effects as 'Māva', and try to analyse the statement as it stands in the context, the emphasis laid by the employment of the particle 'eva' restricts the application of 'satyatva' to something to the exclusion of all else concerned. Now, the reality of the cause is a matter of common agreement and it is but logical that forms, names, etc. constituting 'modification' in the triple illustrative instances, are not deemed real. If these changes in the aspect of clay as a pot, etc. were thought to be real by the author of the text under consideration such illustrations would not and could not have been adduced here, and secondly since distinctions are manifold the concept of their reality would lead to everything being real and there is no reason why the assertive statement of the

¹ 'एवैकं मृषिादनं सर्वं ज्ञानं विना सदा कालान्तं त्रिषु गणनादं मन्विकृतं सत्यम् ।'

knowledge of all through that of One should have been made. Therefore, the straightforward meaning of the statement is that the cause alone is real—which necessarily brings in the concept of the unreality of the effects—qua effects, since these are meant to be excluded from being considered as real, by the express mention of : 'Mṛttiketyeva Satyam'. These material instances of clay, gold, etc. are given in the initial stage so as to prepare the pupil (who was initially unconcerned, reserved in nature and puffed up) to gradually trace it back to Br, the cause of all causes who represents the ultimate Reality.

The instances offered happen to be the cases of "Avikṛta-parināma" only, and it is but natural that one seeks an explanation for such instances also, as represent what is generally called the 'Vikṛta-parināma', e.g. the milk turning into curds

This gives rise to the question whether the change which milk undergoes while turning into curds is real or not ; if real, where does that aspect of a real change come from ? If from the cause itself, well, it is just a difference in name and form, if it is a new thing, the contingency of Asatkārya vāda—or of the doctrine that something can come out of nothing. Thus, even when there is a considerable change perceived in the effect as curds, the essential aspect of it as 'milk' alone constitutes the reality. It is, of course, difficult to explain this 'Vikṛta-parināma' instances, and perhaps that is the reason why Uddālaka gave Śvetaketu these illustrations—not one, nor two, but all three—of 'Avikṛta-parināma', which is easy to understand.

Yet, looking back upon the seers who were strenuously trying to lay bare that principle of Reality, which is the only enduring entity through the multiplicity of changes and modifications, it is impossible to think that the 'Vikṛta-parināma'—cases had escaped their notice, though they did not analyse their full difference or implications as yet and propounding the knowledge of all through the realisation of One in the form of a generalisation, they must have intended an application of the same concept to such instances also without as yet having analysed them or felt their peculiarity which they did not adduce, since Śvetaketu to whom the words are addressed is a novice as it were, in the field of Br, and therefore the instances given should be easy to follow

Uddālaka's words of admonition to Śvetaketu suggest that the

mere accidental qualities of what one sees around are not real—ultimately—since it is the underlying and interpenetrative and all pervasive cause alone that is real

Thus far the context and the general meaning of the illustrative instances

Coming to the text ‘*Vacarambhanam Vikāro namadheyam, mrttiketyeva satyam*’, it is noteworthy that if the whole effect were intended to be real like its cause, as V (with many others) holds, the words ‘*ityeva*’ would be stripped off their significance and propriety. The restrictive particle ‘*eva*’ necessarily bars off ‘*Vikāra*’ from sharing reality, which the cause “alone” enjoys. Again, the employment of “*iti*” and “*eva*” together is very suggestive in that the seers, who had no vested interests in any particular system as such, wanted to reduce the whole issue to the form of a universal proposition, *viz* that the cause alone is real. Otherwise, the same illustrations could have been worded differently.

If both the cause and the effect were real, it would be necessary to consider whether they are real in the same sense, *i.e.* at the same metaphysical level, or not, if the former alternative were accepted, it remains unanswered as to why the seers chose such illustrations instead of saying directly something like ‘*Ubhayamapī satyam*’, etc. The latter alternative suggests that it falls in with the Śāṅkara view. Ś does speak of the triple gradation of reality, *viz* the *Paramārthika* or the Ultimate Reality (which is *Br* alone), the *Vyavahārika* or the phenomenal reality (as witnessed in the world) and the *Prātibhāsika* or apparent reality of the dream world and so on.

Thus, an answer has to be furnished to the afore-said issue by those like V who postulate the world to be a manifestation of the “wonderful power” of the Lord.¹

Thibaut, who holds Rama’s doctrine in high esteem, says, explaining the terms ‘real’ and ‘unreal’, that the world is “unsubstantial, if we take the term ‘substance’ in its strict sense. And again, everything material is immeasurably inferior in nature to the highest spiritual principle from which it has emanated. . . .”² This unsubstantiality or inferiority, although not equivalent to the sense in which ‘*Maya*’ is used by Ś, does necessarily imply that the world is not as real as *Br* is—and

¹ ‘*The Vedānta-Sūtras*’, S B F Series, Vol. XXXIV, Introduction

hence, it just boils down to a verbal difference in so far as the reality of Br as also of the world is in question

V is right in remarking that the 'ananyatva' or non difference of the cause and effect is what is expressly mentioned in the sutra (II 1 14) and not 'mithyatva' or unreality, but the question as to how this non difference is possible forms the very core of the issue. And the 'Vacarambhāna'—texts clearly point to the reality of the cause alone, as detailed out above. The laboriousness with which V has attempted to read into this text the reality of both the cause and the effect is rendered tragically ineffective by the fact that the employment of the restrictive particle 'eva' posits something to the exclusion of all else concerned. Moreover, reading so much sense in 'iti', viz reality of both the cause and the effect, to the thorough disregard of the particle 'eva' is unwarranted and unreasonable.

V lashes at the 'Adhyāropapavada' doctrine of Ś and states that the experience of the world is not a matter to be proved by the scriptures, so as to enable the latter to first superimpose it on Br and then deny it. Again it is merely fool hardy to say that the Vedas are products of ignorance if the world were unreal the persons, etc. being included in it would never get liberated and even their efforts in that direction would be futile. Ignorance cannot pertain to the jivas (jivaśritavidya), nor to Br (For detailed explanation, please refer to Ch V 1). Nor can Māya be the cause of the world since the scriptures proclaim 'How can a real thing be produced out of unreality?' etc., 'On account of reflection', and so on. By laying down the negation of Karṣṭva or agency the scriptures suggest the greatness of the Lord and His being a substratum of contradictory attributes. Therefore, says V¹ the scriptural description of ignorance is for the sake of producing confusion or infatuation as stated by Lord Kṛṣṇa himself in 'They call the world to be unreal, lacking in support, etc. (Compare Anu I 1 3 p 16)

It is worthy of notice that the Gī 2—text quoted by V here in support of his view that those who believe the world to be unreal etc. are demonic, should be properly understood in the light of the context in which it occurs. The opinion of scholars

¹ 'अतो एव कर्तृत्वमसौ विध्यादवमादाः माविद्वन्ति चेन्द्रे एतानुगन्ति निरव ।

is unanimous with respect to the meaning of this stanza that the said stanza, falling within the appreciation of the differentiation of the 'Daivi' and 'Āsuri' qualities, refers to the attitude of the possessors of the 'Āsuri' qualities towards worldly ends such as sense-enjoyments, etc. It does not refer therein to the view of Ś that the world is a product of Maya. It would be a travesty of the wording of the text and its context to try to use this statement to condemn the Maya-vāda as propounded by Ś.

V says that when there dawns a realisation of the harmonious nature of the scriptures, everything appears in its true light, viz as a form of Br.¹ It is a notion of distinction that is sublated then and not the object itself meaning thereby that a pot, a piece of cloth, etc. have eternal existence (Nitya satta).

It is strange to conceive of an eternal existence of pots, etc. in their individual capacity (Please see under Ch V L for a detailed discussion on this subject. The contingency of duality (or rather plurality) arising by the acceptance of such a theory is cleverly warded off by referring the distinctions to "mere matters of speech"—which V was at pains to explain in terms of reality.

Detachment, concentration, love and penance are said to be the means auxiliary to devotion—and even by following one of these in a perfect manner, one can attain liberation. The various ways of the abnegation of the world spoken of in the path of knowledge should be understood as leading to purity of mind. The descriptions of the dissolution of the world act as auxiliary to the rise of an attitude of detachment from worldly objects and do not suggest an absolute end of the world.

Thus, having given proper thought to everything, and having realised that everything has originated from the Lord, who is everything one, who resorts to the Lord with love and worships Him by means of śravaṇa, etc. is the best of devotees, in the absence of knowledge, he is termed 'ordinary' and in the absence of love, the 'lowest'—while in the absence of both love and

¹ 'यदा अखण्डाद्देतमानं सुवर्णमाइकवत् तत्त्वेनैव सर्वं गृह्णाति तदा अवान्तरविकल्प-
विषयिणी बुद्धिर्गुणं पट इति, सा बाध्यते। सर्वत्र बद्धावेति। न तु स्वरूपतोऽपि घटादि-
परार्थोऽपि धर्मी बाध्यते इत्यर्थः।'—(p. 158)

knowledge, the undertaking of śravaṇa, etc leads to the destruction of sins, but it does not make him eligible for 'bhakti' ¹

Puruṣottama explains this as follows - The knowledge that the world of names and forms is due to the Lord is secondary while the realisation that the Lord is everything is principle, explains V One, who, led by that knowledge, worships God with love while at the same time undertaking śravaṇa etc is the best among devotees, even in the absence of the scriptural-knowledge, if one worships God with love, he is said to be the 'middle' or ordinary, while one is called ordinary in the absence of either love or knowledge But in the absence of knowledge the possession of love towards the Lord has to be intensified, deep and supreme in order to qualify the devotee as 'ordinary'. In the absence of such a supreme love, even that devotee is termed the 'lowest' (ādīmah) This must mean that the one who can be 'madhyama' is reduced to the rank of 'adīma'—which, by natural right (or value), belongs to him who has only 'jñāna' but no 'prema' But on the other hand, no amount of 'jñāna' or its intensification can raise a natural 'ādīma' to the 'madhyama' rank unless he attains to some 'prema' Mere 'śravaṇa', etc when undertaken by one who lacks both knowledge and love, annihilate one's sins, but do not make one eligible for 'bhakti' This is how the author of the Āvarana bhanga attempts an explanation of the two stanzas Perhaps V meant to say 'Jñānabhāve madhyamah syat, premabhāve tathādīmah',

¹ 'एव सर्वं तत्र सर्वं स इति ज्ञानयोगतः ।
यः सेवते हरिं प्रेम्णा श्रवणादिभिरुत्तमः ॥
प्रेमाभावे मध्यमः स्याज्ज्ञानाभावे तथादिमः ।
उभयोरप्यभावे तु पापनाशस्ततो भवेत् ॥—(V 101-102)

This verse (102) is badly construed in the sense that V himself has to explain it (in his Prakāśa) in a very unusual and far fetched manner. Somehow, the meaning it expresses does not fit in with the concept of the graded order of karma jñāna and bhakti as maintained by the Śuddhadvaita school of thought which speaks of love as superior to jñāna. This flaw is obvious since even the Āvarāṇabhanga-kara after having tried to explain the afore said stanzas has to say that this meaning is not borne out by the text itself and hence V has to analyse and explain the same (in his Prakāśa on it)—p 166

"प्रेम्णा श्रवणादिप्रकारेण यो भजते स भक्तिमार्गे उत्तमः । शरत्कार्थज्ञानाभावेऽपि प्रेम्णा भजनं गच्छति । प्रेमाभावे मध्यम इति वा । ज्ञानाभावे तथा मध्यम इत्यथ । आदिमो वा ।"
(V's Prakāśa on V's 101-102)

suggesting thereby that one who possesses mere scriptural knowledge is the 'lowest' and definitely inferior to one who does not possess such knowledge but is full of an extreme love towards the Lord—which sense is more in consonance with his system and its postulates

Thus the 'śastrārtha'—chapter elucidates the meaning of the scriptures, says V, on the basis of the harmony of the authoritative canons like the Vedas, the Bhg and so on, while in the next chapter, called the 'Sarva nirnaya', the nature of the 'Prameya' or the object of knowledge is discussed

(1) *The Sarva nirnaya Chapter*

In this section, V discusses different philosophical topics whereby his attitude to Vedic literature, especially to Purva Mimamsa, and to other literary works is reflected. According to him, both the Purva and the Uttara Mimamsas represent the limbs of the Lord, but the observance of the ritual injunction alone does not produce the highest fruit, it is the worship of Kṛṣṇa alone, says V, that is conducive to blissfulness

Literal identification of sacrificial forms and offerings with the Lord is set out in detail—and although it does not fall within the sphere of 'Vedānta thought' that we have selected to treat here,—it is deemed worthwhile to make a reference to it, since the latter embodies V's attitude to Dharma or the path of ritual, his concept of 'svarga' and so on

Different sacrificial forms like the Agnihotra, etc are identified with the Lord. The offerings like Prayajas, garlands, etc represent the 'prakṛti' of the Lord while the 'Kāmya' actions stand for his 'vikṛti'. A gradual release, of the nature of bliss, takes place in the case of one who has known Br and who has also carried out scriptural injunctions. Instantaneous release can be had only through extreme favour of the Lord. In the absence of knowledge of Br, one attains 'svarga' through the worship of the sacrificial aspect of the Lord

'Svarga' means the experience of 'happiness of the Self' which—in its substance—is not sublated or contradicted later on. But this attainment of 'svarga' is characterised by miseries born of competition, jealousy, etc and since it is born of the performance of rituals, it is said to be lower than the attainment of 'Brahma loka'. This 'svarga' stands for 'svarga loka'

as also for 'ātma sukha'—this combined application of meaning being meant for producing an inclination towards the ritual performance in the case of the ignorant V states that the performance of Agnihotra, Darsa purna masa and Jyotiṣṭoma leads one to 'svarga', while the attainment of "all worlds" is the fruit of Paśu bandha, and the fruit of Caturmāsya is imperishable. Just as by means of concentration, etc. on the statue of the Lord, one comes to realise the Highest, even so the performance of scriptural injunctions leads to 'the realisation of His form as sacrifice' (v 15). All human efforts are directed to the attainment of happiness and the destruction of misery. Happiness stands for 'svarga', etc. and the absence of misery is termed 'liberation'. Ritual performance acts as an auxiliary to these two ends in view. Knowledge as such is not deemed to be one of the four fold ends of human endeavour, since it is included within the fold of Dharma, as postulated in the Yājñavalkya-smṛiti (that reflection on the Self leads to happiness or liberation)¹ (p 16)

Thus, says V, the two fold nature of the Lord as the means (sadhanam) and as the fruit (phalam) is described in the Vedas. His manifestation (to man) forming the chief human objective. He created *the form display (Rupa prapañca)* of the world and the jivas, which are His parts, and in order to remove confusion that arose with respect to the jivas on account of their multiplicity, He made the scriptures,—and, V adds, for the sake of self satisfaction, the jiva and the Antaryamin entered into the heart for tasting the effects of good and evil. This experience gave rise to mental impurity which they were unable to remove by themselves, since they were stationed within. Thus, some external force was necessary for the removal of that impurity,—and that is the reason for the fashioning of the scriptures (pp 17 18). This is how, says V, the good understand the word of the scriptures.

The *gradation of the jivas* as the divine, human and demoniac souls is due to the triple characteristic that constitutes the power of Māya belonging to the Lord. This triple characteristic of

¹ 'अथ हि परमो धर्मो वयोजेना सञ्चितम्' इति याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृतौस्तस्य धर्मवान् मुखमोक्ष-योहान्तन्-यत्नम्, हान्तस्य धर्मान् प्राप्त एव सर्वेषां सम्मत इत्यर्थः ।'—(Āvaranabhanga on v 16)

Māyā covered the jivas that emanated from Br through His desire to be many, in order that the three fold sentiment (based on 'tamas, rajas, sattva') may be enjoyed. In the absence of this gradation of jivas, there would be no enjoyment of the 'Tamasa' objects. Thus, the scriptural texts come to be interpreted by one in accordance with the category one belongs to. Some regard mere 'action' to be the purport of the Vedas, as they are ignorant of the object meant in the context and as referred to in the initial statements, etc. Thus, different paths are advocated by different people and since everything is but a part of the Lord, some fruit, says V, does arise in each case, but this is not eternal, and therefore, an attitude of detachment and an absence of any desire for fruits constitute the teachings of the Lord. Cessation of rebirth follows the intelligent performance of Vedic injunctions, while rebirth accrues in the case of one, who, in the absence of proper knowledge carries out the rituals.

The mention of 'Dhuma marga' is for the sake of producing 'vairagya' or an attitude of detachment. Clinging to the mere word of the Vedic injunction (and disregarding the 'spirit' of it) and the belief in the supremacy of action constitute 'confusion'. It is with a view to establish that all sacrifices are but forms of the Lord and a manifold description of the same is given. The sacrificial cult is treated by Jaimini in the Purva mīmāṃsā, while the aspect of knowledge forms the subject of treatment in the Uttara mīmāṃsā of Bādarayana—both these being complementary to each other. Thus it is with the knowledge of these two mīmāṃsā branches that one comes to realise the purport of the whole Vedic literature. V says that the commentators on these two Mīmāṃsās have interpreted the sutras to suit their own preconceived theories and that is how the real meaning has been lost (p. 29). V then refers to knowledge and sacrifice as forming respectively the 'head' and the 'body (trunk) of the Lord. This comparison is carried further on and different sacrifices are described as representing His hands, feet and so on (v. 32).

V defines 'smṛti' as the seers' recollection of (their) previous conduct¹ and as the experience of the seers is varied, its

¹ 'स्मृतिर्ज्ञानं पूर्वकारणम् स्मृतिरुच्यते'—(v. 33)

description and recollection also assume varied forms Hence the treatment of diverse subjects in different 'Smṛti' and its Scope smṛtis The śrutis (Vedas) are said to be revelations and hence termed 'apauruṣeya' (not man-made), while the smṛtis are based on the experience of the seers and ranked lower than the śrutis In order to facilitate a smooth running of society, the smṛtis deal with important subjects like normal conduct, worldly dealings, social rules and regulations, expiatory rites, etc.

The 'Smṛtis' are meant for one and all, while the teachings of the 'Śruti' are limited in their application with reference to particular time, place and individuals Smṛti and Śruti Compared and Contrasted V compares the 'śrutis' to the 'body' and the 'smṛtis' to the 'home' of a person, and says that just as one's home is a source of happiness (real relaxation) to the individual, even so the smṛti acts as an auxiliary to Dharma, and the harmony of the śruti and the smṛti strengthens the Dharma (v. 35) The sixteen sacraments, the morning and evening libations, etc comprise the smṛti topics

The Puranas are useful to one and all The four ends of human endeavour have a two fold nature—as conceived by an Īśvara or God, and as conceived by the jiva (p 42),—the former aspect is based on the Vedas, while the latter represents the Pauranika aspect V says¹ that śruti, smṛti and Purana play the parts of the body, the home and the furniture (paraphernalia) respectively with regard to the 'Dharma' Thus, the Puranas, like the instruments or the furniture, give comfort to a person, and in the absence of the knowledge of the Puranas, one cannot come to know the exact nature of the external entities Hence, the Puranas are said to be the 'heart' of Dharma, when even the śrutis and smṛtis stand for the "eyes"²

Innumerable ages or aeons are brought about by Lord Kṛṣṇa with the aid of qualities like 'sattva', 'rajas' and 'tamas' In the Tamas ages, the creation is from Lord Śiva, in the Rajasa ages

¹ 'श्रीनो धर्मो देहस्थानीय । स्मार्त्ता गृहस्थानीय । उपकरणस्थानीय पौराणिक इति ।' (p 42, Comm on v 48)

² "श्रु तस्मिन् उमे नेत्र पुराण हृदय स्मृतम्" इति हृदयत्वम् ।—(p 43)

through Brahmā and in Sattvika-ages from Visnu—but the 'All-Form' Lord Kṛṣṇa is present in them all and He is the ultimate creator

V distinguishes between the Vedas and the Bhg—notwithstanding their ultimate identity—since the latter is not expressly stated by Vyāsa as forming one unit.

The Vedas and the Bhg. The Vedas cannot purify one whose religious conduct is poor, while the knowledge of the Bhg can accomplish anything and everything. The 'Dharma' preached by the Lord as embodied in the Bhg is independent of the six factors like time, place, material, agent, the mantra and action, which influence or affect an ordinary act. And therefore, the impurity of any of these which is normally detrimental to the rise of a prescribed Vedic fruit does not act as an impediment with reference to the Lord.

Different works of religious literature such as those on the Sadangas, the Rāmāyana, etc are pointed out as auxiliary to Dharma or to the Vedas—and it is very peculiar how V, like Plato, discards the field of Poetry as utterly useless, since its formation or composition is based on imagination, and hence is 'unreal',—although V states that it has utility from the aspect of its individual composer, who may, while abiding by one's 'dharma', gain fame and dexterity.¹ Although the Rāmāyana falls within the sphere of 'Kavya' or Poetry, it is exceptional in that it has its contribution to Dharma, says V, since its author, the sage Valmiki, has envisioned it in his meditation.

The Sāṃkhya, Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems are intended for confusing those who are, by their very nature, irreligious (v 83)

Thus, according to V, 'pramanas' include all works that teach 'Dharma', and these are the Vedas, the Smṛtis, the Purāṇas, the Śadangas, the Artha-śāstra, the Kāmaśāstra, the Rāmāyaṇa, the Bhg and so on.

Referring to the aspect of *the 'Prameya' or the object of knowledge*, V says that the only and ultimate 'prameya' is Lord Kṛṣṇa, who is both 'Saguna' and 'Nirguna' (v 84) and even those entities which are propounded in other scriptures ultimately

¹ 'वाच्यानीनां सारस्त्वान्नेपयोग कथञ्चन ।
धर्मं कर्तुं न्वचिद् कीर्तिर्नैपुण्य पाठं क्वचिद् ॥'—(v 80)

Himself', in the Vaikuntha, the Aksara appears in the form of the Vaikuntha world,—and hence, the residents of the latter are 'liberated'—(p 61)

Distinguishing between the fruits of the practice of knowledge and of 'bhakti', V says that the followers of the path of knowledge meditate upon this Aksara, and on the attainment of its knowledge, become eligible for devotion, while in the path of devotion, there prevails supreme bliss from the very beginning

The partial manifestation of the Sat aspect of the Lord to the complete suppression of the Cit and the Bliss aspects represents the form of *Kala*, wherein the power of action predominates, which is the substratum of all and is ever a flux (*nityagah*) The attribute of sovereignty which belongs to it is due to the Lord

'*Karma*' also is a form of the Akṣara (like *Kala*), but unlike *Kala*, which is self manifest, its manifestation takes place through the modes of injunctions and prohibitions carried out by man, and it is not eternal, lasting only upto such time till its fruits arise (v 110)

'*Svabhava*' is manifested through the Divine Wish and not in the form of Sat, Cit and ananda It is experienced as the very 'nature' of a being, both sentient and non sentient, thus, it represents the potentiality in milk, clay, etc to turn into curds, pots and so on respectively Its presence can be inferred but it is not a matter of direct perception

Thus, *Kala*, *Karma* and *Svabhava* are nothing else than the Lord in the sense that these cannot have an existence independent from the Lord Like the Lord, who cannot be classified amongst the different elements (*tattvas*), since He is the common principle that pervades and interpenetrates everything these three forms also do not fall within the range of elemental categories

V then *refutes the concept of antecedent non existence* on the strength of its being non different from the causal state, and incidentally, other forms of non existence (like *Pradhvamsabhava*, etc) are also refuted According to him, these 'abhavas' are nothing but the power of suppression or concealment of a potentiality (*tirobhava śaktyatirikṭasya dhvamsasya nirupayitum aśakvatvat*)¹

¹ For details see Ch VI 1

All entities in the world are characterised by a three-fold distinction as the celestial, the spiritual and the phenomenal. The sat, cit and bliss aspects, as manifested in the body, the individual soul and the Inner-controller respectively, account for the distinctions witnessed in the phenomenon, the spirit and the divinity. The individual soul, the universal soul and the Purusā are the forms of the Lord, but these are mentioned under the classification of the Jīvas so as to signify that there is a predominance of *Sat* in the embodied souls representing the 'vyasti', that of *Cit* in the Cosmic Egg standing for the 'Samasti' and that of *ānanda* in the Purusa¹

The Inner-controller, the Aksara and Kṛṣṇa represent another set of different forms of Br and can be compared with the charioteer, the owner of the chariot and the occupant of the chariot in respective order. These three, again, possess triple distinctions each, in accordance with Svabhava, Karma and Kāla.

Avidyā, Prakṛti and Māyā are said to be the powers of the Jīva, the Aksara and the Lord Kṛṣṇa respectively. The pots, etc., although ultimately non different from the Lord, are said to be produced, etc for the sake of facilitating worldly dealings. In the same way must be explained the mention of the rise of knowledge and action (v. 135).

Directing an attack against the theory of reflection ('prati-bimba'), V. says that an entity having no form at all can never be reflected, and again, if the individual soul were a reflection of Br in *Avidyā* or in intelligence (buddhi) the latter should be regarded as pure,—and consequently the reflection of Br in a pure surface would involve omniscience on the part of all.

The inter play of the triple qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas, which are characteristic of Buddhi brings about the conditions of waking, dream and deep sleep in connection with the Jīva. Thus, the jīva is not independent of the triple-guna (v. 137).

V. describes the rise of happiness and misery as the fruit of knowledge acquired through the practice of enjoined and avoidance of prohibited actions respectively. But, says V., it is

¹ 'तथा च ईश्वरानन्दो व्यष्टिस्त्वज्ञानरसस्य सत्त्वात्मन्, सन्नष्टेऽज्ञानरसरीतौ विज्ञानस्य पुरुषात्परस्य सान्निध्यवन्निर्निर्जडव्यवस्थेर्दयः ।'—(Āvaraṇa-bhanga, p. 94)

“beyond the pale of doubt” (“nitya”)¹ that such happiness and misery, which are but mental tendencies or attributes, are distinct from the ‘Bliss of Br’ as also from entrance into “Blind Darkness” (“andham tamah”) Thus, other mental tendencies like shame, desire, hatred, etc also have an origination, and these, in the case of the jivas, are transient, while in the event of their being predicated of the Lord, these are said to be eternal

Turning to the topic of *manifestation and concealment*, which represents the cardinal doctrine in the system of Pure Monism, V states that manifestation and concealment are two powers of the Lord, which explain the transformation of seed, etc into a full fledged form of a body and so on Behind these developments and changes, the Divine Wish acts as the governing factor The attribute ‘manifestation’ belonging to the Lord is instrumental in establishing the manifestation with respect to pots, etc Viṭhala attempts an explanation here (which is rightly believed to have been added to V’s ‘prakāsa’-portion in this connection) in which he anticipates an objection that this manifestation, being an attribute, requires a substratum, and this being so, through the fact of the existence of pots, etc even prior to their manifestation, and through the fact that manifestation and concealment, as the powers of the Lord, are eternal, the manifestation and concealment (of an object) would become eternal This is met by saying that the Lord possesses innumerable powers, and that is how the process of development or transformation with respect to an object can be explained Thus, ‘the sting of impropriety can be removed with the aid of the Lord’s power, viz Divine Wish’²

(c) ‘उत्पत्तिनाम वरुचन धर्मः । भगवत्त्वं सेत्स्यति ।’ (pp 114-116)

‘Production, indeed, is an attribute, and it has to belong to some entity (Thus, production is what brings about a thing, and since the former, being an attribute, must have a

¹ ‘नित्या न विवादास्पदमिति’

We come across a very unusual and abnormal meaning that the author wants us to understand by the word nitya that is used here meaning a settled or established truth or thing

² ‘इच्छाशक्तिरुहकारणानुत्पत्तिपरिहारः ।’

(p 114) This clearly brings out how V has always to fall back upon the concept of Divine Wish when propriety is at stake—A panacea for all maladies, indeed

substratum, there must exist an entity of which it can be predicated)—This leads to *regressus ad infinitum* (Nor is it an attribute like 'ten' in 'ten days' referring to past and even future days) because even the connection with the time-factor is itself an attribute. Therefore, whatever may define it has to be included in the sphere of 'attribute', and hence, it must be said that the entity (i.e. the substrate of an attribute) exists even before its production. But then, the active use in 'Ghaṭo bhavati' would be improper—(since, if the pot is 'pūrvā siddha' or existent even before its production, it does not require to be produced) And the meaning of the root 'bhū' 'to become' would be inconsistent. Also, the practical dealings like 'the pot is not produced', 'the pot is destroyed', etc. would be equally improper. Therefore, the possessor of attributes (*dharmin*) has to be accepted to be eternal—and that can be none other than the Lord Himself. And since the 'dharmin' has to be eternal, the scriptural texts teaching non-difference establish that this 'dharmin' is the Lord. Accordingly, the attributes are also proved to belong to Him."

The above passage throws light on the doctrine of eternal existence of an entity—which is upheld by the followers of Pure Monism. The concept of the eternality of an entity and consequently of its attributes is based on the theory of manifestation and concealment, on the strength of which V has attempted a refutation of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the four-fold non-existence. It also hints at the Satkhyāti doctrine viz. that the effect is existent in its cause even before its manifestation as an effect. When it is said that 'the pot is not produced', 'the pot is destroyed' etc. what is really meant is that the pot has not been manifested in the form of a pot, and that it has disappeared manifesting itself in the form of clay, respectively. These two powers of manifestation and concealment are dependent on the Lord who presents Himself when pleased with devotion. The manifestation of different entities in their particular forms and at a particular time and place, by means of certain implements, in their particular modes etc. takes place in accordance with the Will of the Lord."

* अस्तित्वस्यैतन्निरूपणं तदात्म्यस्यैव। एतन्निरूपणं देवं सत्यं इति देवं सत्यं
 वेदोक्तं। (संस्कृत-दर्शन-संग्रह, पृ. 118)।

Explaining the first and the last (viz production and destruction) of the six aspects of 'modifications of an entity' (bhāva-vikāras) as nothing but manifestation and concealment respectively,

V proceeds to interpret the remaining four (viz. existence, growth, change and decay) as different phases of the same. Different modes do not cause any blemish in the case of the Lord, since these are brought about through the Divine Wish.

The creation by the Lord is two fold—the *Form world and the Name world* (Rupa-nāma-prapañca), the former being represented by Kala, Karma, Svabhāva, Maya and the Lord, while the latter is caused through His manifestation in the form of the Āsanya or the chief vital breath (p 123)

V's peculiar attitude to the views held by Naiyāyikas and others with regard to the question whether the words can convey any sense by themselves, etc is reflected in his statement that even letters as such do possess significance,¹ since 'letters are identical with akṣaras—and Lord Kṛṣṇa has himself stated that the letter 'a' stands for Him. The sentences, words and letters represent His Name world. Thus, even the letters are eternal, being but forms of the Lord. In this Name-world, notwithstanding the fact that all words represent the Lord, each word possesses a particular meaning only, in accordance with the convention that is established with respect to the object connoted by it. All this is very archaic Brāhmana like speculation, reminiscent of word magic adopted to a new setting but very unrealistic and naive. What follows contains more of a sensible approach on the whole. A word may convey many meanings, but its exact and appropriate meaning has to be determined with reference to the context in which it is used—thus, it has to be understood as conducive to the complete comprehension of the sentence in which it occurs (v 156). And the highest meaning of all texts is Kṛṣṇa.

The objection that the meaning conveyed by a particular word in a sentence is lost no sooner than that word is uttered is met by saying that even when the individual words do not exist physically till all the words in a sentence have conveyed their meanings, yet they do exist internally in the sense that there is a recollection of the connection between the meanings of different

¹ 'अक्षरमन्ते तु वार्ता अक्षरं वन्दत' ।—(p 129)

words The subsistence of the Form world is through action while that of the Name world is due to knowledge Expectancy, propriety and juxtaposition are the factors that lead to a complete comprehension of a sentence, the former representing its limbs, as it were, while the sentence itself is the very Goddess of learning (v 173) V says that the quality of inspiring one to activity belongs to Kṛṣṇa and not to the injunctives The highest Lord is devoid of all defects, and even when he inspires man to activity, there is no flaw that may cling to Him, since, in reality, there is equality of happiness and misery concerning all jivas alike in the births (yonis), the perception of gradation (with respect to happiness and misery) is due to one's own making only Lord Kṛṣṇa abides in one and all, and hence the non difference V gives his cardinal doctrine in verse 184,¹ which asserts that all that is, is Br —this alone constitutes the "Brahma-vada"

Thus, having concluded the topic, viz 'the object of knowledge', V proceeds to discuss the question of 'fruits' Everyone is advised to follow 'dharma' in compliance with one's caste and stage of life One, who knows the religious rites, etc and has an inner faith in the performance of these, gradually gets liberated and attains to "Brahma-loka" or the bliss of Aksara Thus, for every stage (āśrama) of life certain rules and regulations are stipulated in the scriptures, and, says V, the greater the faith in the subsequent stages, the better the fruit (v 196) And the presence of the feeling of devotion in the last stage, viz. Sannyasa, would bring about the highest fruit V specifies that even 'bhakti' has to be accompanied by knowledge and the performance of 'dharma' in accordance with one's stage of life, in order that it may destroy "concealment"² A different condition is, indeed, rare, yet when the devotee considers the

¹ 'मात्रमेव तदिदं सर्वं ब्रह्मैव तदिदं तथा ।
इति श्रुत्यर्थमादाय साध्यं सर्वैश्च मनसि ॥
अयमेव ब्रह्मवादः शिष्टो मोहाय कल्पितम् ॥—T D N II 184

² 'तिरोधाननाशो ब्रह्मभावः । (p 156-157)

Here 'Brahmabhāva' is equated with 'the destruction of concealment'; but it is strange that the concept of 'nāśa' or destruction has been brought in again after its having been negated earlier and been referred to as nothing but a phase of 'Āvirbhāva tirobhāva' Thus, does 'Brahmabhāva' mean the 'concealment of concealment'?

performance of ritual, etc as an impediment to the worship of the Lord, he abandons all the customary rites concerning his stage of life. This feeling arises only in the stage of Sannyāsa, says V, when the person cherishes an attitude of detachment and sheds the notions of 'I' and 'mine'. It is then that he attains to the best type of Yoga or the supermundane state, with his senses withdrawn inwardly and getting lost into indeterminate concentration, he attains liberation at the time of the fall of his body. If the Lord manifests Himself to him who is lost thus in such a concentration, he may acquire immediate release (v 198-99)

In the state of determinate concentration, the person, experiencing the external contacts also, while practising Yoga for the realisation of the Lord, abandons his body and acquires gradual release.

V compares and contrasts the fruits of Sāmkhya, Yoga and Bhakti and states that the followers of the first two have to come back to the mortal world, while the devotee of the Lord attains to Him. V. then describes *the fruits of mere (kevala) Sāmkhya and Yoga (uninformed by devotion)* as the destruction of ignorance and attainment of release, while the practice of these, when flavoured with 'bhakti', leads to the Supreme attainment, viz the Lord. The extremes of the Sāmkhya and Yoga, which are perverted and hence forbidden, are said to be "devoid of piety and fed by perverse notions", these lead to "hell alone" (v 207). The Sāmkhya and Yoga are said to be auxiliary to knowledge, and are not accepted by V to be independently authoritative. Any path that is not supported by the Vedas can never lead to the attainment of the Supreme fruit, and one who abandons the righteous path and takes to the practice of 'adharma' is wicked and has the agonies of hell in store for him, on the other hand, one who takes to the righteous path and always worships Kṛṣṇa in accordance with the teachings of the Bhg is bound to overcome the defects of the Kali age. Even amongst the followers of 'Bhakti mārga', one who condemns the Vedas somehow and practises 'adharma' will not have to suffer 'hell'—since he belongs to the faith preached by the Lord—but would be born amongst low people (v 216). If, on account of the impressions left from the previous births, he worships Kṛṣṇa, he may get release after many births,—but in the event

of these impressions not being firm enough to put an end to his attachment to the 'samsara', he may not obtain release. When everything is abandoned and the mind is fixed on Kṛṣṇa alone through devotion, there results 'sayujya' or association or communion with Kṛṣṇa. V says that such a person is extremely difficult to be found even amongst crores of people.

The Code of Good Conduct

This path is said to be the best of all paths, because there is no "fear of a fall", as the devotee is ever protected by the Lord (V 222). The Lord offers

liberation, says V, even to those who practise any other means (paths), because it is His very nature to be a release giver and therefore does so necessarily to those who follow his own dictates. V then declares that nothing is possible in the case of one who has not been blessed by the "grace" of God—especially so in this path of devotion.² Therefore, one desirous of knowledge ('jijñāsu') should with respect, resort to a person who is devoted to the service of the Lord and is devoid of vanity, etc. and who has known the purport or the real nature of the Bhg (v 227). If he cannot find such a preceptor, he may himself erect a statue of the Lord and constantly offer worship to it, since the Lord resides therein in that form of the idol.³ If the household members are in favour of this worship, he may make his wife or someone offer worship to the idol, but if they are disinterested he may himself offer 'seva' to the Lord, or else, if they oppose it, he may even abandon his home. The devotee should always study the Bhg with great reverence, endure all harshness in life thinking that everything is but a form of God, never keep away from detachment and self-contentment, give up all expectations, steady his mind, and with

१ 'स हि स्वानव येनरेनचिदुमप्रकारेणपि प्रवतमानान् मोचयति, मोचकस्वभाववान् । नत्र स्ववासयानुगतान् दथ न मोचयन् ।'—(p 169)

—But if it is the very nature of the Lord to give release as V states why does he not offer release to one and all?

The answer may be partly deduced from the above statement —He offers it to *all* but they must strive on their own with *some* kind of 'puruṣakāra' along the paths of their choice although those are not the best.

२ 'सर्वथा चेद्धरिभूषा न भविष्यन्ति यस्य हि ।

सस्य सवनराज्यं स्यान्मार्गैरिभन् सुतरापि ॥'—(p 171)

३ Reference to idol worship in V's cult of Sevā

result the futility of the enjoined and prohibited acts. Ś anticipates the argument that if the jīva were to depend on God for the undertaking of an activity, there is no point in saying that God takes into consideration the Jīva's effort in the form of good and evil (dharmadharmalakṣaṇah) born of it,—and he also furnishes an answer by saying that even when the 'kartṛtva' of the jīva is dependent on God the jīva is *himself* the doer and God makes him act who is already acting, moreover, God takes into consideration the previous effort of the jīva for making him undertake an activity, and the activity to that previous efforts has still previous effort serving as the point of discrimination, and since the 'samsara' is beginningless, there is nothing wrong in postulating that God takes into consideration the effort of the jīva ¹

If there were no such point to be considered by Īśvara even the ordinary human effort would lose its significance and the flaw of experiencing the fruits of even those actions that are not performed by one would arise This is what the term 'adi' in the sūtra suggests, says Ś

Thus, Ś is fully conscious of the problems that the interpretation of this sūtra would involve and he offers an explanation of each of these that is perfectly logical with his postulates V explains under this sūtra that the flaws of doing injustice and creating inequality do not pertain to God since the latter takes into consideration the effort of the jīva—but the jīva can only make efforts and hence the carrying out of an activity and the bestowal of fruits come from the Lord alone, just as a father explains the good and bad aspects of a matter to his child who is striving but he would make the child follow the course of its own inclination, even so in the case of the Lord The śruti texts which speak of His 'desire to lead one high', etc. also refer to His desire to give a particular type of fruit to a particular jīva V says that God has explained the good and bad nature of actions in the scriptures, and He makes a jīva perform certain actions which it is bent on following The jīva's will leads it to the undertaking of a particular

¹ 'ननु कृतप्रयत्नपक्षेऽप्यनव जीवस्य परादत्ते कर्तृत्वे नाप्यदत्ते । नैव दातृ । परादत्तेऽपि हि कर्तृत्वे कर्म दातृ जीव । कुत न हि तन्नीरवः कर्मयन्ति । अपि च पूर्वप्रयत्नपरिणामानि कायन्ति ॥१॥ च प्रयत्नपरिणामानि परादत्तेऽपि रक्षन्ति । सत्यम् ॥ ॥ — Ś B II 3 12

activity; the will is determined by its past actions, but it is the Divine will that operates in and through all these as the ultimate dispenser.

If the Lord were not to take the effort of the jīva into consideration there would result futility of the prescribed and prohibited actions, and the scriptural injunctions would lose their authoritative character. It is because of these reasons that V. attempts to set out in detail the aspects which the Lord takes into consideration—for the bestowal of fruits, He takes into consideration the actions, for making the jīva undertake an activity, He considers the effort of the jīva, for making the jīva endeavour after a particular entity, He takes into consideration the desire of the jīva, and for making the jīva desire for anything. He regards the stream of samsāra or pravaha. Thus, He fashioned the Vedas with a view to safeguard these set limits.

Hence, says V., the said flaws do not arise in His case, and since these considerations are required in the path of Mārvada, the Lord does not lose His 'sovereignty' nor become 'un-Godly' by abiding by the same (meaning that He establishes the law and wills its execution as *just* retribution of man's efforts)

Thus, V. at least is seen to attempt a patching up of the implied problem of the negation of the value of human endeavour, which would accrue if he were to sacrifice the human aspect at the altar of the absolute sovereignty of the Lord—That actually happens to be so at the hands of Viṣṇu, the celebrated author of V.M.,—who emphatically declares that 'Kṛtaprayatnapelkṣaḥ' refers to the effort that *the Lord* makes for the sake of sport while creating the world. According to him, there is no reference here to the jīva's efforts at all, and the high and low creation based on difference and gradation is rooted in His desire to sport.

This interpretation involves the negation of the Law of Karma, (which V. accepts as such since he believes in Rebirth), but is not prepared to accept its implications. For Viṣṇu if the Lord were to take the actions of the jīva into consideration for the bestowal of fruits the majesty of His absolute Independence would be impaired—and hence, he proclaims that the Lord is guided by His Will alone in showing His favour

the good or bad actions that he may do—or rather is forced to do

Moreover, it is all very well (although it is *not*, really) to talk of the Divine Wish in these terms from above—*i e*, from the analysis of the Lord's independence, etc., but in practice, it is next to impossible to decide which jiva is the 'chosen' one of God and whether he should undertake to follow this path or that. On the basis of V's line of thinking, one may pose as a person belonging to the 'Pusti mārga', and, that, even when he undertakes evil actions, he may profess not only to escape unpunished but to be a receptacle of the Supreme Grace! The question is *who* would decide the correctness or otherwise of his statements? *Since, there are no set rules to be followed in that particular path of Grace,*¹ and —we are told—even the best of means may not produce any fruit, while the absence of means may lead one to the Supreme Fruit!²

This means that the Lord's Grace can overstep the boundaries of strict dues in justice—a sublime feature of religious thought, but a veritable disfiguration of philosophical values if it goes *against* essential justice and human freedom as V's system would imply

Commenting on the sutra II 1 14 viz 'Tadananyatvam—ārambhanaśabdādibhyaḥ V proceeds to reconcile the contradictory nature of different scriptural statements. He asserts that the Ch Up text, 'Vacarambhanam vikaro namadheyam mrttiketyeva satyam' seems to suggest that the modification or the effect is something that has its beginning in mere speech, *i e*, it is a mere matter of speech and not a reality. But if that were so, *i e*, if the world (which is an effect or a modification of Br) is not real of what could Br become the cause? Therefore, the meaning of the afore said Ch Up text has to be ascertained. The sutra under consideration states that through words like 'arambhana' and so on the non-difference (ananyatva) of the effect from its cause is understood and not the unreality (mithyatva) specifies V. He undertakes to refute

¹ 'कले च साधने चैव सवप्र विपरीता ।

कलं भाव साधनं स पुष्पिणः स कथ्यते ॥'—ब्रह्मवादसंग्रह, १ 16

² 'यत्र कलम्य भगवत आती सवसाधनभवा हतु' यत्र साधनमपन्नपि न तत्फलं, यदत्तन्नाद्योग्येषु पुलन्दान्पि दीयते ।'—P R p 19 20

the view of Ś viz that since “the clay *alone* is real”, the effect is unreal, a mere modification, just a matter of speech. This interpretation, says V, is that of the dull-witted who have completely thrown overboard the ‘doctrines of Br’ by misunderstanding the śruti and smṛti texts. Therefore, this adhikarana (tadananyatva) undertakes to “kill the thief who has entered one’s premises”. Such an interpretation (as Ś has offered) involves three flaws, viz the imagination of a sense (mithyatva) that the sutra (II. 1. 14) does not warrant, the contradiction of the assertive statement (of the knowledge of all through that of one) and the contradiction of the very context (prakaraṇa). The truth of V.’s statement in attributing the above mentioned flaws to Ś’s interpretation has to be judged in the light of the Ch. Up. text itself.

A detailed enquiry has been made further up into the meaning of the text, the context in which it stands, the meaning of the particle ‘eva’ and so on.¹ The view has been expressed there that even if one were to take it for granted that the Maya theory in its technical Śankara sense was not known to the author of the Ch. Up. text under investigation, the idea of the opposite of ‘satyatva’ (suggested by the restrictive particle ‘eva’ as asserting ‘satyatva’ of something to the exclusion of all else concerned) with respect to modification (as against the cause, which *alone* is stated to be ‘satya’) was, no doubt, present before his mind. Thus, even if this concept of the reality of the cause *alone* which the śruti text embodies were subjected to a process of technical analysis for the super structure of the theory of Maya (which denies reality to the world), it declares in no uncertain terms that ‘the modification (vikara) is a name, a matter of speech, while it is clay *alone* that is real’. Therefore, it seems strange how V comes to read the sense of “ubhaya-satyatva” in this text. If that were intended to be conveyed, it must be explained why the author repeatedly asserts in all the three illustrations that the cause *alone* is real, the ‘vikara’ being a matter of speech, etc. Thus, the idea of the reality of both the cause and its effect is not warranted by the wording of the text itself.

¹ For a detailed analysis of the whole problem refer to Chs V 1 156, V 2 (b) p 172 177

Therefore, even if this sūtra expressly mentions 'ananyatva' only, and not 'mithyātva' of the effect with respect to its cause, the very concept of 'ananyatva' which means 'non-difference', suggest that only 'oneness' or 'unity' is the purport and hence, the cause alone is ultimately real, there being a non-difference between its effects and itself

Thus, Ś's explanation of this sūtra (as based on the meaning of the 'vacārambhana-text) presents a case of a neat and systematic formulation, rather than a baseless imagination, into a complete theory out of the Upanisad texts, which were pregnant with the implications of the same.

Another fundamental text, viz. 'That thou art' ('tattvamasi') also demands our careful consideration. This also involves the question of the relation of the jiva to Br, which occupies *the* central position amongst the fundamental postulates of all systems and also acts as the most outstanding hinge for the divergence of opinion in the interpretation of not a few sūtras. (e.g. II. 3.18, II. 3.43, II. 3.50 and so on)

Ś interprets this text, viz. "Tattvamasi" as meaning identity of the jiva and Br., the term 'tat' stands for 'Br.', and 'tvam' referring to Śvetaketu in the context is identified with 'that', viz Br. Since Śvetaketu qua Śvetaketu cannot be said to be non-different from Br, S. suggests in his analysis of the text that we have to understand here a metaphor which is partially rejective and partially retentive. Thus, the body, etc of Śvetaketu as implied (along with his jiva), in the connotation of 'tvam', should be contradistinguished from the sentient jiva, and the latter alone has to be understood as identical with Br. This is how Ś interprets the sruti text 'tattvamasi' while maintaining that Br is the one and the only Reality, the jiva being non-different from Br. and all else being a figment of Nescience.

Ś. has to take recourse to metaphor in the explanation of this fundamental text, while other Ācaryas are not obliged to do so, since none of them speaks of a complete identity of the jiva and Br. For them, Br. is something more than (adhika) the jiva, either the latter forming a part of the 'Body' of the Lord (as Ramā. holds) or representing a 'partial manifestation of the Saccidananda Br (as in V.'s system). Again, the body, etc in the case of the embodied jiva do not constitute

unrealty in their opinion, and hence they can explain the text 'That thou art' without their having to take recourse to metaphor

Thus, this text is explained and interpreted by each Vedanta-commentator in the light of his own system of thought

As for V., "tattvamasi" means that the jivas are non different from Br. since the jivas are but 'amśas' of Br, the Amśin. Thus the jivas, being but parts of Br., are said to be Br., says Vit,¹ and there is no impropriety in the jivas' being so identified inspite of their being "ignorant' or less intelligent", and Br being omniscient, for that is a better position than the acceptance of the unreality of the jivas. Thus, it is only through the relation of 'part and the whole' that the non-difference' (abheda) as propounded in texts such as the one under consideration can be understood, says Vit²

It must be said to V's credit that his interpretation of the sutra 'Amśo nanavyapadeśāt', etc (II. 3.43) is more natural and straightforward than that offered by Ś (Cf. Ch V 1). The jiva, in the system of V, is a part of Br, and there is no impropriety nor inconsistency in speaking of Br as both partite as well as impartite, since Br. is an abode of contradictory attributes, explains V. Another sutra (II 3 46) viz 'Prakasadvannaivam parah', also finds a better treatment at the hands of V than Ś, since there is no point in the case of the latter, in discussing the question whether or not Br is affected by the different conditions with respect to the jivas when (in his opinion) the jivas are absolutely non different from Br (Cf Ch V 1). V simply explains this sutra as meaning that Br is not affected by the happiness misery, etc arising in the case of the jivas. His amśas even as light which is not affected by the defects pertaining to the objects it illuminates—and this explanation is more satisfactory than the one given by Ś — (although his interpretation can be justified in the wake of his own postulates). Other similar cases are pointed out by Dr. Ghate and other scholars

As regards the stylistic procedure that V follows, his text is generally clear and brief (as against that of Vit) but sometimes

¹ V M p 80

² V M p 75

he tries to stress, in accordance with his concepts of grace and devotion, that a particular word means a particular thing only, and while attempting to justify his stand, all possible etymological derivations are enlisted by him (—and finally rejected too !) Compare, for instance, the meanings suggested for the root “as’ (Anu I 1 11), the words ‘samparaya’ (Anu III 2. 27), “prāyana”, (Anu IV 1 12), “pāta’ (Anu IV. 1 14), “deva’ (Anu IV 4 15), “nirakārah’ (T D N I 28), “atīvimālaprajñā” (T D N. I 78), “nityāḥ” (T D N II 138)—all unique in themselves and reflecting on the author’s style

V’s system of thought, which embodies deeper religious values than philosophico metaphysical subtlety, is primarily based on the doctrine of Grace (Pusti) and Devotion. It is noteworthy that his path of Grace is meant for those who feel defeated and utterly helpless and yet are animated with an inner urge to attain salvation. Thus, in practice those destitute of knowledge and incapable of taking to the path of ritual (Karma marga) find in this path of Grace an object of their desire for upliftment. The concepts of service to the Lord, of a single minded devotion, of a complete self surrender, and of the extrication of the bonds of ego and possessive spirit as characterised by the notions of “I” and “mine” pertaining to worldly entities are undoubtedly sublime factors that lead one to a better pattern of living and shape one’s moral and ethical rules of conduct. And since no particular means or rules are prescribed in the Pusti marga, one and all, without any distinctions of caste and creed, can take to the path of Grace. Thus the doors of Pusti marga are said to be open to one and all. Again, V is said to have risen to the occasion as demanded by his times —when females and sudras (members of the so-called lower classes) were not accorded proper attention by his predecessors in the sense that they were debarred from the study of the sacred lore and when the iron age rendered the time-honoured paths of knowledge Action and Bhakti unpracticable,—by presenting this Path of Grace as a further development of bhakti’ which opened a new avenue for humanity at large.

But this concept of Pusti as depicted in the Bhg (in the illustration of the Rasa lila) has been instrumental—against

the intention of V., it must be acknowledged—in provoking misunderstanding and misinterpretation, in so far as its practical side is concerned. The translation of the idea of Puṣṭi into one's action necessitates, in the V. school, that one should take 'Brahma-sambhanda',¹ whereby all types of impurities pertaining to one's body and soul are said to be removed. After being initiated as a devotee by means of a chant, known as the "Śarana-mantra", one aspiring for spiritual upliftment is required to recite the "Ātma-nivedana-mantra"² which means dedication of one's entire being and possessions at the feet of the Lord. This is done through an Ācārya or a preceptor.

This dedication of oneself and one's belongings to the Lord rests on a noble ideal of self-sacrifice and surrender, but the substitution of a human 'ācārya' in place of the Lord which came to be introduced later at the hands of some of the followers of V., proved to be the beginning of a period of deterioration. Śravana or listening to the tales of glorification of the Lord, singing in praise of Him, etc. and keeping one's mind engaged in the worship of Śrī Kṛṣṇa are very important points in the sense that they mould one's pattern of life and thought to a better order and perspective, but it is none-the-less important to note that very gross injustice could be done to the same principles when they are misused.³ The degeneration caused by the abuse and wilful misinterpretation of this practice has been the target of scathing criticism and attacks by some scholars—both Eastern and Western.

Yet, this 'problem' was anticipated by V., the founder of the doctrine of Puṣṭi. He repeatedly says that the episode of the Gopīs and Kṛṣṇa (on which the concept of Puṣṭi is founded) is both real and allegorical. In the first case, no tinge of sensualism should be understood with respect to the Rāsa-līlā, although the Rāsa-līlā depiction in the Bhg. may appear to be more or less worldly. If the attitude of the devotee is informed by faith, there is no possibility of its being misunderstood as

¹ 'Siddhānta rahasya', V 2. Refer to Ch. V 4 4.

² Refer to Ch. III F (p. 73, f. note 3) for the text of this mantra.

³ 'Report of the Maharaja libel case and of the Bhāṭṭā conspiracy case connected with it'.

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being sensual in import. When the Rāsa līla is understood allegorically, the Gopīs stand for the śrutis and their enjoyment of the company of the Lord signifies that the śrutis teach only one thing viz the Lord. Thus V seems to be pretty conscious of the possibility of this concept being misunderstood and the consequent situation because he has advised his followers not to imitate the Lord literally, but to offer their service to Him. Even the selection of one's guide as a spiritual preceptor has been prescribed by V on the basis of strict discipline and moral qualities.¹ Therefore it must be said to V's credit that the later abuse of this doctrine and the evil consequences thereof should not be attributed to the founder of the theory of self-surrender and Worship to and total dependence on the Lord. Such abuses represent but a diseased condition of a religion whatever that religion be.

Yet a point of philosophical significance that this concept of Puṣṭi involves has—as we have repeatedly done—to be taken into consideration. When the Divine Grace is said to be the sole decisive factor in leading a jīva to the undertaking and performance of an activity and the bestowal of fruits on a jīva is said to follow no rules whatever except the Wish of the Lord, the consequent ruling out of the human aspect and the problem of justice become questionable. The idea of binding one's hands and feet together and throwing oneself into the ocean of the Divine Grace would not only be challengeable but also most unworthy of acceptance—unless involving a *free-willed* act of self-dedication in love to the Divine Service. Again the evil consequences of the likelihood of its being mishandled in practice are looming large over the whole concept of Puṣṭi as such—making the latter all the more unacceptable unless duly purged of its predestinarianism and irrational aspects and trends.

Still the concept of Puṣṭi as V meant it to stand for and the principles of good conduct that it is expected to give rise to and to be followed are worthy of admiration and form a unique feature of the Suddhādvaita doctrine. It represents a special contribution of V to the practical

¹ 'बृष्णमुवाच- वीक्ष्य दम्भात्प्राङ्मन नरम् ।'

aspect of the Vedanta thought, as understood in the light of his teachings Against the trend of world fight and world-contempt (as unreality), he stresses a healthy realism and a kind of mystical approach that tends to see God in everything and *vice-versa*

The concept of the absolute, unrestricted supremacy of the Lord which is also implicit in this theory of Pusti— (which over rules even the claims of the Law of Karma) forms another special feature of V.'s contribution The idea of the Akṣara Br, although referred to in the Gīta and the Bhg, came to receive a significance of its own at the hands of V. It is a curious fact of history that the distinction between the higher and the lower Br that Ś postulates with respect to the Nirguṇa and the Saṅuṇa aspects of Br becomes reversed in its application to the Saṅuṇa and the Nirguṇa (Akṣara) in the system of V The emphasis on 'Bhakti' and 'Pusti' aspects is so overwhelming in V's doctrine that his interpretations of many a sruṭi text as also of B Ś reveal a good sense of theology rather than philosophy

And yet, looking back at V's system, as a whole, it is not an unimpressive achievement in its main trends and dynamic attitude to the complex problem of reality in function of the Absolute there is, on the one side, a loyal allegiance (even to extreme literalism!) to the old sruṭi-tradition, and there is, on the other side, the preservation of that religious theocentric tendency, typical of the soul and culture of India, rising beyond the polytheistic approach and culminating in monotheistic bhakti of the Gīta and the Bhg The stress on the reality of the world as against Ś's concept of 'māya' which assigns ultimate unreality to the world, the postulation of a personal Lord as the Highest Br so as to satisfy man's heart also rather than the head alone, the concept of the unconditional independence of the Lord and the all-embracing dependence of all reality on Him, are some of the chief ideals which V ultimately fought for The Akṣara concept, as also the Āvirbhāva tīrobhava theory, the preaching of the superiority of the path of devotion as characterised by the Grace of God to all other paths and the Supreme value of personal self-dedication in love constitute the inner dynamism of his system

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- 33 Anubhāṣya Trisutri, with five commentaries Bombay, 1921
- 34 Tattvārtha-dīpa nibandha with Prakāśa, Āvaraṇabhanga, Yojana and Satsneha bhajana—N Seth & J Asanmal Trust Fund Publication, No 12
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- 38 Vidvan mandana—Viṭthalanatha Bombay, 1926
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41. Brahmavāda-Samgraha—Harirāya, Chowkhamba S. Series, Benaras
42. Brahmavāda—Śrī Dīkṣitjee Mahārāja, Nirṇayasāgar Press.
43. Prasthāma-ratnākara—Puruṣottama, Nirṇayasāgar Press.
44. Vādāvalī—(many authors).
45. Bhakti-hetu-nirṇaya—Viṭṭhalanātha.
46. Bhakti-mārtanda—Gopeśvara.
47. 'Bhakti-hamsa'—Viṭṭhalanātha.

INDEX

- absolute—1, 3, 12, 13, 15, 16, 42, 52, 56, 63, 79, 87
- Absolute Monism—2, 12, 57, 60, 69, 84, 91, 94, 101, 153, 242-43, 264, 290, 308, 315
- bhāvas—31, 49, 50 (refutation of the *Vaiśeṣika* school), 133-34, 286, 292 94, 301
- Īyāta vāda—2, 14
- ākṣara—8, 17, 19, 25, 32 34, 37 38, 40, 100-102, 105-106, 139, 150, 157, 163, 169, 171, 185 87, 190-91, 196 201, 205 206, 212, 230 31, 234 35, 239, 241, 292, 297, 299-302, 319 20, 333
- mśāmsī bhava—52, 61, 106, 108, 329
- taḥ karaṇa*—161 62, 164, 167, 218, 224, 234-35, 251, 298
- nu*—20-21, 29, 32, 35, 38 39, 44-45, 51, 55, 60-61, 64, 72, 76, 91 92, 100, 107, 205, 227-28, 235, 281, 292, 330
- Anubhūti (Realisation)—11, 46, 52, 57, 70, 199, 251
- Arundhati—3
- Asat-kārjā vāda—50, 175
- Sat kārjā vāda*—50, 55, 257
- Avatāra (Incarnation)—39-41, 45, 133-35, 169, 210-11, 213, 218, 222, 224, 226 27, 229, 232 33, 269, 276, 302, 309-10
- (*vibhūti*)—39, 103
- Avidyā—7 (*ajñāna*), 12 (Ś), 28, 30 41 (V), 57 (Ś), 58 (Ś + V), 59 (V + *Rāma*), 65, 68, 69, 108-109 158, 226, 229, 240, 243-45, 247 55, 264 65, 275, 288 92
- (five facets)—65, 161, 167-68, 171-72, 187, 197, 206, 208, 229, 261, 297-98, 310-11,
- (*vidyā*)—68, 109, 247-48
- (*Brahmāśrī*)—109, 251
- (Relation bet *ā* and *Avidyā*)—109, 253-54
- (*Upādhi*)—6, 59, 262-63, 270
- Avikṛta parināma*—19, 32, 53, 54, 55, 96, 175, 272, 292
- Avirbhava-tirobhāva* (Manifestation concealment)—29, 33, 35, 36 (meaning), 41, 48 (theory), 49 (defi), 50, 53 (defi and sources), 55, 64, 96, 160, 168, 169 (defi), 188-90, 256 (defi), 259, 280-82, 285 86, 292 93, 301, 315, 333
- Badarāyana*—1, 2, 11, 18, 132, 141, 182
- Bhg*—2, 30, 39, 43-47, 53, 71-73, 81, 83 84, 86 88, 91, 123, 135, 138 39, 141, 143 45, 150, 156-57, 164, 172, 180, 184, 192-93, 200-203, 205, 207, 209, 211, 223, 227-228, 230, 269, 274, 278 79, 280, 286 294, 296, 301, 304 305, 307-310, 315 16, 330-31, 333
- (*Bhg dharma*)—79 81
- Bhakti* (Devotion)—4-9, 23 24, 31-35, 38, 41, 70-72, 74, 78-79, 83-88, 135, 137-46, 149, 157-58, 163 (defi), 164, 168, 178-79, 186, 192-193, 195, 197, 199 202, 204-205, 209, 211-15, 217 220-31, 233 34, 236-37, 241, 289, 292, 299, 302, 312-13, 330, 333
- (Diff stages)—236, 238
- (Path—77-79, 82-83, 86, 89 90
- (*Śuddha puṣṭi-bhakti*)—303
- (Supremacy of *puṣṭi bhakti*)—199 200
- (Term and Concept)—72, 83-84, (defi)
- Brahma*—3-4, 6-7, 10-19, 25, 33-41, 45, 54-55, 60, 62, 66-67, 78, 95-101, 104, 107-108, 117
- (Ś)—3, 12 16, 52, 56-57, 60, 97,

98, 104, 126

(V.)—16-19, 25, 33-41, 45, 55, 62, 66-67, 95-96, 107-108, 136.

(Qualified-non-qualified)—10-11, 13-15, 41, 54, 78, 97, 99-101, 104, 130, 132, 134, 141, 146, 150, 157, 169-70, 203, 229, 242-46, 248-49, 264, 273, 276, 282, 289-90, 308-309, 318-20, 333.

(Bliss par excellence)—76, 85, 227, 278, 301.

(Para Brahma)—13, 23, 68, 102, 104, 215, 219, 291-92, 299-300.

Brahma-sambandha — 89, 232-34, 241, 331.

Brahma-sūtras (B S)—1, 10-11, 13, 21-22, 41, 44-47, 53, 55-56, 60-61, 67, 91, 125-26, 135-36, 138-39, 141, 143, 157, 205-206, 228, 245, 259, 264-66, 275, 281-84, 290, 309, 315-16, 318, 322, 333.

Brahma-vāda—19, 55, 59, 66, 67, 69, 74, 109, 128, 158-59, 172, 191, 293, 307-309, 312, 327.

Buddhi—8, 31, 63, 118, 120, 207, 220 (diff characteristics)

Buddhism-Jainism—2, 60, 81, 82, 83

Deva-yāna—153-54

Dhūma-mārga—182, 194

Gāṇḍa pāda—2, 14, 82

Gītā—10, 13, 21, 38, 44-46, 56, 62, 71, 79-81, 83-84, 88, 98, 123, 135, 139, 146, 156-57, 166, 177, 199, 206, 215, 227, 238, 275, 297-98, 300, 307-08, 310, 315, 333

Grace—6, 8, 20, 23-25, 35, 38, 45, 66, 70-74, 76, 84-85, 101, 116, 138, 141, 143-44, 150, 155, 158, 162-64, 168, 193, 199-200, 224-206, 215-16, 220-21, 224, 226, 230, 232, 240-41, 278, 298, 302, 304, 306, 326, 330, 333

Prasāda-Anugraha—224 (defi)

Individual Soul (Jīva)—3 (Ś), 4-5 (Rāmā), 6 (Nimbārka), 7

(Maḥiṣa), 8 (V.), 14, 16, 17, 20-22, 33, 38, 48, 64, 100, 122, 126, 217, 219-21, 233, 237, 284, 297.

(puṣṭi-jīva)—23, 24, 72, 149, 156, 231-33.

(Nature)—19-20, 117-118, 229, 254, 294, 296

(Divine)—23, 299, 304, 313.

(Devilish)—23, 25, 27-28, 277, 298, 313.

Inner Controller (Antar-)

17-18, 25, 32-33, 37, 40-41,

55, 103, 168, 181, 187, 207,

213, 219, 265, 283, 301-302.

Inner-Self (Pratyagātma)—5,

Iṣvara—13, 14, 16, 32, 54,

121, 148, 183, 207, 228, 243,

288, 317, 322-23.

Jagat (World)—3-4, 6, 12-13,

17, 19, 29-32, 36, 49, 53, 64,

70, 95, 96, 114, 158-60, 230,

261, 282, 286, 292, 295, 315,

322.

(Jagat vs saṁsāra)—30-31, 65.

(saṁsāra)—24-25, 28, 30-31,

58, 64-65, 119, 193, 203-04,

207, 209, 213-14, 220, 224,

230, 251, 261, 296, 298, 306.

(Perception of the jagat)—

247, 262, 289, 296, 308-11, 31

Karma—39

(Law or Theory of Karma)—84, 170, 258, 324-25, 333.

(Karma-mārga)—82, 308, 33

(Prārabdha)—94

Mādhva—2, 6, 7 (fundam distinctions), 82, 87, 113, 315.

MBH—79, 81, 88, 258, 280.

Mīmāṃsakas—2, 45, 82, 96, 180, 182.

(पू. मी.)—260, 278.

Mukti (Mokṣa) (Release, Liber

- Salvation)—4 7, 14, 20, 23, 25, 27-28, 64, 70, 99, 101, 111, 116, 119, 125, 127-128, 143-44, 146, 155, 167, 178, 181, 192, 199, 201, 209, 211, 219 (defi), 223, 225-28, 231, 239, 248, 250-51, 255, 297-299, 306, 308, 310, 313-14, 330
(*jivan-mukti*)—23, 94, 124, 157, 160, 162, 164, 167, 251-53 (defi) 298, 310
- Nescience—3-4, 6, 8, 12-14, 18-19, 23, 30-31 35, 56-59, 64, 121, 124, 134, 163, 197, 247, 282, 288, 298, 328
- Nimbarka*—2, 5, 6, 82, 290
- Nirodha*—219 (defi), 221, 225, 239, 240 305-06 (defi)
(*Nirodha lilā*)—226
- Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*—50, 66-67, 69, 189, 242, 271, 307.
- Pāñca ratra*—11, 45, 53, 80, 116
- Paramānu vāda*—66, 67
- Parināma-vāda*—6, 55, 60 66
- Prakṛti*—4-5, 7, 32, 39-41, 54, 58, 66, 95-96, 104, 108, 110-113, 158, 165, 169, 171, 185, 187, 203, 210, 212-213, 220, 235, 309, 313
- Pramanas*—43, 62, 71, 80
- Prasthāna trayi*—5, 11, 44, 60 88
- Prati bimba*—165 67, 187, 248 53 255
- Purānas*—45, 64, 172, 183-84, 202 203, 210, 252, 290, 315 (V P)
- Puṣṭi-mārga & Maryada marga*—44, 70 73 85, 138, 140-41, 143, 225, 267, 269, 308, 315 16
(*Puṣṭi-mārga*)—214, 232 234, 241, 267, 299, 303-304, 313, 326, 330
(*Puṣṭi*)—20 (defi) 71, 74-75 (term and concept development), 143, 145-50, 152-55, 164, 205, 212, 227, 228, 231-32, 234, 276, 278, 292, 298 99, 302 (defi), 303 315, 326, 330-31, 333
(*Puṣṭi-Pravāha maryādā*)—230-32, 305, 325
- (*Maryādā-path*)—226, 268-69, 299, 305, 324
- Rdmā*—2, 4-7, 11, 16, 27, 58-59, 72, 81-83, 87, 110, 117, 119, 122-123, 127-28, 176, 221, 315, 321, 328
- RV*—50, 71, 77-78, 80, 123, 278, 309
- Ś*—1-4, 11-12, 14-15
(‘That thou art’)—4, 51-52
(*Māyā vāda*)—6, 11-12, 14, 50-51, 56-60, 63-64, 288, 308-309
(*Br*)—12-16, 52, 56-57, 97, 98, 104
(Three gradations of reality)—4, 14, 57, 126, 176
(Superimposition)—69, 94, 95, 121, 123-24, 162, 198, 247, 252, 261,
(*Ś* vs *V*)—8 (Scrip authority), 9 (styles), 20 (*jīva*), 23 (*Kartṛ-bhokṛ*), 27, 30 (*jagat*), 36 (*jagat*, Bliss), 37 (*vacāramo*), 41 (*Br*), 43 (*pramānas*), 51-52 (That thou art), 54, (world - cause), 55 (world-cause), 58 (world unreality), 61 (world unreality) 63 (*Māyā, Br, jīva, error*), 67 (Illusion), 69 (Superimp), 70 (means), 94 (*Adhyāsa*), 94-95, 97-98, 104-105, (*anandamaya*), 111 (*Aja*), 114 (*ananyatvam*), 123 (*amśatva*), 124 (*abhasa*), 280-282, 315-16, 319-20, 326-27, 329
(*Jīvan-muktas*)—94, 252-53
- Sadhanas* (means)—3-9, 43, 47, 70, 72, 74-76, 82-83, 85, 87, 101, 125, 138-39, 143-45, 163, 168, 178, 181, 202, 205, 215-16, 225, 236, 238, 240, 254, 264, 302-3, 308, 313, 326, 330
(*Karma-jnana-bhakti* compared)—143 221, 308
- Sāṃkhya-Yoga*—45, 54-55, 66, 69-70, 79, 88, 108-13, 192, 195, 199-200, 204-205, 207, 299, 308-309
- Sannyāsa Nirṛti*-Renunciation—30,

64, 86, 211, 220, 234, 238, (defi).
239, (meaning, value & purpose).
(Nirvrti-marga)—212

Sarvāma-bhāva—84, 304-305

Sat-cit-Ānanda—4, 13, 17-19, 22,
33-34, 37, 42, 48, 55, 64, 96, 99,
135, 186-87, 195-96, 217, 222,
265, 283-84, 301, 312, 328.

Sattva-Rajas-Tamas—32, 302, 306-7
(Sātvika-Rājasa-Tāmasa bhaktas)
—305-306

Sātvika-Rājasa-Tāmasa Sport—
305.

Śruti—(scriptural texts)—2-3, 5, 7-8,
10, 13, 17, 19, 30, 33, 40-41, 43-46,
48, 52, 54-55, 57-58, 62, 67, 84, 93-
96, 98-100, 103-104, 106-108, 113,
116, 120, 22, 124, 127, 181-83, 191,
197, 206, 217, 228, 244-45, 252,
263-64, 266, 271, 72, 274, 276-77,
280, 282, 289, 294, 296-97, 299-
300, 307, 311-13, 315-20, 323,
327, 332, 33

(Śabda)—35, 43, 46, 48, 108

(Samṛtis)—98, 113, 182-83, 327

(Śrota)—(diff types)—237

Supreme Mantra—240

(Sarara-mantrapadeśa)—89

Suddhādvaita (Pure Monism)—8, 12,
17, 23, 35, 37, 43, 51-52, 54-55,
60-61, 66, 69, 72, 82, 87, 96, 144,
149, 152, 189, 205, 223, 227, 28,
242-43, 282-83, 289-90, 292, 299,
307, 312, 315-316, 332.

(Theory)—17

(Meaning of the compound)—18

(Suddhādvaitas)—152, 253, 277,
279, 281, 285, 300

SUMMUM BONUM—9, 66, 72, 82

(Upanisads)—1-3, 10-12, 14,
44-47, 56, 60, 66, 71-72,
97, 156, 163, 227, 255, 257,
310, 315-16, 328.

Br-Up—13, 29, 33, 44,
105, 111, 126, 133, 141, 147

Ch-Up—12, 36, 53, 67,
107, 110, 112, 113, 147, 1

283, 320, 326-27

Kaśha-Up—13, 71, 79, 183

Māhānārāyaṇa-Up—142

Muṇḍ Up—33, 71, 79, 101,
145, 284, 320

Sarvasāra—53

Śvet-Up—13, 79, 110, 124-25

To Up—78, 85, 96, 101, 105,
139, 151-52, 283, 316.

V—2, 8-9, 16-19, 23, 32, 48, 52,
60-63, 65, 69, 87, 108

(Br)—17-18, 23, 25, 27, 33, 37,
41, 45, 54, 60, 61, 67, 96-98,
101, 309

(Personal God, Kṛṣṇa)—36

40-42, 47, 73, 75, 78, 80, 83, 87,
(Ch IV 86-90)

(Rasa-rupa Puruṣottama)—30,
85, 101

Kṛṣṇa—34, 36-37, 40-41

(Puṣṭi)—20, 70 (theory),
73-74

(Āvirbhāva-t robhāva)—29,
35-36, 48-49, 53, 58, 64, 96, 121

Avikṣta-parināma—19, 32, 53-54,
96

(Seva)—83-84, 86, 88-89 (three-
fold), 89-90 (fruits), 291,
304, 332.

(Amṣamā-bhāva)—21, 52, 61,

- 244, 269, 271, 275, 279, 281, 310, 315, 333
- V. M*—76, 132, 242-82, (full treatment), 268, 281, 292, 300, 324.
- Viśaya Viśayatā*—30-31, 63, 218-19, 294-95 (Concept and defi.), 296, 311-12.
- Viṣṇuswāmin*—18, 82, 221.
- Vivarta-Vāda (Mayā-vāda)*—3, 8, 11, 14-15, 19, 36, 50, 51, 54-57, 59, 60-61, 66-67, 69-70, 75, 108-109, 160-61, 166, 169, 171-72, 174, 177-78, 181, 187, 190, 198-99, 201, 203, 207-10, 245, 250, 279, 288, 290, 308, 327.
- (*Māyā*)—3-4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 18-19, 23-24, 30-32, 35, 41, 51, 54, 56-60, 63, 66, 69 (Cosmic Nescience), 117, 126-27, 158, 209-10, 213-19, 223, 226-27 (defi.) 231, 243-45, 277, 288-90, 294-96, 301, 313, 321-22, 333.
- (*Vivarta*)—14, 59, 68
- (*Upādhi* adjunct)—6, 24, 56, 59.
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of Devotion Describing the fruits of Sāmkhya and Yoga, V repeatedly says that God Śiva promulgated scriptures in order to produce confusion among the seven types of demoniac persons to be born in the Kali age and to destroy them (v 279) These are the Vaidikas, the Vaiṣnavas, the Śaivas, the Śaktas, the Vamas, the Siddhantins and the Kaulas V warns that those, who carry out even the minutest of things in opposition to the Vedas, should be regarded as 'Pasaṇḍins' clad in the garb of the followers of scriptures (v 284) Such people are destined for "darkness" and "hell" and on coming out of the latter, they are born among low caste people (v 285) The misery, which is their lot, consists of the total concealment of bliss, which is characteristic of the 'world of Yama' 'Pure darkness' of the form of misery, pertains to the born devils (Sahajāsuras)

V describes *the three fold 'misery' ("duḥkha")*, which is in store for those who undertake actions that are 'prohibited' 'Duhkha' (that is caused on account of the concealment of Bliss) is particularly found in the Yama loka and generally all over the world, "suddham tamas" or "Pure darkness" which resides in the born devils is another type of 'misery', and 'hell' ('naraka') constitutes the third type V explains that "a slight concealment of Bliss makes one into another entity", and this is as good as 'the absence of misery', since the concealment of Bliss is 'just a little' or slight (iṣattirobhāva), while the complete concealment of Bliss is 'duḥkhā', since the latter is of the nature opposed to happiness, for, "otherwise, what could 'duḥkha' be like in the absence of entities which are distinct from Saccidananda nature? —) e the slight concealment, as referred to above, leads to becoming another entity and is practically the same as 'absence of misery', now, the complete concealment of Bliss cannot be the same, and it is explained as 'duḥkha' of the nature of unhappiness if this were not so distinguished, it could not be defined as such because there is no entity in the world which does not imbibe any of the Sat, cit and ananda aspects of the Lord This duḥkhā is characterised as "turning away from the Lord" as against the very nature of the Self The global sense seems to be first, by a slight concealment of Bliss the jivas are made into distinct beings but without misery, second, by the complete absence of Bliss they are made to enter into 'duḥkha', the first stage is needed because, if the beings

were not distinct, they could not have 'duhkha', since they would be totally identical with the Lord, hence incapable of experiencing 'duhkha', but then there must be a further distinction between their state of mere distinction and the state of 'duhkha', otherwise all the jīvas would be in a state of 'duhkha'. Hence the complete absence of Bliss must constitute that

After having described the three fold 'duhkha', V asserts that 'happiness' (which is the complete manifestation of Bliss which is worldly) is also three fold. The 'Āvarana-bhāṅga' explains this topic as follows. The Sat, the Cit and the Ānanda are two fold, viz. as forming the essence (svarūpa), and of the nature of attributes (dharmātmaka). These, again, can be classified as divine, spiritual and elemental. The Lord Puruṣottama represents the Saccidānanda form in the 'essential divine aspect, while Akṣara and the first Puruṣa stand for the spiritual and the elemental aspects of the same. Of the 'dharma' (dharmātmaka)—aspect, the 'divine', the spiritual and the elemental planes are represented by the paraphernalia of bliss, consisting in (Līlā) Sport, Vaikuntha and in the twenty-eight elements respectively,—the first two (viz. Līlā and Vaikuntha) being of the nature of Saccidānanda, while the last (viz. the twenty-eight elements) being of the nature of Sat only, have the knowledge and bliss pertaining to the 'tattvas' as representing the elemental cit and ānanda aspects in respective order. V asserts that 'happiness' is manifested by degrees progressively first, slightly in the form of a (pleasant) desire of the (delectable) objects ("iccha"), second, in the form of a passionate attachment ("kāma") when that desire has been further intensified, finally, in the form of "sukha" (proper) which is the mental pleasure resulting from being satisfied in the actual experiencing—enjoying of the desirable object—as Āvarana bhāṅga explains while commenting on this topic¹

'Āvarana bhāṅga' attempts a lucid explanation of the nature and kinds of 'misery' and 'happiness', both of which are to be explained ultimately in terms of Divine Bliss (See p. 210). This discussion about 'happiness' and 'misery' presents psychological analysis of their repercussions in the human mind as offered by V.

¹ 'इव च विषयशामारूपेणपदमिव्यक्त सुखाकार इच्छा । स पदाधिकोद्गत काम । आशास्यविषयानुभवेऽनुकूलतयाभिव्यक्तो भान्स ध्यानन्द सुखमिति सिद्ध्यति ।'—(p. 211)

If the fruits of one's 'Karma' get ripened during the course of one's life, one enjoys them before the fall of one's body, but others have to be enjoyed in the further course of time. The objection that if the actions invariably produce fruits, there would arise futility of the expiatory rites of the scriptures enjoining them is met by pointing out that the destruction or the extermination of one's 'nature' (svarupa nāśa) can be accomplished by means of expiation, etc. but the karma can come to an end only through the enjoyment of its fruits (p 213). But these concepts (karma fruit, etc.) which are attributes of the 'Antahkarana', arise (as connected with the jiva) especially on account of the nearness of the 'Antahkarana' to the jiva, and come to be designated as jiva connected in the absence of the knowledge of their (proper) substratum. Then the jiva comes to be regarded (in the world) as 'happy', 'unhappy', etc. These concepts of karma, fruit, etc. are to be predicated of the Antahkarana only, and not of the 'Self', since the Lord in the form of Karma is manifested in the Antahkarana alone and not in the Self.

Although knowledge is said to put an end to misery, yet it is devotion alone, according to V, that really destroys it (p 215). Mere verbal knowledge of scriptures cannot remove Avidya, but when it is accompanied by reflection and contemplation, there arises a cognition in man's mind that he is Br. Thus, words or scriptures are only auxiliary and it is the mind that is the chief operative cause with respect to the knowledge of Br. Explaining this, V lays bare the weakness in the much acclaimed stock illustration that the followers of Absolute Monism offer while comparing the removal of superimposition with the removal of error through the knowledge caused by the words "Thou art the tenth" (*Dasamastamasī*). The person, who counts the members in a group of ten and forgets to count himself, commits an error, but when he is reminded of the fact that he himself is the tenth by someone who points out to him, "Thou art the tenth", that error is removed and he comes to know the correct thing. But, the verbal knowledge arising from hearing "That thou art" (in the application of the illustration) does not destroy Nescience. Thus these cases are not analogous. In the illustration given, the word 'tenth' refers to the man, who considers his body and his soul to be identical, while in

the object to be illustrated, the self, devoid of any connection with the body, is taught to be Br. Again, the word 'tenth' in the illustration is an outer or external agent or factor that rises to the man, who is a direct object of perception, while in the case of producing knowledge of the unity of the jiva with such a means as 'śabda', which is an external agent, can operate, because (as the *Āvarana bhanga* explains), 'Brahmatva' is an internal realisation sought to be attained, to which even the sense-organs, which are nearest to the mind, cannot be of any use, (except the mind itself) then the possibility of an external aid like 'śabda' being of any avail therein is rather remote (p. 217). The attribute of the self is of the nature of 'Brahmatva', which is not external, like 'being the tenth', which is a bodily attribute and incapable of giving rise to self-realisation.

V declares that even the knowledge of Br. cannot destroy superimposition, just as waking from a dream state does not terminate sleep, even so the 'vidyā' (which results at the 'pralaya' of the jiva) can never destroy ignorance, since these, viz. sleep and vidya are dependent on Maya. 'Knowledge' also is one of the many phases of Maya. Therefore, that being alone, which can put an end to this Maya, would be able to remove the superimposition. It is the spirit of self-surrender alone which eliminates superimposition and not mere knowledge. Moreover, the knowledge of one's self as Br. can arise only after the nature of Br. has been realised.¹ Or else the illusion of the cognition of silver in place of nacre may take place in the case of one devoid of the knowledge of silver.² (p. 220)

V says that some dull-witted people consider the self-knowledge to be identical with the knowledge embracing all. It is only in aeons like the 'Satya yuga' that one may come to experience the oneness of the self in all while otherwise, to say 'I became Manu and Surva,' etc. is really deceptive and foolish.

Perhaps it could be understood here that V means to say that

¹ Not so on the strength of the experiences of the mystics. It may be true theoretically but it should not be forgotten that the knowledge of Br. is—for a monistic vedantist—identical with the knowledge of the Self as Br. (in one way or the other) and therefore the accomplishment of one is not exclusive of the other.

² While this is true in the case of the illustration cited it does not apply to the realisation of the Self as Br.

the realisation of the unity of the Self in all is not expressed in the above statement (as made by Vāmadeva), since the latter embodies a note of distinction between 'I' on the one hand and other entities like Manu, Surya, etc on the other. And the highest type of monistic 'anubhuti' does not, absolutely speaking warrant such a discriminative attitude. Therefore, says V, (p 222), one who deems the two, viz. the self knowledge and the knowledge of all, to be identical, is mentally deficient. But this explanation does not do full justice to V's intended sense. He admits, as it should be clear from his words, that such an expression *can* express the knowledge embracing all as knowledge of the one in all (he expressly says it may do so in the "satya-yuga")—but only under certain conditions and in its highest degree of realisation (something similar to the sentence "tat tvam asi" which taken literally also expresses distinction of discrimination between "tat" and "tvam") But more naturally V's objection is based on his own theory that the self is an amśa of Br and that the knowledge of one self as such has degrees of realisation which do not embrace the full depth of the infinite Reality of Br with all its implications, which will be realised only in the perfect mukti or in the full consummation of the supreme final puṣṭi bhakti. It is, therefore, foolish for anyone to think he can reach that at any of the lower stages of true but not full self knowledge.

Supremacy of Grace-Devotion

The words of Lord Kṛṣṇa as addressed to Arjuna, viz. that 'those who resort to me alone cross over this Māya', suggest that all means other than devotion are futile. Thus, His grace alone is the means,¹ as rightly emphasised by 'eva' in the aforesaid Gitā statement.

Comparing and contrasting *the fruits of Samkhya, Yoga and Bhakti*, V gives a picturesque description of the states of those who follow these paths (v 314). The practice of Samkhya makes one endure whatever hardships may befall his lot—and thus, the removal of misery is equivalent to the endurance of the same, even as one who is oppressed by thirst somehow has to

¹ वस्तुतस्तु कृपैव साधनम् ।—(p 225)

'प्रेमैव साधनमिति निश्चिद्यते ।—(p 226)

'भक्तावत्यादरेणैव प्रकटो जायते हरिः ।—(p 227)

stand it—endurance being the remedy (or means to master it) The Yoga-practice is like the digging of a well when one feels thirsty, while Bhakti represents the condition of one's being just on the bank of the river Ganges, since therein (in bhakti—like the water in the Ganges) the Lord, who is the remover of all miseries, is manifest (ready at hand, as it were) There again, if the devotion is characterised by affection for the Lord, “the Ganges would itself rise unto the thirsty and quench his thirst”,¹ says V

Summarising his stand on devotion and the internal and external means to attain the same, V concludes that in the absence of the knowledge of the Bhg, devotion cannot arise in one Therefore, the elucidation of the exact meaning of the Bhg in the next chapter, viz. the ‘*Bhāgavatārtha*’

(iii) *The Bhāgavatārtha Chapter*

In the third section of his T D N, V undertakes to unfold “the meaning of the Bhg.”, but his ‘Prakaśa’ portion on the ‘Kārikās’ runs only upto the thirty-third verse of the fourth ‘skandha’,² while the commentary starting with verse thirty four onwards upto V. 135, comes from the pen of his son, Viṭṭhala³

The means stipulated for the eligible persons, the listening of the tales of glory concerning the Lord and the Sport of creation form the subject matter of the first three skandhas The means as well as the ends of human endeavour with respect to one's birth, special grace of the Lord, the good qualities, bhakti, attachment, etc, are the subjects narrated in the remaining skandhas

According to V, the meaning of the Bhg interpenetrates the Śāstra, the skandha, the prakaraṇa, the adhyaya, the

¹ ‘ज्ञानमार्गे दुःखे समागते तन्नितृप्तिं सहनप्राया । यथा तथा सहनम् उपाय । योगस्तु खननप्राय । भक्तिस्तु गगतीररिधिरूपा । दुःखनिर्वाकस्य प्रकृत्यात् । तत्रापि प्रेमसन्मदे गगा श्वयमुच्यते पाययति ।’—(p 228)

² Puruṣottama, the author of the Āvaranabhanga remarks at the end of his commentary on IV 33,—‘एतदन्त श्रीमद्भागवतं कृता व्याख्या, एतदग्रे प्रामदीया ।’—(p 170)

³ इयद्वध्येव प्रमुचरणा निदन्ध प्रकाशितवन्त ।’—Āvaranabhanga, (P 307) The Āvaranabhanga also ends here—it being a commentary on the ‘Prakaśa’, but the ‘Yojanā’, which is also written by Puruṣottama is complete

vakya, the pada and the akṣara. The first four of these are said to have been dealt with in the T D N, while the last three have been treated in the Subodhinī. Since most of the doctrines embodied therein and accepted by V are reflected in other works of his—which also find their treatment in the present work—only such points as possess philosophical importance and a shade of novelty have been accorded a special reference here.

In this section of his T D N, V has attempted to press into service the detailed features of the various episodes and anecdotes that comprise the vast bulk of the Bhg and summarily discussed the significance thereof. Most of these are narrated with a view to bring to light the supremacy of 'Bhakti' over other means and underline certain religious beliefs and practices. Obviously, therefore, their exposition cannot be accorded a complete and coherent treatment here within the narrow compass of this present work. As a matter of fact, the wide range of this 'Bhagavata' chapter itself would demand a complete and exhaustive treatment as an independent subject for a thesis. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that herein only those aspects which are significant from the philosophical point of view (and on which there is a gloss called 'Prakaśa') shall be dealt with. The same should be acknowledged with reference to our treatment of the Subodhinī, which follows this section.

Maya, the best of the potencies that the Pure, Sakara Br possesses, is instrumental in bringing about confusion in the world. It is bhakti alone that paves one's way to release (sk. I v 16). The Lord incarnates himself by means of His powers of knowledge and action, the manifestation of the power of action in His incarnation as Varaha, etc. is meant to put an end to external miseries, while that of the power of knowledge, as witnessed in persons like Vyasa, is for the sake of destroying the internal or mental afflictions and miseries (commentary on 1 55-56).

The Bhg narrates what is bondage in order that the nature of liberation be ascertained, and for the establishment of worship or devotion, the Lord is declared therein to be eternal and unknowable (1 65 66). In general, the Lord always extends his hand for the protection of his devotees, but the protection offered through extreme affection to those who praise him is for the sake of

stimulating the enthusiasm of the devotees to undertake 'bhajana' (I 99) V says that those who are overpowered by the defects of the Kali age cannot put faith in the Bhg, which delineates the life-story of the Lord (I 122 ed)

Referring to the question how the 'tatparya' of scriptural words and sentences has to be ascertained, V states that Kṛṣṇa with his ten fold sport is the purport of all the texts, and Śravaṇa, reflection, meditation, etc., are prescribed as means for the attainment of the Lord. The Lord has two forms—one devoid of attributes, which is described in the Vedas, and the other is possessed of attributes, as described by the Purāṇas. Thus, if one were to determine the nature of the highest principle in accordance with the Vedic description, the form devoid of attributes would be the object of Śravaṇa, etc. (II Comm on V 2 5) In order that one's mind may not give way and take the line of least resistance at the time when one is on the death bed, the necessity of renunciation of staying at places of pilgrimage and of the practice of meditation is stressed (II 10) Yet, 'bhakti' is the ultimate end, and all other means are but auxiliary to it. The doubt with respect to the efficacy of 'bhajana' may arise only so far as one has not properly realised the nature, attributes activities, etc., of the Lord (II 24)

Utpatti or origination is considered to be three fold when it pertains to transitory or non-eternal entities, it is called 'production', in the case of eternal but limited entities it is termed—'Conjunction' (samagama) or 'union', but it is known as 'manifestation with respect to eternal and unlimited entities (II 29) (vide Bhg II 6 1)

Even the liberated jivas have to be born again if the Lord so chooses (III 7 ed) The Lord offers earthly as also super worldly fruits and salvation to a jīva when He is pleased, hence, one should worship Him with veneration when He becomes incarnate (III 12 13) Attachment for one's family is a hindrance to devotion, which is vanquished by undertaking a tour to places of pilgrimage. One who takes to the 'Śravaṇa' of the tales of the Lord is a highly qualified devotee, but one who is an object of the Grace of God is the best or the most eligible person. V says that the Purāṇa narrated by Lord Kṛṣṇa himself is the Bhg, for, who else but the Lord Himself would know the divine sport, which forms the subject matter of the Bhg. ? (III 44) Other

purānas are said to be subsidiary to the Bhg. The determination of the meaning of a thing on the basis of reasoning is 'laukika' or earthly, while the meaning of the Bhg. is divine (alaukika), and it does not present itself to one devoid of fitness or eligibility. The question as to how the Nirguna Br. could bring about an effect (viz. the world) which is Saguna, and also the predication of a desire to create on the part of the Nirguna Br., should not be explained as suggestive of the Saguna Br. being the creator of the world—since the latter position would imply that the lower Br., conditioned by Māya, creates the world and hence, such a God is ungodly ('durbhaga') (III 51). Actually, God does not depend on this Mayā, since he is not qualified by it, but the latter stands to him as something like a maid servant to her Master (III Comm on v 53). And the connection of the cause to its effect of a contrary nature is not, says V, a defect, but it speaks of the glory of the Lord, because such a connection is His own creation and described by Himself (III 55). Similar contradictory results are due to Maya, e.g. the person remaining alive in spite of his head being cut off¹.

On account of the Wish of the Lord, even the liberated jivas may return to mundane existence. Births and deaths constitute the nature of this mundane existence (samsara).

The jivas of females are dependent on Prakṛti according to V². The power of Mayā, constituted of the three guṇas possesses a form that is useful for sport. V states (III 162) that through the 'entrance' (pravesa) of the bliss aspect into the female jivas, the latter have become "objects of enjoyment", although the bliss aspect has also entered into the Puruṣa jivas (since the latter too become objects of enjoyment with reference to the female jivas) yet the predominance of 'Śakti' in the female jivas through the strength of the guṇas leads to their being so designated—(female jivas). Again, it is because of this predominance of śakti' in them that the female folks are pleasing or fascinating. The relation of the Prakṛti and Puruṣa is eternal—the grace of Kṛṣṇa being the root cause of everything (III

¹ This is brought in as an exception rather than a rule and is meant by the author to refer to mythological/legendary cases (with no historical value but considered by him as historical)

² 'स्त्रीजीवा प्रकृतिपरवरा ।'—(Comm on III 160)

V states that for the good, everything is achieved through 'bhakti'—it is discrimination between what is self and non-self, it is knowledge and also yoga

'Whatever one strives after (whether it be 'dharma', 'artha', 'kama' or mokṣa') shall be accomplished by resorting to the feet of Kṛṣṇa and in no other manner—this forms the subject of the fourth skandha of the Bhg. The problem of the complete extermination of both 'Prārabdha' and 'kamyā' actions, in the case of a jñānī which has been treated in Anu IV 1 13-19, has been referred to here under the discussion on the topic of the Divine Wrath, which is regarded by the followers of Śuddha-dvaita doctrine as capable of putting an end not only to the 'Prarabdha' karma results, but also to all types of karma forces and even their effects or fruits (which may have already started to be experienced) (pp 177-178) Thus, it is implied that the Divine Will can operate where even knowledge fails since the latter is not capable of nullifying all karm-results. V states that wealth (artha) that is obtained through the Grace of God is useful, while the rest should be considered to be useless (anarthatvam) (IV 8 81)

The Lord, when pleased with devotion, manifests himself as the Aksara (which is His Abode and the cause of the world) in association with the vital breath (IV 8 93-94) In the path of Puṣṭi, the Will of the Lord is supreme, and therein the worship of the devotee is centred round Kṛṣṇa alone and none else. An association with the good, the realisation of the Highest in all things through their teachings and an unswerving faith in the Lord, which is produced by taking recourse to self sacrifice, represent steps in the ladder leading to 'Bhakti' (IV 20 144) 'Bhakti' is, thus, very difficult to be attained, yet, it should not be said that the 'Grace' of God is purposeless, because 'Bhakti' does not arise in one in the absence of Divine Grace, even when he is qualified otherwise (through the practice of other means) Nor should it be said that other means should not be resorted to and that let there be mere 'Grace' (since it is both essential and easy to obtain)—because other means *do* make one 'formally fit'. In the absence of such 'formal or essential fitness' (svarupa-yogyata), there cannot arise an effect with respect to the object, even if the co operative instruments are present, e.g. a piece of stone may be present, but if it is intrinsically or

is the Lord's own, not its own) The body, etc , are not so, since they fall within the range of the world, which is the real manifestation of the Lord Those false notions are responsible for bringing about a connection between the jiva and the bodies, etc Even when the jiva and the Inner-controller are said to stay together in one, the Inner-controller is not dependent on intelligence, while the jiva is dependent, nor is there any māyā, nor infatuation resulting with respect to the Inner controller, who is (unlike the jiva who is happy, unhappy, etc) the remover of unhappiness by means of knowledge The Inner-Controller, being the Īśvara, has no attachment to actions, etc , and is but a form of the Lord manifested as such through the Wish of the Lord to sport in variety resulting from the high and low creation Therefore there is no 'Samsāra, accruing in the case of the Inner-Controller (IV 175)

'Buddhi' or intellect is said to have been mentioned even before the jiva's acquisition of a body, since the Lord Kṛṣṇa himself has created it along with the vital breath, the senses, etc , before the adhyāsa or superimposition takes place with regard to the same (IV 176) V says that those who indulge in sense pleasures, etc , and disregard the dictates of the Bhg are described as "Male", while others who follow the teachings of the Bhg and rely upon its word are "Female" (IV 178) The intellect (buddhi) is regarded to be 'female' because it pertains to the notions of body, Self, etc , which are of the nature of ignorance , since the latter is regarded to be 'female' on account of its fascinating character, intellect also is said to belong to the 'female' group (This, indeed, is a unique idea)¹

In spite of being connected with a body, etc for the sake of Sport, Brahma and others do not possess an earthly (parthiva) intellect that is constituted of the notions pertaining to body, self, etc Such an intellect is denied of them, who have attained perfect knowledge Their intellect, eyes, etc , are of the nature of knowledge (Jnana maya), and their vital breath, speech, etc , are of the nature of Yoga or concentration because they are the objects of the desire of the Lord to carry out a particular activity through their agency, and as such, their bodies, senses, etc , are enlightened (IV 181)

¹ This is a twofold use of the feminine concept from the attitude of self-dedication and from the characteristic of attractiveness

Explaining the import of the negative answer to the question 'To whom do you belong? 'Whose daughter are you?' V. states that the ignorance of one's father in that context is suggestive of the ignorance of the nature of the creator of the world—and since the effect (the world) is an object of perception, it is established that though unknown, the Lord is the creator of the intellect, etc., and these are not fictitious¹

Hereby, says V, the views that are opposed to our system (like the Maya vāda) are eliminated 'I do not know' in the capacity of an answer to the question about the creator should not be mistaken to represent the objective ignorance as the cause of the world, because this ignorance is dependent on the Jiva (as its attribute), and hence there would result impropriety of the use of the first person. Nor should it be regarded, points out V, on the strength of the plural use in 'we do not know' that even the Jiva is included in the field of ignorance, and hence the first person use is not improper—because 'she' (ignorance) could say so *only* if she were herself 'the knower of truth' (Tattvajñā), which she is not. And if she were 'tattvajñā', she cannot be herself, viz. 'ignorance'—and because 'knowledge' can belong to the Jiva only (and not to 'ignorance'). Moreover, if the body, self, etc., were fictitious, the knowledge of Br which would put an end to ignorance, would also destroy one's very nature or the self²

Again, says V, if the 'Jivatva' or the condition of being a Jiva were beginningless, what is the proof for its being a product of Avidya? If it were said that its destruction through knowledge acts as a proof, V answers in the negative and explains that it is 'samsāra' only, a product of ignorance (of the *true relation* of the soul to the world and to Br) that can be destroyed by knowledge and not the world, which is a creation of the Lord. If the opponent were to say that he does not subscribe to the view that the body, self, etc. are created by the Lord, just as the 'Suddhadvaitins' do not believe in the theory of Avidya,—V rejoins that the Māyavadin is thereby betraying

¹ 'अत्र हि 'कस्वात्मी' ति प्रश्नस्योत्तर 'न विदाम वदाम्' इत्यादिना ग्वम्य परस्यानीत्यादिना जंघादेरपि कतुरमानमेवोक्त तथा । तथा चैतेनापि भावकतृत्वमेवायाति बुद्ध्यादीनां न मायिस्त्वमित्याह अननैवेति ।'—Prakāśa on IV 182 (pp 232 33)

² Prakash on IV 183 (pp 233 34)

himself by declaring 'liberation' to be of the nature of the destruction of one's self, and by prescribing that as the goal of human endeavour

Thus far the Bhagvatartha chapter (of the T. D. N.), which, in V's own plan,—as pointed out above—forms like a bridge to the Subodhini now following

3 Subodhini

This is a commentary on the Bhg (the first three skandhas, a part of the fourth, the tenth and a part of the eleventh), which purana is deemed to be of supreme authority by V. Our treatment of that commentary here touches points of philosophical importance (as has been stated earlier) with the aid of a work called 'Subodha ratnakara' (in Gujarati) which represents a collection of important statements of thoughts occurring in the Subodhini

The Bhg has been described as the 'fruit of the desire fulfilling tree in the form of the Vedas, having the Gayatri mantra as its 'seed—all fructifying in 'Bhakti'. The Lord's manifestation as the son of Devaki is for the welfare and liberation of beings. Those who undertake to listen to tales of His glorification attain an immediate release from this dreadful transmigratory existence. His sport is said to be effortless, being carried out through joy¹. He possesses the power of Maya, whereby He becomes all, and this Maya power cannot be known, nor transgressed by anyone. He is supreme joy and can be experienced by beings in accordance with their eligibility (fitness). He is the object of unconditioned and unimpeded devotion. If this devotion does not bring about a feeling of affection for the Lord, the object of worship remains unfulfilled. 'Brahman', 'Paramatma' and 'Bhagavat' are His different names, and, fixing faith in Him, the sages realise the Self within by means of devotion. He is the Lord of the Sattvatas and should be heard, praised, meditated upon and worshipped. When the Lord is cognised within oneself, the knots of the heart get untied or dissolved, all doubts are removed and the action loses its binding character (I 221). He is the creator of the world—the cause of the origination, sustenance and dissolution of it and yet remains

¹ 'अनायासेन इषान्नियमाया चैषा लीला ।' (p. 14)

beyond the triple distinctions of Prakṛti V says that the Vedas, the sacrifices, the yogic practices, all ritual activities, all knowledge, penance, religion, etc., have Lord Vasudeva in view and He is the Supreme End to be attained. The Lord created the world by means of His power of Māya, of the nature of both being and non being, representing the high and the low entities¹. V says that the Lord, uniting with this Mayā, manifests Himself in the form of the world*. This Mayā is very close to the Lord and 'sleep' is also one of His powers, which takes the jiva near Him. When the jiva reaches upto Maya, he is said to be in (ordinary dream affected) sleep, while on going near the Lord, the jiva falls into deep sleep. This sleep allows the jiva to come back to its normal state of existence, while the power of Vidyā leads the jiva to Br, but does not allow it to come back. After having referred to the creation by Br through His union with Maya, V hastens to remark that the Vedas state that Br created the world without any connection with Maya, while the Puranas affirm Him to be the creator in connection with Maya. It is because of this Maya that the Lord appears as the possessor of attributes amongst those objects which are seen as qualified and residing within them, He shines as the Inner Controller through knowledge (I 2 31). Like fire which is latent in wood, He is present in all beings, and this Universal Self appears as many. Having created the beings characterised by different qualities senses etc., the Lord enters into them and experiences these aspects of the beings. It is for the good of the world that He manifests Himself in the form of different incarnations. The Lord assumes the human form with the aid of 'mahat' ego and the five 'tan matras', while He becomes 'Sodasakala' (sixteen factored) by means of eleven sense organs and five 'maha bhutas', with a desire to create the world (I 3 1). The foundation or the seed of all different incarnations is immutable and eternal while the

1 'न एवमनवाप्तये भवान्नात्मयया । सुन्दरस्य चत्सो' (I 2 30)

Here Maya is spoken of as Sadasadrupa while it was described earlier in I 1 18 as the power to become all. Again Sadasadrupa might seem to come near S's definition of Maya as 'तत्त्वान्दवाभ्दानान्दचनाश' । But their connotations are not the same.

* Does it not mean that He becomes नानुन्दद—even when Mayā for V is His power?

creation of Gods, animals, men, etc , is through the part of Its (16) parts Describing the various incarnations and factors of the Lord, the author gives what we might call the signature-tune of the system, viz , that 'Śrī Kṛṣṇa is the Lord Himself' (1 3 28), one who worships Him with devotion is freed from the manifold misery In the explanation of verse 30, V says that in accordance with the sutra, 'arupavad eva hi tat pradhanatvat', Br does not possess 'rupa' at all, since He is of the nature of sentiency and since the non sentient alone can acquire a 'rupa',¹ His body in the form of the Cosmic Egg is made of the Mayā qualities Like the clouds in the sky and earthly dust in the wind the characteristics of being the object of perception are super imposed on the Perceiver by the ignorant, while in reality the Lord is all pervading and the seer of all Such characteristics do not belong to Him but to the jiva He creates this world, protects it and destroys the same through sport, but is not affected by the good and the evil arising thereof He is present in the created beings and is self reliant one who resorts to this Lord of all worlds and dedicates all his belongings to Him, considering all to be the Lord, does not have to come back to this mortal world The women folk, the Śūdras and those low-born people who are not entitled to Vedic learning, may attain salvation even in the absence of other means, through the hearing of this great work (Bhg)

When knowledge and bhakti together produce some fruit, a doubt arises as to which one of the two has been really instrumental in bringing it about V says that mere knowledge, bereft of devotion to the Lord is meaningless since bhakti is complementary either to the nature or fruit of knowledge (p 63), and hence in the absence of bhakti, there would be no accomplishment of its nature or fruit One saying that, after having superimposed the Self on the body, etc , a person should attempt to sustain the same is destined to attain hell One who takes to the path of renunciation or abstention (Nivṛtti), obtains the bliss of the Self, and the bliss of Br is meant for one who renounces

¹ "अल्पदेव हि तत्रान वाद्" ति न्यायेन ब्रह्मणि स्वतो रूपं नास्ति । तत्र हतु — विनात्मन इति । जन्मवहे रूप भवति । नैनन्यनात्रस्याऽमूर्तस्य रूपाभावादिति हिशब्दार्थ । तर्हि कः ब्रह्मणश्शरान्वसुक्तम् । सायागुणैर्विरक्तमिति । वैष्णवत्वे आदिदेविकस्य शक्तिराया ।" (p 43)

everything like Śuka V. then discusses who should undertake hearing, etc., of the Lord's life, and declares that the followers of dharma should hear His tales, etc., but they should give up all their dharmas, even as in the Nivṛtti-mārga. It is the natural duty of the jīvas to serve the Lord in accordance with the path of devotion (p. 66)—especially so because they are 'parts' of the Lord and associative union (sayujya) with God is the end in view. Lord Puruṣottama is the highest entity, next to whom comes Aksara, another form of the Lord. A different additional form of Him which is the agent of all activities is Kāla, a most important thing. Karma and Svabhāva are parts of this Kāla. Sacrifices represent different forms of the Aksara, and Prakṛti and Puruṣa also are forms of the Aksara. From them come forth the 'tattvas' or elements which give rise to the Cosmic Egg, (Brahmānda). Therein, the jīvas are but parts of the Puruṣa. The worship of the Lord is not attained through Kāla, since it is performed by the (jīvas which are) integral parts of His and cannot be inspired through an external agency. The grace of God alone is instrumental in bringing about the highest attainment. Even the intellectual effort in this direction leads only to the Aksara and not to the Highest Lord (p. 67), therefore one should try to worship Him. Even when the devotee may come back to this world along with the Lord, when the latter becomes incarnated, this 'coming back' on the part of the devotee is not due to non-attainment of the Highest through devotion, since it is of the nature of supreme bliss, and hence represents the fruit itself (V. 19). This world is a manifestation of the Lord, but not the Lord Himself, its origination, sustenance and dissolution are due to Him. Since there is a non-difference between the cause and its effect, the difference is only from the standpoint of the effect, while from the standpoint of the cause, there prevails non-difference. (Bhedasahiṣṇurabhedaḥ tādātmyam). Bhakti is said to destroy the 'rajas' and 'tamas' qualities in one. The Karma which is normally the cause of bondage becomes a purifier when it is dedicated to the Lord (p. 74). That action which is performed with a view to please the Lord, gives rise to Bhakti and knowledge.

Bhakti puts an end to all evils ("anarthopāśamam sakṣāt"), such as depression, infatuation, fear and so on. An attitude of self-contentment and absence of all complexes give rise to

unconditional (unalloyed or selfless) devotion to the Lord (p 91) Śrī Kṛṣṇa is said to be the solace of all who are tormented by the fire of Samsāra, and He is the great Lord, higher than the Prakṛti, who resides in the sheer 'Kaivalya' of the Self, having originated the power of Mayā through His power of Cit

The manifestation of the Lord and the co-incarnation of the rsis, etc, are for the sake of producing the highest deliciousness (rasa) to be enjoyed by the devotees V says that the enjoyment of this deliciousness of love does not arise for one and all, even as the rise of such a sentiment depends on one who is 'rasika' or connoisseur of dancing, when there are many others witnessing the performance (in whom it does not so arise) ¹

Kṛṣṇa is spoken of here in 1910 as 'Mayayopatta-vigraham', which is explained as 'possessing a body through His power of Maya He is abiding within all beings as the Inner-controller, for the external cognition (Bahirbhāna) of which, His power of Māya becomes instrumental (p 129) Having fixed his mind upon the Lord by means of devotion, and singing in praise of His name, an ascetic, while passing away, gets freed from the sting of Karma (1923) One whose happiness abides in Kṛṣṇa is a real happy soul (p 143) When any creation is to be spoken of, its previous state must be described first When the concluding day of Br comes to an end and when it is 'nightfall', the cosmic Egg breaks and there is a complete absorption of all 'tattvas' This 'kala is termed Rātri or Night The powers of the Lord rise up in Him in turns of 'sleep and 'waking But whether in the condition of sleep or of waking, these represent the Lord upto the origination of gunas (p 152) Thus, the Lord alone was there in the beginning and He created kāla in the first instance as of the nature of His Valour, and this Kala woke up the sleeping or dormant power of Maya in the Lord This Maya is two fold in that the Lord thereby firstly manifests Himself in the form of the world and secondly, it confuses the jivas that (through His desire to create) have emanated from Him The devotees realise Him within themselves with a pure heart The Lord who becomes incarnated within the frame of this world with the aid of His Māyā, is wrongly believed to be attached to it by an ignorant

person owing to the projection of human characteristics on Him even when, in reality, He is absolutely untouched (I 11 37) The world is dependent on the Lord, who unites people and also causes separation of people On account of Maya, He appears to be many, as reflected in different forms¹ The realisation of Br puts an end to all calamities and tears asunder the distinctions and duality In I 16 26-29, V enumerates the attributes of the Lord such as 'satya' (truth), 'sauca' (purity), 'daya' (pity) and so on Verse 35 in I 16 describes how very difficult it is for one to bear the pangs of separation from the Lord, who, by means of affectionate gazing, beautiful smiles and sweet words, wins over the hearts or takes away the self mastery (steadiness) of the female folk As regards sacrifice, V points out (I 17 33) that the Lord is to be worshipped as the Self of it and the sacrifice will represent the 'adhidaivika' aspect when carried out in accordance with the path of devotion, the Lord being the ultimate dispenser of its fruits Gambling, drinking 'women' and violence are the four 'adharmas' or evils-prevalent in the Kali age Falsehood, pride, passion attachment and enmity are also said to be the Kali-characteristics Worldly dealings are termed 'Sannipata' meaning 'a state of delirium' This 'delirium' continues as long as one is alive but it is removed by doing acts concerning the worship of the Lord by means of one's body senses and the self Mental worship of the Lord is said to be 'sāttvika' or good (p 265) V declares that he does not consider 'heaven' or non return to the world to be at all comparable to 'union with the Lord' (Bhagavat sanga) and (as second to that) what could be more beneficial to a human being than association with those who have been united with God? Hence the path of Grace is the best of all paths, as compared with the worldly and Vaidika ones (p 269) The Lord is 'Rasa' or 'Deliciousness' and He generally produces this sentiment in all the hearers alike but in the case of those who are overcome with the most evil malady of transmigratory life (samsāra) there is no access (to that) available and the absence of perception of this Rasa even for once, leads to the absence of inclination towards it (p 269) As for the devotees

¹ 'दृश्यं प्रकृत्या तस्यैव • भवति इत्यन्तर्दृश्यं स-क- • १ ५ १' (p 201)

who have tasted this 'Rasa' once, there is no quenching of their thirst after it, since the Lord is 'Deliciousness par excellence'. Those attached to the Lord have no attachment for their body, etc. Even the meanest member of mankind can extricate himself of all defects through the grace of God. When the mere remembrance of Him can instantaneously purify the devotee, what could not be achieved through seeing, touching and so on?

'Resort to Him, the 'store-house' of Bliss indeed and do not get attached to anything else, since it leads to self degradation', says V in the concluding note to the first 'adhyaya' of the second 'skandha'

In the second adhyāya, different yogic practices like 'dhyana', 'dhāranā' and so on are described as having Hari in view, but, reminds V, all these should be marked with an undercurrent of affectionate devotion to the Lord—which alone qualifies different paths and practices as right routes to the *Summum Bonum*. Any moment that is spent in worshipping the Lord or in hearing tales of His excellent deeds, etc., is well spent and that moment alone is considered as one that does not cut short the life of the devotee concerned (II 3 17). The unaffected and different principle, viz the 'Para Br' is the Highest, which, on account of a desire to be many, created the world. He is the cause of the origination, subsistence and dissolution of the world which He brings about by means of His powers of Maya, for the sake of sport. He is immanent in all beings. He has entered into all created entities after having characterised them with different names and forms. The chanting of His names, indulging in remembrance of Him and so on at once wash off the (effects of the) sins of the devotees. By resorting to the Lord, the devotees attain to an attitude of complete detachment from worldly objects and come to realise Br. V states (while explaining II 4 17) that penance or self mortification is of the nature of affliction and since it culminates in the stage of 'sadhana' or means only, it is not beneficial. Nor do the sense-organs, when agonised or subjected to pains, give rise to happiness¹. V cites Gītā² in support of his view and states that by self mortification one surely becomes guilty of causing grievance

¹ 'न हि दहेद्रियाणि क्लिष्टानि सुख प्रयच्छन्ति ।'

² 'कुर्यान्त शरीरस्य भूतघ्नान् etc

right example, since they have attained Him and hence their lives serve to be an indication of the highest attainment in this path of devotion (II 7 33) V defines 'Rāsa' as 'an entity filled with bliss ('rasa') and devoid of any other connections',¹ and then explains it as 'a particular type of dance wherein many charming damsels take part', or it is the enjoyment thereof predominated by the sentiment of love ('śṅgara') The incarnation as 'Buddha' is for the sake of confusing the demons² Kṛṣṇa enters the loving heart of the devotee on account of the 'Śravaṇa' undertaken by the latter, who, being purified thereby, never more gives up Kṛṣṇa's Feet, to which he has resorted (II 8 6)

In the ninth 'adhyāya' of this 'skandha', V explains the natures of the jiva and Br The 'jiva' is 'one that lives', only making an effort to sustain the vital breath When it is confused by Mayā, it resorts to the Āsanya or the chief vital breath (of a ten fold nature) and comes to be known as a 'jiva' (p 145) The separation of the jivas from Br is due to Br's desire to be many The Lord's power of action belongs to the Sat aspect and that of Maya to the Cit aspect while that which is the cause of the world belongs to the Ānanda aspect These attributes of Sat, Cit and Ānanda, while separating themselves, divide their substratum also, and it is then that the Lord is said to have hands, feet, etc in all directions and is termed 'Sakara' or 'possessed of Form' (p 145) Because of the manifold nature of Maya, which cannot be defined properly,³ the jiva getting tinged by the attributes of Maya conceives of the notions of "I" and "mine"

V states that one who believes in the greatness of the Lord and does not doubt His being the Master rises beyond the pale of confusing Maya its attributes its effects and the notions of "I" and 'mine' (II 9 3, p 147) Of all powers of the Lord the

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rights of man (due to him on account of his moral deeds and so on) and contradicts the very existence and purpose of man's freedom and moral responsibility

¹ 'रामो नाम रसेन पूण पदार्थोऽन्यमन्वधरहित ।'—II 7 33

² 'दैयनाहनाथं युद्धावतार इति सूचितम् ।'—II 7 37 (cf T D N I 15)

³ 'अह नदन्न इत्या मान ख्यापयित्वा तेषा हृदयवार्त्तामुक्त्वा विश्वाममुपाद्य निपरीतावदेशान् अतिविमोहनम् ।'—(II 7 37)

³ 'तरया सन्यक्त्वरूपसमपकामावात् ।'—(II 9 2, p 146)

The knowledge born of this *visayatā* is illusory, while that born of 'visaya' is the correct knowledge. The perception of the moon as two moons is due to *Mayā* only, so also is the cognition of darkness (as an object of direct perception) in the absence of light. This latter example illustrates 'the perception of a thing in the absence of an entity', which is due to the confusing *Māya*¹. The scriptural texts as well as the valid means of knowledge have in view the removal of this illusion (pp 164-165)

V defines '*Nirodha*'² as "a favourable condition for the Divine Sport along with all His powers", and '*Mukti*' (liberation) as "regaining of one's natural form by destroying another form"³

One may resort to the Lord (*asraya*) by way of self surrender or union as also through (what is commonly called) origination, sustenance etc '*Ābhasa*' is again explained here by V as corresponding to origination, etc, meaning different modifications of being which, in reality, represent 'resort' (*asraya*) unto illusion as applied by the followers of *Maya*. V himself does not recognise origination, etc, as such (since these, for him, are but phases of 'manifestation' and 'concealment'). Thus, '*abhāsa*' and '*nirodha*'—in his terminology stand for '*utpatti*' and '*pralaya*'—respectively, and other intermediate modifications are but different phases of these. These two, viz '*abhāsa*' and '*nirodha*' depend upon the Lord, the supreme Br, the highest 'Resort' of all (pp 174 175)

He is the Spirit, the Divinity as well as the Element factor—as represented respectively by the individual soul, the Inner Controller and the body. This is how He becomes the '*asraya*' of

¹ V explains *abhāsa* in two ways (i) as mere appearance in the absence of a reality as in the case of the two moons (ii) as reflection (say of one's face in the mirror)

² Cf *Subodhini* X 1/1

³ The definition of *Mukti* as given here (II 10-6) seems to indicate that the form of *jiva* as such has to be eliminated in order that it may attain liberation, which is defined as *svarupena vyavasthitiḥ*. Perhaps V has foreseen the possibility of its being misunderstood as suggestive of the unreality or the fictitious character of the *jiva* qua *jiva*—and therefore he specifies that the *anyatharupa* of the *jiva* is also real and its abandonment only refers to a special condition of the *jiva* (p 174). The *jiva* remains a *jiva* but recognising itself as an integral part of the Lord

knowledge, and He Himself does not require any 'aśraya', since He is "the Resort" of all, self-subsistent, etc Matter, action, Kala, Svabhava and jiva owe their existence to His Grace (II 10-12)

The single-minded and natural un self-seeking devotion to the Lord is said to be superior even to yogic accomplishments and it is capable of instantly destroying the linga body (kośa) which is the root of 'samsara' (II 25 32 33) The best devotees are those who do not desire to attain 'union' with the Lord but crave to be for ever in His service Prakṛti is regarded to be the cause with respect to one's becoming an effect, a cause and an agent, while it is Purusa who is the cause of one's being an enjoyer of happiness and misery (III 26 8) Doubt, confusion (viparyāsa), determination (of truth), memory and dream are different characteristics of 'Buddhi' (III 26 30) The Purusa, although abiding in Prakṛti (material body), does not get influenced by the latter, since He is unmodified, a non agent and Nirguna, but when this Purusa, i.e. the jiva gets entangled in the ego and cherishes an attachment for the material gunas, there arises the 'samsara' of 'I' and "mine" in his case (III 27 1-2) One can control one's wandering mind by bhakti (born of love for the Lord) or by renunciation (resulting from detachment from worldly entities)

Just as, although identified (as "mine") with sons, wealth, etc, the jiva is distinct from the latter, in the same way, it is different from body, etc (III 29 39)

Renunciation *in itself* is improper and is inferior to self surrender and dedication to Kṛṣṇa, says V Those who see difference between the jivas, etc and the Lord are the 'extrovert' type of people who fall a prey to the Kala or Time V explains the word 'kala' as 'one who knows, understands or eats up (destroys)', or 'one that encompasses man by means of action or knowledge' This Kala is said to be the controller of even Brahma and other deities (III 29 38) The feet of the Lord should be the final resort for all devotees V points out that service to the Lord must be regarded as the supreme duty of all jivas—and this service should be directed to Lord Kṛṣṇa only and to none else (III 32 3) Those, who remain engrossed in the performance of ritual and do not undertake 'śravaṇa', etc, should be considered to have been 'killed by Providence itself'

by way of making their senses averse ('Pratikula') to 'Śravaṇa', etc.

The author lays special stress on the efficacy of 'bhakti', and the supremacy of its fruit (over other fruits attainable by other means) and states that of all forms that seem to be worthy of being worshipped, it is Lord Kṛṣṇa alone that should be resorted to, and that all thoughts should be directed to His service only. It is Bhakti alone that leads to the highest fruit, while the latter does not accrue with respect to followers of any other path. Other paths are characterised by vanity (sabhīmāna) and bring one back to the mortal world, while the path of devotion is free from this drawback, and hence, worthy of being practised (III 32 22)

The concept that the Lord is the all-doer should not be misunderstood to express the futility of the 'bhajana', since in the absence of the latter one does not come to realise the truth of that concept¹. The author states that the three-fold practice of Bhakti as based on scriptures is represented in its Tamas, Rajas and Sattva aspects by the followers of Viṣṇu-svamin, the 'tattva vādins' and the followers of Rāmā respectively, and he places the doctrine of Bhakti as propounded by himself as beyond the pale of these gunas (nairgunya)

V defines the term 'Nirodha' as 'a favourable condition for the divine Sport of the Lord' caused by the inconceivable powers of His (X 1 1)². This Sport of the Lord is explained and justified by V in a unique manner—he says that "blazing fire, when stationed outside cannot enter into a piece of wood and light the 'fire' (potentially) existing within that piece of wood, and that fire (potentially existing) within that piece of wood can neither be able to burn that piece of wood by itself" —in the same way, although Viṣṇu is all-pervading, in so far as the manifest form of Viṣṇu does not enter into them the jivas cannot merge into Br, thus, it is for the sake of facilitating this that the Lord sports in the world (X 1 1)

¹ This is typical of the occasions when V somehow brings in the element of human endeavour and co operation to the Lord's grace—out of a free choice or consent. It so seems here. Other statements seem to exclude that, and so does the system's logic.

² Compare P R—treatment of this topic in Ch VI 3 also Subodhinī II-10 6

The power of the Lord which is said to be responsible for the creation of the world is 'Yoga Maya'. One who is protected by the Lord does not perish. Nothing but self-surrender at the feet of the Lord can be of any avail to a jiva in its flight unto the Highest on a path that is bereft of any (other) support. The jiva who binds itself with a rope in the form of love to the feet of the Lord does not fall down from such a flight (X 2 33)

The experience of the Self or self-realisation destroys one's ignorance, while the realisation of Br puts an end to one's notions of distinctions and duality,—these two together remove the super-imposition of the body, senses, etc., and give rise to Pure Non-dualism (X 2 35). In the path of Bhakti, the Lord Himself acts as the means of valid knowledge (pramana), the object of knowledge (prameya), the means (sadhana) as well as the fruit (phala).

The company of the good and the Bhg represent the "elemental" aspect of the Lord, knowledge and devotion the "spiritual" aspect, and the very feet of the Lord (which one resorts to) stand for the "divine" aspect (which is revealed to a devotee when the Lord is pleased with his devotion). The attainment of any of these makes one blessed (X 3 37). The removal of the miseries of His devotees is as natural to the Lord as 'smell' is to earth. The Lord becomes perceptible in His manifested form only because He so chooses to, but in reality, He is beyond the range of sense-perception. The Lord is said to be the "giver of liberation to one and all" ¹

The powers of Action and Knowledge belonging to the Lord are never concealed (X 6 7), 'Maya' gets dissolved in the presence of the Lord. The activities of Krsna are "extremely divine" (atyalaukika) since they are carried out in dire opposition to the age (yuga) and the means used (when He appears). One's

¹ The 'durjña' jivas present a difficulty in this respect. Does V implicitly take for granted that they are somehow freely responsible for their obstinacy—in spite of his other statements in the opposite direction? There are some signs of discrepancies in the school as to this—as noted elsewhere (Ch VI 4). Or does V mean 'all those capable of it'—as if assuming that the 'durjña' souls are excluded as naturally as the beasts? The thing is not quite clear but it is difficult to exclude a predestinarian answer.

ous types of sports in a human form are for the sake of establishing 'bhakti' in the case of the devotees V. advises that one should direct all one's sense, etc., to the worship of the Lord 'Liberation' (mukti) and 'love for the Lord' are said to be the two forms of 'Nirodha' Mukti means the non-remembrance of the world (prapañca-vismṛtiḥ)

V stresses the significance of the association with the good (satsanga), which he deems to be even superior to the knowledge of Br and he illustrates this by saying that the contact with a heated iron-ball creates a deeper sense of burning than that with fire itself—in the same way, an association with the good puts an end to one's bondage (X 10 41) (This seems to mean that the "contagion" of personal contact and example is more efficacious than mere theoretical knowledge)

The above statement is corrected as it were by V, since he immediately states that it applies to the followers of Maryāda, while the Lord Himself can remove 'bondage' in the case of the non-eligible persons *also*, and thus, the Lord's supremacy is established over Satsanga, etc

The 'stream of the tales of the Lord's glorification' enters into one through the ears, and flows out from the mouth, thus when repeatedly allowed to flow, it purifies one of all one's defects (X 12 41)

The Form world (Rūpa-sṛṣṭi) of the Lord is endless, mutable and gross, while the Name-world of His is subtle, immutable, of the nature of knowledge (X 13 43)

V endorses the view that women are wicked (dusta), but explains that their wickedness is due to their 'yoni' or birth (bodily nature) and it does not pertain to their jivas as such (X 13 52) Any type of connection with the Lord—established either through love or anger or jealousy—serves as a means to liberation (X 13 64) It is demerit (pāpa) that causes one to take to the course of action opposed to the Vedas, but when there arises merit (dharmā), one does not feel inclined to that wrong path (X 17 8)

The sentiment of Love (Sṅgata) involves all sentiments, the others are not regarded to be 'sentiments' at all (X 18 12) It is considered to be the supreme good fortune to be accepted as a follower of Bhakti—and it is indeed glorious to be the receptable of Puṣṭi puṣṭi (X 19 4)

V. offers a moral code of good conduct when he says that if a jiva were to assign to everything its rightful position as belonging to the Lord and as meant for one and all, and free oneself from the bonds of ego and possession, it would be worthy of being deemed equivalent to an incarnation of the Lord (X 19 35)

As compared to the Bliss of the Lord, the bliss of 'Svarga' or heaven is insignificant (X 20 9) The incarnation of the Lord is meant for the driving away of evil people and for their annihilation (when they cannot be removed), so as to keep others away from evil contacts and their influences—and to offer liberation to those who follow the path of devotion and worship the Lord (X 24 9)

The jiva on which the Lord wishes to bestow His Grace turns its senses away from their external objects, but the sense-organs may not yield to this grace when they are surrounded by a host of sense-objects The Lord says that when an object can be achieved with the aid of a 'small' favour, He does not employ His 'great' favour, but simply severs one from one's wealth and belongings first, and then leads him on by means of a 'small' favour (X 24 16)

By means of His 'Nirodha sport', the Lord undertook various activities and thereby put an end to the miseries of His devotees (X 25 3)

Enjoyment of an object without its being dedicated to the Lord involves sin (X 25 4) Avidya which is caused by the Mava-power of the Lord cannot operate with respect to the devotees of the Lord The bliss of 'bhajana' is greater than that of Br (in the maryada path) (X 25 17) The manifestation of the Lord is for the sake of liberation of all beings, and there is no selfish motive behind it on the part of the Lord The Lord, by His very nature, is the husband or master of the jivas—especially of the female ones (X 26 24)¹ Mere offering of wealth does not please Him since it is the spirit of humility and utter dependence that acts as the means to win His pleasure (X.29 1) If a 'Sattvika' person becomes self-dedicated towards God, he acquires devotion, but through his contact with devilish persons, his goodness and devo-

¹ This is ambiguous in the light of what was said above Does it contain an implicit reference to those jivas who assume an "alaukika" gopi form in the Lord's sport?

tion get blunted (X 35 1) V says that 'Pusti' is that whereby all are well nourished and healthy, but those who do not receive it, would remain 'underfed' inspite of their eating plenty (X 35 55)

In the path of Devotion, 'enjoyment' (bhoga) and 'liberation' (turning away from 'bhoga') are not opposed to each other, says V, since it is Lord Himself who offers both to His devotee (X 48 59) Mayā is the 'capacity to become anything and everything'—a power of the Lord—which becomes His instrument in the creation, sustenance and destruction of the world (X 54 15) The Lord becomes incarnate for the protection of the regulation ordained by Himself (X 57 2) V states that the follower of the path of devotion should not harbour anything like pride, or else there would be no difference between 'bhakti' and 'jñāna' paths (X 57 29) When a jīva becomes utterly helpless, it seeks refuge in the Lord (X 73 13) The Lord accepts even an insignificant object that is offered to Him though intense love Sacrifice is enjoined with a view to cut off one's Karma (for the future), to renounce one's desires and to nullify one's debt (X 81 40) Worship of other deities with the knowledge of their being subordinated to the Lord is not faulty, says V

The Lord is capable of 'doing' 'not doing' or 'doing it other wise', and is Bliss par excellence

Although the 'Subodhini' is just a commentary on the Bhg (hence difficult to systematise in itself), it has come to enjoy an overwhelming importance on account of the high esteem in which the Bhg itself is held in the school of V It is encyclopaedic in its range (hence, again, the difficulty to give it a systematic arrangement)—it explains, annotates, substantiates and clarifies the contents of the Bhg, and in its turn is accepted by later writers professing 'Śuddhadvaitavāda' as a tribunal of final appeal in relevant controversial points—a status, which, it can be said without cavil, it truly deserves

4 The Śodasa-granthas

V. is said to have written a number of works, the chief of which are the Anu, the T D N, the Subodhinī and the Ś O G, his commentary on the Jaimini-sutra which is available only on I | 1. and II | 1 He does not seem to have written independent commentaries on the Upaniṣads and the Gītā, the meaning of

the latter being explained, according to him, in T. D. N. I Thus the Anu. and the Subodhini are written in the form of commentaries on the B S and the Bhg respectively, while the T. D. N. (popularly known as 'Nibandha') and the S O G are independent treatises for the enunciation of the Śuddhādvaita doctrines and the elucidation of the scriptural texts

In the S O G, which consist of sixteen small tracts on different subjects, V. has dotted the 'i's and crossed the 't's of the various doctrines bearing on the system of Pure Monism. Some of these tracts describe the doctrine of Puṣṭi in its manifold implications, while there are some, e. g. "Navaratna" and "Sannyasa Nirṇaya", which are intended to be addressed to particular Vaiṣṇava devotees.¹ The S O G represent a popular edition of the Puṣṭi-mārga principles for an easy understanding of the same, and also throw light on the line of thought followed by the author.

(a) The first of these sixteen tracts is called the 'Yamunaṣṭakam', which contains eight verses, composed in praise of the river Yamunā, which is regarded by the followers of Puṣṭi mārga to be superior even to the holy river Ganges

(b) *Balabodhah (with the commentaries of Puruṣottama and Devakīnandana)*

This tract contains nineteen and a half verses, which explain the fourfold end of human endeavour, viz., dharma, artha, kama and mokṣa, as thought of by the jiva (jiva vicānta) and by isvara. Ordinary people find it difficult to attain these (and the 'vyākhyā' explains that only those who follow the path of devotion are capable of acquiring them). 'Dharma' constitutes a compliance with the injunctions and prohibitions as laid down in the śrutis. The undertaking of activity in opposition to these represents 'adharma'. 'Artha' is explained as standing for garlands, sandal-paste, wife, progeny, body, self, wealth, etc., while 'kāma' means the indulgence of the sense organs in objects of enjoyment. The 'Mokṣa' or 'release' is a turning away from the notions of 'I' and 'mine' pertaining to objects of Mundane existence.

The path of devotion asserts that the dependence on one's efforts is inferior to that on the Divine Wish, the former is

¹ Prof. G. H. Bhatt's introduction to S O G (M. G. Shastri Smaraka Māla, No. 10, in Gujarati)

technically called "Svatah-sastra" in contrast to the latter, called "Paratah śāstra", Brahma only carries out the order of the Lord in fulfilling the act of creation, while Śiva and Viṣṇu look after the dissolution and sustenance of the world respectively. Although both Śiva and Viṣṇu are the incarnations of the divine qualities, and as such are capable of bestowing fruits like enjoyment (bhoga), salvation (mokṣa), etc., the assignment of work is done by the Highest Lord in view of each one's quality (p. 12). The nature (svabhava) of souls is wicked, but not so their essence, since they are parts of the Lord (p. 15) since the souls do not undertake to discharge their obligations in the form of service to the Lord, their nature is said to be wicked (dusta), but, for the removal of this evil nature, they should engage themselves in hearing, singing, etc., the praise of Śrī Kṛṣṇa. Thus, when there arises in the soul a feeling of absolute self-surrender at the feet of the Lord, the Lord accepts that particular soul as His own. In this way, says V, any one who resorts to Lord Kṛṣṇa with a single-minded devotion, can become a "blessed one" of the Lord¹.

(It may be noted that Puruṣottama explains that "wicked nature with respect to the jīvas" means the embodied jīvas along with the five fold characteristics (of Avidya) are wicked by nature, since their quality of divinity, mortality and devilry makes them partake of the defect characterised by particular innate feelings born of ignorance, etc. (p. 18).

Thus V presents in brief outline such points as dependence on the Lord, self-dedication, dissolution of the bonds of "I" and "mine", etc. which are helpful in directing one to the course of normal good conduct.

(c) *Siddhānta muktāvalī* (with the commentary of Śrī Lāloobhatta)

V points out the importance of 'Seva' or service to the Lord in this tract consisting of twenty-one verses. The dedication of body, mind and wealth to the worship of Kṛṣṇa is a harbinger of the realisation of the highest and puts an end to all miseries born of Samsara. The flow of mental activities towards the Lord is

¹ This passage seems to contain elements of non predestinarianism.

But the previous typical mapping out of the world of the 'jivas' contains also some of the most disquieting features of the system—a dark lowering cloud of pre destinationism broods over that landscape where souls seem to be made into contradictions in terms which both presuppose and exclude free responsibility

(e) *'Siddhānta-rahasyam (8½ verses) (With eleven commentaries by V's followers ed Telivala and Sankalia)*

The inner meaning or the secret teaching of the doctrine of worship or devotion, which has been presented in the 'Siddhantamuktavali' (confer (C) above), has been brought to light and clarified in this booklet, which contains eight and a half verses. It states that on the eleventh day of the bright half of the month of 'Sravana', whatever the Lord spoke to the author (Vallabha) at night is related here. Vallabha has been traditionally regarded by his followers to be an incarnation of the Fire God, who represents the mouth of the Lord, (an old vedic metaphor). This tract refers to a religious ceremony called the 'Brahma sambandha' — 'a connection with Br', which the followers of this system consider to make the Pusti souls realise their true nature as 'parts' belonging to and hence dependent on the Lord. V states that this establishment of this connection with Br on the part of the jiva puts an end to all defects and flaws belonging to the jiva. The initiation ceremony requires the initiated person to dedicate everything to Krsna (through his preceptor) and become an humble servant of Him¹. This is the generally accepted meaning of the 'Brahma sambandha' and the mode of self dedication to the Lord as expressed in the 'mantra',² prescribes self surrender and a feeling of complete dependence on the Lord³.

¹ 'ब्रह्मसम्बन्धकरणं नाम एतन्मन्त्रिणा गायद्वासा भावन्तिवदनम् ।'

² For details of the text of this 'mantra' please see Introduction p. VI. Siddhāntarahasya -ed Telivala and Sankalia (Commentary by Gokulanatha)

³ It is noteworthy that in the mantra itself as written by V there is no reference to the ācārya through whose medium self dedication is enjoined by almost all the descendants of V. (Please see p. VII Introduction to Siddhāntarahasya ed Telivala and Sankalia wherein 11 different interpretations of brahma-sambandha as given by V's well known followers are cited.)

thing does not have any meaning and that God does everything for the good of His devotees and hence it is very sinful to request God to grant us something which He has not willed for us. Absence of anxiety regarding the attainment of a particular thing, absence of egoism through the knowledge of one's dependence on the Lord, readiness to act according to the divine Wish, communicated through the medium of the purity attained by the 'antah karana' (as judged by the suspension of all mental repercussions) and abandonment of rigidity with respect to the observance of certain rules and regulations in adverse times (apaddharma) also constitute a 'discriminative attitude'

The endurance of the three-fold miseries, viz those pertaining to the body, the senses and those caused by obstacles or impediments in one's way to serve God, representing the phenomenal, spiritual and the divine categories in that respective order, is known as 'Fortitude'. A feeling of absolute dependence on the Lord, remembrance of the fact that Kṛṣṇa alone is one's Supreme Resort, abstinence from the worship of any other deity except Kṛṣṇa, an unflinching faith in Him and an absence of attachment for worldly and Vedic activities comprise the knowledge of the 'resort' (aśraya) viz Śrī Kṛṣṇa.

Thus, in these (8) various tracts which form part of the 'Soḍaśagranthas', V has laid bare certain modes of religious and moral practices that lead to a correct and good living and to a deepening of the realisation of one's living and lived relation to the Lord leaving the philosophical aspects and issues to be discussed in other major works of his like the Anu, T D.N and so on.

The remaining 8 tracts follow now in order —

(1) 'Śrī Kṛṣṇastayah' (11 verses)

Describing in each couplet the deterioration of Kala, regions, money, agent, chants and action, V prescribes Śrī Kṛṣṇa alone to be the highest and unaffected principle, worthy of being resorted to. All other deities are dependent on Prakṛti, and the Akṣara has only limited bliss, it is only Śrī Kṛṣṇa who possesses the fullness of Bliss, says V.

(2) 'Catuh sloki'

V declares herein that the only duty of man is always to

worship the Lord with all his heart. The worldly activities and Vedic rituals lose their significance if the ultimate end they promise to lead one to has already been achieved, i. e. when a devotee has enshrined the Lord within his heart, he does not have to take recourse to such injunctions. Hence, says V., one should never give up remembrance (Smarana) and worship of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, the Perfect Lord. (In short V. emphasises the supremacy of the Supreme End vs. the relativity of all mere means)

(A) *'Bhakti-vardhini'* (11 verses).

The strengthening of the 'bījabhāva', which is said to be a means to increase 'bhakti' is based on the extermination of the notions of 'I' & 'mine' and on 'śravaṇa', etc. This strengthening of the 'seed' of 'bhakti' can be achieved either by remaining in the state of a householder with an attitude of detachment, offering worship to the Lord by means of 'śravaṇa', etc., or, from a different aspect of the same attitude by fixing one's mind on Śrī Kṛṣṇa. One may undertake 'śravaṇa' and so on, while at the same time taking care of the worldly dealings, etc. Both these types of worship gradually produce in the devotee a feeling of love for the Lord, tending to 'passionate attachment' ('āśakti') and culminating in a 'craze' or 'Ardourous love-sickness' 'vyasana' for the attainment of Śrī Kṛṣṇa. The love for the Lord puts an end to earthly affections, while its second stage (passion for Kṛṣṇa) produces a feeling of aversion to one's family bonds; the final stage of 'love-sickness' lifts one up beyond the reach of evil contacts and their influences. One who possesses this 'love-sickness' attains, on abandoning his home etc., supreme bhakti. After this has been acquired, the devotee undergoes a state of excessive torment (whose intensity is a measure of the love that produces it) caused by separation from the Lord and ultimately comes to realise Him — (This is a psychological analysis of the stages by which love-bhakti reaches its perfect consummation)

(1) *Jala-bhedah* (21 verses)

In this tract, V. describes on the analogy of water (as belonging to different places) different kinds of aspirants for salvation, practising various means and methods. Music, Yoga, Meditation, penance, Knowledge, etc., are enumerated amongst the ways

not experience the pangs of separation from Him and so intensely aspire or crave for union with Him¹ The followers of the path of knowledge attain, through renunciation, to worlds like 'Satya loka', Aksara, etc, but in the case of those who have taken to the path of devotion, there results annihilation of all bondages when the self, (hiddenly) abiding within, manifests itself without, like fire, and enters back into their hearts (by being experienced as present)

In the path of knowledge, renunciation is undertaken with a desire to know (vividisa) or it stands for the adandonment of one's home, etc, after the attainment of knowledge But neither, says V, is proper, since in the first instance, there is an expectancy or anticipation of other means like 'sravana', etc, (from the teacher) for the rise of knowledge, and, in the state of renunciation, there should not be any such expectancy Secondly, renunciation undertaken after the attainment of (theoretical) knowledge has to fight its way, through many aeons in order that it may bring about liberation Again, it ends in the attainment of the Akṣara only, and is, therefore, inferior to renunciation practised as prescribed in the path of devotion

Therefore, declares V, one following the path of knowledge should never take to renunciation, especially in modern times, (Kali yuga), since it leads merely to remorse, repentance and hypocrisy* In the path of devotion, when one has completely turned away from things of worldly interest and excitement, and is intensely suffering the pangs of separation from Kṛṣṇa, even the evil contacts or Kali defects cannot affect the person concerned

This analysis of the meaning, value and purpose of 'Sannyāsa' is very typical and interesting, and the trend to make it dynamically positive (as an emptying unto fulfilment) and not merely negative is valuable

(o) '*Nirodha-Lakṣaram*' (20 verses)

V. defines 'Nirodha' as the turning away of one's mind (attachment) from the worldly entities and focussing it on

¹ मया न निर्गुणः—V 9

² 'अन कलौ तु संन्यस्त' परमात्मन्य नन्दया ।

व्यष्टित्व मवेत्तपि तरनाज्ञाने न सन्त्यमेत् ॥'—संन्यस्तनिर्गुण —V 16

overcome In case of the impediments caused by the divine wish such as chronic diseases and the natural extrovert bent of mind, which refuses to take to worship or service of God, one should try to cultivate an attitude of discrimination and engage one's mind in pursuit of knowledge, so that one may attain to the Aksara state (to the state of mind of those that strive for Akṣara—as an intermediate state of preparation)

By the removal of the afore said impediments and by engaging oneself in the service of the Lord, one becomes eligible for the fruits of Seva and gradually acquires them through the grace of God

This is an indication that *V practically* admits that man's own efforts of free willed striving are expected from him by the Lord, who then, if man does co operate, is ready to bestow his free gifts, even if they are not *directly* merited, upon the jiva This shows how often the real practice of life rounds off and smoothes away certain sharp edges of the mere theoretical doctrine of a system

The S O G thus present the principles of the Puṣṭi mārga in general, such as the concept of grace, the different types of the jivas, the attainment of an attitude of discrimination (viveka) fortitude and a feeling of absolute dependence on the Lord, the concept of Bhakti and the accompanying means like 'śravana' and so on This collection of sixteen small tracts also throws light on the practical side of the Sevā cult and the fruits of Seva the nature and significance of the 'Brahma sambanda' ceremony, characteristics of 'restraint' and the means to attain it Thus the author has herein given us a picture of the general principles of good conduct and morality that should guide one to the path of devotion and Divine grace

CHAPTER VI

IMPORTANT WORKS OF V'S FOLLOWERS.

1 *Vidvanmandanam*

V M. is a highly scholarly work in which its author, Vitthalanatha, restates, expounds, amplifies and supports the views and postulates of V. In fact, the work enjoys a pivotal position in the literature of the Suddhadvaita system. Herein, many a point left ambiguous or doubtful in V's works is elucidated and supported by a wealth of arguments, both rational and traditional.

The author discusses in this work the doctrines of various systems like the Nyaya, the Vaishesika and the Absolute Monism in particular, attempting a refutation of their doctrines and thereby trying to prove his own as the correct stand. The language is dialectical in style and the abundance of the use of pronouns as also the innumerable references to different sources without naming them make it rather difficult to understand. But the 'Suvarnasutra' commentary on it written by Purusottama has proved to be a valuable guide to the work of offering explanatory translations and new interpretation of the important passages occurring therein.

The author picks up scriptural texts that state Br. to be 'nirguna' as also others where Br. is described as 'Saguna'—and since these two concepts cannot be applied to Br. in one and the same sense at one and the same time, it may be argued by the opponent that one set of passages, says he, has to be subordinated to the other. The prima facie view is that Br. must be Nirguna, since the Nirguna texts are primary or fundamental on which the Saguna texts depend, because the former deal with the essence of Br., which forms a necessary basis or substratum for the existence of qualities, etc. Again, the Nirguna texts are "internal" (antaranga) referring to the essential aspect of Br., while the predication of attributes is "external" (bahiranga). Thirdly, the Saguna texts refer to the

lower aspect of Br. known as Īsvara, for the sake of meditation, etc., through which one attains purity of mind and gradually comes to realise the highest, as devoid of all characteristics. Thus, the prima facie view explains the Saguna-texts to be subordinate to the Nirguna ones.

The author then questions the opponents (Śāṅkarites) whether there is any difference between the Saguna or lower Br., and the Nirguna or the higher one. He postulates his own principle of Śuddhāvaita which does not recognise any difference between these two as there is no adjunct (upādhi) such as Māyā (Nescience) and there is no adverse result, viz., the rejection of the reality of the world—which the Śāṅkarites have to face. Br. is the support of all and possesses such powers as to become the substratum of these. All these points place the doctrine of Saguna Br. above contradiction.¹

After laying down the above doctrine, Vit. questions the follower of Absolute Monism as follows

• (a) “अत्र मिथ्यावादी प्रष्टव्यः ।...त चातु प्रलयः ।

—(p. 12)

“The author asks the upholder of the doctrine of Br. being ‘quality-less’ whether he accepts difference or non-difference between the Saguna and the Nirguna Br. And if he answers that there is a difference, he is further questioned whether it (difference) is real or unreal. The difference cannot be real, since it has been so pointed out in the section of ‘sarvatra—Prasiddhopadeśa’ If the difference were real, this section would be contradicted, because the qualified Br. as pointed out in the ‘Manomayatva’—statements, etc., is said to be the object of meditation in the whole of Vedānta, while according to Ś. and his followers, this qualified Br. is the lower Br., since qualities, peculiarities, etc., are but the products of ignorance. Moreover, if this Br. were considered to be different from the Highest, ignorance and so on would all the more cling to the jiva and the great scriptural statement, viz. ‘that thou art’, which teaches non-difference would be contradicted. (This means that if the differences rooted in

¹ “अभेदादनुपाधिविना जगदप्र यथास्तिः ।
सर्वशक्तत्वनन्नायच्छक्तिवान्नारय बभूव ॥”

ignorance were real, the ignorance and such characteristics would naturally cling to the jiva, created by the lower Br in connection with Maya. And if the jiva were thus ignorant, etc. how could it be identical with the Highest? And the scriptures teaching oneness, etc., would also be contradicted because of the contingency of Br being accepted as many ('That thou art' teaches oneness of the self with Br and since jivas are many, there would follow the contingency of many Br.) And that is not acceptable to you. (Ś) Even in the case of these who accept it (the Madhvas who propound the doctrine of duality, the purport of the Vedānta is non-difference between Br and jiva. That will be refuted later on. Now, neither can this difference be unreal, because this is possible only if it were the result of an adjunct, like the ore caused by a pot etc., in the case of akāśa space (sky). That is, the unlimited space (sky) appears to be conditioned because of the adjunct of a pot, etc., circumscribing the space within it as it were. In the present case, what is that type of adjunct? Again, it should be considered whether that adjunct is beginningless or has a beginning. If you say that Avidyā itself is the adjunct and it is beginningless—it is not consistent, because, since both (Br and avidyā) are beginningless, and as you accept that conditioned Br alone is the creator, there would be a non-stop or continual creation and no end (pralaya) since Br as qualified by His will is stated to be the creator.

The question of difference between the Saguna and Nirguna Br has been analysed in a two-fold manner. The two cannot be really different, or else there follows duality. If the difference were unreal, there must be some reason for that, if it is due to Avidyā which is beginningless—well Br also is beginningless, and since Br conditioned by Avidyā is regarded to be the creator, there would be a never-ending creation, because the limiting adjunct (Avidyā) as also the Br who creates in connection with it, are both said to be beginningless.

Here, it may be pointed out that according to the Śāṅkara-school the difference between the two viz. Saguna and Nirguna Br, is said to be fictitious because it is brought about by Avidyā, which is neither real, nor unreal. Br is one, without a second and the concepts or notions of difference pertain to the jīva whose real nature (as nothing else but Br) is veiled from it.

Hence, it must be admitted, says the author, that there is no difference between the two, and the Nirguna texts declare Br to be beyond the pale of earthly attributes but do not deny qualities like His being a creator, etc which are authentic and authoritative scriptural postulates.¹ Again, the texts describing creation, etc, would, according to S, be inconsistent, since they do not refer to Br

(c) 'नन्वस्ति सगतिरध्यारोपापच,दलक्षणा • श्रुति कथमेव वदेत् ।'

— (p 14)

In the passage just quoted, the argument of S is summarised as follows

"The texts describing creation, etc, would not be absolutely inconsistent, since they are useful for producing the knowledge of Br, (which is very difficult to attain) through the procedure of super imposition and later denial. The knowledge of pure Br is very difficult to obtain, and therefore the Saguna texts first speak of creation, etc, and lay down Br to be the creator, enjoyer, etc, then, when the intellect attains steadiness in connection with the conditioned (Saguna) Br, they deny the same of Br and lead one to the higher concept of the Nirguna, according to the maxim of the 'branch and the star—'Arundhati,' just as the bigger stars close to the branch of a tree are first pointed out in order to prepare one for seeing the distant and smaller star Arundhati when the mind is steadied even so the Saguna texts prepare the intellect for the reception of the abstract and higher doctrine of the Nirguna Br

The author says that this is not proper, because it would involve non acceptance of the reality of the world. And this perception of the world is not a matter to be proved by any scriptures so that it might be first laid down and then rejected. It is an object of perception and when there is a (logical) expectancy of a creator, the Śruti should teach about a creator only, and not talk of the world a matter of everybody's experience, then speak of its creator and then deny it. This

¹ Hence according to the author it is the co-ordination of the two sets of scriptural texts that is intended and not the subordination of one to the other,—although in the application of this concept to the Nirguna—set of texts, he has to restrict the meaning of the term 'Nirguna' to a special use as against its generally accepted sense.

being so, i.e. when there is a denial of the "Kartṛtva" on the part of Br. and when no other creator is posited, the world could not possibly exist (it being an effect) and the subsequent mention of it would be devoid of a subject-matter (i.e. the world is the object it refers to, and since the world would be non-existent because of the lack of a creator, the subsequent mention of it would be without a subject) And how can the 'Śruti' which propounds the highest truth speak of such a thing as the cutting of one's own (supporting) branch or the mother being barren ?'

In the above passage the theory of "Superimposition and its subsequent denial in Br" is challenged, and the author further on questions the opponents as to how they could logically explain the perception of the world. If one were to argue that perception is caused by desires (vāsanā), it is not logical, because the innate desires are born of experience, and since the world is said to be non-existent, how can there be the very first experience ? (prāthamīkanubhavaḥ)

Therefore, the world cannot be unreal like the dream objects and this conclusion is supported by the Sūtra II 2 29 (Refer to Ch. III D 3rd para)

The opponent's stand is explained by the author in connection with the perception of the world. The world, though unreal, is perceived because of Avidyā resting in the jīva. The scriptures describe the identity of the souls and Br, and since the difference is said to be eliminated by this knowledge it means that the difference is unreal and caused by ignorance. So, the beginningless Nescience, of the form of ignorance and established through one's experience, viz, 'I am ignorant', is something positive which conditions the soul. It is through this Avidyā, capable of giving rise to various objects comprising the high and the low world, that the world becomes an object of perception. Since the world is void or empty (tuccha) its cause must also be similar. It is the cause of the distinction of the Br and the jīva through its coming into contact with the sentient Br, like the mirror being the cause for the distinction of the object and its reflection, through its connection with the object. This distinction gives rise to superimposition of the self, etc., and the soul considers itself to be the agent, enjoyer and so on. But when through the practice of quietude, restraint, etc., one

'no', because what is seen as reflected is the mass of that much light which possesses 'form' Moreover, a thing is not reflected where it actually is, like the edge of the mirror ("दर्शयस्वत्") In the same way, how can the all pervading Br be reflected in Avidyā, which also is all pervading? Not that the reflection of contact (Samyoga) between the two goes against the theory of reflection, because (actually) there is no contact between them as they are both all pervading On the other hand, even the mass of light which is in contact (with a mirror, etc) does get reflected (or is perceived as being reflected) Nor is it that there is no reflection of the part which is in contact, because even that light, at the surface of the finger, which is obstructed merely by the fibre of a lotus is reflected in the mirror'¹

In the above passage the theory of reflection in the case of jiva is attacked on the basis that both Br and Avidyā are all-pervading Firstly, the highest reality, which according to S is Nirguna, Nirakrti, etc, cannot cast its reflection, since the objects having a form alone can cast their reflections Secondly, Avidya acting as the reflecting surface or an adjunct for the production of its reflection is unclean—and such dirty surfaces cannot act as reflecting agents The illustration given about wind and wood is very suggestive It subtly implies the impossibility of the formless wind having for its reflective surface wood, which is not a proper medium for reflection Then, the argument of the opponents to prove the possibility of reflection even in the case of formless Br on the analogy of the reflection of the formless sky in the mirror, etc, is refuted by the author, showing that the sky which is seen reflected is nothing but a mass of light abiding in that much space or sky—and this proves that only things possessing a form can cast their reflections

The reflection theory is not consistent with the scriptural statements to the effect that both the Br and the jiva are abiding in the same place, such as 'Guhāṃ Pravistva' 'Dva suparna', etc, since the object and its reflection cannot both exist at exactly the same place

¹ The exact meaning of this last line is not clear and the 'Svarna-sutra' also is silent on the same

(c) “अपर च, अविद्यायां ब्रह्मप्रतियिम्बो- पारलौकिक प्रयत्न न कुर्यात् ।”
—(p. 25)

“Moreover, when you say that the soul is the reflection of Br in (the mirror of) ignorance, and again, according to you, liberation consists in the destruction of ignorance, then (it means that) the destruction of the (very) nature of the soul would mean ‘liberation’¹ And since the annihilation of one’s self is not an object of human pursuit, liberation would not be regarded as an object of pursuit, and the soul would become unreal (since it can be destroyed) That being so, nobody would strive for the attainment of anything otherworldly or divine”

The author here attacks the Māyāvādin, squeezing him between his own postulates, viz., that of the soul being a reflection of Br in ignorance and that of liberation, which stands for the destruction of Avidya. Here it may be pointed out that the theory of reflection is not borne out by the illustrations (given by Ś) of Ghaṭākāśa, Maṭhākāśa, etc. Ś himself only suggests that the soul is like the space circumscribed by a pot etc., which are the conditioning or limiting adjuncts comparable to ignorance. Just as the ‘great space’ cannot be bound or circumscribed by such adjuncts, Br also remains unaffected by the ignorance which pertains to the jīva. Actually therefore Ś does not seem to have propounded this theory of reflection (prati bimba)¹ (except for the illustration he gives in Ś B II 3 50 to explain the non-confusion of actions and results with respect to different jīvas) and it assumed this significance during the period of his followers. (Refer to Ch V — introductory remarks) Thus, the Reflection—theory which has been responsible for so much of severe polemics reminds a careful reader of the ‘tilting at windmills’ —at least as far as Ś himself is concerned. In continuation of the same topic, the inconsistencies arising from the theory of reflection are mentioned. The ‘staying together’ as is laid down in the case of Br and jīva in texts like ‘Dva Suparna’, ‘Guhāṃ Pravistau’ etc., would be contradicted since an object and its reflection do not stay or exist in exactly the same identical

¹ Cf Radhakrishnan’s remark. Those who reject both the limitation and the ‘reflection’ theories declare that the jīva is the unchanging Br-ignorant of its true nature. Ś is inclined to this view as also Suresvara.
—I P II p 608

place, the implication of the destruction of the jiva meaning liberation, as a result of which none would undertake any activity for such an attainment, the incongruency of the illustration of an object and its reflection in the mirror as applied to the case of jiva being Br's reflection in (the mirror of) ignorance, because the reflection is seen by the reflected *object*, which comes into contact with the mirror, etc while Br as the object cannot be said to be the seer, nor could it come into contact with ignorance, etc —all these inconsistencies as also the contradiction of many scriptural texts follow as corollaries to the theory of reflection

Finally (and as arising from the same theory), the impossibility of having jivan mukti is pointed out as follows

(f) "जीवन्मुक्त्यनुपपत्तिश्च । तथाहि जीव इति पक्षोऽसंगत ।"

—(pp 27-28)

"And there is no possibility of liberation while alive' (jivan mukti) For you have to say that the jiva is a reflection either in (the mirror of) the Antahkarana or in ignorance. If the first so far as the Antah karana is there, the person will continue to be bound by samsara. If the Antah karana is not there it means the highest type of liberation and not jivanmukti (no Antah karana, no adhyasa, therefore Release). If jiva were said to be Br reflected in Avidya, there follow greater inconsistencies. For the ignorance is said to be destroyed through the knowledge of Br, and when ignorance is destroyed the reflection cast upon it would naturally be destroyed, so the body of the jivan mukta (having the reflection i.e. jiva destroyed) would not be able even to move. Nor can you say that ignorance only which forms only a part of the Prarabdha karma remains and thereby everything is consistent, for, ignorance which can be destroyed by the realisation of Br alone, cannot exist when such a realisation has dawned on one because there is no obstacle in the way. If ignorance is not destroyed even through realisation it will never be destroyed by anything else. If it were said that it can be destroyed only by enjoyment (bhoga) of the same then that' is something different from ignorance and its products. This would be the purport of your argument. When the knowledge of the rope is attained there is no continuation, in any part of it (rope),

of the knowledge of the snake or the fear etc caused by it. If you say that trembling etc does continue or persist well let that trembling which has been caused previously continue to exist in its own nature but it cannot accomplish anything on its own by itself. Thus Prārabdhā karma also can bring about an embodied state only and not enjoyment etc since there is no superimposition and (ignorance) is also present in the state of deep sleep. Moreover the trembling caused by the (false) knowledge of the snake persists because of the impressions of velocity etc. In the present case of Prārabdhā karma which is a product of ignorance there is no such impression and since it is necessary that it should be destroyed by knowledge how can it (Prārabdhā) continue to be there, when knowledge dawns? Again if it were to continue the teaching (Pravacana) etc would be out of place and propriety. And since the śrutis, smṛtis and purānas speak of jīvan mukti we cannot say that it does not exist. Therefore the case of the soul being a reflection of Br is inconsistent.

In the above passage the author has pointed out how the theory of reflection goes against the concept of jīvan mukti which is unanimously acknowledged by śrutis, smṛtis and purānas. The inconsistency has been clearly shown in either of the cases viz. the soul being a reflection (mirrored) in the Antahkarana or in ignorance. This is explained after the argumentative style of Ś. If that portion of ignorance which persists bringing about the embodied state on the part of the soul of the jīvan mukta cannot be removed even through the knowledge of the Highest it must be something other than ignorance and its products. If it is ignorance only it must get destroyed by the knowledge of Br and if the latter cannot put an end to it there can never be anything else which can destroy it!

Thus Vīt cleverly reasons out the fallacies in the theory of reflection (as propounded by its defenders whoever they be). The passage quoted above reminds one of Ś's eloquently argumentative style but it is—as we did above—necessary to recall the fact that reflection theory in such details is not postulated by Ś (as pointed out in our explanation passage (e) given further above) and that it got its present form from the followers of S.

Again, the embodied state, on the part of the soul even after the latter has attained jivan mukti, is there through the force of ignorance, which itself is already destroyed, but its effects (like the arrow that has already been discharged) must reach the destination or yield the necessary fruit, viz embodiment in the present case. But inspite of the existence of body, etc., on the part of the jivan mukta, the cognitions of "I" and "mine" based on the superimposition of the self on the non self and vice versa are absolutely non-existent, and this is what is meant by jivan mukti." The very term 'jivan mukti' speaks of liberation inspite of being in an embodied state, and when the soul attains the state of unity or oneness of spirit in all beings, even if it possesses a body, etc., and carries out the routine obligations, it does not, in reality, do anything from a selfish point or with any personal motive behind the acts. He (the jivan mukta) remains absolutely untouched, as it were, by his actions, etc., as the drops of water on a lotus leaf are in contact with the lotus leaf, but the latter remains unaffected by them.

Thus, when the concept of "jivan mukti" is understood in the light of Ś's own theory, the arguments of the Śuddhādvaitavādins fall off their mark since they are directed against a quite different hypothesis, at least in so far as they are directed against the prati bimba theory.

Then the author enters upon the discussion of another theory put forth by the opponents that Br appears as many jivas because of ignorance, like the moon which though one, appears to be dual because of pressing the eye with a finger. Even if this were accepted, the question "To whom it appears so?" remains to be answered. It cannot be Br (to whom it so appears), because there cannot be any confusion for Br (as the subject of it). Nor could it be the jiva, because it is the object involved in such an illusive appearance. The passage then discusses the relation between the Br and Avidya.

(g) "अपर च, अविद्याब्रह्मणो क सम्बन्ध ? इत्यत्र को हेतु ।'

—(p 34-35)

"Moreover, what is the relation between Avidya and Br.? It cannot be contact (Samyoga), since both are all pervading. Nor could it be superimposition, for that is absent. Nor could Avidya be the very nature of Br, because even in the case of

a released soul, it would, then persist and bring in the state of a Samsārin. Whatever the kind of relation, it has to be beginningless, and as Avidya, Br and their relation are all beginningless, the separation of jīva would also be beginningless, and thus it would be inconsistent to speak of causality between the connection with Avidya and the distinction as jīva, as both these belong to the same time while the relation of causality is (considered as) requiring that the cause must be invariably antecedent to the effect in point of time. If it were said that this relation of causality is taught by the scriptures and thus it is for the sake of conforming to them that you have to accept the differentiation of jīva as later (than the connection with ignorance), but that the statement “the bondage of it (jīva) is beginningless because of Avidya” refers to the bondage (or separation as jīva) as beginningless, which should be so considered—well, it is not so, because this negation of having a beginning does not mean a complete negation, but it is a general negation of having a beginning in comparison to the beginning of a pot, etc. Just as the gods are said to be immortal, this negation of mortality is relative and means that they are comparatively immortal.¹ Otherwise, the instrumental case ending in “Avidyaya”—through ignorance, suggesting a means, would not have been used. And this would not be proper if it (ignorance) were not to precede its effect, viz., bondage. It may be asked what is the reason for not having any bondage for some time after the jīva comes into existence, when ignorance is of the very nature of bondage.”

Then the nature of jīva is explained through the following discussion

(h) “मुक्तमिति तु न वक्तुं शक्यं सा बध्नाति, नरयम ।”

— (p 35)

“The jīva cannot be liberated, as there is an absence of means and as there is to be bondage later on. Nor could it be conditioned, because it is *going to be* so (a future condition). You cannot say that there is no state other than these two

¹ This text interpretation is typical of the way (common to all schools) of handling scriptural texts in order to make them fit into a system which was *not* in the mind of the author of the text.

(said above) which is unknown, for it (the possibility of such an extra state) has been included among the twelve chief powers of the Lord (vīṛ, Śrī, Puṣṭi, Gīra, Kānti, Kīrti, Tuṣṭi, Ilā, Ūrja, Vidyā, Avidyā, Śakti and Mayā) and ignorance is dependent on the Will of the Lord, since it is His power. Moreover, if He has a desire to bind a person, it (ignorance) binds him alone and none else.”

The above passage lays down Avidya to be one of the chief powers of the Lord and even when the jiva is neither liberated nor conditioned at a particular time, it may have a special nature of existence in accordance with the Wish of the Lord, says the author. People like Śuka, Sanaka and such others were for ever free, since the Lord did not wish to bind them. Then some Upaniṣad statements are quoted to prove that bondage and liberation, in the case of one and all jivas, depend on the Wish of the Lord.

(‘ एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति तं यमेभ्या लोकभ्य उन्निनीषति, एष उ प्वासात् कर्म कारयति तं यमेभ्यो लोकभ्योऽथो निनीषति ।’)

This is the scriptural text which has been exploited to its fullest possible extent by V and his followers to build up their theory of the Divine Wish. If all actions and undertakings really had no choice on the part of the jiva and could be referred back wholly and solely to the Wish of the Lord, there would result an absolute lack of responsibility in any matter a jiva undertakes and no moral rules or regulations could at all have any existence or application in the world.

After showing how many scriptural texts would be contradicted on the acceptance of the reflection theory, Vīt proceeds to point out that S’s interpretation of the fundamental texts, ‘That thou art (based on partial acceptance and partial rejection through Metaphor) would be proper if the said statement alone were to constitute the ‘Maha vakya’, but it is not so since the whole passage should be taken into consideration. The passage starting with ‘That teaching I ask for, whereby all that is not heard becomes heard all that is unthought of becomes thought’, etc, which speaks of the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one, implies that this could be possible only if the reality, being one only, could become everything, like the lump of gold and its products which are nothing but gold. ‘The existent (sat) alone’, etc points to the fact that

all is Br, and even the inanimate world is mentioned as having Br for its essence ('Aitadatmyam' etc) and then in order to remove doubt as to how the inanimate world which is perishable could be Br, the statement of its being real (Tatsatyam) is expressly made. The whole passage means that Br is the one and only reality by the knowledge of which everything else is known, since it is immanent in all, the inanimate world also has Br for its self and it is real.

Then the terms 'Āvirbhava' and 'Tirobhava' are defined as 'the capability (of a thing) to become an object of experience' and 'the capability of not becoming the same respectively. But if these two were thus the qualities of an existential entity, how could they be the inherent capacities of the Lord? This being so (if these are the attributes of an entity) there must be some reason for the occasional character of its perception and non-perception, and again this reason must have another reason for its existence, and thus the series of perception on the one hand and non-perception on the other would lead right back to the Wish of the Lord. And this Wish being eternal, there would again be no escape from the flaws of the object (say a pot) being inexplicable (anirvacya) and the contingency of Śūnya vada.

(1) 'अनुभवविषयत्वयोग्यता आविर्भाव निराश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।'

— (p 44)

'Manifestation is the capability of becoming an object of experience, the capability of becoming a *non object* of it (absence of an object or a contradictory object) is 'concealment'. They are characterised by the existence of an entity. These cannot be unreal, because, as qualities, they cannot exist without any substratum. Moreover, even you have to accept the existence of objects which are referred to as 'future' and 'past', and as these are the qualities of a pot, etc, these would become supportless if the pot etc do not exist.'

The above passage defines the terms 'Āvirbhava' and 'Tirobhava' and proves them to be eternal, since as attributes they must have the substratum and as the substrates are eternal, their attributes (viz. Āvirbhava and Tirobhava) must also be eternal. This is explained in a rather peculiar way—in that the necessity of a substratum for the existence of qualities is first

spoken of, and then the eternality of that substratum proves the eternality of its qualities. The qualities of being in the future or to have existed in the past also require the existence of the entity, since they cannot exist in the absence of their substratum. Therefore, the object exists for all times, it being referred to as possessing the quality to exist in future, etc.¹

This implies that an object exists for all times, and that is why, says the author, even an object that is destroyed, is perceived by mystics. It also lays bare the theory of Satkarya or existence of an effect in its cause, which all the Vedāntins accept. The opponent argues (p. 54) that when you accept a pot, etc. to be eternal, why refer to it as "to be" or "was"? Even this 'Being in the future' etc. falls within the range of the world and hence it should also be eternal. The author answers the objection by quoting scriptural texts like 'He is all this, which has been and which is to be,' etc., and lays down the world to be nothing but Br. The challenge that the reference to the eternal object as "future" and "past" is useless is refuted on the authority of the scriptures themselves referring to everything as "to be in the future" and "to have existed in the past". Rules and regulations are made by the Lord for the sake of worldly use—thus for example, only the objects produced from the earth can have the quality of 'smell' (gandha) and none other. All this is stipulated in accordance with the Wish of the Lord.

The author quotes an extract from the MBH to prove the existence of everything for all time. At the end of the great battle, Vyāsa, in order to console Gandhārī, asked Dhṛtarāstra, the Paṇḍavas and the women-folk to go to the river Ganges and come to him at nightfall. On their doing so, Vyāsa called forth all warriors and kings who had been killed in battle to rise—they all arose, and at the end of night, disappeared.

To Janamejaya's query as to how dead persons could be seen again, Vaisampayana replied "It is settled that there is no destruction of any action, the bodies and shapes, all born from actions, are eternal," etc. Vīt tries to establish that this was no mere illusion and for various reasons adduced by him, it has to be accepted as a fact.

¹ 'श्रुतो भावित्वभूतत्वव्यवहारकालेऽपि घटादिसत्ता उररीकार्या ।'

The syllogistic reasoning in the afore-said passage is not valid, for, the effect cannot (and does not in practice) possess all the characteristics of its cause. In the illustration given, actions are said to be imperishable—but this does not seem to be true, since both V' and Vi' speak of "the decrease ("Kṣaya") of actions through their enjoyment ("bhoga") alone", thus, actions are not, even according to the author himself, imperishable. Again, the statement that the bodies are products of action has to be analysed. Action done in one's previous birth is (in the Karma theory) responsible for bringing about a particular type of life in one's next birth, but it is the good or the evil resulting from the actions done previously that is of a permanent value and not the bodies. The bodies cannot be imperishable for the simple reason that such is not the experience in life.

Besides it should be pointed out that human speech-usage is not technically and physically rigorous, hence by the mere saying that the "pot is future" or "the future pot" the quality of existence or futurity is not intended to be meant as *inherent* in a substratum—in the same way as red colour is, when we speak of a red pot.

Therefore, the point that the author wishes to stress thereby remains unacceptable. The pot, etc., can never exist for all times as a pot and so on—except in the special sense indicated further up. It is true that matter cannot be destroyed but it only suggests that it exists in one form or the other and not that 'A' exists just as 'A' for all times.

Here the author shows an inclination to press into service a mere anecdote occurring in the MBH¹. There are some such contradictions in the ancient works, but it is for reason to discriminate between what is acceptable as a statement of fact and what is mere myth, fancy or metaphor. The old beliefs have to evolve breaking through the barriers of parochial outlook, as Dr Radhakrishnan emphatically and repeatedly points out, in order that they become reasonably acceptable (Ref. Ch III A).

The author tries to put these confusing and contradictory traditional accounts into a syllogistic form and the result is

¹ 'पतिव्रतानां तानां स्वस्वभर्तृभिः सह विहारकथनाच्च। अदर्शनादापत्तिः पुनः शब्दान्च, दर्शनापूर्वं वस्तुनत्ता प्राप्यते।'

indeed pitiable. Finally he sums up the whole discussion on Āvirbhāva-tirobhāva as capabilities of becoming an object of the Wish of the Lord that a particular thing should or should not take place at a particular time and place, in a particular fashion¹. The question of continual perception or non-stop non-perception of an entity is also dismissed on the basis of their being nothing but Br. The Lord through his wish manifests Himself as 'X' to be perceived as such, and that is what is 'manifestation', and where he chooses the form of non-perception of the same, it is called 'concealment' e.g. the manifestation in the form of smell in earth alone. Thus, when one realises the presence of Br in all, there is no room for any contradiction, and even when there is a contradiction (in the statement 'Fire is not hot') the very aspect of contradiction is ruled out in the case of the knower of Br, and the statement is accepted as correct.

This is a further instance how Viṭ's arguments seek shelter under the frame of his own system, based on scriptural dogma and his own view of it, and they derive strength from the "strait-jacket" of his predestinarian concepts for the explanation of the 'Āvirbhava'—'Tirobhāva' theory. He really is consistent at all costs—but what costs!

(J) "तत पूर्वोत्तरयोर्जऽजीवयो • उपक्रमविरोधाच्च "

—(p 63)

"Then, while proving the first and the last, viz. the world and the jiva, to be real, the reason is given in 'He is the self'. Thus, having spoken of the world having the Self as its essence, the (Upanisadic) author also lays down the same in the case of the jiva in 'That thou art'. This being the instruction he repeated it many times, as is seen from the B.S. "Āvrtti-rasakṣdupadesat". Hence, the whole passage constitutes the preaching just as in the sentence 'Ātadatmyam', the Sat-aspect has not to be understood in the light of partially-rejective metaphor, the latter should not be applied to the cit-aspect in the explanation of 'That thou art'. And thus, the whole passage

¹ "अग्निं काले अग्निं देशे इदं कार्यमेव भवत्विति च्छाविषयत्वमाविभाव तदा तत्र तथा तस्मा भवत्विति च्छाविषयत्वं निरोभाव इत्यपि सुखम् ।"

whole (sarvam) is Br, one has to admit that the statement is made with reference to the inanimate world, "all this, which is an object of perception, is real, because it is made of Br." In the same way, one has to admit that 'tvam' in "Tattavamasī" indicates all that is an object of perception, without excluding anything—as a parallel to "Aitadatayam" wherein both the 'Sat' and 'Cit' aspects are understood (as meaning the *whole* of reality—including the jīva) If you do not, then you commit "Vakya-bheda", and contradict what you have undertaken to prove, viz, that *all* is Br, in the same sense as all this tangible real reality, which has 'sat' for its 'self'

But, it must be noted that if the author of the sruti under consideration were of the above opinion, he would not have separately stated that "the world has Br as its self", which means that the world is distinct from Br in so far as the latter can become the self of it, and this is entirely distinct in itself from the statement that follows "That thou art" which does not refer to Br as the self of Śvetaketu (as in the former instance) but *identifies* him with Br Thus, a careful consideration of the whole problem reveals that the said flaw of 'Vakya-bheda' does not result in its interpretation as offered by Ś, because every statement in the passage is complete in itself, and even if the meaning of one such statement is found to be different from that of another [as Purusottama, the author of 'Suvāra-sūtra' wishes to point out (p 68) against Ś], this 'arthā bheda' does not amount to 'Vakya bheda' in its strict sense

The author then ably argues against the postulates of the Māyavadin If the soul were really unreal, the statement should be 'Thou are not that' Again, if the world, a product of ignorance, were superimposed on Br and thereby became perceptible, like the silver in the nacre, there must be a knowledge of the substratum acting as the cause for such a superimposition But in the present case there is no such knowledge of the substratum, viz Br Moreover, even if the knowledge of Br, were to remove ignorance, it would be with regard to the Samsara and not to the world, which is a manifestation of the Lord The destruction of the five fold ignorance (consisting of the ignorance of one's nature and the superimpositions of the body, senses, the internal organ and vital breath) by means of knowledge, refers to the destruction of Samsara in the form of

'I'ness and 'mine'ness while the world, being a part of the Lord can never be destroyed

As a matter of fact, even the good and the evil resulting from one's actions are also eliminated through the realisation of Br (Kalyāṇe caryā karmīni, etc.) Moreover, if ignorance were accepted to be non-existent, it is not possible to speak of its destruction either. It cannot be related to Br since a relation requires two members while in the matter in hand it is impossible. So *who* would perceive, *what* would he perceive, and *by what* would he perceive? The ignorance which is said to be the cause of distinction is itself non-existent or unreal, therefore the distinction also is unreal and hence absent. If you say that you call it so, because you infer it to be unreal from the unreality of its effect, viz the world—well, we object to this, since even in the illustration of the juggler showing things which really do not exist the things may be unreal but the power with which he produces them is *not unreal*. Therefore the concept of ignorance giving rise to the perception of the world and the distinction of the souls is not logically acceptable says the author, and there is no propriety in denying creation to Br (p 65)

Then the author discusses the question of an adjunct which is said to be the root cause of distinction between the souls and Br. He questions the upholder of the theory of Upādhi (Avidya) as to how the unreal souls could be non-different from Br, which is real. It cannot be explained on the analogy of the waters of rivers really distinct from one another, merging together and giving rise to a perception of non-difference. It is proper, says the author to explain the non-difference between them as both having the same material—one having innumerable parts and the other possessing similar parts—both can be said to give rise to an effect common to their own natures and this is what is meant by non-difference or unity¹. But in the present context both the soul and Br are said to be all pervading and hence there is no such possibility.

(k) 'किञ्च जीवग्रहणो ए सम्बन्धः ।'

—(p 72)

¹ 'तयोर्न बाधविसादयनेकान्तीशब्दयो उभाभ्याम् रक्षणतीत्युपाय इति युक्तत्वेऽप्यनङ्गम् ।'

The passage starting with the above question discusses the nature of the relation between Br and jīva

“It cannot be contact, because both are all pervading Nor could it be inherence, since neither is said to require any support It cannot be of the nature of essential form (svarupa) because as the essential form of Br, the jīva would be eternally existent and could not come to exist as ‘jīva’ at all Moreover, even if the jīvas were regarded to be atomic, they would never be perceived as jīvas, since Br is all-pervading, and the relation of all souls to it would be eternal Nor could you term the relation to be of the nature of the knower and the thing to be known, because it would imply real difference between the two, which is not acceptable to you Moreover, since relation subsists between two, this relation of “knower-and-the-object of knowledge” would imply that Br. knows even the conditioned jīva, and thus it brings in the contingency of non difference (from Br) on the part of even a conditioned jīva (p 73) ¹ But the quality of being an object of knowledge is denied of Br in scriptures such as ‘the speech cannot reach him, He is unattainable by mind,’ etc

Again, the non-difference between the two cannot mean identity, (which means “being the self of the other”), which can be possible only if they are related as an object and its attributes But this is out of question in the present case And thus, there arises the impossibility of the realisation of all through that of one, as propounded by the scriptures It (i.e the jīva) cannot be a modification or transformation either, because both are laid down to be immutable It cannot be a part of Br, since the latter is impartite Therefore, according to the opponent, the soul must be an adjunct so as to make room for the texts teaching non difference And since there is no possibility of (Br’s) identity with the conditioned, the Upādhi is said to be apparent so as to establish the identity, for, if it (Upādhi) were real, it cannot be destroyed by knowledge, thus, the condition of ignorance refers to perception of duality and when it is destroyed, one experiences the state described in “Yatra tvasya sarvamatmaivabhut tat kena kam pasyet”, etc This establishes the world to be

¹ “किञ्च, सम्बन्धस्य द्विनिष्ठत्वात् समाख्यमपि जीव ब्रह्म जानाति इति” (१)

unreal being produced by Avidya Hence, Br conditioned by Avidya is the creator or the cause of the world "

All this embodies the view of the Kevaladvaitin as understood by the author who follows :

Having described the stand of the opponent the author now gives the siddhanta or his own principle, as follows

The soul is not unreal or a product of ignorance, but real This reality on the part of the soul does not contradict the scriptures laying down unity of Br, since it is possible through the relation of the part and the whole There is no violation of Br's being impartite for Br can be known only through the scriptural authority, as it is beyond the pale of phenomenal experience (sense perception) The Lord created the author of the sutras—who decidedly mentions the soul to be atomic and a part of Br (B S II 3 43) The various types of designation in the case of the soul (as Br as produced as ignorant as sentient as an object to be governed etc) cannot mean anybody except Br who is the abode of all contradictory attributes Hence the reference to jiva meaning Br suggests that jiva is a part of the Lord The scriptural texts like just as the insignificant sparks etc also support the same view The view that the soul is an adjunct and that its sentiency is like the heat etc, belonging to the spark and that its being called a part is metaphorical—is not worthy of being accepted by learned thinkers because the former and the latter parts of the passage would be contradictory to each other since in their opinion the soul is unreal so Br could not be said to stay within such an unreality nor to control it ¹

Further on the author says that it is not possible nor proper to decide with earthly means (of knowledge) whether Br is impartite or is made of parts Reason cannot prevail in the field of supra sensual things—as also in matters where the very nature of a thing gives rise to a particular effect (like the magnet attracting the iron filings by its very nature) The scriptures speak of Br as devoid of parts (Niskalam Niskriyam and also as possessing parts (Yatha gneh Padosya visva bhutam) The Smritis also refer to the soul as a part of Br (नैवैवासा चकनाक) Therefore the soul being a part of Br can

¹ 'य आ न न लुष्टनामानादरा ययन

be said to be non different from Br , and hence the non duality. The sūtrakāra also affirms the same in B S II 3 43. This does not bring in the contingency of ignorance, etc , on the part of Br because it is through His wish only that attributes like Omniscience, etc , are concealed or suppressed in the soul (B S III 2 5). This concealment is brought about through His desire to give rise to variety, which would not be there if sovereignty, etc , were manifest in the soul (p 81). This concealment results in bondage on the part of the soul, who becomes helpless and dependent owing to the suppression of sovereignty , undergoes all miseries owing to the loss of valour, suffers meanness through the disappearance of fame , becomes an object of all calamities like birth, etc , through the concealment of glory, conceives of "I" in the body, etc , owing to the suppression of knowledge, like the perverted knowledge in the case of a forgetful person. Attachment to sensual objects results from the disappearance of 'detachment', and the bliss-aspect which is suppressed at the very beginning brings about the condition of being a "jiva" (p 81).

Then the question of non sentiency on the part of the world and sentiency in the case of jiva, in spite of their having the same cause, viz Br , is taken up. The author explains how through the Wish of Br the world, the soul and the inner controller arise out of His triple aspect of existence, intelligence and bliss. The doubt,—that in concealing the natural attributes of His in the jiva and endowing him with defects like ignorance, etc , the flaws of destruction of the existent and coming into being (or acceptance) of what has not been done (as deserved by karma) would arise,—is answered on the analogy of a king, ordering the destruction of old mansions etc , and getting them replaced by a garden, etc. When such a thing is possible in the case of an earthly king, how can one question the King of all kings if He chooses to suppress the divine qualities in the soul and to make him ignorant ? Moreover, the origination, sustenance and destruction of the world are due to His and if the above doubt had any place, it would apply in this case also, since He destroys what is created, etc. But such a conception would result in either the eternality of the world or absolute non existence. Therefore, even bondage, etc , is dependent on Br who brings about everything through His wish. And His powers of Avidya and so on envelop the soul whom He wishes to bind—and this

is the great majesty of the Lord. Again, the above-mentioned flaws would arise in the case of an earthly being, but not so with respect to Br. The soul is not an independent agent, as is laid down in the B S II 3 41

The *prima facie* view with respect to the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions is given first and then refuted by the author. The *Īsvara* or God makes the *jīva* act in accordance with the good and bad action done by it (earlier, in previous births). He makes the soul carry out the prescribed injunctions and refrain from the prohibited activities. Yet, in spite of the scriptural prescriptions being for all, only some people follow them while others do not, the reason being their own actions in a previous birth; and the stream of such births is beginningless. But this view of the opponent is not sound, says the author, since you cannot postulate an *Īsvara* just because he is needed to make the soul act, on the basis of the necessity imposed on such an agent on account of the non intelligence of "activity" itself. The consequence of this would therefore be nothing but atheism. If you were to argue that you postulate such an idea of God being bound by the consideration of the good and bad actions of the soul on the basis of the *Sūtra* II 3 42, which states that God considers the efforts of the soul, so as to account for the injunctions and prohibitions which would otherwise be meaningless—well, you have misunderstood the *sūtra*, says the author (p. 90)

Here, *Viṭ* attempts to safeguard the sovereignty and Absolute-ness of the Will of the Lord (who is the ultimate initiator and dispenser of every factor involved), and thereby sacrifices human will and freedom. He also shows metaphysical insight in breaking the (seemingly?) vicious circle of a mutually self causing series (beginningless) by attaching it to the Absolute, who is, for him, the only possible Cause. But he completely eliminates the free-agency of the *jīva* by making the latter a mere tool of God. The example of absence of acting according to the injunctions and non-abstinence from the prohibited actions, in spite of the prescription in scriptures, cannot be made acceptable—he says—on the supposition of previous actions, since the injunctions and prohibitions would become senseless if activity and abstinence from the same were based on the previous actions. The reason is that the world is said to be beginningless. This being so, it would mean just blind following the blind and the propriety

of injunctions, etc , would be violated Thus, these consequences show that it is better to relegate everything to the divine Wish—than to anything else Because, in spite of knowing that one should carry out the injunctions and refrain from the prohibited acts, one is seen to do otherwise , and for this, nothing but the Wish of the Lord could be the cause

Then—in conjunction with this stand—the author explains the sūtra II 3 42 as follows “The Lord made an effect for the sake of sport The sport is the chief thing , everything else is subordinate to it Thus, the Lord taking into consideration His desire to sport, himself gave rise to limitations, such as “I shall make him such a one who acts like this”, etc. This is for the sake of fulfilling the conditions or rules, created by himself Thus, the effort that He made in order to bring about variety consisting of different souls, etc , is what He takes into consideration while making one act in a particular way The word “adī” in the sūtra under discussion suggests that there cannot be any fruit in the absence of actions Therefore, the text ‘Him whom He desires to uplift’ etc , speaks of ‘the desire to give fruit’ as the cause for making the soul undertake an activity” (p 91)

Here the author reproduces the view of V on this sutra and says that ultimately it is not different from his own,—(although the details given by V are different) which is given above

“According to our preceptor (V), as one explains the good and bad points of an object to one’s son or a child who is making an attempt to understand, but makes him do in accordance with his (i e the son’s) inclination , even so Br , who takes into consideration the actions for the distribution of fruits, (as is borne out by the text speaking of (karmapeksā’)) is mindful of the soul’s effort in making him do anything , as for the effort, He considers the soul’s actions and regards the worldly stream for the desire of attaining heaven etc , and thus there is no room for any flaw of His part Nor could He thus lose His majesty, since the path of Maryada is created for the same reason But where this is not so it means the acceptance of the path of grace ”

It may be pointed out that the above explanation is not different basically from the explanation given by Ś On the whole, the term “Kṛtaprayatnapeksah”, as interpreted by V in

details, yields the same meaning, viz. that Br makes one act in accordance with one's actions done in previous births. The long list of "hetus" given above for Phaladāna, Karma-kāraṇa, Prayatna and Svargādikāma boils after a long winding detour to "Prayatne tat-karmāpekṣah" as he himself gives! And if this is how he tries to escape the charge he has himself raised against Ś's explanation, that Br would become dependent on such a regulation and thus lose His 'Īśvaratva'—well, it would be far better for him not to have made any such allegations than to have been the target himself!

Even the last straw, in the form of the Maryada path, that Vit clings to for the explanation of injunctions, etc. is very dogmatic and rationally unacceptable.

He also points out the defect in the opponents' explanation 'Prayatna' or effort is an attribute of the Self and it exists prior to the activity, which brings about the good and the bad fruits. Therefore, "Kṛtaprayatna", explained as the good and bad results arising from the deeds, etc. cannot mean the resultant good and evil, since "prayatna" is an attribute of the self which precedes action, and hence naturally the good and evil ("dharma-dharmāu") resulting thereof. So, the word 'prayatna' cannot stand for the good and evil, as the opponents suggest, says Vit.

But this argument would be applicable to the opponent's view only if a *first* creation were admitted, and the opponent speaks of a beginningless creation.

The author then refutes the doctrine of Madhvas and Prabhakaras that the souls are eternally distinct. This cannot be so, for the scriptural text laying down the knowledge of all through that of one would then be sublated.

It must be said to V's credit that his interpretation of this sūtra is not as dogmatic and based on the concept of sealed predetermination as that offered by Vit, since V explains 'Kṛtaprayatnapekṣah' with respect to the jiva and its efforts, while Vit completely refers it to the Divine Sport.

According to Vit the Lord decides whether a thing should take place like that, at a particular place, at a particular time, etc. (V M p 56) or otherwise, and the human aspect or the effort of the jiva does not find any consideration whatever, while the inclination or the effort of the jiva does not find its place in the list of "hetus" that V offers in the interpretation of the

sutra II 3 4? Viṣṭ interprets this sutra with respect to the divine Will alone —his explanation of Kṛtaprayatnapakṣah is really interesting in that it is unique in being referred to the effort that the Lord made with an idea of Sport! It is indeed hard to believe that the Sutrakara could have had this meaning in view

The soul is said to be a part of the Lord and the texts that deny its birth or production suggest its emergence on the maxim of the sparks. Production is described to be three fold — creation in the case of perishable things contact (samīgamā) in the case of eternal but limited things and manifestation with respect to eternal and unlimited objects (vide Bhg II 6 1 as cited in Subodhini II p 77)

Thus the souls when separated from Br as its parts become atomic capable of entering back into Br become objects of a perception of non difference when they go back to Br and are capable of emerging out again from it—as is seen in the case of sparks emerging from fire. But (as is pointed out in Ch III D) this comparison is not fully congruent in as far as the sparks do not usually enter back into the fire. The re entrance—Vit continues—is referred to in Brahmaiva an brahmapyeti. The becoming Br should be understood as the manifestation of the bliss aspect in the soul by its following the prescribed rites whereby the Lord is pleased and manifests His sovereignty etc in it. Sutra I 1 18 means that the scripture teaches the attainment of Br full of Bliss by the soul who has obtained Brahma bhava. Such souls merge into Br as it were or become one with Br as the sruti says Na Pretya Sanjasti Sutra 1 19 etc. This points out that Br is mentioned throughout as the material cause in the Vedānta (p 97). At the time of His incarnation the Lord chooses those souls which are suited for sport and brings them to the world with Him—and this is the quality of being able to emerge out again on the part of the soul. This is so only in the case of those accepted to be the followers of grace while the rest are bound by Maryāda and are not capable of emerging out again. Thus the sutra IV 4 22 refers to the latter

The author then explains the prima facie view that the entrance of the soul back into Br is impossible since this means going inside from outside which cannot be in the case of

unconditioned and impartite Br He refutes the same on the basis of scriptural texts that describe it

Moreover, this is all the more inconsistent, he says, if the doctrine of Upadhī is accepted, since Upadhī is said to be perishable, and when it is destroyed, who would enter ? Therefore, the word of the sruti should be regarded as authoritative, and it speaks of Br as the material cause, which should be accepted as true

If it were argued that the mention of re-entrance sublates the pervasive character of the soul, the author answers that the soul is not all pervasive but atomic, as is borne out by texts like "Āragramatro" "Balagra sata bhagasya", etc

The following passage fully describes the arguments of the opponent in connection with the size of the soul

' Moreover, if the soul were atomic, there would not be the experience of sentiency all over the body It cannot be explained on the analogy of the experience of coolness all over the body even when the sandal paste is applied on a part of it, because in this illustration the position of sandal paste as applied to a particular portion is directly perceived, while the position of the jiva occupying only a part is dubious Nor could you infer it to be atomic from the case of sandal paste spreading its quality of coolness to places in excess of the one occupied by itself, because the reason, viz the quality to spread, is not proved and secondly, because this is non different from the thing to be proved That is, when the jiva is proved to occupy one particular place, its quality to spread sentiency may be proved, and when this quality is proved, the former can be proved on its basis—thus, the inference is mutually dependent Even in the illustration of the sandal paste, its minute particles may possibly be travelling all the body over and thereby producing coolness, because the quality cannot possess any activity except through its substratum Even in the illustration of the Campaka flower, the fragrance perceived elsewhere may be due to its subtle particles being carried there by the wind This travelling, of the particles does not bring about the total disappearance or destruction of the object, since it is possible that their vacated places might be occupied by other particles through the unseen principle (adṛṣṭa) Otherwise, the object should get destroyed, which

is not so in practice On the strength of this, we say that the soul cannot be atomic " (p 109)

The following passage refutes the above arguments

(m) "भवेदेतदेव यदि तथात्रापि तदुपपत्ते ।"

—(p 109)

'This would be so, if by "He, this great", etc, the soul were described But that is not possible, since it falls in the context of Br For this reason only, Badarāyana also states "If it were said that it is not atomic, as it is not so stated by the scriptures because it is in connection with the other (Br)' Nor does it involve the impossibility of experience of sentiency all over the body, because it is possible as in the case of the fragrance of the Campaka flower Nor could you say that qualities cannot exist in the absence of their substratum, because it is possible as in the case of inherence (samavāya), which exists as a relation even in the absence of its related objects, according to the followers of Aksapāda"

The last reference to the doctrine of inherence as propounded by the Vaisesikas is unacceptable, since Samavaya as such is vehemently attacked by all the Vedanta philosophers (including V, whose criticism on the same (Anu II 2 13) may prove to be a sharp contrast to the view of Vit) And it is indeed surprising and strange that Vit has to press into service the concept of Samavaya of the Vaisesikas which all the Vedantins—whatever their mutual differences—are at one in denying

Then it is argued that if "smell" could exist in the absence of its substratum, why not other qualities like form, flavour and so on? The author answers that this case of 'smell' is special like that of Samavaya, which can exist although the objects to be related are absent The particles cannot be said to travel for the explanation of the presence of "smell" in the absence of its substratum because musk, although covered by a number of leathern layers, gives out its fragrance, and in this case its particles cannot be said to travel through the layers, etc, and be responsible for the fragrance

Thus, instead of indulging in a round about explanation for the existence of "smell" in places other than its substratum (like the moving out of the minute particles, their being replaced through an "Adrṣta" and so on), why not accept that the

'small' can so exist? Even the Sūtrakāra expresses the same opinion while proving the soul to be atomic (Sūtra II 3 26). Other scriptural texts speaking of the soul's stay in the region of heart etc. can be explained only if the soul were atomic. The soul cannot be said to be of the nature of mere sentiency or intelligence because the text *Prājñayā śarīram samarūhya*, etc. points out that intelligence is instrumental and hence both (jīva and caitanya) are distinct. Again it cannot be all pervading since in that case the coming and going described by scriptures would not be possible.

The author explains that the text 'That thou art' does not refer to an identity between Br and jīva because the unity is metaphorical as in the case of a Minister being called a King. The soul does not possess any quality by itself since intelligence etc. are the qualities of the Lord and the soul is said to possess them because of its being a part of Him e.g. Sūtra II 5 29. The author says that the above sūtra is explained by the opponents to mean that *anutva* in the case of jīva is a fictitious quality and therefore the jīva is all pervading but this is not proper since other texts describing the rising going etc. of jīva would become meaningless if it were all pervading. Nor could the fictitious qualities be said to be essential (*saravāt*) which could be so only in the case of the divine qualities. The sūtra *Ābhasa eva ca* also points to its being a part of the Lord wherein the bliss aspect is concealed but not to its being unreal. Just as a Brahmin with bad conduct is called a so-called Brahmin (*Brahmanabhasaḥ*) since the good qualities associated with Brahmins are absent in him in the same way the jīva is said to be an *abhasa* but it does not become unreal thereby.

The opponent argues that even if Br were the cause it must be the efficient cause only like the potter and not the inherent or material cause because this would bring in the contingency of its being changeable and consisting of parts. The author answers that this would be so if the conception of Br's being the material cause were a human fancy but this is what the *sruti* states and in matters supra-sensual *sruti* has its validity self-established and hence is most authoritative. The defects of change etc. can cling to the earthly material cause and not to Br. Therefore we propound the doctrine of (immutable) transformation which safeguards both the situations. Br is the

material cause and yet remains immutable or unmodified. There is no contradiction involved in accepting the above principle, since Br is an abode of all contradictory qualities.

The next passage opens with the objection that Br cannot be both Savisesa and Nirviseṣa, since this implies contradiction and therein the view of the Mâyāvādin is fully given. The sūtra III 2 22 also explains that the next "Neti Neti" etc., denies the two fold form (as mentioned above) of Br and then says again that there is nothing else except Br that can be real. (p 115)

After having described the opponents stand in detail, the author refutes the same, emphasising his own doctrine. "If the characteristics are products of ignorance, as you say, what is that ignorance which gives rise to them—and does it belong to the soul or to Br? It cannot belong to the soul, because it is incapable of imagining attributes in the case of Br. Therefore, it must belong to Br. But the highest Br, which does not become the object of even mind and speech, cannot be known by the jīva as the substratum—hence, the question of Br's connection with ignorance is farther removed from possibility. Again, the text which says that a wise man can see the inner Self, etc., implies that Br can become an object of perception in the case of one who possesses knowledge—and thus the possession of knowledge should bar off ignorance, and in spite of the absence of ignorance, how can Br become an object, etc.? Therefore, the Nirviseṣa Br cannot be meant or else the scriptural statements like 'One knowing Br becomes Br' 'having known him alone, one transgresses mortality', etc., would be contradicted."

Then the question is put to the opponent as to what is meant by 'unreal' ('avāstava'). If the natural characteristic of an object is real while the accidental attribute is unreal, then the form, etc. (having breadth and depth in the case of clay) should also be considered fictitious like the silver in the nacre, and you should not regard it (form, etc.) to be produced by a potter with the aid of a rod, etc. But this is in opposition to practice. These would be fictitious, if they could arise just by themselves even in the absence of a potter, etc.—but since this is not possible, the qualities cannot be regarded as fictitious. The texts "Na tasya kāryam kāraṇam", etc.—"Parā-sya saktiḥ", etc., lay down

the fact that whatever connected with Br is natural and hence real. The souls are His servants as it were. He possesses infinite powers, which are, again, not accidental but His very nature. Therefore, the śrutis denying attributes of Br do not totally negative the same, but refer to the absence of earthly attributes. The existence of Br alone before creation, His desire to create, reflection and later creation of world, etc., go to show that the jīva did not exist before the creation so as to fancy attributes like agency, etc., on the part of Br through its own ignorance. Even the conception of final dissolution ("pralaya") would be improper if ignorance were postulated because in that state there would be an absence of body, senses, etc., and the soul cannot be said to labour under the influence of ignorance—still the statement of the Lord's 'slumber' is there to prove the impropriety of the idea of ignorance (p. 123).

Again it should not be said that the 'śrutis' stating Br to be Saviśeṣa do not describe the highest, because the sutrakara has harmonisation of all śrutis in view, and if the 'attributes' were really fictitious there would be an express negation of the same (following these descriptions), which is not found, and 'Samanvaya' is really the end in view. Moreover, it is foolish to say that the author of the sutras, having laid down the desire to know Br, speaks of the characteristics of Br as products of ignorance—since it involves violation of the primary statement. The 'Saviśeṣa' and 'Nirviśeṣa' statements with regard to Br have equal weight and hence Br must be understood as possessing contradictory attributes (p. 126). In support of this statement, the author quotes a number of passages from the second and the tenth skandhas of the Bhg describing the activities of Śrī Kṛṣṇa.

The argument of the opponent that the Saviśeṣa texts are meant for the sake of meditation, etc., is challenged by the author as follows. If these are useful for meditation, the idea is that only the conception of the qualified aspect of Br is there, while Br as such is not qualified. But even this meditation, etc., is laid down with reference to the Self, which is real, hence, Br or the highest self does possess attributes. And in accordance with the difference in the modes of worship or meditation, the Lord bestows different fruits on the worshipper. But if the attributes were fictitious the meditation based on them would

also be so, and hence would not refer to Br.—and there would result contradiction of B. S. I. 2. 1., 1-1.6, etc. The Gītā-statements like “Param Bhāvamajānanta”, etc., mean that the demoniac jīvas do not know the bliss constituting the essence of the Lord and hence they call the world unreal. (Gītā XVI. 8). But the possession of empirical qualities like the human form and so on is what is denied, and it refers to the mode of reflection of the lower jīvas, and not to the nature of reality.¹ Therefore, Br. is an abode of contradictory attributes and the imagination of Avidyā for the explanation of Saviśeṣa-texts is wrong.

The sūtra III. 2. 14, “Arūpavad eva hi tatpradhānatvāt”, is explained as not referring to the Nirviśeṣa Br. as the opponent would like to understand, for, if attributes were fictitious, the texts referring to Br. as possessing these fictitious attributes would also be so.² The world is ‘Rūpavat’, ‘possessing form, etc.’, and thus becoming an object of narration or empirical dealings. Br. is different from it, and hence ‘Arūpavat’ (p, 136).³

Thus, Br, distinct from the world (which possesses form etc) is chiefly described in the Vedānta. If this sūtra were to be understood as the opponent suggests, the term should have been, according to Vīt. “Arūpam” and not “Arūpavat” The sūtra “प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं”, etc, also supports the same view. The attributes like grossness, etc., pertaining to the world are denied of Br. but the hands, etc, should be understood in the divine or celestial sense and as meaning nothing but Br. The text ‘Neti Neti’, etc, means that particular category of knowledge (which implies the existence of hands, feet, etc, in all directions

¹ ‘त्रा, मानुषीं तनुमाश्रितमिति तज्ज्ञानप्रकारवचनम्, न तु स्वरूपस्य ।’

² Offering his explanation of this sūtra, Dr P M Modi says that the author of the B S ‘admits both these aspects, but believes that “the arūpavat aspect is the chief (pradhāna) of the two and that, therefore, Brahman may be said to be *only arupavat*” According to him, ‘Arūpavat’ means the subtle (sūkṣma) or formless aspect of Br. while ‘Rūpavat’ refers to the ‘rūpa’ of the Puruṣa, which consists of head, eyes, ears, speech, breath, heart and feet”, and is equivalent to the ‘Puruṣavidhā’ aspect (as spoken of in B S I 2.21 23) These two terms, viz ‘Arūpavat’ and ‘Rūpavat’, do not, according to him, stand for the Nirguna and Saguna aspects of Br respectively, as Ś understands—“and neither of them, not even the *nirākāra*, is *nirguna*, since attributes like *Ānanda* do belong even to the Nirguṇa Br —A Critique of the B S (II p. 3-8)

with regard to Br as the earthly possessions) is the object of negation. The possession of form or otherwise should not be considered as two aspects of Br, but Br itself¹. The sruti speaks of attributes, immediately after having denied the same ("Tato braviti ca bhūyān") as in the text 'laying down the senses to be extrovert, etc., and then referring to the perception of the inner-self, etc. Therefore, there is no opposition between the two sets of scriptural passages, since Br is devoid of material or empirical qualities but possesses infinite 'Sahaja' qualities.

The two fold description of Br—as beyond the range of perception and as an object of perception—suggests that Br cannot become an object of sense perception, but can be realised through the Grace of the Lord 'अपि मराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम्', etc., confirms this stand. The non manifestation of the celestial lustre, etc., when the Lord descends on the earth (in the form of an incarnation) as also His assumption of worldly activities and so on, are for the sake of 'Sport'. The term 'darśana' does not stand for realisation, as the opponent would suggest in accordance with his theory of Br being just knowledge, but it means that Br can also be seen (through Divine Grace) as is expressly stated in the Gītā "Jñatum draṣṭum ca tattvena praveṣṭum ca paramtapa—wherein the actions of knowledge, sight (through Grace) and entrance are separately mentioned. Thus, also the Rasa—the sentiment of love, the desire to sport, the sport, etc., are nothing but attributes of the Lord (p 145). It is on the acceptance of this principle only that His amorous sport with the women folk of Vraja can be explained in spite of His being 'Self contented' ('Ātmarama'). The author here admits that he does not postulate such things as are contradictory, or opposed to reason, but he only follows what the srutis say—and hence he should not be rebuked for the same. If you were to argue that such contradictions are not practical since they are not found in the worldly dealings, well, even your fancy of qualityless Br is baseless, because we do not see in the world anything devoid of all characteristics—even the existence has to be in time, and hence it implies the possession of attributes such as inherence, etc. Therefore, following the verdict

¹ 'परन्त्वन्नन प्रकारण न वेदितव्ये ब्रह्मण एते रूपे इति । किन्तु ब्रह्मैवेति वदितव्ये इत्यर्थः ।' (p 138)

of the *śruti* that in the case of divine matters, reasoning should not be resorted to, we decide that Br possesses all sorts of contradictory attributes

(n) “एक मायाशब्देन भगवत्सामर्थ्यं ब्रवोषि • त्वयाऽनङ्गीकारात् । वाशीवत् ।” —(P 147)

In the above passage, the author questions the Māyāvadin as to what he means by ‘Maya’

“Do you mean the power of the Lord by the word ‘Maya’ ? Or something different from Him that is unreal by nature and producing an unreal effect ? If the first, we say ‘yes’ It cannot be said that by His own power He manifested unreality, because the text “who staying within the earth,” etc , indicates it to be an attribute of Br Itself If Br were not like that, then it would be possible to say so (viz that He manifested unreality, etc), but it is not so, as has been proved above And the manifestation of unreality is amongst the demoniac souls only, on account of which the Lord is said to infatuate them In the present case, the demoniac souls are not there and hence no such unreal manifestation It cannot be the latter, because of untenability of this alternative [It cannot be the latter (alternative), namely, that it is something different from the Lord, unreal by nature, etc — as above, because there is no conception (of it that can fit it and make it understandable)] To explain, is Maya an independent agent or dependent on Br ? Not the first, since it is non intelligent (inanimate) as you do not accept it to be sentient In the second alternative, it would only mean an instrument, like an axe’ [And He has no need of any such (extraneous) instrument, being by nature endowed with all powers]’

The above passage throws light on the principle of Maya as accepted by the Suddhadvaitins It is said to be one of the powers of the Lord, and as such, dependent on Him According to the opponent’s doctrine, Maya is responsible for the superimposition of attributes in the case of Br , but this is controverted by the statement that the inanimate Maya cannot produce anything by itself

The sentiment of love, the amorous activities, the effects of separation from the beloved, the Sport, etc , are all forms of Br ,

who is said to be "Rasa par excellence". The Bhg states¹ that the Lord possesses a multitude of qualities, which are innumerable, His greatness is unfathomable and hence there is no scope for futile argumentation on the part of those who have a perverted outlook and whose self is stained by the quagmire of bad logic and apparent means of knowledge based on the modern thinking and contradictory reasoning. Thus, everything is alright with our postulates."

The nature of Puṣṭi or God's Grace is that the Lord in a sportive manner assumes dependence on His devotees and transgresses the limit put by Himself on His own nature. Therein consists the real majesty of the Lord, in that He does not lose His sovereignty while going against the mandates pertaining to His nature. None else but Br can do so (p 150)

Then the author undertakes to prove that the body, actions, attributes, etc., in connection with Br are eternal and he refers to many a passage from the Bhg, RV, Subodhini and Purva-mīmāṃsā to show that even the particular incarnation which took place in a particular country at a certain time, etc., should be regarded as eternal, since there are devotees who still visualise Him in that form. Moreover, as all this falls within His sport, which is eternal, it must be eternal, says the author (This seems to be unduly based on dogma. The quoted works are not strictly philosophical and the legends occurring therein have been given undue importance). Even the regions where Śrī Kṛṣṇa had his 'Rasalīla'—the surroundings, mountains, trees, animals—are all said to be 'Brahma rūpa' and eternal (p 162, 178, 179). These are eternally perceived by the Gods, etc., who are devoid of ignorance (p 179)

God is described to be very merciful in that He Himself removes the faults of the person, whether the latter resorts to Him or not—or even when the person has acted in opposition to Him. The example of Indra who obstructed the sacrifice, etc., through excessive rains is quoted here to point out that notwithstanding the faults of Indra, the Almighty Lord did only

¹ "न हि त्रिषु उभय भावन्यपरिगणितगुणगण इश्वरऽनबाह्यमाहात्म्येऽवान्ति-
वित्कविगप्रमोद्याभामकृत्ककापलान्त करणदुग्दप्रहवादिना विवाणनवम्पर इति सर्वमन-
व्याय ।"

remove his arrogance, but did not destroy him altogether Thus one should worship this merciful aspect of God, says Viṭ

The Ch Up text¹ is explained by the author as referring to Gokula, the place of the Sport of the Lord It is implied that this Gokula is eternal But this sort of explanation is too dogmatic to be acceptable, since there is no reference to Vaikuntha, nor to Gokula in the whole of Vedānta and to deduce such a meaning from the Upanisadic text is indeed far fetched—and perhaps unknown altogether to the author of the text

It is rather strange that the Śuddhādvaitins explain the Nirviśesa texts as denying the possession of empirical qualities in the case of Br and in the same breath suggest that the word 'kāma' in 'so snute sarvan kamān', etc, stands for the satisfaction of the desire, the imagination of material body, etc, in the case of Br is forbidden² and again the projection of the same is laid down as the object of a bhakta's visualisation or service The truth of this is witnessed in his own statement viz 'तेन लीलास्यवदार्या स्वरूपतस्त्वऽलौकिका एव तथापि लौकिकस्वरूपा इवेति ज्ञाप्यते ।' (p 186)

After having described the various types of sports of Lord Kṛṣṇa as occur in the Bhg the author attempts to prove the eternality of the same and concludes that those who do not believe in this and regard the world to be unreal, are demoniac since they cannot pursue the path of devotion and worship of the Lord Their scepticism is also born of the Wish of God The author finally bows to his preceptor 'who spread the path of Love for the Lord of the Gopis (p 219)

The main point in connection with Ś's theory at which most of the attacks have been directed is the unreality of the world V and his illustrious son and follower, Viṭ, seem to find an easy target in this theory of Illusion of Ś and do not even fight shy of calling him a pseudo atheist This has been

¹ " नास्य जरयैतज्जीयति, न वचनात् इत्यन, एवम् मय ब्रह्मपुरमग्निन् कामा न्माहिता ।' etc

² 'कामपदन कामभोगापकरणान्यव तत्राभिप्रेयन्ते । मनोरथपरस्त्र त्वशानाक्तिर्विद्ध्यत ।'

—Comm on V M p 185

³ 'सर्वत पाणिपादान्नादिग्वेव लौकिकत्वेन वेदन मा भूत् ।'

noticed in detail in chapter V wherein important works of V have been dealt with. Both Ś and V regard the śruti to be supreme in authority, but in Ś, this leaning on revelation is seldom seen to go against reason, while in V and his followers, one marks a tendency to ignore reasoning, whenever it has to be ignored, while taking resort to the mere word of the 'śruti', or on the other hand, to exploit theoretical reasoning to its other extreme recking little of facts of experience—and this can lead to anything.¹ This yields results which are neither practical, nor possible. The illustration of the 'imperishable pot' also reveals how very uncertain and unsupported by experience some assertions of the Śuddhādvaitins are.* Again while revelling in syllogistic style to prove a point or to postulate a theory, Viṭ sometimes gives reasons which are suitable to him, but are not valid "hetus",² sometimes gives too many ablatives meaning only one thing, and, of course, proving just the same thing,³ and at times plunges into poetic description, reminding the reader of Bāna (but this is sorely misplaced as the work deals with philosophy and not with literary artifices)—but is it because he is not able to prove his point of view rationally?⁴ Sometimes there is a confusion of terms in syllogistic reasoning⁵—especially when the author tries to be rational about the dogmatic assertions of the Bhg and the MBH—and last but not least, when all reasoning fails and no śruti—statement can be clutched at, the author blandly pronounces that anything *can* happen—even fire can become 'non hot'—if the Lord so chooses!⁷ When

¹ E.g. the argument that even a pot that is seen to be destroyed can become an object of perception on the part of the mystics (p. 37)

² In the discussion on Āvirbhava Tirobhava concepts, the impossibility of postulating any tirobhava of a pot etc. which leads to the eternal perception of the latter even when it is destroyed constitutes one of the illustrations of this type

³ 'मलवकल्प्या हि सा ।'—(p. 56) 'नाप्यभ्यस्त, नग्याऽयमावात् ।'

—(p. 34)

⁴ p. 75

⁵ E.g. तथा च जीए तर्पणाऽऽकीर्णविवक्षन्त ब्रह्मवादभवन् नम ।' —(p. 54)

'अहो भूटना ॥ यत्कल्पना न भिष्यामिवादन ।' —(p. 64)

⁶ 'अविप्रणारा सर्वेषा तदेवाकृत्यो नृप ।' —(p. 55)

⁷ 'ब्रह्मण' नदरूपवेनाप ब्रह्मेरेनु एवरुपरवेनापि, वह्निरनुष्य हत्य दिवाप्याभ्य ष प्राणान ।' —(p. 63)

such dogmatic statements are made without having any scope for rational approach, anything can be proved from anything—and there is no explanation to be expected

While discussing the nature of Āvirbhāva and Tirobhava of a thing, the author first of all attempts to define and explain these terms on the basis of reason, but slowly the arguments take an unusual turn and end in the Wish Divine¹

This may be good theology, but surely, it is bad philosophy. The student of the system of Pure Monism is too often forced to leave the regions of perception and inference and is led into the misty rainbow-tinted heights of theological postulates, which are highly entrancing, but least convincing,

Yet, the VM possesses certain merits which cannot be denied. The vigour and close reasoning which Viṭ shows in different passages raise his work to a level of value superior to the Anu. As usual in controversial works of the Vedānta schools, the most telling hits are made in finding the chinks and weaknesses in the opponents' armour and position—much more often than while defending one's own system. It may be said that both V and Viṭ are too staunch in their acceptance of the sruti-word as presenting *the* final truth to see any necessity of admitting 'reason' at all, while with Ś, who also considers 'śabda' to be the highest authority, every sruti text that he treats in the course of his interpretation of the BS or the Upaniṣad, is subjected to a rigorous test of logic. This may lead someone to conclude that V—Viṭ's attitude is, on the whole, more consistent with that whole-hearted acceptance without fear of consequential logical as well as metaphysical difficulties and impossibilities—than that of Ś, who disregards the meaning of the sruti texts for the sake of logical reasoning in his system. One may even go the extent of accusing Ś of being unfaithful to the very basic acceptance of the authority of the 'sruti'—but the fact that every commentator has selected certain Up texts to the exclusion of others is suggestive enough of their formal acceptance of the 'sruti' as the final authority and it reveals that they were all conditioned by their own times.

Therefore, what remains to be seen is the consistency *within* a system as such—whether one may or may not agree with what

V. or Ś has to say—when once the fundamental postulates, common to both or peculiar to each one, have been accepted as a basis. And that should be the proper standard to judge their relative merits.

2 *‘Suddhādvaita mātandah (by Giridhara)*

The author deals with the doctrine of Pure Non dualism in this work of ninety-five verses. The empirical dealings with (objects distinguished by) names and forms are not unreal, since they fall within the range of the world, a manifestation of the Lord. It is the notion of difference (from one another, as if not having the one common divine substratum) pertaining to the names and forms that is unreal and a product of ignorance, but not so the names and forms themselves. The text ‘sarvam khalu’ etc., speaks of everything as non-different from Br., from which the world originates, whereby it exists and wherein it finally gets dissolved. The term ‘īdam’ in the afore-said text points to the reality of the world, an object of experience, since it is said to be of the nature of Br. This acceptance of the reality of the world does not lead, says Giridhara, to dualism since there is a non-difference between Br. & Jiva, these being related as cause and effect.

The doctrine that Br. is the cause of the world is amply supported by sutras like ‘Janmādyasya yatah śāstrayonitvat’, as also by śruti texts such as ‘yato va imani bhūtāni, etc. Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhatta explains in his commentary why the second sutra should be read as above and not be regarded as two separate sutras. Following Puruṣottama in his explanation he states that if it were split and read as two distinct sutras the first sūtra would lack reason (hetu) while the second would be devoid of any point to be proved (sādhyā). The scriptural text ‘Satyam Jñanam anantam Brahma’ presents the characteristic nature (svarupa lakṣana) of Br., and ‘Janmadyasya yatah’, etc., gives its characteristics in relation to the world, its effect (Karyalaksana). Again, even at the end of the Svarupa lakṣana statement, there is no express negation of ‘Kartṛtva’ on the part of Br., Br. is an abode of mutually contradictory attributes and the texts with negative import such as “asthulam”, etc., refer to the detail of empirical or material qualities in Br. and not to a total denial of attributes. Therefore, the scriptural authority testifies that

Br. is the cause of the appearance and concealment of the world

The 'Samanvaya-sūtra' discusses whether Br is the inherent (samavāyi) cause or not, and finally establishes Br to be the inherent cause of the world, even as the clay is that of pots, etc. This inherence is neither superimposed nor accidental, since, says the author, an inherent cause is that which gives rise to the effects through the relation of identity (tādātmyam). Material causality (upādāna) is also a phase of it.

Here the point of distinction that the author wishes to bring out between the inherent (samavāyi) cause and the material (upādāna) cause hinges around the use of the term 'yadasrayam' in the definition of the 'samavāyi-karana', which is stated to be 'that, founded one which, the effect takes place (or is produced) through the relation of identity'. The 'Upādāna-Kāraṇa' is defined as "that which becomes manifest in the form of an effect sharing the same existence (with its cause)"¹

The third adhikarāna (Iksatyadhikarāna) posits in the Cit-aspect of Br the reason for Br's being the cause of the world. The Ānandamaya adhikarāna stresses the Ānanda aspect of Br as leading to His being the cause of the world.

Thus, having laid down Br to be the cause, the author proceeds to present the characteristics of Br. He cites texts from the T. Up. and the śvet. Up. (He is Rasa, etc. having eyes in all directions, etc.), the Ch. Up. ("He is 'Sarvakāma', 'Sarvagandha', etc."), the Purusa-sukta and Nārada pāncarātra which describe Br to possess hands, feet, face, etc., as made of Bliss alone—and concludes on the strength of these that the texts as are deemed to have a negative import, e.g. 'Apanipādo javano grahītā', etc., actually deny the possession of *material* hands, etc., and the characteristic of 'Javagrahītva' that follows immediately suggests that Br possesses a form and qualities, as it is also supported by texts like 'His powers are great and varied' etc., 'He is omniscient', and so on.

The emergence of sparks of blazing fire forms a stock illustration of the followers of Pure Monism for establishing that the jīvas, the jagat and the Antar yamun emerge from the Sat, Cit

¹ 'तदात्म्यसम्बन्धेन यदाश्रयं कार्यं भवति तन् स्मवाधिकारणम् ।

स्वत्मानसत्त्वाकाराकारेण यदाविर्भवति तदुपदानम् ।'

and Ānanda aspects of Br¹ This emergence (vyuccarana) of the jivas, etc., precludes the possibility of their being 'originated' (utpatti) as well as being non-eternal (anityatva)

Thus, the jiva comes out of the Sat and Cit aspects of Br and is a part (amsa) of Br In spite of the jiva's being atomic (anu), its quality of sentiency (caitanya) spreads all over the body, even as the light of a lamp, placed in a corner spreads in all directions in addition to the one occupied by the lamp B S like 'Gunīdvā lokavat', 'Vvatirekogandhavat', etc., illustrate the same point Just as the fragrance of a flower is experienced even at a place where the flower itself is not present, in the same way the 'caitanya' of the jiva spreads all over the body, notwithstanding the atomic size of the jiva

Here, the author of 'Prakāsa' on the Śu M very clearly and briefly brings home to the reader what the celebrated author of the more ambitious work, viz V M, has not been able to do so clearly and succinctly while discussing therein the same topic in his dialectic style Ramakṛṣṇabhāṭṭa says in four lines that you cannot say that this fragrance which is experienced at a distance is on account of the travelling of the particles of the flower, since this would necessitate that the flower should get reduced, and the argument that these reduced particles get refilled or replaced by way of an 'Adṛṣṭa' or an unseen principle with respect to the flower to be experienced or enjoyed—is unacceptable, since it involves excessive recourse to hypothesis Moreover, there is the case of excessive or intensified smell like garlic, after having handled which, even when one washes the hand many times its smell does not go, and the musk (dried up secretion in the navel of the antelope), in spite of being covered up by layers of leather (or skin), spreads its fragrance all round Therefore, the round about hypothesis of the refilling of the reduced particles, etc., stands (nullified) refuted by these illustrations The sutras like 'Avirodhascandanavat' and 'Amśo nanāvyapadesat' support the same view, viz. that the jiva is a part of Br and that its sentiency spreads throughout the body like the sandal paste, applied only to a part of the body, produces coolness all over the body

¹ यथा मुद्रास्तारु पक्ववदिरकुलिङ्गा व्युच्चरन्ति, एवमव तस्मात्प्रजन सुवे प्रण सुवे लोका नवे त्वा कपूयवत्तण रमणायचत्तण ।'
—Mu Up

The difference between the jada or inanimate and the jiva or the sentient form exists because of the concealment of certain aspects of the Lord in them or the manifestation of the same in a graded form. The manifestation and concealment depend upon the Wish of the Lord and if He should wish to manifest all His aspects inclusive of Ānanda, everything would be Br. It is for the sake of Sport only that Br assumes such forms, and He is not conditioned by any of these, nor does He undergo any modification, even as the serpent of its own wish assumes a coiled form and yet is not modified. Just as gold remains unchanged in its essence, even when it is moulded into forms of bracelets, rings, etc., even so Br remains unchanged and immutable.

All things in the world are subject to the Will of God. A pot is perceived as a pot through the Wish of the Lord to be manifest as a pot. These manifestation and concealment are the powers of the Lord and even when, through His Wish, a pot is not manifest, it does not mean that the pot does not exist—it simply means that what was explicit as a pot has been made implicit in its causal state. And manifestation (āvirbhava) means that the implicit in the causal state becomes explicit in the form of a particular effect. Therefore, all things are eternal, since they are but the manifestations of the Lord. If a pot is destroyed, it is not that it is non-existent, but that it has been restored to its causal condition, viz. clay. Manifestation and concealment are defined in the V. M. as the capability of becoming an object of experience and the capability of becoming a *non-object* of experience' respectively—but the commentator on the Śu. M. seems to have overlooked the point that 'concealment' also is a power of the Lord, in that he defines it as 'tadayogyatvam', seeming thereby to give a negative import to this power of the Lord which is precisely the aspect desired to be avoided by the followers of the doctrine of Śuddhādvaita. Viṣṇu in his V. M. and also the commentary on it explain the term 'avisayatva' as 'the absence of an object' or 'another, opposite object'.¹ This definition (of Tirobhāva) is so construed in order to avoid the negative import which would have been conveyed if it were defined

¹ 'अविषयत्व इत्यत्र विरुद्ध अर्थान्तरं वा ।

as 'advīṣayatvāyogyatā', and this is likely to be misunderstood as the negation or absence of 'capability', used in the definition of 'Āvirbhāva', a power of the Lord

This being so, the (abhāvas) antecedent non existence, etc, become senseless and hence are unacceptable. The Prāgabhāva, the Pradhvamsābhāva, the Anyonyābhāva and the Atyantābhāva are but phases of these two powers of the Lord. Thus, Prāgabhāva is nothing but the effect remaining implicit in its cause. Pradhvamsābhāva is also the return to the condition of causality which is incompatible with the actual manifestation of the effect, Anyonyābhāva is the experience of a pot in a pot only and not in a place of cloth because of the Wish of the Lord to manifest as a pot in a pot only and not in a piece of cloth, etc, and vice versa. Atyantābhāva is just 'tirobhāva' or concealment.

Thus, the author propounds the reality of the world, an objective form of the powers of manifestation and concealment belonging to the Lord, and discards the notions of Prāgabhāva, etc.

Citing a famous stanza from the Bhg.,¹ the author proceeds to show that anything that exists is a form of Br,—be it an effect, a cause, a substratum, an instrument or anything—wherever and whenever it is, it is nothing but Br, who is capable of assuming any form, and who is an abode of contradictory attributes.

Just as ornaments made of gold are essentially non different from gold so are these things nothing but manifestation of the Lord. The sruti texts like 'just as, O dear one, everything earthen becomes known', etc, point to the non difference between the pots, etc, and clay, and the fundamental text 'That thou art' speaks of the non difference of the 'amsas' from their 'Amśin', viz Br.

Ś interprets this text by resorting to 'Bhagatīyaga lakṣaṇa' i.e. 'tat' in the sentence stands for Br, while 'tvam' refers to jīva having limitations, etc. the identity of these two is not possible since Br is Omniscient while the jīva is 'little knowing' (alpa jñā) or ignorant (ajñā), so this passage, referring to the

¹ 'अथ येन यतो यस्य यदने यद्यथा यदा ।

स्यादिदं भगवान् सात्त्वन् प्रपन्नपुम्पश्वर ॥'—V. 18

Omniscience and ignorance, on the part of Br and jīva respectively, should be discarded and only the Cit-aspect common to both should be accepted as the basis for postulating the identity of the two Rāma dissolves 'tattvamasi' as "tasya tvamasi", pointing thereby to the relation of master-and-the servant, while Madhva says "Atattvamasi" meaning that "thou art not that Br" ('tad Brahma tvam nāsi')

V says that the jīva is a part of Br, and hence the Non-dualism. The story of Śvetaketu begins with the very question which refers to the knowledge of everything through the knowledge of the One. Now, this is possible only if that One, inspite of being just One, could be all, whereby the truth of the above statement be realised. Just as ornaments of gold as well as lumps of gold are nothing but gold, by the knowledge of which, the former are automatically known, in the same way, by the realisation of the prime cause of everything, all its effects would be known. It is for this purpose that the narration starts with "Being alone, O my dear one", etc, and for the sake of assigning reality to this inanimate world, it runs as "Aitadātmyam idam sarvam" meaning that all this (the world) has the Self for its essence. Then for removing imperfections like unreality, etc, pertaining to the inanimate world, the reality is asserted as "tat satyam". In order to lay down the reality of the inanimate world and the jīva or the self, the reason is given as "He is the Self". Thus, having spoken about the inanimate world being but a form of God, the jīva is also identified with Br by the statement "That thou art". This whole passage has to be regarded as the preaching and not merely the statement of identity, viz "tattvamasi", and just as we do not take resort to Metaphor in determining the meaning of "Aitadātmyam" and do not relegate the Sat portion therein to Metaphor, we should not explain "tattvamasi" by relegating its Cit-aspect to bhāga tyāga-lakṣṇa as Ś does. So the text 'tattvamasi' should not be detached from its context and so interpreted as to yield the sense of oneness or identity of the jīva and Br, because this would involve the flaw of 'Vākya-bheda' (lit splitting of the sentence) and contradiction to what has been asserted in the beginning (Upakrama-virodha).

The afore-said explanation embodies the view of the author of the 'Prakāśa (on Śu. M.) who closely follows Viṭ. ¹'Vākya-bheda',

¹ Refer to Ch. VI. 1, for the detailed discussion concerning this topic.

as already explained earlier, is said to result when a particular word or statement is accepted to stand for a particular thing in the first place and just its opposite or a different thing altogether in the same breath. But here the author has borrowed this technical term of the Purva-Mīmāṃsā and appropriated it very differently, viz. in the literal sense of 'splitting of the statement', and he is only following the lead given by his masters.

Giridharajī next proceeds to explain the term 'suddha' as 'Maya-sambandharahitam' meaning that Br. creates the world without getting involved in any connection with Maya. Here the author summarises the Maya-vāda as postulated by S. "The world is but a figment of Nescience and hence perishable. Br. is the cause only through the instrumentality of Māya, but in reality It remains beyond the pale of causation, etc. The high and low world, a product of Nescience, must have a cause similar to itself, thus, Avidya alone can be its cause. Scriptural texts like 'Niskalam', etc., 'Yad vaca anabhyuditam—tadeva Brahma tvam viddhi nedam yadidam upasate', etc., point to Br. being formless and non-agent (akārtr), since agency implies possession of characteristics or attributes. And whatever possesses a form is liable to destruction, and since Br. is imperishable, it must be formless. Avidya is established on the experience of man as "I am ignorant." Maya and Avidya are but synonyms. It gives rise to various modifications whereby this world becomes a matter of preception. Maya is said to have a predominance of pure element, while in Avidya the impure element is preponderant.

Just as the Sun, etc., are seen reflected in water, mirror, etc., even so is Br. reflected as Isvara and Jiva through Maya and Avidya respectively. The sutra 'Ābhasa eva ca' corroborates the same view. The illustration of snake-in-the-rope lays bare the doctrine that the jiva is but an appearance superimposed on Br. The śruti text 'vacarambhanam', etc., explains that modification is only a matter of speech, while, in reality, modifications like a pot, etc., do not exist as such. Hence the perception of this world is only due to delusion and the idea that Br. is its creator, etc., is false.

The śruti texts which predicate creation, etc. of Br. are meant for the sake of meditation and form a step in the ladder to the

Supreme Realisation. The possession of form, attributes, etc., is imposed on Br. for facilitating an easier apprehension and meditation, and when the mind becomes better prepared for the reception of the Highest truth, these characteristics are denied, and Br. devoid of all attributes, etc., is finally spoken of as the *Summum Bonum*.

“When the knowledge of such a Br. dawns on one, one attains oneness with Br. and all one's limitations resulting from Avidyā drop off like the dream-objects on waking.”

After having thus presented in a nutshell the postulates of Ś, the author attempts a refutation of the same from the standpoint of the Śuddhādvaita system. He states that the scriptures lay down the reality of whatever is a matter of perception—e.g., ‘Yadidaṁ kinca tatsatyam’, ‘Sarvam khalu, etc., ‘tadetadaḥṣayam nityam jagan-munivarā-khīlam’, etc. All these establish the reality of the world as also its non-difference from Br. Again, there is no valid means of reasoning or proof to show that jagat is unreal. The texts of negative import like ‘Niṣkalam’, etc., only deny the material qualities of Br. and do not assert a total absence of qualities. This is supported by the sūtra “Prakṛtāitāvattvam hi pratīśedhati” etc. Even after having spoken of ‘asthūlam’, etc., the texts further on describe that the heaven and earth are supported by Him, and so on, which proves that Br. does possess attributes. The mantra “Rūpam rūpam pratirūpo babhūva yattasya rūpam praticaksanāya, Indro māyābhīḥ pururūpa iyate”, etc., points out that Māyā acts as an instrument for jñāna and not for Br.'s assumption of many forms. And the inference that ‘whatever has a form is liable to perish requires some ‘hetu’ like ‘since it is produced’ or ‘since it is material’ but neither is applicable to Br., therefore, Br. is not proved to be ‘Formless’.

Again, the illustration of the snake-rope is not appropriate, says the author, since it implies that the snake was seen elsewhere, the rope is the object, while the false appearance of a snake in the place of a rope is spoken of in the case of a third person, viz. the seer. In the present case, according to Ś, the world is unreal, Br. cannot be the object of perception and there is no seer even. Thus, the case is not analogous. The wrong perception of a snake in the rope is due to the similarity between the two. And if the illustration were regarded to be applicable

and congruous, even Br would have similarity with the object superimposed on it, and hence would become 'Sākāra' or possessed of a form. Even the Vacarambhana—text refers to the non-difference of the cause and its effects and not to the unreality of the world. The Sutrakāra also lays down that the dream world is "māyika" (B S III 2 3) and in B S II 2 29) emphasises the point that the world is different from the dream-world, and hence the former is not 'mayika'. V says that the Purana reference to regard the world as 'māyika' aims at producing an attitude of renunciation. If it were held that the attributes are superimposed on Br, for facilitating an easy apprehension at a preliminary stage, then the lower Br (Upahita) would become an object to be abandoned and even the knowledge of the unreality of the world would not purify the mind at all. Thus, the Mayavāda is open to criticism, says the author.

Giridharaji next questions the upholder of Māya theory, whether this "Maya" is produced or unproduced, and points out fallacies attendant on both the alternatives. If it is produced who is its producer? It must be Br, since there existed nothing other than Br, and in that case, Br would be 'Śaviṣeṣa' or qualified. If Maya is unproduced, it would lead to duality and contradict the text 'This self *alone* was there in the beginning', etc. If it were beginningless, it would have no end either, which position would, again, be unacceptable to the followers of Absolute Monism. Thus, the postulates of the doctrine of Absolute Monism are founded on confusion or intermixture of the effect and the cause, since the effect (jīva) is intelligent, but limited by Avidya, while the cause is intelligent, limited by Maya.

It is with a view to do away with this defect that V has qualified his doctrine of Advaita by the epithet 'śuddha', suggesting the non-duality of the jīva and Br which is pure. The author follows V in his explanation of the term 'suddhādvaita' and says that the effect (jīva) also is nothing but the cause, viz. Br and hence the jīva is not unreal.

Describing the three types of people in accordance with their fitness or eligibility, the author says that the followers of Pure Monism are the best qualified, since they regard everything to be the Lord, the followers of Nimbarka and Bhāskara come under the second category or are 'ordinary' with respect to their

eligibility, because they regard this world to be the same as Br and that it is different from Br on account of His Wish to create. The lowest type of eligibility is witnessed in the followers of Dualism who speak of a real difference between the jiva and Br and so on. Their view is most inappropriate says the author. The difference that is perceived is due to the Divine Wish which gives rise to the condition of effect for the sake of Sport, but at the time of dissolution everything becomes one with the causal state as in the case of a pot which lapses back into its causal state viz clay¹

Following in the footsteps of V and Vit, Giridharajī says that the faults of inequality and cruelty do not arise in connection with Br. He also offers the interpretations of sutras like 'Arupavadeva hi tatpradhanatvat, 'Prakrtiscā pratijñā drstān t inuparodhat', etc, as given by V himself and concludes that the sutra 'tattu samanvayat corroborates the same point, viz that Br is also the inherent cause (samavayi) besides being the efficient cause of the world.

The author then refers to the four fold canon of authority that V has accepted. Next he deals with Seva or service to the Lord which forms a unique feature in the system of V. Its definition is reproduced here as the flow of the mind towards the Lord, resulting in the realisation of oneness of spirit in everything arising gradually through the dedication of one's body, wealth etc, at the feet of the Lord. V says in his Anu that when the knowledge of Br arises in one the Avidya rooted in the cognitions of I and mine gets removed and thus the material qualities are eliminated and purity is attained—and thus, one acquires a body suitable for the attainment of the highest Lord. Such a jiva is chosen by the Lord as His own (sviyatvena varana) and he becomes eligible for a formal participation in the Divine Sport. This is described in the text

So snute sarvan kaman saha Brahmana vipascita, meaning that such a jiva enjoys all desirable pleasures along with the intelligent Lord. The removal of Avidya is witnessed through the statement 'Mameva te prapadyante mayametam taranti

¹

'पूर्वावस्था तु मृदया घटावस्था ततोऽभवत् ।

घटोऽपि मृत्तिकारूपा लये यश्चात्र मृत्तिका ॥

te", which means that those who resort to the Lord overcome Avidyā clinging to them. The devotees are said to assume a non-material body, suitable for participation in the Sports of the Lord, after they get an entrance into the Akṣara Br., an abode of the Puruṣottama. "Puruṣaḥ sa parah pārtha", etc. suggests that this Akṣara-attainment is lower than that of the Highest Lord. Lord Kṛṣṇa, who is attainable only through supreme devotion, liberates the jīva by means of His Grace and puts an end to all his afflictions—and when through the torment of separation from the Lord, the jīva becomes capable of destroying its state of embodiment, the Lord makes it enjoy the *divine Bliss*. This enjoyment of Bliss does not result in the case of the jñāna-followers, who are said to acquire union with the Akṣara Br. only.

The 'Śu M.' is thus a handy compendium of the philosophy of Pure Non-dualism. It presents the main theories of the Doctrine of Śuddhādvaita in brief outlines, and although there is nothing new in the topics dealt with therein, its attempt to refute the chief Vedāntic systems within its small compass is unique in itself. The commentary is very lucid. It is not exhaustive in presenting the details of the system.

3. *Prameya-ratnārnava* (by Bālakṛṣṇabhāṭṭa)

As compared to the Śu.M., this is an even more ambitious work, wherein the author has dealt with the cardinal aspects of the Śuddhādvaita system which are reproduced from V.'s works such as the Subodhinī, the T.D.M. and Anu, as also from the V.M. of Viṭ.

The author states that he undertakes to describe the nature of the jagat first, since the knowledge of the jagat, as a form of Br., forms a stepping-stone to the worship of the Lord. The jagat is a manifestation of Br., the latter remaining unchanged or unmodified in itself. This brings in the theory of the Immutable Transformation of the Lord, also supported by sūtras like 'Ātmakṛteḥ parināmāt', etc., Hence, this jagat is neither a product of nescience nor different from Br. It is real, and hence should be regarded as 'manifested' and 'concealed' rather than as 'produced', 'destroyed', etc. This theory of Āvirbhāva and Tirobhāva sets aside the question of antecedent non-existence, etc. The objection—that in spite of the acceptance of the non-difference of the jagat from

Br the Anyonyābhāva does prevail, since objects like pots, etc cannot be non different from others like a piece of cloth and so on—is met with the answer that through the Wish of the Lord to be many, the quality of being a piece of cloth, etc, is concealed in a pot, etc, and since the quality of being a pot is manifest only in a pot, there is no possibility of any confusion either. The Lord has so ordained that a particular object, say, a pot, can accomplish a particular effect only, such as of fetching water, so, even when these form the characteristics of the Lord, there is a regulated course controlled by the Lord pertaining to the capacity of an object to carry out only a particular type of effect. Thus, a pot can fulfil the purpose of fetching water which a piece of cloth, etc, cannot. This explains that everything is accomplished through the powers of manifestation and concealment and therefore, mutual non existence should not be accepted—e.g. 'Sarvam Sarvamayam, etc

Thus, when Anyonyabhava is cast aside, and when everything is accepted as a form of the Lord, there is no need of refuting the Atyantābhāva or total non existence. Here the author winds up his statements defining what is 'Brahma vadā, but the statements are hardly convincing¹ (except to the follower of the doctrine that Br is the real substratum of everything and is potentially existing as any other thing)

Here, it could be objected that the absence of a pot on the earth points only to the non existence of it at that particular spot at that moment, it does not speak of the possibility or otherwise of the presence of any other object such as grass, space, etc. Secondly, the argument that since grass or space is present there, even the pot is present, because everything is a form of everything is open to challenge. This would become acceptable if a particular thing were taken to mean everything else—which undoubtedly is not practicable since the purpose of fetching water can never be fulfilled by everything except a pot, although the existence of grass or space may be posited in the place of a pot. It is true from the ultimate point of view that all this is Br but so far as any practical end is in view, 'A can

¹ 'तथाहि भूतले घटा नास्तात्त्वत्र हि घटानुपलम्बेऽपि तन्भूतल वस्वतरम्य तृणादराकाशस्य वा विद्यमानत्वात् तृणादिना आकाशन वा घटस्यापि भवान्नायन्ताभाव । अत्र सर्वस्य भद्ररूपत्वात् भवस्य भद्रत्र विद्यमानत्वाच्च सर्वस्य प्रत्यक्षमिति शुद्धो ब्रह्मवाद ।'

only act as 'A' and 'A' alone, and nothing else

This also involves the question of shifting the importance which is primarily meant to be attached to the realisation of everything as nothing but Br, to passage of worldly concern. This "Sarvasya Sarvarūpatva" cannot be experienced so far as one is stuck up in the quagmire of "I"-ness and "mine"-ness referring to the objects and dealings of the world. So, when we are talking of the worldly objects from the empirical point of view, we cannot transfer our deductions to Br and similarly the characteristics of Br to the worldly objects and ends.

The world is a form of Br and it merges into Br and also becomes manifest through the Wish of the Lord. About the manifestation of a pot, etc., the Lord chooses to be manifested through clay as the material cause in the form of a pot, etc. Thus, that clay is the material cause and the pot, its effect.¹ But the same divine substratum could manifest itself as cloth substratum, or grass substratum or space substratum or vice versa, even when only "empty" space seems to be on an earth surface (in the case of "atyantabhava")

The Concept of Viśayāṭā Vs Viśaya

It is *Mayā* which confuses the *jīva* and gives rise, in the mind of the *jīva* to an unreal object (similar to the real, worldly object) and projects the same on to the real object within the sense range. When the *jīva* tries to perceive the real object, even the unreal object is cognized, and the knowledge soiled by the perception of such an unreal object produces confusion. This being so, the unreal qualities also become a matter of perception and the same is referred to in "Yadidam manasa vaca", etc.

The scriptural statements referring to the world being *Mayika* are meant for the sake of producing an attitude of renunciation and sacrifice. Thus the perception of the confused or dull willed is unreal, but there is no flaw concerning the object itself. The same is mentioned in the Bhg (II 9 33) as 'anything that is perceived in the absence of an object and does not convince the Self, should be regarded as 'Maya of the Self, like reflection and darkness'. Commenting on the same, V says that confused by this (Maya) the intellect regards the objects to be different, but the objects themselves do not become different thereby. Just as

¹ 'मृदादि म।वक्ष्य वटाशकादभ्युत्पत् ।'—T D N

a person in a moving vehicle feels that the objects he passes by are moving, but in reality, movement does not belong to those objects, in the same way, the illusion (Viśayatā) distorts the perception, while the object is nothing but Br, which is the ultimate reality. Again, birth, death, decay, etc., which we experience, are a form of 'Viśayata', a product of illusion. This 'Viśayata' is of two types, the first one conceals the real nature of things and the other one is the cause of perception of one thing as another (anyatha pratiti hetuh)

This Viśayata is defined differently in different works. The characteristics given above refer to the explanation of the term given in Subodhinī, which illustrates the two fold illusion as something like the reflection seen in a mirror or the production of darkness in the absence of light. The 'Phakkika' says that Māyā produces the two fold illusion in the form of action. It does not manifest the nature of Br and, secondly, it is 'Jagad rupa', which is explained as that type of Viśayata which seems to be real like the jagat, but in reality it is not¹. It does not mean that the world which is a matter of experience has 'Viśayatā', since jagat is but a form of Br, which is the 'Viśaya'. Maya produces Viśayata pertaining to attributes as also to the possessor of attributes. For example, the movement attributed to the non moving objects (seen from a moving vehicle, etc.) is of the first kind, while darkness in the absence of light goes under the second category. Both these types of Viśayata are common to the jagat and hence it is said to be 'Jagadrupa'. This Viśayata can be destroyed by means of Brahma Jnana.

This world is seen differently by different persons, who can be divided into three categories. Those who have attained 'Brahma bhava' regard the world to be of the nature of pure Br itself.

Here an illustration of the perception of a white (piece of cloth)" as white seems to be in the mind of the author, but the text (as it is available) is incomplete, since there in the subject is missing (to which the following clause refers)²

¹ 'जगद्रूपा विषयता जगदिव सत्यमिव रूप यस्या सा जगद्रूपेति समाप्तो हेय ।

² Probably meaning with the *natural* whiteness of cotton made threads

³ 'यथा यस्मिन् लये स एव शुक्लो गृह्यते । तद्वत् ।'—(p 4)

For those who have acquired knowledge through scriptures, the jagat possesses the attributes of both Br and Māyā, like the form, etc belonging to a piece of cloth are deemed to be real, while greenness of the cloth is regarded to be fictitious (as being super added to the natural qualities of the cloth and discardable) As for the dull witted or non-discriminative people, the jagat appears to possess both these types of attributes, which, for them, are non-distinct from each other, like the form, etc, as well as the greenness etc, pertaining to a piece of cloth are equally real and natural in their opinion

This being so, the difference is due to one's cognition and not due to the essence or the nature of an object Hence, the jagat must be accepted to be real, it being non different from Br

The Idols of the Lord One devoid of devotion for the Lord has his intellect dominated by Maya which produces 'Viṣayatā' in his mind But it cannot affect

the idol of the Lord, since therein the divine qualities are manifest and Mayā is not capable of projecting its Viṣayata on it The T D N, the Bhg etc, attach very great importance to the service to be offered to the idol of the Lord The author here quotes many such works and tries to justify the same by saying that many are reported to have attained the Lord through their connection with the idol, etc

If one were to argue that if everything were but a form of Br, the body also must be so, as it falls within "everything" and so the intellect belonging to it must also be valid or good, and yet this intellect has been censured in the Bhg, etc to this the author says that in the case of one who has not realised Br and who sees the body as possessed of modification etc—the intellect pertaining to body and soul, produced by Maya has been the object of criticism and censure, while in the case of one who sees everything as Br and hence his own body also as so, this intellect is valid—as supported by the Sutra "Ātmakṛteḥ pānamat"

The reconciliation of the statements of the world's reality and the 'advaita' position of Br is effected by postulating the doctrine of the unreality of the samsara rooted in 'I-ness and 'mine-ness' The Jagat is real, but the samsara is unreal

The scriptural statements such as 'tattvamasi' 'nanuratacchruṭeḥ', etc point to the fact that the jiva is atomic in size—and is

The Nature of the Jiva : non different from Br , of which it is but a part
 The jivas are of three types the pure, the mundane and the liberated From Aksara, which is the cause, these jiva comes forth as the sparks emerging out of fire The Aksara has the pure element of being (Viśuddha sattva) and as the jivas comes out of it as its part, it shares the characteristics of the Akṣara, but by the Wish of the Lord, the bliss portion gets concealed in the jiva Then that part, atomic in size, having intelligence or sentiency in predominance, with the bliss non manifest, comes to be known as a jiva In the commentary on Subodhini, it is said that the bliss aspect is concealed in the beginning whereby there results the existence as a jiva ¹ Here 'purvameva' points to the concealment of the bliss aspect before the concealment of the divine qualities like sovereignty, etc The T D N explains that through the desire of the Lord to become the high and low world, the bliss portion was suppressed in the jivas

Even when Br is all pervading, the emergence of the jivas from it is possible, because the sruti speaks of it and secondly because Br is an abode of contradictory attributes 'Sarvam Khalvidam Brahma' supports the same "Yatra yena yato", etc, also speaks of Br as immanent in everything After the emergence of the jivas from Br, the condition that precedes the connection of the jivas with Avidyā marks their stage of purity (suddha jivas) Then the divine qualities like sovereignty, etc, are concealed in them through the Wish of the Lord ² The Lord, thus wishing to be many, for the sake of Sport, causes in the case of certain jivas a type of daiva nature which is characterised by a subtle good inclination, whereby these jivas become eligible for attaining salvation For instance, the Gita says, "Daivi sampadvimoksaya", etc The bondage that is said to be beginningless refers to the jivas connection with Avidya, but the 'anaditva' of this the bondage is relative and not absolute i.e. it is said to be beginningless in relation to other momentary effects, like the use of 'immortality' in the case of Gods, etc, who are immortal as compared to the mortal beings, but not absolutely immortal This Avidya has five phases, such as

¹ 'आनन्दरास्तु पूर्वमेव त्रिहितो यत्र नोवभाव ।'

² 'पराभियानात्तु त्रिहितः, तत्रा ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययो ।'

the superimposition of the body, sense-organs and the Antah-karana on one another and the forgetfulness of one's own nature. Conditioned by these, the jīva suffers and that is what 'saṁsāra' consists of. This saṁsāra does not exist in reality, since it is a product of one's own ignorance. Then the jīva, being connected with the subtle and the gross body, experiences births, deaths, etc., which are obligatory for a 'Saṁsārin' and coming into contact with the good, through the Grace of the Lord, obtains five-fold knowledge and (finally) salvation, characterised by the highest Bliss¹ The jīva then ceases to be a 'Saṁsārin', since the five-fold knowledge he attains puts an end to his ignorance. These liberated jīvas may either be Jīvan mukta or Mukta—those who attain celestial abodes other than the "Vyāpi-Vaikunṭha" are called the Muktas, while some daiva-natured and best jīvas, coming into contact with good people, enter into eternal sport through their freely-chosen ("svatantra") devotion produced by 'śravaṇa', etc., rooted in their primary inclination or tendency. This eternal Sport is their liberation or the highest end. This description seems to indicate that these souls are given a natural fitness or natural aptitude for 'bhakti', but that they have to make that definite and full by a free-choice of their own in answer to the call of "pusti"² In the case of other jīvas, the Lord invests a certain baseness in them (Āsuratvam), characterised by an evil inclination, acting as an obstacle to liberation, as they become the object of His Wish to manifest the low-nature of beings. These jīvas are called Āsurajīvas or devils, who indulge in censurable activities and for all times to come remain in bondage only. (cf. Gītā, XVI. 19-20) Such jīvas can never attain salvation—except when the Lord, regardless of the efforts of the jīvas, destroys their Saṁsāra Himself at His own sweet will and puts an end to their Avidyā. Then these Āsura jīvas attain purity. The dissimilarity in the world caused by the concealment of His triple aspect in a graded form is then dissolved at the rise of the Bliss portion

¹ 'वैराग्यं मान्द्यये गौ च तपो भक्तिश्च केशवे ।

पञ्चपर्वेति विद्येयं यथा विद्वान् हरिं विशेत् ॥'

² This would ensure freedom for that type of souls, but not all, (Cf. the following lines) Yet even that is not clear, considering the general trend of the system

in the jivas, etc., and the whole world merges into the Lord. This is real Advaita and even the Aksara merges into the Para Brahma

It is interesting to note that this seems to form a part of the regular process (from the way in which the author speaks of it here), so that no jivas are for ever 'āsura', but *all* are put at some stage in the 'suddha'-state ("Kṛṣṇasyatmaratatvasya layah sarva sukhavahah"), where they can choose devotion, as said above. On the other hand, since all have to be finally ready for this "laya" or merging into the Lord, there does not seem to be any *final* freedom, since all have to accept that final bliss. This is consistent within the system of Pure Monism, but it also exposes the incompatibilities to which it must lead with regard to the real freedom and responsibility of the jivas.

The daiva-natured jivas are two-fold—those who follow the Maryada-path and the others who follow the Puṣṭi path. The former strive for salvation by following different paths like the Karma, Bhakti, Yoga, and carry out the injunctions laid down in scriptures, while the latter are blessed by the Lord by planting in them a seed, whereby they attain the highest fruit with the help of Puṣṭi or Grace.

The jiva is atomic and there is no contradiction involved here since its sentiency pervades the whole body like the sandal paste applied only to a portion can produce coolness all over the body. This illustration is not inappropriate although the sandal paste is perceived as being applied to a part and the coolness produced by it is a matter of experience—while in the case of the jiva, its stay in a particular part is not perceived. This is emphasised by śruti texts like "Katama Ātmā Yo-yam vijñānamayah", etc. Moreover, sentiency, like smell (gandha), can exist in places over and above that occupied by its substance (dravya), e.g. "Vyatireko gandhavat". It should not be said that the elements or particles of the flower can travel and thereby its fragrance (gandha) in places other than the flower itself is justified because such particles can never travel as is witnessed in the case of garlic, when touched by hand, leaves its smell on the hand, even after the latter has been so washed as to clear off the garlic particles—proving that 'gandha' is experienced in spite of the absence of its 'dravya', and secondly the musk of the antelope, even when enveloped in many layers of leather so as to

bar off the possibility of the escape of its particles, does give out its fragrance outside. This is dealt with elaborately in the VM. The texts like "So vā eṣa mahān etc." refer to Br as the context justifies. The sūtra 'Nanuratacchruteh' etc., also stresses the same point.

The Gītā speaking of the all pervasive characteristic in 'Nityaḥ sarvagataḥ', etc., should not be misinterpreted because it refers to the all pervasive character that comes about in the case of the jīva when the lordly qualities are bestowed on it at the rise of 'Brahmabhava'. So, all scriptures speaking of all pervasion should be understood in the light of the above clarification. There is again, no contradiction in its being thus both atomic and all pervasive, since it (?) is an abode of contradictory attributes. Just as the child Kṛṣṇa although placed in the lap of Yaśodā, is the support of the whole universe. Therefore, the jīva is atomic and its sentiency pervades the whole body.

Here, it should be noted that there is a turning away from Jīva to Br, as the author, following his predecessors tries to prove that the Jīva is atomic in size. The last paragraph clearly points to that transference as the author has to cleverly refer to and bring in the topic of 'Viruddha dharma śrayatva', which could be labelled as the last resort of the Śuddhavaitsins and the despair of all rational thinkers. One may say that this characteristic belongs to Br, while the jīva is the matter in hand, so the specific qualities of Br even if taken for granted, cannot solve the contradiction involved in the case of Jīva's being both atomic and all pervasive. Besides the illustration of Kṛṣṇa in the lap of Yaśoda is a popular one but not very apt since one can object that it is based on religious dogma rather than impartial reasoning.

In the system of V supreme reality is predicated of Kṛṣṇa who is said to be higher than the Aksara Brahman or the Following the Gīta statement 'Akṣaradapī highest Reality cottamah' V advocates the supremacy of Kṛṣṇa over Aksara and says that Kṛṣṇa is the Para Brahma, an abode of divine qualities like existence, intelligence and bliss.¹ The negative scriptural statements like 'asthulam', etc. implies that He does not possess any worldly

¹ Śuddhanta muktavali (V 3)

or gross qualities, while the texts laying down attributes refer to the eternal and divine qualities that He possesses¹ Kṛṣṇa is also known as Puruṣottama and is spoken of as the highest end and an object of worship in the Bhg , the Subodhini and the T D N He is the fullest (pari pūrṇa tama) manifestation of divinity and Vaikuntha is his abode He has Flavour or Bliss as his essence

He manifests himself through his desire to create in the form of Akṣara, wherein the bliss aspect is obscured "as it were" This Akṣara flashes differently on the minds of persons in accordance with their fitness To the devotees it appears like Vaikuntha, etc , which is the abode of Lord Kṛṣṇa This Akṣara becomes an object of experience for the devotees for whom some of its divine qualities are concealed while others are manifest These manifestation and concealment are the powers or the inherent capabilities of the Lord Tirobhava is defined as the non production of one's effect by an existent entity² It is objective in character, not subjective

As for the followers of the path of knowledge the Akṣara possesses existence, intelligence and bliss, is not conditioned by time and space, is self refulgent and devoid of attributes Actually, the Akṣara appears to be so to the Jñānins because the power of concealment alone is operative and hence it comes to be called 'Nirdharmaka' or devoid of attributes "Samsuptavacchunyavad apratarkyam tanmulabhutam padamamananti", etc describes it as something dormant, like the void difficult to be conceived as the prime factor There is no absence of qualities but there is concealment, and Subodhini states that 'abhava' does not form a separate category from 'Tirobhava' yet one cannot say that since we speak of the absence of misery, etc in Br , it means concealment of the same and hence the contingency of the existence of misery, etc , because misery, etc , are imaginary notions produced by Māyā and hence unreal , therefore their 'abhava' also is unreal, as is the case with the absence of the son of a barren woman

The divine element controlling the earth the sun and the rest (of the Universe) is termed 'Antaryamin' —or the inner controller and it regulates all worldly affairs The author says that the

¹ 'प्रतीत च निषेध, नाप्रतीत, न श्रुतिप्रतीतम् ।'

² 'सत पदार्थस्य स्वकायाकारि च तिरोभाव ।'

Highest possesses Sattva, Rajas and Tamas but these are divine not "Prakṛta" ! The Antaryāmin is immanent in all beings and is the root of all sportive incarnations like the Fish incarnation and so on Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva are the three Gunāvataras' or incarnations in accordance with the Rajas, Sattva and Tamas qualities embodied respectively in each of the divine manifestations The incarnation as Viṣṇu is said to be superior to the other two, because of the manifestation in that form of many characteristics of Puruṣottama such as the four arms, the yellow garment, the garland, etc

Thus, the fundamental principle assumes four forms, viz. those of Puruṣottama or Kṛṣṇa, Āksara, which is two fold (as mentioned above), and the Antaryāmin

The term 'Puṣṭi' is defined as 'Posanam tadānugrahaḥ' meaning the grace of the Lord The T D N also states that Puṣṭi is an attribute of the Lord in the form of Grace or Mercy It can

be inferred from one's attainment of a highly praiseworthy fruit without the aid of any prescribed means—whatever The supreme grace of the Lord is seen at work in cases like those of Devahūti, Ajāmīla, Śakra, Dītigarbha and Āśvatthaman, who were saved by the Lord's grace in critical times The grace in its normal force sets aside obstacles coming in the way of the chosen ones and makes the Highest accessible to them The special grace gives rise to an attitude of devotion resulting in the attainment of the Highest This is termed as 'Puṣṭi bhakti' or devotion born of grace V says in his Siddhanta muktavali¹ that grace is the decisive factor in this path of devotion And this specific type of grace is inferred from its effect, viz the attitude of devotion a jiva exhibits² The devotees who enjoy this special grace do not crave for anything apart from the attainment of the highest. It is four fold, viz Pravaha puṣṭi Maryada puṣṭi Puṣṭi puṣṭi and śuddha puṣṭi Those who have an inclination towards the performance of action or ritual in accordance with the predominance of the notions of "I" and "mine" constituting the Samsāra and are blessed with grace are called the Pravaha puṣṭi The Maryada puṣṭi devotees undertake

¹ 'अनुग्रहं पुष्तिमागं निदानं ह इति स्थितिः ।'

² 'भक्तिमानस्य कवनात् पुष्तिरस्तीति निरन्तरं ।'

activities like listening to the narration of Lord Kṛṣṇa's life, etc., being unmindful of the petty cares of earthly ends in view on account of their pure love for the Lord. The Puṣṭi-puṣṭi devotees have knowledge useful to devotion in addition to the grace of the Lord and they come to realise the nature of the world with its paraphernalia including the divine sport of the Lord, along with the Lord himself. This is the stage for the attainment of which a jīva should endeavour. The fourth type of devotion viz. Suddha-puṣṭi-bhakti is entirely a gift of God. Bestowing this on the jīva, God, so to say, surrenders himself to the devotee. The Subodhinī and the T.D.N. speak of 'Puṣṭi' as grace also meaning 'devotion born of grace'.

The path of grace signifies that the absence of any means for the achievement of the end works itself as *the* means as well as the fruit and that is the meaning of the path of grace. The 'end' here stands for God himself and the stanza speaks of the utter futility of all means other than the Lord, who is both the means and the end. The devotion characterised by śuddha puṣṭi does not require any special fitness on the part of the jīva, since the Lord blesses certain jīvas without taking into consideration any such points. These blessed jīvas do not look forward to this worldly or other-worldly objects and have a single-minded devotion towards Lord Kṛṣṇa, they do not consider their bodies, etc. as their own since they dedicate everything at the feet of the Lord, the condition of separation from the Lord keeps them constantly engrossed in the thoughts of Him and hence they deem it to be better than union as it were, they always possess selfless modesty and a feeling of dependence on God resulting from their separation from Him and offer every bit of their possessions—body, wealth and mind to the Lord, dedicating their whole life to His service.

The grace theory brings in the question of 'fitness' (adhikāra) on the part of the jīva for being selected for such a grace. The śruti texts like "This being accepted in self cannot be attained by means of dis-
The Path of Grace courses", etc., "He alone whom He chooses can attain Him", etc., point out that the Wish of the Lord to bless a particular jīva is the prime factor in its being selected. Even the inclination or tendency to worship God cannot rise in a jīva in the absence of grace. Amongst the

daiva natured jivas, there are some whom the Lord chooses to accept into the fold of Puṣṭi-mārga and thus through grace, they come to possess an inclination towards that path and practise singing etc., in praise of Lord Kṛṣṇa. It is like a 'seed' planted in them by the Lord in the form of subtle devotion. Here it should be pointed out that there is an inter-dependence of 'ruci' and 'puṣṭi'. The Wish of the Lord is the ruling factor, but rationally speaking, a jīva should not be held responsible for anything it does as inclination in the form of a 'seed' is said to be planted by God. It is called 'Bija bhāva', which through indirect attraction or tendency (Parokṣa ruci), helped by the force of śravaṇa etc., illumines the jīva with the flash divine. This natural flash of the divine gives rise to a specific type of inclination (ruci-viśeṣa) culminating in love for the Lord, which sets aside all earthly loves. This, when saturated with repeated listening to His panegyrics, service, etc., results in deep attachment (Āsakti) making the jīva turn away from all household objects and concerns that have no connection with God. This feeling of deep attachment gradually keeps on developing and ends in 'Vyasana' or 'Ardour', which is equivalent to "mental service defined as "the mental flow unto the Lord" which is the supremum service to the Lord. All the thoughts or mental activities are therein focussed on the highest Self, viz. Kṛṣṇa. This devotion culminating in 'Ardour' for the Lord is referred to in the Bhg as the unconditioned unrestricted devotion which regards co-existence union nearness similarity in form and even oneness with God to be worthless if not accompanied by 'service' to Him.¹ The extreme love resulting in an 'Ardour' for the Lord, makes its possessor realise everything as God Himself—which is called 'Sarvatma bhava' and brings about the fruits of Bhakti like Salokya Samūpya Sārūpya and Sayujya, etc. The fruit termed 'Supra worldly strength (Alaukika samarthya) refers to an entrance into the divine and eternal sport of the Lord. The text 'He enjoys all the desirable pleasures' etc. points to the fruit which a highly blessed soul attains in the eternal sport divine.

¹ 'अहैतुक्यव्यवहितं या भक्तिं पुरुषात्तम ।
 सा वाङ्मयसर्गिणामनीप्यहास्यैकत्वमश्रुत ॥
 दीयमानं न गृह्णन्ति विना मत्सेवनं जनाः ।
 म एव भक्तियोगस्य आत्यन्तिकं उपाहनं ॥'

some in the form of devotees, cows, animals, birds, etc., (with a body divine, suitable for such a formal participation), experience, owing to the manifestation of the bliss-aspect of the Lord in them, the highest type of enjoyment having Lord Kṛṣṇa for its essence. The followers of Māyā-dā get sayujya or union with the Aksara as the highest fruit of Bhakti, while the Puṣṭi-bhakti followers attain supra-worldly powers and enjoy the highest type of bliss in the participation of the sport divine as described above.

The notion of the existence of the self in all or of everything as the self is the result of an un-
Experience of the Self conditioned love for or devotion towards
in all and all in the Self the Lord. This, again, is said to be two-
 fold in the school of V in accordance with the distinctions of Māyā-dā and Puṣṭi. The first type is represented in the ninth skandha of the Bhg., where the kings like Ambarīṣa are spoken of as experiencing this unity of the self in all, while the Gopīs in their state of separation from Lord Kṛṣṇa seeing Him everywhere through love, represent the second type. The second variety falls into the category of Śṅgāra or the love-sentiment, for the attainment of which the devotees having pure Puṣṭi alone are eligible. This notion of unity leads to absolute surrender of one's self at the feet of the Lord.

The Bhg. describes the fruit of Puṣṭi, attainable by the
Fruit of Puṣṭi followers of the Path of Devotion, as accru-
 ing from the theoretical knowledge of the verbal import of the scriptural teachings in the Bhg. (viz. that 'the Lord depends on the devotee')—The other fruit results from a special spiritual knowledge which consists in a personal conviction and realisation (after the attainment of the full knowledge of the sport of the Lord in action). "The Lord submits Himself to the puṣṭi-bhaktas"

The Sport of the Lord in the world with all His inconceivable powers is given as the characteristic of 'Nirodha'. A condition favourable to different sportive activities of the Lord is what 'Anuśāyana' means and not 'sleep'. The sport of the Lord (of the nature of 'Nirodha') varies with respect to devotees of different types, such as the Sāttvika, the Rājasa and the Tamasa, whose attention is intended to be arrested by means of various

types of His Sport, on the lines of worldly sport. The devotees come to forget this world on account of His threefold sport (Sāttvika, Rājasa and Tāmasa) and then an attachment for the Lord arises in them. This attachment for the Lord is also termed 'nirodha', says the author, since it is "turning away from the world on the part of the devotees" in order that they may attain liberation. In the 'Nirodha lakṣana' tract of the Ś O G, it is said that "those who are released (let loose) by the Lord get immersed in the mundane existence, while those who are 'governed' by Him enjoy Bliss day and night". The author further explains that even when one has turned one's mind away from the world (prapancāt rodhe), if one were to ponder over the objects of sense-enjoyment, one would not become eligible for the experience of the Divine Sport—hence, one has to give up earthly attachments for the sake of the 'Attachment Divine' 'Nirodha', therefore, stands for an attachment to the Lord preceded by a forgetting of the world. Finally the author sums up his statements and defines 'nirodha', as 'the Sport of the Lord, based on the world, leading to an attachment for the Lord, being preceded by a forgetting of the world. This sport is His attribute, while 'nirodha' as understood to mean 'an attachment for the Lord following the forgetting or non-remembrance of the world' should be regarded as an attribute of the jiva.

Those jivas in whom God has planted the seed in the form of devotion based on Puṣṭi—through special Favour or grace so as to enable them to obtain the highest fruit—are called the Puṣṭi followers. They are judged to be Sattvika, Rajasa or Tamasa in accordance with the preponderance in them of the quality of Sattva, Rajas or Tamas respectively. The fountain of affection for the Lord springs forth spontaneously in the sattvikas who engage themselves in the service, etc. of God. The Rajas or the mediocre ones and Tamasa or the low ones have the seed of Puṣṭi in them, but, owing to the force of evil tendencies or defects, they cannot dedicate themselves to the service of the Lord with a single minded devotion, which is characteristic of an emotional fervour. Then through the carrying out of service, panegyric listening, etc., their 'seed gets mature or strengthened, their defects arising from the Tamas, Rajas and even Sattva gradually disappear, and finally they

rise beyond the pale of triple qualities. And when the triple qualities are destroyed, one attains Br. The gross body, etc., is put an end to, and the jīva assumes a divine body, suitable for participation in the eternal sports of the Lord and then enjoys the formal participation along with Lord Kṛṣṇa in the sport. This is said to be the highest fruit in the system of V.

The author attempts to correlate the details of Kṛṣṇa's life into a suggestive and sustained metaphor and to throw light thereby on central ideas and concepts of the Śuddhādvaita system. This attempt at presenting an integrated and symbolic picture of the various stories of Kṛṣṇa's activities is unique in itself.

In the latter part of the book, the author keeps on quoting passages from the Bhg., the T D N and the Gīta. The doctrines are not explained independently of the above mentioned works. The style is lucid and the work is more exhaustive in its details than the Śu. M.

4 *Brahma vāda* (by Śrī Dikṣitjee)

(Of this modern work, we treat the first five sections, which comprised the edition as made available to us at the time of our undertaking)

(i) The author, who is a learned scholar and the highest authority on the 'Śuddhādvaita' system of V, undertakes (in this work) to present the doctrine of Pure non dualism, also known as 'Brahma-vāda', as the real and only correct approach to the highest. He also gives a historical background in order to facilitate a clear understanding of the doctrine of V and points out the fallacies in each preceding system which gave rise to further development, culminating in different systems. The Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika stands are explained and finally the statement of Ś that the Paramanu doctrine is absolutely unacceptable to all 'respectable' people is said to be capable of being turned against Ś's own doctrine, since he does not accept Br as the material cause. If Br were not the material cause, scriptural statements like "wherein they merge", etc., "tājalan", etc., would be futile, because the merging or dissolution of an effect into the cause can take place only if the latter is a material cause. The illustration of the pot merging into its material cause, viz. clay, is given to prove the point. (This is

elucidated in Ch III E. of this work) Thus, Br is laid down as "undifferentiated material and efficient cause of the world"—and that is real Brahmavāda, says the author

Then Ś's theory of Māyā is refuted as it assigns unreality to the world "Tadaikṣata Bahu syām", etc., speaks of (pre-creative) reflection on the part of Br. Now, a person with prior reflection or thought cannot get confused himself nor create anything of the nature of illusion. Hence this world, which is a product of previous reflection on the part of its creator, cannot be unreal. It is a manifestation of the Lord and hence it must be real, says the author¹

(ii) The nature of Puruṣottama or the highest is then described as attainable only by devotion, planted in the jīva through His grace. The theory of grace mentions Puṣṭi alone as the means to salvation and the single minded devotion of the jīva (as freely co-operating) based on grace is capable of fascinating the Lord, who becomes dependent as it were (through loving affection) on His devotee

(iii) In this section, the author describes the path of Action as also a means to salvation. The Bhg also speaks of the paths of Action, Knowledge and Devotion as leading to the same goal. The performance of ritual as enjoined in the path of action helps to produce purity of mind which acts as a means to 'desire for knowledge', but it does not directly bring about salvation. But taking into consideration the words of Śrī Kṛṣṇa in the Gītā as also in the Bhg (such as 'the fruit that is obtained through Samkhya is also attainable through Yoga, and one who considers both Samkhya and Yoga as one and the same is the real seer' etc., and "for the good of men have I spoken of three paths," etc.) one comes to realise that both Samkhya and Yoga produce the same fruit viz. salvation. The TDN supports the same view (The kind of salvation meant is the subject of further discussion in the system)

(iv) The author discusses the meanings of 'Saguna' and 'Nirguna' terms in this section. The Upanisad texts referring to Br as Saguna as well as Nirguna give occasion to a desire to determine whether Br really possesses attributes or not. These terms are explained differently by the Kevaladvaitins and by the

¹ Detailed treatment of this section is given in our Ch III E

followers of Śiva and Viṣṇu. The former mean by 'Saguna' the possessor of attributes and by 'Nirguna' the Absolutely unqualified Br (devoid of all attributes). According to the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava systems, 'Saguna' stands for the possessor of unearthy or divine qualities, and 'Nirguna' for one who is devoid of earthly, material qualities. The author quotes the Bhg, the Viṣṇu-Sukta from the R V and certain Upaniṣad statements like "Para-sya sakti", etc, and concludes that the Vaiṣṇava-interpretation of the said terms is based on scriptural authority and it leads to the conception of Br being the possessor of divine qualities and not to the negation of all attributes in Br. The word "Svabhaviki", meaning 'natural' in one of the texts quoted above excludes the doctrine stating that the attributes in connection with Br are mayika or illusory. If these were illusory, the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine would be meaningless, since it would boil down to the fact that Iksana or the quality to think or reflect, can belong to Prakṛti which is manimate. And this is in sharp contrast to the view of the author of the sutras, and it cannot be explained away as metaphorical either because of the express negation in "Gaunascennatmasabdat".

Even the scriptural statements of negative appearance like 'asthulam' etc, do not refer to a total negation of attributes but to the absence of material attributes in Br. Otherwise, statements like 'Etasya va aksarasya prasasane', etc, would be meaningless. The word "prasasana" meaning 'governing' clearly points to the fact, says the author, that the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava interpretation is sound, as it is based on scriptural authority and it refers to Lord Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu as the highest reality.

(v) '*Srikusuma prabha* —a commentary on the Brahmavada' of Śrī Harīraja by Śrī Dikṣitjee

Śrī Harīraja has written a work called 'Brahmavada' which is composed in prose and verse, and it is on these two aspects of his work that Śrī Dikṣitjee has commented in a lucid manner in his *Srikusuma prabha*.

(a) There are eleven verses describing in short the impropriety of the theory of Ś. (1) If the world were non different from Br, how could the world be an object of our perception? If there were non duality between the two, texts like 'Yattadadresyam', "Paranci khami", etc, as also the incarnation of the Lord would

become futile, because being non different from the world, a matter of perception, Br also would become an object of perception for all, and hence there would be no need of incarnation, and if the perception of the world were rejected, it would be tantamount to destruction of all the empirical dealings, which is contrary to experience

If an escape were sought in the direction of postulating a difference between the world and Br, how can the world be a matter of perception to the knowers of Br? The discussions of such knowers with their pupils, etc, are stored in the Upaniṣads, the Bhg and so on, which proves that even those knowers *did* see the world, etc Hence, both the views, of difference and non-difference between the two, are faulty, according to the author and the commentator

Here we may try to explain, from the opponent's theory, the point that the non-difference mentioned should be referred to the fundamental unity or oneness of the self and when such a realisation dawns on a person, even when he does see the world with his gross eyes, etc, and carries out the routine work, he does not in reality see anything as different from Br, as all differences and distinctions are dissolved in the basic unity that prevails for him all throughout As for the knowers like Śukra, Yajña valkya and others who are quoted their discussions and explanations are noted for the good of the following generations and they do not imply at all that they saw the world as different from Br Finally, if such a notion of duality existed there could be no non duality (Advaita) which is the end in view of all Vedanta philosophers and they cannot in that case be called "Brahma vidṣ either" This also brings in the question of jivan mukti Liberation means the destruction of Avidya so when one is said to attain liberation it necessarily presupposes the destruction of the notions of duality and distinctions which are but products of Avidya Hence even if the liberated person continues to exist as Mr X in the world he does not do anything with a selfish motive but for the sake of the good of others This is described in the Gita as *Kurvannapi na lipyate, 'lipyate na sa papena* ' *Kaimani akarma yah pasyet* etc meaning that such a person even when he undertakes any activity, is not sullied or stained by the fruits of his actions since he has an attitude of perfect detachment whereby he remains untouched

as it were—(That is how the opponent would argue his own point of view)

The work continues

(2-3) Br should be understood just as it is expressed by the scriptures. The Śruti clearly speaks of the non-difference between the world and Br. In the case of an ignorant person, the object characterised by "Viśayata" or illusion is perceived and hence it is not regarded as a part of the whole, viz Br. In spite of there being a non-difference between the world and Br, even when the world is an object of our perception, Br is not perceived, unless the extrovert sense organs are turned inwards. Thus, the texts like "Paranci khani" are not contradicted. Although there is no viśayata pertaining to the perception of a pot, etc., its presentation as an inanimate object considered as incapable of the sentient or intelligent aspect, does not illuminate the Sat aspect in the case of the pot as one of the aspects of the Lord, and hence the propriety of the texts like 'Yatta-dadreśyam', etc. In spite of the inherent purity of everything, things are perceived to be otherwise because our perception of them is characterised by Viśayata, a product of ignorance.

(4) This unreal form as perceived by us is but a modification of speech, and is sublated immediately on the acquisition of the knowledge of Br. The objects such as the pots, etc., are not unreal, but their names and forms resulting from speech are called unreal. Witness for instance what the author says in this connection ¹

The Antara-srṣṭi consisting of illusory experiences like the dream world, etc., has Avidyā as its substratum, while the world is real, as it is co-ordinated with Br through the relation of causality. The illusory worlds like the dream exist so far as the knowledge of Br has not dawned on a man. When one attains "Brahma-Jñāna", everything is perceived as Br and hence even what appeared to be false before, becomes Br or is seen as Br. The body, etc., are unreal in so far as they are seen as veiled by Viśayata rooted in Avidya.

The devotees deem even their bodies, etc., as nothing but Br.

¹ 'नानेन घटपट्टादिनामधेयस्य अवास्तवत्वमुपपाद्यते, किन्तु विकारस्य कवलवाचारव्यनम-धरयावा तवत्वमुच्यते, अत्र धाभितस्यैव भ्रान्तत्वमवास्तवत्व च निद्वयति ।'

and their actions resemble the sportive activities of Lord Kṛṣṇa

(b) *Gāḍyāmāya Brahma vāda*

The Brahmavāda is said to give rise to the knowledge of the Lord's greatness and is but a manifestation of the Lord in this form, representing the quintessence of all scriptures. The world forms a stage for the divine sport as also a partial manifestation of the Lord. The text "Neha nānā stī", etc., meaning 'there is nothing here different from (Him)' bars off the possibility of duality. Br is one, without a second, and since it is immanent in all and since the world exhibits a graded manifestation of His triple aspect as existence, intelligence and bliss there is no scope for duality. The objects are not unreal, but our defective perception rooted in illusion (Viṣayata) is responsible for such an appearance (of difference from the Lord). The wise or the knowers of Br do not suffer from such a faulty perception, but the extrovert people take the objects to be unreal, while in reality their cognition of the objects is stained by Viṣayata which produces illusion, whereas the objects remain as they essentially are (as real manifestations and parts of the Lord).

The śruti-texts speaking of the world as worthy of being abandoned (heya) are meant to put an end to passion or attachment on the part of the jīva for its own self (as independent owner or centre of it). The argument that the world being but a form of God should be proposed as the object of attainment which one should strive after does not hold water, because the mention of meditation, etc., is for the sake of producing knowledge, but when one comes to realise the true nature of the world as a part of God those injunctions are no more applicable to him.

The author explains different aspects of the Śuddhadvaita system in a question answer form the main points of which are summarised below.

The arguments challenging the propriety of worship (bhajana) are refuted giving a clear exposition of the doctrine of devotion and its importance. The jīvas are required to offer devotion for the removal of ignorance and for the achievement of their original nature. The 'bhajana' is necessary because the Lord who created the jīvas for sport implying their separation from Him

as parts—wishes them to enjoy union with Him through 'bhajana'. If it were argued that in Pusti-marga, which does not admit of any means apart from the Lord's grace itself, if there is room for 'bhajana' as means, the very concept of Pusti is open to criticism—to this the author replies by explaining what 'The Path of Grace' is. The path of grace is that wherein the fruit itself acts as means, and hence, there is no impropriety.

If one were to argue that the jivas being parts of the Lord cannot be inferior (nyuna), and hence no use of 'bhajana', the answer is that the Lord wished to create for the sake of Sport and the jivas are characterised by inferiority in rank and power to the Lord. They remain so (i.e. nyuna to God) even in the state of liberation, and their manifestation depends on the Wish of the Lord, but this wish does not change their nature of being inferior, since they are always willed by the Lord as partial manifestation. Even when innumerable jivas emerge from Br as the sparks do from fire, there does not arise any 'nyunatva' on the part of Br as the śruti text describes—'Purnamadah', etc. The division into divine and devilish souls is due to His desire to sport. The high and low world produces variety which is necessary for sport. This variety is brought about through the graded manifestation of His triple aspects in the world, the soul and the inner controller. The Sport is eternal and hence the bondage and salvation, being but forms of the sport (since these are included in it), are eternal and so is the division of souls into divine and devilish. The bondage in the lot of the devils is eternal, since they are enveloped in a mass of confusing and infatuating power of the Lord called Mayā arising because of their emergence resulting in separation from the Lord. The salvation in their case is said to be as impossible as the recovery of wealth gone into the hands of thieves. The Lord only produces Āsuras, everything else (ending with the impossibility to gain unity with God) is consequential to infatuation produced by Māyā. If it were argued that in the state of dissolution when all jivas merge into the Lord, even these devilish souls would merge into God and enjoy bliss, the author replies that it is *not so*, because even when the Prakṛti gets dissolved as it were in Br at the time of dissolution and thereby shares the bliss-aspect, the devilish souls cannot obtain this bliss, because of their being screened off by Maya. Again, if dissolution were to

bring about the attainment of bliss, there would be no difference between Pralaya and Mukti, and then no sensible person would strive for liberation if it meant the dissolution of one's own self¹ Therefore Mukti is different from Pralaya and it is of the nature of the experience of bliss of the self, while Pralaya means a state wherein the jivas creep like reptiles as it were and get their afflictions of many births removed Bliss can be obtained only through worship of the Lord^{1*}

¹ This point is explained differently in other works of the school (E.g. P. R.)—with a possibility for *all* of attaining bliss in Pralaya

* Thus far the work as available to us

CHAPTER VII

FINAL EVALUATION

In the preceding chapters the doctrines of the Śuddhādvaita school have been set out in detail as embodied in the works of V. and his followers. The acceptance of the reality of the phenomenal world on the part of all post-Śankara schools of thought acts as a line of demarcation between these schools on the one hand, and the Kevalādvaita system on the other, since the latter assigns unreality to the world. Like Rāmā and Madhva, V. also upholds that the world is real, being but a 'partial' manifestation of the Lord. This distinct realistic trend as also the concepts of Āvirbhāva, Tirobhava, Puṣṭi, etc. and the implications thereof lend a characteristic hue to the system of V.

The later four schools of Vedānta view a common opponent in Ś., since he denies the reality of the world, while attempting to postulate ultimate and absolute Reality of the one and only Principle viz. Br. The Upaniṣads, the B.S. and the Gītā represent the triple canon of authority that all these schools are at one in basing their doctrines upon, but the fact that each of these schools is entirely distinct in itself reveals that the acceptance and the interpretation of the fundamental śruti texts are different in each case. For instance, Rāmā attaches a good deal of importance to the Viṣṇu-purāna in the interpretation of the B.S., while V. declares the Bhg. to be an independent, ultimate source of authority, which, for him, is not only an additional authoritative canon, but also enjoys supreme importance as the 'final say' in matters of doubts pertaining to the generally accepted triple canon. It is no wonder, therefore, that the acceptance of such an extraneous loyalty obliges him at times to force the śruti texts to yield a meaning that he has already deduced from the tenets of the Bhg.

Again, an attempt at a systematisation of the conflicting or contradictory Upaniṣad texts (which, on the other hand, are

traditionally accepted to propound Truth) is based on a rationalistic spirit. Hence the diverse nature of the scriptural texts as well as the background of the acceptance or influence of an additional source of authority go to make the task of interpretation of the B S very subjective and even dogmatic at times. Thus, it is difficult to assert which one of the commentators escapes more or less unscratched or untouched by such brambles in the form of extraneous influences. Therefore, it is not so absolutely important (though it has its valuable uses) to find out which one of the commentators is more faithful to the original meaning of the B S, because the B S themselves are evolved out of the Up texts and the latter, being of a contradictory nature, are liable to be interpreted diversely. So, keeping this point in mind, one has to acknowledge the merits of a system as such in accordance with the degree of the test of consistency that it can stand,—besides the test of rationality in the fundamental postulates, especially those peculiar to it.

It is for reasons such as internal consistency and the height of logical acumen as also for the profundity of thought that Ś's system has such a wide range of followers. As against Ramā and V, Ś is entirely free from sectarian entanglements. In so far as V is concerned, the word of the Bhg is final, and therefore, it is but natural that often Śuddhadvaita doctrines are only extended applications of the Bhg teachings, and they represent more of theology than of philosophy. Yet, it would be far better for the founder of the Śuddhādvaita system to accept this fact than to read into the B S and even into the Ups his own doctrines, which are an outcome of the Bhg tenets. This involves a chronological reversal of order which would hardly be acceptable to a scholarly mind. Witness for instance, the building of the whole superstructure of the 'Rasā-līlā' on the strength of the Bhg. descriptions, and its being referred back to the T Up text 'Raso vai sah', which simply means that Br is of the nature of Bliss. The interpretation of practically the whole of the fourth adhyaya of the B S as given by V is devoted to the explanation of the Puṣṭi and Maryada paths, the fruits thereof and so on, but these concepts as such are conspicuous by their absence in the Upanisadic literature and the B S.

V's system is based more radically than other systems on the authority of 'sabda', and he repeatedly declares that dry logic or mere reasoning has no place in his system if it is in conflict with 'sabda', since it can only lead to 'Abrahma vidya' ¹ Prof G H Bhatt maintains that this attitude of V is responsible for the strong and scathing criticism that he directs against Ś. Although it is quite true that the highest Experience (anubhuti) or the realisation of the Supreme Self cannot just be had through syllogistic reasoning and ratiocination, unformed by the flash of inner vision in the form of self realisation, yet, different scriptural statements do require to be reasonably analysed in order that their implicit truth, pertaining to the experience of the mystics becomes explicit, understandable and acceptable. Again, the modern scientific and rationalistic approach to the subject necessitates the separating of the grain from the chaff—and hence, the mind would naturally be unprepared to accept all the scriptural accounts as 'revelation' in the sense in which the latter is generally understood. Thus, a process of 'gleaning or selection is inevitably required with respect to various accounts occurring in the scriptures. The realisation of this necessity, rooted in a spirit of critical and rational analysis, seems to have been responsible for the rise of different philosophical systems.

Now, the question arises of the selection of scriptural texts for the formulation of one's fundamental stand. Ś deems the texts that present Br as possessing attributes, etc to be secondary in importance, since, for him, the Supreme Br is devoid of all such characteristics. Thus, the Saguna-texts, we are told, act as mere stepping stones to the realisation of the highest. The description of Br as the all-governing, the creator, etc as given in the śruti refers only to the lower Br, known as the Īsvara, says S. Thus, the acceptance of the existence of the one and only Principle, viz Br, and its absolute unrelatedness and independence, has led him to deny the reality of the world, an object of perception, as also of the scriptures and even of Īsvara,—since these fall within the range of duality. An outcome

¹ 'तरमात्र प्रमाणमेवानुमर्तव्यम् । न युक्ति । युक्तिगम्या (ब्रह्मविद्यैव) ।'

—Anu I-2-32

* The Cultural Heritage of India III p 350

of Nescience —But this is sheer blasphemy, according to V who accepts the word of the śruti as the final authority and as such, both the saguna and the nirguna—texts *must* be accepted and somehow accommodated within the frame work of his doctrine. As a result, he postulates that Br is both Saguna and Nirguna (though in a special sense) since the śruti so declares —and if that involves contradiction in terms, on the human level of logic, be it so, for, Br is ‘an abode of contradictory attributes’

This attitude to cling to the word of the śruti has thus led V to formulate principles, which completely put reasoning out of court and hence they hardly remain acceptable. Nor does he leave any scope for the application of reason to his conceptions and theories because he propounds that “the very nature of Br is such, being the possessor of contradictory attributes, and hence, one need not suspect any incongruity.” Again for him, Br can become *anything* and hence there is no ‘virodha’ or conflict that can arise in His case.

It is clear from the above that inspite of the declaration that V makes to the effect that reasoning should be accepted when not opposed to the śruti text, the fact remains that in practice, V has hardly accorded it its due scope.

But none can be entirely free from the influence of the compelling force of Reason —thus V is often at pains to explain and interpret the B S and even the śruti texts on the basis of reason —but it is only too often that he feels compelled by his own extremely literal interpretation of śruti to sacrifice reason to the final and “vetoing power of the scriptural testimony as understood by him. Moreover, the concept of the Divine Wish seems often to act as a panacea for all maladies born of reason.

¹ ‘ननु तथापि काचिद्देदानुमारिणी युक्तिवन्तव्या शास्त्रसाफल्ययति चत् । उच्यते ।
विरोध एव नाराङ्गनीयो वस्तुस्वभावात् ।’ —Anu I-2 32.

² (i) ‘न हि विरुद्धधर्माश्रयव भगवद्भयनिरिक्तं भवति । नवभवनसुानथ्यामावात् ।’

—Anu I-2 24

(ii) ‘भगवति सर्वे विरुद्धधमा दृश्यन्ते । न हि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम । व्याधानात् ।’

—Anu III 2 21

(iii) ‘अवाचीनविकल्पविचारकुतकप्रमाणाभासशारत्रकलिनान्त करणदुस्वग्रद्वादिना
वदानवन्तरे सर्वभवनसमर्थे ब्रह्मणि विराधाम्बान्त्व ।’

—Anu II 1 27

V, says that he has undertaken the work of faithfully explaining the scriptural texts as commanded by the Lord, since these were misinterpreted by S¹

An analysis of the different fundamentals that Ś and V have accepted shows that their selection of certain śruti texts as primary or otherwise has paved the way to various points of doctrinal differences in their case. Some scholars are inclined to opine that S does not do full justice to the stand of common agreement amongst all commentators that the śruti word is the highest authority, since he relegates certain texts to a subordinate position in favour of some other texts, which he holds to be of a greater significance. Thus, he is not justified in doing so, while V accepts all the śrutis and declares them to be authoritative and hence proves himself to be a better follower of the śruti—as much—as Ś. As against this, one may point out that it is far better to be ‘selective’ and clear about the acceptance of one’s fundamentals and then present a system consistent in itself and based on reason—rather than “swallow” anything and everything without any discrimination while laying the foundation for one’s system of thought and then stumble at every step that follows.

Dr Radhakrishnan says “The greatness of S’s achievement rests on the peculiar intensity and splendour of thought with which the search for reality is conducted, on the high idealism of spirit grappling with the difficult problems of life, regardless of theological consequences, and on the vision of a consummation which places a divine glory on human life’

Again, even when V accepts both types of śruti texts (viz the Saguna and the Nirguna), he also has to distinguish between the higher (the Saguna, for him) and the lower Br (Akṣara) in the ultimate analysis that he offers. With Ś, the position is just the reverse, in the sense that the Nirguṇa Br represents the highest principle, while the Saguna is the lower one—although, ultimately, according to him, there is no distinction, no duality, since Br alone is. Thus, if discrimination regarding the selection of texts, etc were considered to be a drawback in the case of Ś, there is hardly anything to safeguard V’s position

¹ Subodhini I 11, Anu II. 2.26

² I P p 658

from its being challenged on the same grounds, because the śruti does not lay down that Saguṇa Br should be regarded as the higher Br and Akṣara the lower. Therefore, from this point of view of 'selection', etc. there is hardly anything to choose between the two, viz Ś and V.

Hence, it is on the basis of internal consistency and logical tenability that the worth of a system of thought has to be properly assessed.

In the preceding chapters, we have already detailed out the procedural points of importance with respect to the interpretation of many a crucial sūtra. Here we intend to briefly note some of them in order to present sufficient evidence for drawing a conclusion regarding the correctness or otherwise of the interpretations offered by the two commentators, viz Ś and V. Ś has been paid so much attention to here because he happens to be the "pradhana-malla" (the chief antagonist) of V, who is the proper subject matter of our work.

In sūtra III 2 14, viz 'Arupavidevahi tatpradhānatvāt', the Sūtrakīra states that Br has been stated in the scriptures to be formless alone, because that aspect of Br (as Formless) is the chief one. Ś explains that the texts like Br Up 3 8 8, Kṛtha Up 3 15, Ch Up 8 14 1, Mu Up 2 1 2, Bṛ Up, 2 5 19 and so on have the Nirguṇa Br as the chief object of description and a harmonisation of all these texts reveals that Br has to be known as devoid of form (rūpa) etc. Other texts that have the determinate or qualified aspect of Br in view do not have the highest Br as the chief object of consideration, and such texts are only for the sake of facilitating meditation.

V explains under this sūtra (III 2 14) that "what can be formulated, narrated and can become an object of practical dealings" is what is meant by 'rupa', viz that which can become an object of all practical dealings, and the 'world' possesses these characteristics. Br is distinct from the world, which is only a 'part' of the former. If it were argued, says V, that as cause and effect, there should also prevail non-difference between Br and the world, the answer is furnished in "tatpradhānatvāt", meaning that Br is the chief object of narration, and hence the attributes of Br should be regarded as principal. For example, Br's being the sovereign ruler is deemed to be the principal attribute as compared to 'Sarva karma', which, being only a

glorificatory attribute based on the analogy of worldly activity, is secondary in importance. This attribute, viz Br's "being not like the world" is not a principal attribute of Br, and hence, explains V, the Sūtrakara has stated it as 'arupavat' instead of 'arupam'. "Therefore, the attributes of the effect (world), like the effect itself (karyavat), belong to the Lord (being attributes of the effect that springs from the Lord), but these (karya-attributes) do not thereby become His attributes."

This interpretation of the above sūtra is singularly outstanding in itself and the dissolution of the compound 'arupavat' as V. makes it here is simply inconceivable under normal circumstances. It presents an instance of the extent to which a commentator can twist the sūtras in order to make them fit into his own theory. On the other hand, the straight-forward reading of the sūtra emphasises the point that Br is only formless, since the śruti texts chiefly present Br to be so. The determinative particle 'eva' after the employment of the word 'Arūpavat' lays stress on that aspect only. This straight forward statement as embodied in this sūtra can also be argued to lay bare the intention of the Sūtrakara, viz, that the Nirguna Br is the highest, though it must be confessed that "arūpavat" is not exactly the synonym of "nirguna" and that other scholars are of different opinion, as pointed out elsewhere. Yet it is generally agreed that V's interpretation is unacceptable.

The sūtra (III 2 3), viz 'Mayamātram tu Kārtsnyenānabhi-
vyakta svarūpatvat' is explained by Ś to speak of the unreality of the dream-world, since the latter does not fully manifest the attributes of an existential entity ('न हि कार्त्स्येन परमार्थवस्तुधर्मणा-
भिव्यक्तस्वरूप स्वप्न ।') V also states that the dream world is just 'Mayā', since it does not manifest the real nature of an entity in its entirety in relation to time, place and matter. For Rāmā, this 'Māyā' is something miraculous, since it cannot be experienced by all, and the dream-world, which can be perceived only by a particular person who is dreaming, lasts only for a particular duration of time, and is therefore something 'wonderful'. The nature of the jiva is not completely manifested in the state of 'samsāra', and hence the jiva does not possess such powers as to be able to create the dream-world. Hence, says Rāmā, the dream world creation is "something miraculous."

In the system of V. this 'Māyā' is explained as a special power of the Lord, whereby the jīva gets confused ¹

V also tries to clarify that the scriptures do not assert the 'reality' of the dream-world creation, as they do in the case of the world. Therefore, the creation of the dream-world is just 'Māyā' and not real.

Reading between the lines, one can see how V is consciously struggling, to preserve the 'reality' of the world even when the subject under consideration is the character of the dream world. Ś straightaway explains that the dream world is unreal, being nothing but Māyā, since therein the nature of the dream-objects is not fully manifest,—and he gives a detailed analysis of the 'how' of it—in the explanation of the sūtra. He does not refer to the reality or otherwise of the world as such at least during the course of the treatment of this sūtra.

Actually, except for the slight note of difference as pointed out above, the explanations offered both by Ś and V are the same, viz "the dream-world is only 'Maya', since its nature is not completely manifest", but the term 'Maya' has to be understood as 'mere illusion, unreality' and 'a special power of the Lord' (which causes delusion) in their cases in respective order. and that does constitute a vital difference, indeed.

Although the word 'Maya' occurs here (in this sūtra) for the very first and only time in the whole B S, yet, the wording of this sūtra is pretty clear in giving a name, as it were, to the concept of Mayā or Unreality of the world, which is implicitly contained throughout the B S (Cf Ch II). Again, it should not be forgotten that the absence of the word in the rest of the B S does not imply the absence of the doctrine itself.

Another sūtra of special significance is II 3 42 kṛtaprayatna pekṣastu vihitapratīśiddhavaivarthyaḍibhyaḥ, which is explained by Ś to mean 'The Īśvara takes into consideration the effort (of the jīva) of the nature of 'dharma' and adharmā (in order to make the jīva undertake an activity)—(or else) there would

¹ 'मिथ्याते तु सामर्थ्यविशेषो माया । अष्टमस्कन्धे 'नटवन्मूढ मायाभि' अत्र ईश्वरस्य या व्यामोहिका शक्तिः, सा माया प्रकृते हेया । तथा चन्द्रजालिकेन नटेन यथा सामानिक-व्यामोहेन कौतुकार्थं मायामात्रसृष्टिं क्रियते, तथेश्वरेण जीवव्यामाहनादर्थं स्वप्नसृष्टिं क्रियते इति न तस्या सत्यत्वम्' Purusottama's 'Bhaṣya prakāṣa' on Anu